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ERNESTO 'CHE' GUEVARA
Argentine Marxist revolutionary
At two years old Che Guevara developed asthma from which he suffered all his life, and his family moved to the drier climate of Alta Gracia (Cordoba) where his health did not improve. Primary education at home, mostly by his mother, Celia de la Serna. He became a voracious reader of Marx, Engels and Freud which were all available in his father's library, it is probable that he had read some of their works before he went to secondary school (1941), the Colegio Nacional Dean Funes, Cordoba, where he excelled only in literature and sports.
At home he was impressed by the Spanish Civil War refugees and by the long series of squalid political crises in Argentina which culminated in the 'Left Fascist' dictatorship of Juan Peron, to whom the Guevara de la Sernaswere opposed. These events and influences gave the young Guevara a contempt for the pantomime of parliamentary democracy, and a hatred of military politicians and the army, the capitalist oligarchy, and above all the U.S. dollar and imperialism. Although his parents, notably his mother, were anti-Peronist activists, he took no part in revolutionary student movements and showed little interest in politics at Buenos Aires University (1947)where he studied medicine, first with a view to understanding his own disease, later becoming more interested in leprosy. In 1949 he made the first of his long journeys, exploring northern Argentina on a bicycle, and for the first time coming into contact with the very poor and the remnants of the Indian tribes. In 1951, after taking his penultimate exams, he made a much longer journey, accompanied by a friend, and earning his living by casual labor as he went: he visited southern Argentina, Chile, where he met Salvador Allende, Peru, where he worked for some weeks in the San Pablo leprosarium, Colombia at the time of La Violencia, and where he was arrested but soon released, Venezuela, and Miami. He returned home for his finals sure of only one thing, that he did not want to become a middle-class general practitioner. He qualified, specializing in dermatology, and went to La Paz, Bolivia, during the National Revolution which he condemned as opportunist. From there he went to Guatemala, earning his living by writing travel-cum-archaeological articles about Inca and Maya ruins. He reached Guatemala during the socialist Arbenz presidency; although he was by now a Marxist, well read in Lenin, he refused to join the Communist Party, though this meant losing the chance of government medical appointment, and he was penniless and in rags. He lived with Hilda Gadea, a Marxist of Indian stock who forwarded
his political education, looked after him, and introduced him to Nico Lopez, one
of Fidel Castro's lieutenants. In Guatemala he saw the CIA at work as the
principal agents of counterrevolution and was confirmed in his view that
Revolution could be made only be armed insurrection. When Arbenz fell, Guevara
went to Mexico City (September 1954) where he worked in the General Hospital.
Hilda Gadea and Nico Lopez joined him, and he met and was charmed by Raul and
Fidel Castro, then political émigrés, and realized that in Fidel he had found
the leader he was seeking. The war games at the farm attracted police attention, all the Cubans and Che were arrested, but released a month later (June 1956). When they invaded Cuba, Che went with them, first as doctor, soon as a Commandante of the revolutionary army of barbutos. He was the most aggressive, clever and successful of the guerrilla officers, and the most earnest in giving his men a Leninist education. At the triumph of the Revolution Guevara became second only to Fidel Castro in the new government of Cuba, and the man chiefly responsible for moving Castro towards communism, but a communism which was independent of the orthodox, Moscow-style communism of some of their colleagues. Che organized and directed the Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria to administer the new agrarian laws expropriating the large land holders; ran its Department of Industries; and was appointed President of the National Bank of Cuba.
Also at this time, he glorified his own kind of communist philosophy. ( published later in the Socialism and Man in Cuba, March 12, 1965). It can be summed up in him ' Man really attains the state of complete humanity when he produces, without being forced by physical need to sell himself as a commodity.' He was moving away from "Moscow", towards Mao, and beyond into what is essentially the old idealistic, Anarchism. His formal breach with the Soviet Communist Party came when, addressing the Organization for Afro-Asian Solidarity at Algiers (February 1965) he charged the USSR with being a 'tacit accomplice of imperialism' by not trading exclusively with the Communist bloc and by not giving underdeveloped socialist countries aid without any thought of return.
He also attacked the Soviet government for its policy of coexistence; and for revisionism. He initiated the Tricontinental Conference to realize a program of revolutionary, insurrectionary, guerrilla cooperation in Africa, Asia and South America. On the other hand, after a halfhearted attempt to come to some kind of terms with the USA, he was also attacking the North Americas, at the UN as Cuba's representative there, for their greedy and merciless imperialist activity in Latin America.
On October 9th, 1967, Ernesto "Che" Guevara was put to death by
Bolivian soldiers, trained, equipped and guided by U.S. Green Beret and CIA
operatives. His execution remains a historic and controversial event; and thirty
years later, the circumstances of his guerrilla foray into Bolivia, his capture,
killing, and burial are still the subject of intense
OCTOBER 3, 1965: In a public speech, Fidel Castro reads a "Farewell" letter written by Che in April, in which Che resigns from all of his official positions within the Cuban government. The letter, which Che apparently never intended to be made public, states that "I have fulfilled the part of my duty that tied me to the Cuban revolution...and I say goodbye to you, to the comrades, to your people, who are now mine." (CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "Castro and Communism: The Cuban Revolution in Perspective," 5/9/66) OCTOBER 18, 1965: A CIA Intelligence Memorandum discusses what analysts perceive as Che Guevara's fall from power within the Cuban government beginning in 1964. It states that at the end of 1963, Guevara's plan of "rapid industrialization and centralization during the first years of the Revolution brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power." "Guevara's outlook, which approximated present -day Chinese--rather than Soviet--economic practice, was behind the controversy." In July 1964, "two important cabinet appointments signaled the power struggle over internal economic policy which culminated in Guevara's elimination." Another conflict was that Guevara wanted to export the Cuban Revolution to different parts of Latin America and Africa, while "other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal problems of the Revolution." In December, 1964, Guevara departed on a three-month trip to the United States, Africa, and China. When he returned, according to the CIA report, his economic and foreign policies were in disfavor and he left to start revolutionary struggles in other parts of the world. (CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of the Cuban Revolution," 10/18/65) FALL, 1966: Che Guevara arrives in Bolivia sometime between the second week of September and the first of November of 1966, according to different sources. He enters the country with forged Uruguayan passports to organize and lead a communist guerrilla movement. Che chooses Bolivia as the revolutionary base for various reasons. First, Bolivia is of lower priority than Caribbean Basin countries to US security interests and poses a less immediate threat, "... the Yanquis wouldn't concern themselves... ." Second, Bolivia's social conditions and poverty are such that Bolivia is considered susceptible to revolutionary ideology. Finally, Bolivia shares a border with five other countries, which would allow the revolution to spread easily if the guerrillas are successful. (Harris, 60, 73; Rojo 193-194; Rodrfguez:1, 157;Rodrfguez:1, 198) SPRING, 1967: From March to August of 1967, Che Guevara and his guerrilla band strike "pretty much at will" against the Bolivian Armed Forces, which totals about twenty thousand men. The guerrillas lose only one man compared to 30 of the Bolivians during these six months. (James, 250, NYT 9/16/67) APRIL 28, 1967: General Ovando, of the Bolivian Armed Forces, and the U.S. Army Section signed a Memorandum of Understanding with regard to the 2nd Ranger Battalion of the Bolivian Army "which clearly defines the terms of U.S.-Bolivian Armed Forces cooperation in the activation, organization, and training of this unit." MAY 11, 1967: Walt Rostow, presidential advisor to Lyndon B. Johnson, sends a message to the President saying that he received the first credible report that "Che" Guevara is alive and operating in South America, although more evidence is needed. (Rostow 05/11/67) JUNE, 1967: Cuban-American CIA agent Felix Rodriguez receives a phone call from a CIA officer, Larry S., who proposes a special assignment for him in South America in which he will use his skills in unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla operations and communications. The assignment is to assist the Bolivians in tracking down and capturing Che Guevara and his band. His partner will be "Eduardo Gonzalez" and Rodriguez is to use the cover name "Felix Ramos Medina." (Rodriguez:1, 148) JUNE 26-30, 1967: Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin visits Cuba for discussions with Fidel Castro. According to a CIA intelligence cable, the primary purpose of his "trip to Havana June 26-30, 1967 was to inform Castro concerning the Middle East Crisis...A secondary but important reason for the trip was to discuss with Castro the subject of Cuban revolutionary activity in Latin America." The Soviet Premier criticizes the dispatch of Che Guevara to Bolivia and accuses Castro of "harming the communist cause through his sponsorship of guerrilla activity...and through providing support to various anti-government groups, which although they claimed to be "socialist" or communist, were engaged in disputes with the "legitimate" Latin American communist parties, those favored by the USSR." In reply Castro stated that Cuba will support the "right of every Latin American to contribute to the liberation of his country." (CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 10/17/67) AUGUST 2, 1967: Rodriguez and Gonzalez arrive in La Paz, Bolivia. They are met by their case officer, Jim, another CIA agent, and a Bolivian immigration officer. The CIA station in La Paz is run by John Tilton; eventually the CIA's Guevara task force is joined by another anti-Castro Cuban-American agent, Gustavo Villoldo. (Rodriguez:1, 162) AUGUST 31, 1967: The Bolivian army scores its first victory against the guerrillas, wiping out one-third of Che's men. Jost Castillo Chavez, also known as Paco, is captured and the guerrillas are forced to retreat. Che's health begins to deteriorate. (James, 250, 269) SEPTEMBER 3, 1967: Felix Rodriguez flies with Major Arnaldo Saucedo from Santa Cruz to Vallegrande to interrogate Paco. (Rodriguez:1, 167) SEPTEMBER 15, 1967: The Bolivian Government air-drops leaflets offering a $4,200 reward for the capture of Che Guevara. (NYT 9/16/67) SEPTEMBER 18, 1967: Fifteen members of a Communist group, who were providing supplies to the guerrillas in the southeastern jungles of Bolivia, are arrested. (NYT 9/19/67) SEPTEMBER 22, 1967: Che's guerrillas arrive at Alto Seco village in Bolivia. Inti Peredo, a Bolivian guerrilla, gives the villagers a lecture on the objectives of the guerrilla movement. The group leaves later that night after purchasing a large amount of food. (Harris, 123) According to Jon Lee Anderson's account, Che takes the food from a grocery store without paying for it after discovering that the local authorities in Alto Seco have left to inform the army about the guerrilla's position. (Anderson, 785) SEPTEMBER 22, 1967: Guevara Arze, the Bolivian Foreign Minister, provides evidence to the Organization of American States to prove that Che Guevara is indeed leading the guerrilla operations in Bolivia. Excerpts taken from captured documents, including comparisons of handwriting, fingerprints and photographs, suggests that the guerrillas are comprised of Cubans, Peruvians, Argentineans and Bolivians. The foreign minister's presentation draws a loud applause from the Bolivian audience, and he gives his assurance that "we are not going to let anybody steal our country away from us. Nobody, at any time." (NYT 9/23/67) SEPTEMBER 24, 1967: Che and his men arrive, exhausted and sick, at Loma Larga, a ranch close to Alto Seco. All but one of the peasants flee upon their arrival. (Harris, 123) SEPTEMBER 26, 1967: The guerrillas move to the village of La Higuera and immediately notice that all the men are gone. The villagers have previously been warned that the guerrillas are in the area and they should send any information on them to Vallegrande. The remaining villagers tell the guerrillas that most of the people are at a celebration in a neighboring town called Jahue. (Harris, 123) 1 p.m.: As they are about to depart for Jahue, the rebels hear shots coming from the road and are forced to stay in the village and defend themselves. Three guerrillas are killed in the gun battle: Roberto (Coco) Peredo, a Bolivian guerrilla leader who was one of Che's most important men; "Antonio," believed to be Cuban; and "Julio," likely a Bolivian. Che orders his men to evacuate the village along a road leading to Rio Grande. The army high command and the Barriento's government consider this encounter a significant victory. Indeed, Che notes in his diary that La Higuera has caused great losses for him in respect to his rebel cell. (Harris 123,124; NYT 9/28/67)) CIA agent, Felix Rodriguez, under the alias, "Captain Ramos," urges Colonel Zenteno to move his Rangers battalion from La Esperanza headquarters to Vallegrande. The death of Antonio, the vanguard commander [also called Miguel by Rodriguez], prompts Rodriguez to conclude that Che must be close by. Colonel Zenteno argues that the battalion has not yet finished their training, but he will move them as soon as this training is complete. Convinced that he knows Che's next move, Rodriguez continues pressuring Zenteno to order the 2nd Ranger battalion into combat. (Rodriguez:1, 184) SEPTEMBER 26-27, 1967: After the battle of La Higueras, the Ranger Battalion sets up a screening force along the river San Antonio to prevent exfiltration of the guerrilla force. During the mission, the troops captures a guerrilla known as "Gamba." He appears to be in poor health and is poorly clothed. This produces an immediate morale effect on the troops because they notice that the guerrillas are not as strong as they thought. "Gamba" says that he had separated from the group and was traveling in hope of contacting "Ram=n" (Guevara). (Dept. of Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67). SEPTEMBER 29, 1967: Colonel Zenteno is finally persuaded by Rodriguez, and he moves the 2nd Ranger battalion to Vallegrande. Rodriguez joins these six hundred and fifty men who have been trained by U.S. Special Forces Major "Pappy" Shelton. (Rodriguez:1, 184) SEPTEMBER 30, 1967: Che and his group are trapped by the army in a jungle canyon in Valle Serrano, south of the Grande River. (NYT 10/1/67) OCTOBER 7, 1967: The last entry in Che's diary is recorded exactly eleven months since the inauguration of the guerrilla movement. The guerrillas run into an old woman herding goats. They ask her if there are soldiers in the area but are unable to get any reliable information. Scared that she will report them, they pay her 50 pesos to keep quiet. In Che's diary it is noted that he has "little hope" that she will do so. (Harris, 126; CIA Weekly Review, "The Che Guevara Diary," 12/15/67) Evening: Che and his men stop to rest in a ravine in Quebrada del Yuro. (Harris, 126) OCTOBER 8, 1967: The troops receive information that there is a band of 17 guerrillas in the Churro Ravine. They enter the area and encounters a group of 6 to 8 guerrillas, opens fire, and killed two Cubans, "Antonio" and "Orturo." "Ramon" (Guevara) and "Willy" try to break out in the direction of the mortar section, where Guevara is wounded in the lower calf. (Dept. of Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67) OCTOBER 8, 1967: A peasant women alerts the army that she heard voices along the banks of the Yuro close to the spot where it runs along the San Antonio river. It is unknown whether it is the same peasant woman that the guerrillas ran into previously. (Rojo 218) By morning, several companies of Bolivian Rangers are deployed through the area that Guevara's Guerrillas are in. They take up positions in the same ravine as the guerrillas in Quebrada del Yuro. (Harris,126) About 12 p.m.: A unit from General Prado's company, all recent graduates of the U.S. Army Special Forces training camp, confronts the guerrillas, killing two soldiers and wounding many others. (Harris, 127) 1:30 p.m.: Che's final battle commences in Quebrada del Yuro. Simon Cuba (Willy) Sarabia, a Bolivian miner, leads the rebel group. Che is behind him and is shot in the leg several times. Sarabia picks up Che and tries to carry him away from the line of fire. The firing starts again and Che's beret is knocked off. Sarabia sits Che on the ground so he can return the fire. Encircled at less than ten yards distance, the Rangers concentrate their fire on him, riddling him with bullets. Che attempts to keep firing, but cannot keep his gun up with only one arm. He is hit again on his right leg, his gun is knocked out of his hand and his right forearm is pierced. As soldiers approach Che he shouts, "Do not shoot! I am Che Guevara and worth more to you alive than dead." The battle ends at approximately 3:30 p.m. Che is taken prisoner. (Rojo, 219; James, 14)
Che captured with Rodriguez Other sources claim that Sarabia is captured alive and at about 4 p.m. he and Che are brought before Captain Prado. Captain Prado orders his radio operator to signal the divisional headquarters in Vallegrande informing them that Che is captured. The coded message sent is "Hello Saturno, we have Papa!" Saturno is the code for Colonel Joaquin Zenteno, commandant of the Eighth Bolivian Army Division, and Papa is code for Che. In disbelief, Colonel Zenteno asks Capt. Prado to confirm the message. With confirmation, "general euphoria" erupts among the divisional headquarters staff. Colonel Zenteno radios Capt. Prado and tells him to immediately transfer Che and any other prisoners to La Higuera. (Harris, 127) In Vallegrande, Felix Rodriguez receives the message over the radio: "Papa cansado," which means "Dad is tired." Papa is the code for foreigner, implying Che. Tired signifies captured or wounded. (Rodriguez:1, 185) Stretched out on a blanket, Che is carried by four soldiers to La Higuera, seven kilometers away. Sarabia is forced to walk behind with his hands tied against his back. Just after dark the group arrives in La Higuera and both Che and Sarabia are put into the school's one-room schoolhouse. Later that night, five more guerrillas are brought in. (Harris, 127) Official army dispatches falsely report that Che is killed in the clash in southeastern Bolivia, and other official reports confirm the killing of Che and state that the Bolivian army has his body. However, the army high command does not confirm this report. (NYT 10/10/67) OCTOBER 9, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a memorandum to the President with tentative information that the Bolivians have captured Che Guevara. The Bolivian unit engaged in the operation was the one that had been trained by the U.S. (Rostow 10/9/67) OCTOBER 9, 1967: 6:15 a.m.: Felix Rodriguez arrives by helicopter in La Higuera, along with Colonel Joaquin Zenteno Anaya. Rodriguez brings a powerful portable field radio and a camera with a special four-footed tripod used to photograph documents. He quietly observes the scene in the schoolhouse, and records what he sees, finding the situation "gruesome" with Che lying in dirt, his arms tied behind his back and his feet bound together, next to the bodies of his friends. He looks "like a piece of trash" with matted hair, torn clothes, and wearing only pieces of leather on his feet for shoes. In one interview, Rodriguez states that, " I had mixed emotions when I first arrived there. Here was the man who had assassinated many of my countrymen. And nevertheless, when I saw him, the way he looked....I felt really sorry for him." (Rodriguez:2) Rodriguez sets up his radio and transmits a coded message to the CIA station in either Peru or Brazil to be retransmitted to Langley headquarters. Rodriguez also starts to photograph Che's diary and other captured documents. Later, Rodriguez spends time talking with Che and takes a picture with him. The photos that Rodriguez takes are preserved by the CIA. (Anderson, 793; Rodriguez:1, 193) 10 am: The Bolivian officers are faced with the question of what to do with Che. The possibility of prosecuting him is ruled out because a trial would focus world attention on him and could generate sympathetic propaganda for Che and for Cuba. It is concluded that Che must be executed immediately, but it is agreed upon that the official story will be that he died from wounds received in battle. Felix Rodriguez receives a call from Vallegrande and is ordered by the Superior Command to conduct Operation Five Hundred and Six Hundred. Five hundred is the Bolivian code for Che and six hundred is the order to kill him. Rodriguez informs Colonel Zenteno of the order, but also tells him that the U.S. government has instructed him to keep Che alive at all costs. The CIA and the U.S. government have arranged helicopters and airplanes to take Che to Panama for interrogation. However, Colonel Zenteno says he must obey his own orders and Rodriguez decides, "to let history take its course," and to leave the matter in the hands of the Bolivians. (Anderson, 795; Harris 128, 129; Rodriguez:1, 193; Rodriguez:2) Rodriguez realizes that he cannot stall any longer when a school teacher informs him that she has heard a news report on Che's death on her radio. Rodriguez enters the schoolhouse to tell Che of the orders from the Bolivian high command. Che understands and says, "It is better like this ... I never should have been captured alive." Che gives Rodriguez a message for his wife and for Fidel, they embrace and Rodriguez leaves the room. (Rodriguez:2; Anderson, 796) According to one source, the top ranking officers in La Higuera instruct the noncommissioned officers to carry out the order and straws are drawn to determine who will execute Che. Just before noon, having drawn the shortest straw, Sergeant Jaime Terran goes to the schoolhouse to execute Che. Terran finds Che propped up against the wall and Che asks him to wait a moment until he stands up. Terran is frightened, runs away and is ordered back by Colonel Selich and Colonel Zenteno. "Still trembling" he returns to the schoolhouse and without looking at Che's face he fires into his chest and side. Several soldiers, also wanting to shoot Che, enter the room and shoot him. (Harris, 129) Felix Rodriguez has stated that, "I told the Sargento to shoot....and I understand that he borrowed an M-2 carbine from a Lt. Perez who was in the area." Rodriguez places the time of the shooting at 1:10 p.m. Bolivian time. (Rodriguez:2) In Jon Lee Anderson's account, Sergeant Terran volunteers to shoot Che. Che's last words, which are addressed to Terran, are "I know you've come to kill me. Shoot, you are only going to kill a man." Terran shoots Che in the arms and legs and then in Che's thorax, filling his lungs with blood. (Anderson, 796) OCTOBER 9, 1967: Early in the morning, the unit receives the order to execute Guevara and the other prisoners. Lt. Perez asks Guevara if he wishes anything before his execution. Guevara replies that he only wishes to "die with a full stomach." Perez asks him if he is a "materialist" and Guevara answers only "perhaps." When Sgt. Terran (the executioner) enters the room, Guevara stands up with his hands tied and states, "I know what you have come for I am ready." Terran tells him to be seated and leaves the room for a few moments. While Terran was outside, Sgt. Huacka enters another small house, where "Willy" was being held, and shoots him. When Terran comes back, Guevara stands up and refuses to be seated saying: "I will remain standing for this." Terran gets angry and tells Guevara to be seated again. Finally, Guevara tells him: "Know this now, you are killing a man." Terran fires his M2 Carbine and kills him. (Dept. of Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67). Later that afternoon: Senior army officers and CIA Agent, Felix Rodriguez, leave La Higuera by helicopter for army headquarters in Vallegrande. Upon landing, Rodriguez quickly leaves the helicopter knowing that Castro's people will be there looking for CIA agents. Pulling a Bolivian army cap over his face, he is not noticed by anyone. (Rodriguez:1, 12; Harris, 130) Che's body is flown to Vallegrande by helicopter and later fingerprinted and embalmed. (NYT 10/11/67)
General Ovando, Chief of Bolivian Armed Forces, states that just before he died, Che said, "I am Che Guevara and I have failed." (James, 8) OCTOBER 10, 1967: W.G. Bowdler sends a note to Walt Rostow saying that they do not know if Che Guevara was "among the casualties of the October 8 engagement." They think that there are no guerrilla survivors. By October 9, they thought two guerrilla were wounded and possibly one of them is Che. (Bowdler, The White House 10/10/67) OCTOBER 10, 1967: Two doctors,. Moises Abraham Baptista and Jost Martinez Cazo, at the Hospital Knights of Malta, Vallegrande, Bolivia, sign a death certificate for Che Guevara. The document states that "on October 9 at 5:30 p.m., there arrived...Ernesto Guevara Lynch, approximately 40 years of age, the cause of death being multiple bullet wounds in the thorax and extremities. Preservative was applied to the body." On the same day, and autopsy report records the multiple bullets wounds found in Guevara's body. "The cause of death," states the autopsy report, "was the thorax wounds and consequent hemorrhaging." (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67) OCTOBER 10, 1967: General Ovando announces that Che died the day before at 1:30 p.m. This means that Che lived for twenty-two hours after the battle in Quebrada del Yuro, which contradicts Colonel Zenteno's story. Colonel Zenteno changes his story to support General Ovando's. (James, 15) The New York Times reports that the Bolivian Army High Command dispatches officially confirm that Che was killed in the battle on Sunday October 8th. General Ovando states that Che admitted his identity and the failure of his guerrilla campaign before dying of his wounds. (NYT 10/10/67) Ernesto Guevara, the father of Che, denies the death of his son, stating that there is no evidence to prove the killing. (NYT 10/11/67) OCTOBER 11, 1967: General Ovando claims that on this day Che's body is buried in the Vallegrande area. (James, 19) OCTOBER 11, 1967: President Lyndon Johnson receives a memorandum from Walt W. Rostow: "This morning we are about 99% sure that "Che" Guevara is dead." The memo informs the President that according to the CIA, Che was taken alive and after a short interrogation General Ovando ordered his execution. (Rostow, "Death of Che Guevara," 10/11/67) OCTOBER 11, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a memorandum to the President stating that they "are 99% sure that Che Guevara is dead." He explains that Guevara's death carries significant implications: "It marks the passing of another of the aggressive, romantic revolutionaries...In the Latin American context, it will have a strong impact in discouraging would -be guerrillas. It shows the soundness of our preventive medicine assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency--it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered him and got him." (Rostow 10/11/67) OCTOBER 12, 1967: Che's brother, Roberto, arrives in Bolivia to take the body back to Argentina. However, General Ovando tells him that the body has been cremated. (Anderson, 799) OCTOBER 13, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a note to the President with intelligence information that "removes any doubt that "Che Guevara is dead." (Rostow 10/13/67) OCTOBER 14, 1967: Annex No.3 - three officials of the Argentine Federal police, at the request of the Bolivian Government, visited Bolivian military headquarters in La Paz to help identify the handwriting and fingerprints of Che Guevara. "They were shown a metal container in which were two amputated hands in a liquid solution, apparently formaldehyde." The experts compared the fingerprints with the ones in Guevara's Argentine identity record, No. 3.524.272, and they were the same. (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67) OCTOBER 14, 1967: Students at Central University of Venezuela protest the U.S. involvement in Che's death. Demonstrations are organized against a U.S. business, the home of a U.S. citizen, the U.S. Embassy and other similar targets. OCTOBER 15, 1967: Bolivian President Barrientos claims that Che's ashes are buried in a hidden place somewhere in the Vallegrande region. (Harris, 130) OCTOBER 16, 1967: The Bolivian Armed Forces released a communiqué together with three annexes on the death of Che Guevara. The communiqué is "based on documents released by the Military High Command on October 9...concerning the combat that took place at La Higuera between units of the Armed Forces and the red group commanded by Ernesto Che Guevara, as a result of which he, among others, lost his life..." The report states that Guevara died "more or less at 8 p.m. on Sunday, October 8...as a result of his wounds." Also, in order to identify his body it requested the cooperation of Argentine technical organizations to identify the remains to certify that the handwriting of the campaign diary coincides with Guevara's. Henderson, the U.S. Embassy agent in La Paz, comments that "it will be widely noted that neither the death certificate nor the autopsy report state a time of death." This "would appear to be an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least twenty-four hours." He also notes that some early reports indicate that Guevara was captured with minor injuries, while later statements , including the autopsy report, affirm that he suffered multiple wounds. He agrees with a comment by PresTncia, that these statements are "going to be the new focus of polemics in the coming days." (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67) OCTOBER 18, 1967: The U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia sends an airgram to the Department of State with the Official Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara. (U.S. Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia, 10/18/97) OCTOBER 18, 1967: A CIA cable highlights the errors leading to Guevara's defeat. "There were negative factors and tremendous errors involved in the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara Serna and the defeat of the guerrillas in Bolivia... ." Che's presence at the guerrilla front in Bolivia, " ... precluded all hope of saving him and the other leaders in the event of an ambush and virtually condemned them to die or exist uselessly as fugitives." The fact that the guerrillas were so dependent on the local peasant population also proved to be a mistake according to the CIA. Another error described in this cable is Che's over-confidence in the Bolivian Communist Party, which was relatively new, inexperienced, lacking strong leadership and was internally divided into Trotskyite and Pro-Chinese factions. Finally, the cable states that the victory of the Bolivian army should not be credited to their actions, but to the errors of Castroism. "The guerrilla failure in Bolivia is definitely a leadership failure..."("Comments on the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara Serna," 10/18/67) OCTOBER 18, 1967: Fidel Castro delivers a eulogy for Che Guevara to nearly a million people --one of his largest audiences ever--in Havana's Plaza de la Revolucion. Castro proclaims that Che's life-long struggle against imperialism and his ideals will be the inspiration for future generations of revolutionaries. His life was a "glorious page of history" because of his extraordinary military accomplishments, and his unequaled combination of virtues which made him an "artist in guerrilla warfare." Castro professes that Che's murderers will be disappointed when they realize that "the art to which he dedicated his life and intelligence cannot die." (Anderson, 798; Castro's Eulogy, 10/18/97) OCTOBER 19, 1967: Intelligence and Research's Cuba specialist, Thomas L. Hughes, writes a memorandum to Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. Hughes outlines two significant outcomes of Che Guevara's death that will affect Fidel Castro's future political strategies. One is that "Guevara will be eulogized as the model revolutionary who met a heroic death," particularly among future generations of Latin American youth. Castro can utilize this to continue justifying his defiance of the usual suspects--"US imperialism, the Green Berets, the CIA." Another outcome is that Castro will reassess his expectations of exporting revolutions to other Latin American countries. Some Latin American leftists "will be able to argue that any insurgency must be indigenous and that only local parties know when local conditions are right for revolution." (Intelligence and Research Memorandum, "Guevara's Death--The Meaning for Latin America", 10/19/97) NOVEMBER 8, 1967: The CIA reports that Cuba is threatening assassin a prominent Bolivian figure, such as President Barrientos or General Ovando, in revenge of Che Guevara's death. ( CIA cable, 11/8/67)
JULY 1, 1995: In an interview with biographer Jon Lee Anderson, Bolivian General Mario Vargas Salinas reveals that "he had been a part of a nocturnal burial detail, that Che's body and those of several of his comrades were buried in a mass grave near the dirt airstrip outside the little mountain town of Vallegrande in Central Bolivia." A subsequent Anderson article in the New York Times sets off a two-year search to find and identify Guevara's remains. (Anderson,1) JULY 5, 1997: Che Guevara biographer, Jon Lee Anderson, reports for the New York Times that although the remains have not been exhumed and definitely identified, two experts are "100 percent sure" that they have discovered Che's remains in Valle grande. The fact that one of the skeletons is missing both of its hands is cited as the most compelling evidence. (NYT 7/5/97) JULY 13, 1997: A ceremony in Havana, attended by Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials, marks the return of Che's remains to Cuba. (NYT 7/14/97) OCTOBER 17, 1997: In a ceremony attended by Castro and thousands of Cubans, Che Guevara is reburied in Santa Clara, Cuba. (NYT, 10/18/97)
Anderson=Anderson, Jon Lee, Che Guevara : A Revolutionary Life, Grove
Che Guevara Information Archive
30th anniversary of Che Guevara's deathLessons of the struggleThirty years after his brutal death at the hands of the Bolivian, CIA backed, armed forces, Che Guevara's face remains one of the most recognized in the world. Posters of him adorn student's rooms, T-Shirts carry his likeness - he remains an icon not only in Latin America but throughout the West, especially amongst the youth. The Bolivian hatchetmen were so afraid of him that, after he had been shot, they cut off his hands so that they could prove that he was really dead and buried him in an unmarked grave under a motorway. They feared that even in death Che could be a focal point for revolution. To mark the life and death of Che, we print below a major extract of an article by Miguel Campos from Spain.
This October marks the 30th anniversary of the death of Ernesto Che Guevara. The media will try to present Che as an interesting historical figure, with little political meaning for present day society. For youth and the labour movement this anniversary should be an opportunity to find out more and debate the ideas of this revolutionary - both good and bad - and try to draw out the lessons for the struggle to transform society today. This article is a contribution to this.
Che with his parents Che was born in 1928 in the Argentinean city of Rosario. His father was a builder and architect and his mother owned some land. Several trips around Latin America together with his work as a doctor put him in close proximity with the enormous injustices which this continent still faces. Just one example: in the 19 countries of Latin America, 1.74% of the land owners own 64.9% of the land while 72.6% own just 3.74%. Like many other students in the 50s and 60s, Che was haunted by the misery of the masses, radicalized by the appalling backwardness and dependence on imperialism of their countries and - influenced by the rise in labour movement and peasant struggles - tried to find a revolutionary way to resolve this situation.
The communist parties in Latin America, basing themselves on the links with the Russian Revolution and the heroism of their members in factories and in the countryside, had managed to win a certain influence (especially in the labour movement) and had become a point of reference for revolutionary struggle. But the strategy forced upon them by Moscow led the leaders of these parties to support and even participate in bourgeois governments and movements in a number of countries. It is not generally known and it might now seem amazing that the Stalinist leadership of the Cuban CP participated in the bourgeois government of Batista (the dictator latter overthrown by Castro and Che) in 1942 and later on when Castro and Che launched their guerrilla movement they were attacked by the Communist Party who made all kind of accusations. Raúl Castro was expelled from the Party for opposing this policy of class collaboration. As a result, despite the honesty and militancy of the communist rank and file, the CPs were weakened. Many revolutionary opportunities were lost and in some cases the very same "progressive" bourgeois governments supported by the CPs returned the favour by outlawing them along with vicious repression against their members.
Che with his first child Shortcuts The lack of a genuine Marxist policy forced the most radical layers of the workers, peasants and youth in Latin America to look for a shortcut to revolution through the idea of guerrilla warfare in the countryside. Che was to play a key role in the development of the guerrillas strategy. Given the vacuum that there was, because of the mistakes of the leaders of the working class parties and unions, the Latin American revolutionaries, in an instinctive way, tried to look for a way forward. Many resorted to the tactic of direct armed clashes against the state by a vanguard of revolutionaries, hoping thereby to stimulate the peasantry and to spread the guerrilla "foco" until it reached the level of an insurrection able to take power. In Cuba during 1958, the Batista dictatorship - backed by the USA - was in complete disarray. Support for the guerrillas was growing rapidly, and the government had problems even amongst soldiers and army officers, many of whom were deserting or joining the guerrillas. The situation finally forced Batista to leave the country in. Faced with the possibility of another coup by the top army generals and with the weakness of the guerrilla army in taking power on its own, Castro was forced to issue a call for a general strike. The Havana working class brought the city to a halt for a week. This was the key factor in overthrowing the regime. Castro declared a new government and the victory of the 25 month armed struggle on January 2nd 1959. Heroic The guerrilla army, after a heroic struggle against Batista had won enormous authority and support. Its first move was to form a coalition government of all democratic parties in order to carry through the democratization of the regime. In reality, the ideas of the 26 of July Movement (the name adopted by the guerrillas), founded, amongst others by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara were not a socialist programme. In fact, the stated aims of the Movement were to overthrow the dictator and reinstate the Cuban 1942 Constitution. This meant a bourgeois democracy with democratic reforms and broad social improvements. Fidel, once in power, tried to reassure the association of bank owners, asking for their collaboration in order to modernize the economy and promising them that he had "no intention of nationalizing any industry". His revolutionary ideas changed and became more radical under the pressure of events. In carrying through his democratic revolutionary programme he had to face up to the reality of sabotage by the bourgeois and US imperialism and was forced to deepen the revolution, nationalizing the commanding heights of the economy. Once in power, Fidel and Che realized that the dependent and backward framework of Cuban capitalism was utterly insufficient to allow even the mildest of reforms. The working masses were demanding democratic rights, higher wages and conditions, higher living standards, etc. The peasants started to occupy the land. US imperialism and the national bourgeois knew that the slightest taste of democracy, in a context of a revolutionary awakening of the masses, is not compatible with maintaining capitalist exploitation and their profits and organized a boycott of the revolutionary government. The resulting regime of nationalized and planned economy was an enormous step forward for the Cuban people. Industry grew by 50% between 1959 and 1965. Illiteracy, hunger and hundreds of diseases which had previously devastated the masses were eradicated. This advances gives an idea of the greatness of the revolutionary conquests and explain the survival of the regime over several decades despite permanent harassment by imperialism. But the fate of the Cuban revolution will be decided in the last analysis in the international arena. Any revolutionary worthy of the name must, as a duty, defend the conquests of the Cuban revolution against imperialism (both the blockade by US imperialism and the attempt of European imperialism and pro-capitalist layers within Cuba to restore capitalism gradually). At the same time we must understand that only the spreading of the revolution to other countries, especially the advanced capitalist countries, can guarantee the consolidation and final victory of the revolution. In fact, during the first years of the revolution there were constant tensions between a section of the Cuban leaders (mainly Che) and the Russian bureaucracy, who saw with fear the possible extension of the Cuban revolution to Latin America (something which would serve as an example to workers all over the world, including the Russian working class, and could have lead to the establishment of a healthy workers state, a death threat to the degenerate bureaucracy in Moscow). The tension mounted and grew bigger: on the speed of nationalizations, on the lack of support of the Russian bureaucracy to the economies of underdeveloped countries (denounced by Che in the Second Afro Asian Economic Seminar in 1965), but, above all, on the policy by Moscow of putting a brake on the spreading of the revolution to the whole of Latin America and countries in Asia and Africa (examples of this are the Second Havana Declaration by Che, the Cuban support to the guerrillas of Douglas Bravo in Venezuela who were opposed to the official line of the pro-Moscow Venezuelan CP, etc.). In 1964, in an interview with his friend, the journalist Eduardo Galeano, Che stated that "the role of the Communist parties is to be the vanguard of the revolution, but unfortunately, as it happens, in most of Latin America they are at the rearguard of it" (Entrevistas y artículos, Eduardo Galeano). But he did not draw all the necessary conclusions from this. Che, instinctively, draws the conclusion that revolution must be spread but he is not prepared to accept that, if this is not done (and the Russian bureaucracy kept on putting obstacles in the way), then the character of the workers state would be affected: "Isolation might cause many effects. For example that we make a mistake in appreciating the political situation in Brazil, but it will never distort the path of the revolution." The result, once again, will be a heroic and revolutionary answer, but one which falls into the idealistic mistake of substituting the role of the working class for the actions of him and his followers. Che left Cuba and tried to organize revolt first in the Congo and then Bolivia in order to repeat the method of the guerrilla "foco". But the victory of guerrilla warfare in Cuba and later Vietnam was the result of a combination of uniquely favourable conditions which are not normally present. Observers One of the consequences of the guerrilla struggle, as a fundamental method of taking power, is that the working class is relegated to the role of a mere observer. The result is a war against the bourgeois state which bleeds dry the ranks of the revolutionaries and sows demoralization amongst the masses, especially amongst the workers, as they do not find revolutionary leadership. In Bolivia the attempt of Che to spread the revolution came up against the opposition of the USSR and the Stalinist leaders of the Bolivian CP. Bolivia had (and still has) a strong and powerful working class which had already gone through many revolutionary experiences. Thus the attempt of Che to develop the guerrilla "foco" from the mountains basing himself on the peasantry did not win any support in the labour movement, which remained under the influence of the Stalinist and reformist leaders without anyone offering the workers a revolutionary way forward. The guerrilla group, isolated, was then brutally smashed by the army and Che himself killed in an ambush on October 9th 1967. His body was put on public display the following day in Villa Grande, Bolivia. A few years after, the Bolivian working class organized an almighty insurrection in the cities, showing its revolutionary potential, but once again it lacked a revolutionary leadership, forged and rooted in the factories with a Marxist perspective. Even in those cases in which the guerrilla army manages to take power, its separation from the working class, made inevitable by the military struggle in the jungle or the mountains, has a pernicious effect. As the revolution is not led by the working class but carried through by the guerrillas, the mechanisms of workers power and democracy have not been built during the revolutionary process by the masses themselves. The bourgeois state is destroyed but when the guerrillas take power that state is not replaced by a democratic power structure which would allow the participation of the masses in the process of decision making at all levels, but by the military structure of the guerrillas themselves. Command On the other hand, the very same conditions of permanent guerrilla war against the state meant a strict top-down chain of command, needed for military struggle, the necessary secrecy in decision taking, etc. Che himself explained how the leaders of the July 26th Movement had only had two meetings before taking power. Carlos Franqui, one of the leaders of the July 26th Movement explains in his book "Diary of the Cuban Revolution": "We were studying one of Che's books, 'Foundations of Leninism' by Stalin. The three of us had a very heated discussion about it. Che defended the book and I was attacking it. Fidel's opinion was final: 'A revolution in order not to divide itself and be defeated needs a leader. It is better to have one bad leader than twenty good ones.'" These characteristics can be controlled when the leadership of the movement is in the hands of the proletariat, organized as a class with mass democratic meetings in every factory and an elected leadership. But if this is not the case, the undemocratic nature of a military leadership transfers itself over to the organization of the state after the seizure of power. In contrast with the yearly conferences celebrated by the Bolsheviks even under civil war conditions (a point Lenin stressed time and again), when the Cuban guerrilla movement transformed itself into the Cuban Communist Party in 1965, in the following 30 years they only held 4 conferences! Industrial directors are in charge of all aspects of the administration of factories and they are not under any control by the workers but are appointed by the Ministry of Industry. There is no mechanism for elections, accountability or right to recall of officers at any level. But the main factor was the isolation of the revolution. With all its progressive aspects and despite being a step forward for the masses, the Cuban regime was not socialism. By nationalizing the economy, Che and Fidel were putting down the foundation stone of a workers state that should have led to the transition towards this goal. But with the delay of the revolution in Latin America and the advanced countries, the attempt to build socialism in one country lead instead to a closer relationship between the Cuban government and the Kremlin. In 1968 Fidel supported the sending of Russian tanks to Prague, in the 80s the repression in Poland (and more recently the smashing of the Tianamen movement in China), and the USSR policy of opposing the advance of the revolution with the nationalization of the economy in Chile under Allende and in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas. Marxists fight to defend Cuba, but at the same time we fight for a political revolution which would allow the workers to take control of the state and struggle for a world revolution. This is the only way to really defend the Cuban revolution. The collapse of Stalinism in Eastern Europe and the steps towards capitalism in Russia are a warning of the catastrophe that would occur for Cuban workers and youth after any attempt to restore capitalism. Legacy Today, thirty years after the death in struggle of Che, his revolutionary legacy is more relevant than ever. The Latin American and world revolutions are still to be carried through and the best contribution we can make to them is to learn from the example of revolutionary honesty, heroism and selfless sacrifice of this great revolutionary, but, even more so, from his mistakes. The Latin American labour movement is on the offensive with impressive general strikes and movements: Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil, Nicaragua, Colombia, Puerto Rico, etc. In Europe, in the US, in Japan, the crisis of world capitalism grows deeper. This system cannot offer us anything but misery, exploitation and corruption. The magnificent struggles in France, Belgium, and South Korea herald the new epoch. Today, more than ever, the road to the transformation of society is the road of struggle within the labour movement to oppose capitalism with a socialist programme based on the world revolution, the only programme which can take the working class, the peasantry and other exploited sections of society to a classless society. September 1997
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