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A Survey of
the Baath Party’s struggle
1947-1974
The Arab
Baath Socialist Party
Before the
foundation
(1941-1947)
The
Political Program of the Baath and its National Resistance:
(The Program of Liberation and Independence)
The
Leadership of the Baath and its National Resistance.
October 2006
THE BAATH IS MORE COHESIVE AND UNITED
By Ibrahim Ebeid
The movement began in
Syria and its first nationalistic action was to give support, in May 1941, to
the first Arab revolution for freedom in Iraq. The early Baathists called upon
Syrian Arab youth to join the Aid for Iraq Movement whose purpose was to uphold
this rising for liberation. University students became increasingly interested
in the debates organized by the Party's founder, especially those at the
beginning of 1943. In November 1942, comrade Michel Aflaq and his colleague
Salah al-Bitar had decided to abandon teaching and devote themselves completely
to revolutionary activities and to the political and organizational work of the
new movement. This decision not only had a positive effect on these activities,
but was also a proof of the new movement's firm intentions.
It was in this way that
the Baath started off at a time of anti-colonialist struggle and in the center
of the Syrian Arab people's movement for independence. From the very beginning
the Party was able to bring out into the open the longstanding complicity
between the feudal and bourgeois classes and colonialism. They were its heirs in
the region, which meant that political independence was devoid of any unified,
democratic and progressive content. Under another guise, the region still was
subjected to the imperialist pillage of its wealth, which belonged to the
nation. During the Syrian electoral campaign, the Baath Party issued a
declaration, on July 24th. 1943, on the agreement reached that year between the
ruling National Block and England and France, which stated that: "it seemed to
be an attempt to regain our sovereignty from the colonial powers, but, in fact,
it was nothing of the sort".
The Party put forward
its founder as a candidate in these elections and he obtained a respectable
number of votes. His campaign was not of the usual type, for all he wanted was a
rostrum from which to speak to the people about his ideas and programme. In
fact, he said: "We are not in a hurry to come into power; we will be carrying on
the fight for a long time". His election manifesto did not follow the
conventional pattern of flattering words and promises to redress immediate
wrongs; it presented the political platform of the Party and the novel methods
which it would use, making the difference quite clear between the new movement
and the current ruling classes and politicians who had lost the people's
confidence. It stated: "The maneuvers and tricks of the politicians are of no
use for dealing with our grave problems and the extent of our illness. What is
needed is a new generation of Arabs which is conscientious, well organized and
militant and which has faith in the future of our nation".
Scarcely a few months
after these elections, the Lebanon underwent a difficult ordeal when it demanded
its independence in November 1943. The Baath Party protested against the French
attack on Lebanon's independence and called upon the population to view the
country's cause as one, which affected all Arabs and especially Syria.
It continued to combat
the ruling National Block by denouncing its reactionary policies, its weakness
towards the French authorities in particular, its venality, corruption and
nepotism. The people's resentment against the government grew stronger. The
students organized demonstrations that usually made the government give way or
resign.
The year 1943 was an
important one for the development of the Baath movement's philosophy and
organization. Some of the most important articles were written defining the
personal qualities and skills which would be needed by future Arab generations,
the historical relationship between Islam and Arabism, the living vision of a
cultural heritage, and the differences, both in theory and in practice, with
communism. The most famous of them all was the discussion, led by the movement's
founder, at Damascus University in April 1943, the date of the Prophet's
birthday.
At the beginning of
1944, the Party's attention was focused on the Palestinian question. Notes of
protest were dispatched to those American leaders who supported Jewish
immigration to Palestine. Nevertheless this concern with Arab national causes,
as evidence of its global political concept, did not prevent it from carrying on
the day-to-day struggle with the reactionary Syrian regime. In February 1945,
the Party published a strong article attacking the government's weakness in
allowing the French to take over the command of Syrian army units, and the
familiar policy of lies, exploitation and repression. The article demanded the
dismissal of those responsible for all these political setbacks.
The result was the
arrest of Salah al-Bitar, one of the movement's leaders and his banishment to a
village in the northeast of the country. At this provocation, the Baath
militants called on the population to demonstrate in protest. The appeal was
enthusiastically answered and the demonstration was enormous, even though the
Party itself was few in numbers and with little authority.
In March 1945, the Baath
clarified its viewpoint on the Arab League. It denounced the Charter and the
inconsistencies of its basic positions which were designed to preserve the
political divisions, gave scant attention to the countries in the Maghreb, and
did not mention the Palestinian question or that of the usurpation of the
province of Al-Iskandaron "The bad thing about it", the article stated, "was
that it gave the impression to the Arab nation that this was what was meant by
genuine unification".
At this period also
there were violent clashes between Baathists and members of the Syrian Communist
Party because the latter, as had been agreed with the Soviet Union supported the
French and the British as their allies. The most violent of these clashes was
that of May 1 st. 1945.
On May 8th. the Party
gave the Algerian people its support following the terrible massacre during the
victory day demonstration on which the French authorities opened fire.
On May 16th, during the
course of the negotiations between the French and Syrian governments and because
of the weakness and servility of the National Block and the shifts and evasions
of the French, the Party published a statement demanding the breaking off of
negotiations.
Under the turn of events
and popular pressure the government publicly declared its rejection of and
opposition to the French. The Party stated, "it would support it so long as it
continued the national struggle against foreign aggression". Not content with
just verbal support, the Party started organizing its units for the "National
Crusade" as a means of harnessing the people's movements. These units were of
three types, resistance units, security units and rescue units. They did their
duty when the French attacked Damascus and other towns on May 29th. 1945. This
was the first experience of armed combat for the new movement. This was also the
first time that the communiqué calling for the formation of these units was
issued in the name of the Arab Baath Party, whereas previously they had appeared
under the name of the Arab Baath Movement or the Arab Baath Bureau.
On July l0th. the Baath
applied for official registration as a political party .The application included
a resume of the Party's principles and set out its objectives in 23 clauses. The
government rejected the application.
In October 1945, the
Arab Baath Movement published a political manifesto on the main problems facing
the Arab nation. It confirmed the existing point of view and gave its support to
certain unification projects such as that for the Nile Valley. It supported also
the independence of the protectorates and emirates and their union with other
Arab countries, the unification of Greater Syria on the basis of an Arab
Palestine and the republican government as a measure of Arab progress. The
passage ended with these words: "The most important and decisive act to be born
in mind on this matter of unification is the union of Syria with Iraq". It dealt
also with situation in the Maghreb and Libya and raised the call to fight for
the liberation of these countries.
In a telegram of protest
against the treaty between Jordan and Britain, the Baath warned the Arab people
to be on their guard and to fight against colonialism and its agents. It
organized popular demonstrations and declared that the treaty "nullifies
Jordan's independence, threatens that of neighbouring countries, sets back the
progress towards unification and reinforces the aims of the Zionists".
During the same year,
the Baath had supported Egypt in its fight for complete independence and the
evacuation of British troops since it considered "that British policy is not
only opposed by Egypt but by the entire Arab nation".
In 1945 the Party opened
its first small office in the Canal district of Damascus.
On May 3rd. 1946, the
Baath called a general strike at the arrival of an Anglo-American commission in
Palestine, which was proposing the immigration of 100,000 Jews and had refused
to allow an Arab government to be set up. It was then that Michel Aflaq made his
famous plea –"Let the Arabs not wait for a miracle. It is not the governments
but the people themselves who will save Palestine".
In the second half of
1946, young Syrian Baathists fought two important battles for democracy. The
first was concerned with the decree on the powers of the Home Affairs Ministry ,
giving it authority to dissolve political parties, suspend newspapers and deport
its opponents. Noisy and bloody demonstrations continued until the Constitution
Committee ruled that the decree was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.
The second was against the undemocratic electoral law on the subject of indirect
suffrage. In the following year, the Baath succeeded in having the law changed.
Likewise after a long
fight, the Baath received permission to publish its newspaper, AI- Baath.
Comrade Michel ' Aflaq wrote the first editorial, entitled 'Seeds of the Baath',
on July 3rd. 1946, which underlined the great significance of the new movement.
In its 6th. Issue, he wrote an article on foreign policy calling, for the first
time, for close relations with the Soviet Union. The newspaper was a means of
opposing arbitrary methods, intimidation and exploitation but was constantly
threatened with suspension and legal sanctions.
At a members meeting on
January 27th. 1947, to prepare for the foundation congress, the founder
clarified the Party's position on a number of matters. One of the most important
of these concerned the government, which was described as «representative of the
feudal capitalist exploiters and having no idea of the people's sufferings», and
the vain fight against rising prices "which does not change the basis of our
socio-economic system. The problem of rising prices can only be solved by the
application of socialist principles, by nationalizing the foreign companies and
freeing the people from their exploitation of such basic needs as water,
electricity and transport, and by distributing land to the small farmers". The
congress held its meeting between April 4-6th. 1947 and in this one session was
able to draft out the ideological, political and organizational Party policies.
Its principles of unity, social justice and freedom, together with its
revolutionary approach to politics soon became a powerful incentive and a magnet
for attracting Arab youth and intellectuals.
The Arab Baath
Socialist Party
The Foundation and the
Palestinian Disaster
(1947-1949)
On April 4th. 1947, about two hundred
young Baathists who were able to do so, came from allover Syria to Damascus
together with some students from Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, for the opening of
the 1st. Congress of the Baath Party, in other words, its foundation Congress.
The meeting lasted three days, during which reports previously prepared, were
discussed, the constitution, the principles and internal organisation were
approved. Late
at night on April 6th, Michel Aflaq was
unanimously elected Party president.
An executive committee consisting of
three members was also elected which, with the president, became the first
officially recognized leadership of the Party.
Although no national leadership was
elected by the congress, it at least exposed to the members «the capacities and
potential latent in the Party .The seeds of a National Leadership of the future
had been sown...» The 1st. Congress of the Arab Baath Party was a historic event
in member's lives, only the future will show whether it will also be one in the
history of contemporary Arab politics». (Al-Baath April 15th. 1947).
The foundation congress charted the main
course of Arab revolutionary ideology. It gave it its distinguishing features
and separated it from the main trends of current thought -chauvinism,
ultra-nationalism, national socialism, liberalism, reformation etc.
Nevertheless, the constitution of this first Arab revolutionary movement
seriously attempted to emphasize the complementary aspects of Arab revolutionary
ideology.
From the organizational point of view,
article 1. of the constitution's general principles laid out the structure of
the Arab revolutionary movement and considered the Baath Party to be «a party
for all Arabs who may establish branches in all the Arab countries. It is not
concerned with the politics of any particular country except insofar as it
affects the greater Arab interest”.
The political manifesto drew up a list
of those powers, which were hostile: to the Arab nation, those, which had
usurped part of its territory, pillaged its wealth and supported Zionism. It was
from then on that the Party put the United States high on the list because of
their meddling in Middle Eastern affairs, their support of British colonialism
and their plundering of Arab natural resources. The manifesto called upon the
Arab people to join together to fight these enemy countries. It asked Arab
governments to review their diplomatic relations and that the Arab League should
take urgent steps to unify the armed forces and the representation abroad of
Arab countries, and that passport and customs regulations should be abolished
between them.
The congress also called for a review of
the treaties and concession arrangements with foreign countries and companies
and for a reversal of the divisionism policy being followed by the governments
of Syria and Lebanon. In its place, it proposed that they should work towards a
union, which would strengthen the independence of the two countries and be a
step forward towards Arab unity as a whole.
The congress gave its approval of
cooperation with progressive Arab parties fighting against colonialism from
outside and exploitation inside in order to build a people's Arab national
front.
On Monday morning, April 7th. , the
Party in its new form, began a fruitful period in its militant life.
During the celebrations marking the
evacuation of foreign troops from Syria on April 17th. 1947, the founder,
speaking for the Party, repeated: «The evacuation of Syria should not make us
forget our duty towards other Arab countries».
The Party continued its struggle with
the ruling classes both in Syria and in other countries. On April 23rd., it
declared: «Our people are henceforth committed to action on a national scale;
let the exploiters and the feudalists tremble».
In a manifesto of the same date, the
Party started the battle for the revision of the electoral law to introduce
direct suffrage. The movement was so effective that the government was forced to
revise the law. Thus the Party won another victory for democracy, having already
compelled the government to retreat over its police project. While this was
going on, the Party, in May 1947, supported the Lebanese people in their
opposition to the rigged elections in the expectation that the same class in
Syria would resort to something similar.
On June 2nd. , the president prepared a
memorandum requesting, for the third time, that the Party should have permission
to carry out its public activities. It emphasized that the country needed a new
style of politics. The election campaign took place during June and July and the
Party competed in certain electoral districts. The most noteworthy campaigns
were those of Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar in Damascus and were proof of the
spectacular rallying of the people to the Party. The president was already
certain in advance of several thousand votes, but by shameless rigging, the
authorities stuffed the ballot boxes to the extent that the total votes exceeded
the number of the local population.
During the campaign, Michel ' Aflaq
defined the Party's policy on legislative elections. On June l0th. he stated: «
While for some people it is an opportunity to make speeches and propaganda, we
believe that there are things which are more important and worthwhile than
propaganda for parties or individuals. For us, it is an opportunity to give
people guidance and to carry on the national struggle".
While the fight for free elections was
going on, the Party announced the candidacy of some of its members who intended
to stand as independents, declaring, «the people should not be tied to a list".
It continued to attack the ruling classes and on June l6th. said, «the
sectarianism of the National Party in power is the greatest danger which
threatens the country".
On July 1st., the Party published an
article in AI-Baath newspaper under the title: «The Arab Baath calls upon the
Arab nation to fight against the ruling clique and to overthrow the government
and its plots to prevent free elections".
After publication, Salah al-Bitar was
arrested and sentenced to six months imprisonment.
Hardly had the Party emerged from its
fight for democracy when it once more took up the national Arab cause. In
September 1947, a Party council was held, attended by delegates from the
branches. The final communiqué stated that a number of questions had been
discussed concerning Syrian and national matters, and especially the question of
Palestine.
In the light of the deteriorating
situation and the resolution on partition, the Party announced, on October 19th.
1947: «The decisive hour has struck; Palestine can only be rescued by steel and
guns". It attacked the conduct of the negotiations, considering them to be a
trick of the British, the Americans and Zionism: «They want to make the Arabs
think that the Palestinian problem is a political one which can be resolved by
negotiation and conferences. This, however, is only propaganda designed to
influence the American and British people"... it went on: -«Partition will deny
the people's great ambition for Arab unity... it will not only strike at the
heart of this unity, but will threaten the independence of every Arab country".
(Al Baath, 21/12/47).
Having this clear point of view on the
connection between Palestine, independence and unity, the Party called for the
use of oil as a weapon in the battle: «Oil and the strategic geographical
position of the Arab homeland are, together with military strength, sufficient
to restore us our rights". (11/10/47). If only the Arabs «had threatened these
countries, which only understand the language of self-interest, with the cutting
off of oil supplies and gold, plus an economic boycott. ..partition would never
have happened". (21/12/47).
At the beginning of 1948, the year of
disaster, the Party, «seeing no other way of rescuing Palestine except by war»,
decided at the meeting in Homs on January 15-16th. to mobilize its members to
take part in the war effort within the Arab countries, or in the front line in
Palestine. It decided to dispatch a battalion to the front under the command of
the executive committee». Having arrived there, the Party gave a warning against
the way in which the war was being conducted: «Skirmishes are useless when faced
with unforeseen danger),. It called upon all the Arab armies to come to
Palestine and liberate it from Zionism (15/2/48).
The reactionary Syrian government took
advantage of the Arab nation's concern over the events in Palestine and tried to
change the constitution in order to renew the mandate of the President of the
Republic. The Baathists, fighting the enemy in the front line, opposed this new
attempt to establish a dictatorship, and stressed, «this proposal to change the
constitution was a threat to the Republic, its independence and liberty».
(8/3/48). This new fight for democracy was a fierce one. The government took
arbitrary action against the Party .The newspaper was suspended three times,
members of the Party were arrested, and some, workers in particular, were
maltreated. A terrorist attack against the Party's office occurred on March
14th. 1948 when a bomb was thrown in while a meeting was taking place. The
office was immediately surrounded by the police who arrested about 50 members.
The struggle in Syria did not prevent
the others from continuing the armed fight in Palestine, and when the president
returned at the end of the war, he published a statement, on September 7th.
1948, showing the connection between the Palestine disaster and the
deterioration of the internal situation. This angered the authorities that had
him arrested and sent for trial. The court sentenced him to six months
imprisonment, reduced to two months «because of Mr. Aflaq's record in the fight
against the French during the time of the mandate». This trial and the arguments
for the defense are documents of historical importance.
Only a few weeks after the trial, a
series of strikes took place throughout Syria in protest against the
government's home and foreign policy, the increase in prices, corruption and
venality and illegal profit making. The government fired on these demonstrations
and
a number of people including Baath
militants were killed or wounded. The Party demanded the government's
resignation and the trial of its leaders. In fact the government did resign and
a cabinet of technocrats was set up. It was quickly attacked by the Party as
being "a parody of a solution which still allowed the constitution to be
violated and the people to be coerced, intimidated and misled".
The Party continued to attack the
reactionary government in Syria and, in addition, withdrew from the Arab
nationalist party conference, organized by the Lebanese Nationalist Appeal
Party. The reason was the presence of members of the Syrian National Party, at
the time in power in Syria. Comrade Michel Aflaq, in justification of this
decision, defined his understanding of a nationalist party as follows: «The
nationalist parties would be abandoning their responsibility for rescuing the
Arab nation from the internal and external dangers which threaten its existence,
if they do not decide to break with the social class and its political
representatives who are the cause of the ever-growing dangers to which the
nation is exposed". (19/1/49). The Party also conducted a campaign to prevent
government ratification of the Tapline agreement whereby the oil companies were
given permission to usurp the Arab people's rights. It published tracts and
organized demonstrations, which led to the arrest of Midhat al- Bitar, the
leader of the Damascus branch on March 4th. 1949, and his imprisonment in Ommaya
prison. The Party also denounced the iniquitous financial agreement with France
and all the activities of Syrian reactionaries. By doing this, it helped to
isolate and discredit the government in the eyes of the people, whereas for
several years it had been their beacon and symbol of the national independence
movement.
This left the field open for the
overthrow of the government, which took place on March 30th. 1949, by the army.
This was the beginning of an era of military coups d'etat in Syria, which
continued during the following years.
The Arab Baath
Socialist Party
The Syrian Military
Coups d’etat
(1949-1954)
The first coup d'etat. March 10th
1949
The Party gave conditional support to
the coup d'etat of Husni Za'im. It gave it because he had defeated the
reactionary government, but drew attention to the underlying reasons and to the
need to learn from them for the new period about to begin (Party Memorandum to
Husni Za'im, Apri14th. 1949). The founder, in his address to the Party rally
organized to celebrate the fall of the reactionary regime, said: "What has taken
place is not radical change but only the first step towards it. The Arab people
are looking for a complete genuine change of society". (7/4/1949).
The Party sent a series of more and more
critical memoranda to the new government on a number of questions, amongst which
were the Tapline agreement, the financial agreement and the ban on the civil
service against joining a political party .On May 24th.it stated in a memorandum
that: "The army's power does not depend upon its weapons, but upon the way in
which it responds to the aspirations and needs of the people".
During this time, and before the violent
confrontation with the dictatorial regime, which followed, the memorandum of May
24th. , the first session of the new Party's assembly had been held in April,
and to which members had been elected by the provincial branches in Syria and
Transjordan. Michel Aflaq was unanimously re-elected President and six members
instead of three as previously, were elected to the Executive Committee.
Following the May 24th. memorandum, Michel 'Aflaq and a large number of
Baathists were arrested, but nevertheless the Party continued the fight with the
regime. On May 30th. it published a manifesto in which it declared that any
agreement ratified during this period would be illegal in the absence of the
elected representatives of the people, and that it would oppose any constitution
which had not been drawn up by an elected constitutional assembly. The Party
demanded a free government and opposed the pseudo-referendum for a constitution,
which had been organized by Husni Za'im.
On June 9th. the party renewed its
demands in another communiqué. The result was a widespread denunciation of the
dictatorial regime and a few months afterwards, on August 14th. 1949, it was
overthrown by a group of officers who killed Husni Za'im and the Prime Minister,
Muhsin Barazi.
The Hannawi Coup d'Etat
The Hannawi coup d'etat restored liberal
parliamentary democracy to Syria. A transitional government was formed under the
presidency of Hashim al-Atasi and included all those parties, which had been in
opposition before the Husni Za'im coup d'etat. The Party was represented by its
president who was given the Ministry of Education. The Cabinet was instructed to
prepare a general election for the end of November 1949 to elect a
constitutional Assembly, which would draw up a permanent constitution for the
country.
On September l5th. the Al-Baath
newspaper reappeared and on the 22nd. the Party's offices were re-opened. The
Party put up a number of candidates for the elections. Jalal as-Sayyid, one of
the leaders at the time, was elected, as was Abd-al-Aziz Harwill who joined the
Party shortly afterwards. In the Damascus district, the president obtained more
votes than his competitors, but the large number of candidates prevented him
from winning an absolute majority. He ought to have campaigned for the second
ballot but refused to do so inspite of popular pressure and the requests of many
delegations.
The coup d'etat gave the Al-Sha’ab Party
(people’s party), which supported the monarchy in Iraq, the opportunity to seize
the reins of power and create a climate in the country favorable to a union with
Iraq, which would have been a threat to the republic and to the national and
democratic gains in Syria. The national movements, whose influence with the
people was strong, opposed this move and provided Adib Shishakli with the
opportunity to carry out his first army coup. He took over command of the army
and put pressure on the political institutions.
Before this, during the first week of
December, the Syrian branch of the Party held its regional congress during which
it defined its policies for the coming period. On December 29th. in a speech at
the University, Michel Aflaq gave a warning to be on guard against those who
were supporting imperialist interests, dressing them up in patriotic clothing
and giving them a nationalist appearance. He castigated the feuds, which were
rife amongst the professional cliques, which had sold their souls to the
foreigner. "There are some who want to serve the imperialist interests by
calling for unity, for the republic and for liberty. There are Arab monarchies
support the Syrian republic and others, while claiming to be the standard
bearers of unity, surrender themselves to the foreigner".
In this speech the Party president not
only castigated those who whished to lead Syria according to imperialism's
plans, but also those who, in trying to block these moves, were directing the
country towards other Arab connections. The founder was more specific on the
following January 4th. when he advised the militants "to keep their ranks closed
during the fight and to beware those adventurers whom the fight attracts when it
is easy and full of enthusiasm, and who, when they have become more well known
and influential, consider that by avoiding the demands and the hard logic of the
struggle, they can the more easily gain personal success. This propels them with
disconcerting speed towards treason and conspiracy because for them there is no
middle way".
On January 9th. 1950, the Party set out
its viewpoint on the People's Party proposal for union with Iraq. It emphasized
"the necessity that the union should be between two republics as one of the
basic criteria for the liberation of the Arab nation". It stated that «a union
between Iraq and Syria would be the first step in the direction of Arab union,
but that its success would be determined by two essential conditions; the first
of these was that the people should be certain that union would not subject them
politically, economically or militarily to a foreign power". The Party therefore
"required the revision of the Iraqi-British agreement in order that Iraq become
independent". The second condition was that "on the progressive front, the
people should be certain that union would not mean that they could be exploited
by and subjected to the rule of the reactionary feudal classes. For this reason
it laid down the condition that the progressive socialist government in Syria
should go on".
In this way, the Party clarified its
viewpoint that liberation and progressiveness were part of its social democratic
concept of nationalism. At the same time it took care to ensure that these
conditions should not obstruct the road to union but rather that they should
contribute to its success.
The first meeting of the Party Assembly
for the year took place April 6th. - April 9th. 1950. A short communiqué was
issued which reaffirmed "The struggle against colonialism, feudalism and
capitalism".
An internal bulletin was published
giving an outline of the political and organizational discussions. The Party
opposed the economic rupture with Lebanon and the return of Quwatli to Syria.
The performance of its representative Jalal Sayyid was considered to be
tarnished with "spontaneous improvisation» in the discussion, and various
financial questions and suggestions for covering expenses were also discussed.
It expressed its opinion on the
constitutional project, then in discussion in the Assembly. It demanded that a
limit be set on land ownership and that the farm workers be freed from the
oppression of feudalism; likewise, that industrial ownership also to be limited
and the dignity of the workers protected.
At the end of 1950, the Party supported
the tobacco growers in their struggle against the foreign tobacco monopoly. It
demanded its nationalization and organized student and other demonstrations in
its support. On December 29th the authorities replied by firing on them and the
Party laid the blame on the government.
Preoccupation with internal Syrian
problems did not prevent it from publishing a communiqué on November 29th. 1950,
the anniversary of partition, on the Palestine
problem in which it demonstrated the
link between its liberation and the fall of the reactionary feudal regime.
Previously, on October 2Oth. , it had shown its solidarity with the Egyptian
people in their fight for the evacuation of foreign troops.
It held the second meeting of the
Assembly during the last days of 1950 and took decisions on Syrian political and
economic questions and also on pan-Arab and international matters, (approval of
neutrality as a policy and the fight against imperialism).
At the beginning of 1951, it confirmed
the importance of neutrality when the Western imperialist block was making
attempts to draw the Arab League to its side.
The Party strongly attacked these moves
and repeated that "by being neutral and independent in the defence of our
country, we can keep the peace in the Arab east".
In February, the Labour Offices set up
by the Party held meetings to examine the working conditions of the workers and
peasants. The objective was to agitate for a change in the legislation so that
the workers would be protected, and for new legislation which would do the same
for the peasants. They emphasized the need to form a trade union for these two
classes.
In its reply to the invitation of the
Indian Socialist Party to attend the Asian Socialist Conference, the Party
outlined its view of the relationships between socialist parties. It stated that
it was the anti-imperialist parties, which should be invited and gave a warning
against "the European socialist parties, which behave as if they were the heirs
of colonialism". The letter proposed the formation of a 'third camp', that of
peace and socialism, and described the link between, on the one hand, war,
poverty and lower living standards, and on the other, between peace, freedom and
national unity.
During the same month, the Party raised
the question of the water and food crisis in Jabal Al-Arab, as well as that of
the textile workers who had been dismissed in Aleppo with whom it joined in a
month long struggle. May 1st provided the occasion to bring up the questions of
unemployment and trade union organisation.
The Party Assembly held its first
meeting in July, reviewing all the subjects on the agenda and drawing up the
framework for a genuine people's government based upon "work, freedom and
unity". It put forward the idea of a people's army to defend the country and
fight against imperialism's plots. It stressed the need for an economic union
with Lebanon, analysed the situation in each Arab country and renewed its appeal
for a people's Arab League. Finally, it repeated that there could be no solution
to the Palestine question except under a free and firmly based people's
government.
In August, the Party brought up the
question of the Syrian land workers conditions and demanded legislation which
would limit land ownership, would rationalize the planning of agricultural
income, would distribute land owned by the State to farmers, would guarantee
agricultural loans, control irrigation and institute educational, medical and
social services.
In September, on behalf of the growers,
the Party raised again the problem of the Tobacco administration. In the
previous year, it had succeeded in having it nationalized but this time the
fight was against its internal corruption.
In October, the Party undertook a
widespread campaign, and called for volunteers, to support the Egyptian fight
for evacuation and the rejection of a proposal for a quadripartite defence pact.
On October 28th. It gave Egypt strong support in its opposition to the
evacuation treaty, which would have the effect of isolating her, and pointed out
the danger of this when one considered the importance of Egypt in the Arab
world.
The Egyptian affair provided the Party
with the opportunity to come out into the open in those countries where it was
still in the initial stages, and in Lebanon, the Baathists published a manifesto
under the name of the "Nationalist Arab Youth".
On the anniversary of the Balfour
Declaration, November 2nd 1951, the Party's communiqué pointed out the
connection between the salvation of Palestine, the support of the Egyptian
uprising and the liberation of the Arab homeland and on November 6th called upon
the Baathist youth of the Nile Valley (a group of Arab students in Egyptian
universities and including some Egyptians), to join the freedom battalions.
Shishakli's Dictatorship 1951 – 1954
At the end of November 1951, the Party
was invited to join the People's Party government of Maruf Duwalibi, even though
it had only two parliamentary seats. The Baath refused, however because of the
conditions stipulated and as a result the government found itself cut off from
popular support even though it had a parliamentary majority.
This situation enabled Adib Shishakli to
carry out his coup d'etat on the day following the formation of Duwalibi's
government. He ordered the dissolution of the constitutional Assembly,
transformed it into a National Assembly, dismissed the ministers and took over
direct control.
Shishakli was in a good position as far
as the Party's aims and requirements were concerned, but nevertheless, it
informed him, on December 8th. that it would define its attitude to the coup
d'etat in the light of the new government's actions vis-a-vis the people's
freedom, the return to constitutional government at the earliest opportunity and
the rejection of foreign commitments. It also said, "that the Party could not
turn its back on a constitutionally elected government. But at the same time,
and as a revolutionary socialist party, it would not allow itself to become
ensnared in parliamentary assemblies which were only the instruments of the
exploiters, the feudal cliques and the professional politicians".
During this period, the Party expressed
its views on "the parliamentary experiment and military coups d'etat". It
commented on the fact that Syria, during the last few years, had alternated
between military and parliamentary dictatorship, and stressed the point that a
nominal democratic parliamentary regime was in fact a feudal one. It showed that
there was a connection between parliamentary elections and the laws, which
protected the people from exploitation and terrorization.
In reply to those who used the argument
that a military dictatorship was justified because of the corruption which
existed, the Party stated in its newspaper, on December 29th. 1951, "it is the
struggle of the people which is the real force in the country... the fact that
there is a travesty of democracy does not discredit democracy itself, but only
the baseness of the class which creates the travesty in order to satisfy its
greed and selfish interest".
Despite the seriousness of the
situation, which was developing in Syria and in which the Party was involved, it
continued to note developments in the Arab countries, particularly in Egypt. In
a message published on December 22nd. seven months before the revolution, it
called upon the Egyptian people "to rise against the power of the king and the
pashas", and was enthusiastic about the rapid growth of the people's movement.
On January 19th. 1952, it wrote: "Egypt today is showing us the road to success
in the struggle that is the invincible struggle of the people", and organized
student demonstrations in support. The Shishakli government opposed this and the
Party newspaper riposted with a strong attack in an article on January 26th.
–"The continuance of any government is determined by its fidelity to the freedom
of the people, to its Arabism and to Socialism". Shishakli immediately closed
down the newspaper and prosecuted the Baathists.
In a manifesto published in the same
issue, the Party reiterated the anti-imperialist element in its concept of
neutrality and demanded that a number of interim measures be taken in order to
move towards the main goals of freedom, unity and socialism. The most notable of
these were the denunciation of foreign treaties, the departure of foreign
troops, the nationalization of oil, the nationalization of the exploiting
companies and of the public services, and the announcement of genuine
neutrality.
The Party, at the same time, drew up a
programme for the Arab revolutionary movement to follow up as far as the main
stage of national democratic freedom in the political, economic and military
fields. This programme became the guide for many of the national freedom
movements throughout the entire Arab homeland. Party activity against
Shishakli's dictatorship increased and it began to reinforce its links with its
allies, especially with the Arab Socialist Party .Its leader was Akram Hurani
and its main supporters were in the towns and countryside behind Hama. This
party had similar objectives to those of the Baath, and its constitution,
published in 1950 was also very similar. The merger took place in Damascus on
November 13th. 1953 on the basis of the Baath constitution, and the word
'socialist' was added to the name of the Party .In fact, this signified nothing
new because its socialism had been evident from the very beginning.
The merger had some unfortunate
consequences in that the election campaign mentality and rather traditional
methods began to spread in some Party circles. Nevertheless there were also
positive benefits in the strengthening of the Party's fight against the
dictatorship, which stepped up its repressive measures to the point that the
most important leaders left the country for Lebanon on January 1st. 1953. They
remained there for several months until the Shamoun government expelled them at
Shishakli's request. They then spent four months in Italy, afterwards returning
to Syria to continue the fight. A few weeks after their return they were
arrested, on January 2nd. 1954, and remained in prison until the fall of the
regime on February 24th. of the following year.
The Emergence of the Party on the Arab
Scene 1952 was an important year for the Party, for it was then that the working
people in a number of countries became aware of its organisation.
In Iraq, the Party's philosophy was well
known among student, intellectual, educational and legal circles as a result of
brochures such as 'Observations of the Arab Baath' and 'Arab Politics' or
thought the influence of Arab Syrians attending Baghdad University and Iraqi
students at Damascus University .In the same year, the Independence Party and
the National Democratic Party went into opposition to the government because of
its aversion to the traditional parties. The Baath Party showed its strength by
distributing tracts, organizing strikes and demonstrations, especially during
the uprising of November 1952. This attracted the authorities attention and from
then on they kept a watch on the militants and tried to infiltrate into the
organisation.
The Party also came out into the open in
Lebanon at a large public meeting at Sidon, in the south of the country, held to
commemorate the memory of the Syrian and Lebanese patriots executed on May 6th.
by Jamal Pasha during the First World War. Ten days later the administrative
sections' congress took place during which organizational matters; the
groundwork for future action and the Syrian political situation were discussed.
In Lebanon, on March 6th. 1951, the
Party had issued an appeal for aid to the Moroccan people in their fight against
colonial cruelty, emphasizing that all Arabs should unite to fight colonialism
in every country .On October 18th. 1951, the imperialist plans for joint defence
was attacked in a communiqué, and on October 22nd. a demonstration of support
for the struggle in the Nile Valley was organized.
In Jordan, the Party had started its
activities in 1948 by publishing the newspaper AI-Yaqza. In the following year,
a number of Palestinians joined such as Rimawi and Na'wass, and this provided a
wide field for action, part of which was the decision to take part in the
elections. By 1950 it had two representatives, Na'was in Jerusalem and Rimawi in
Ramallah.
In 1952 the Party held its first
regional congress. It gave guidance to the people's movement by demanding that
the country should be freed from the military and economic shackles of British
imperialism and that the people should regain their freedom of action. It also
opposed the ruler's moves to seek an armistice with Israel and to settle the
refugees on a permanent basis. Large popular demonstrations were organised after
each Israeli frontier aggression and the government attacked for its refusal to
react.
In Syria, the Party in 1953 entered the
final phase of its struggle with the Shishakli dictatorship. It formed a united
front with all the other Syrian parties with the exception of the communists and
nationalists in order to bring down the dictatorship. At a large political
meeting at Homs In the summer of 1953, the front called for a boycott of the
elections. Other methods were also used, beginning with the distribution of
tracts and organizing of demonstrations, and ending by the planting of
explosives in various parts of the towns in order to embarrass and weaken the
regime. It took part in Jabal Al-Arab uprising at the beginning of 1954, losing
more than a hundred of its fighting men, and this opened the way for the spread
of Party membership amongst the officers, starting in Aleppo, and in the end
spreading to every section of the armed forces. As a result, Shishakli was
forced to leave the country to take refuge in Lebanon and subsequently in Brazil
where ten years later he was killed by a young man from Jabal Al-Arab.
In other countries the Party also joined
in the struggle to overthrow Shishakli.
Party activity in Iraq began to take on
wider popular dimensions in 1953, especially after the internal upheaval in the
Iraqi Communist Party, forcing it to disappear from the scene. It published its
first underground newspaper Al-Arabi al-Jadid (The New Arab}, which after its
third edition changed its name to Al-Ishtiraki (The Socialist}. Tracts were
distributed supporting the Moroccan people and the Party also took up the cause
of the Tobacco Company workers in October 1953. On December 14th. it succeeded
in calling a strike of the school and University students as a demonstration of
solidarity with the Basra Petroleum Company's workers, which was a serious
setback for the Jamali government. The Party's reputation reached its peak in
November when it organised a demonstration against the Shishakli dictatorship.
In Lebanon, the Party effectively
demonstrated its solidarity with the Syrian people by distributing tracts and
organizing demonstrations and because of the close ties between the two
countries. During the same year the Party expressed its opposition to the visit
of Dulles to the region.
The severity of the struggle against
Shishakli did not prevent the Party from holding a 'national' meeting at Horns
in the summer of 1953. Representatives of all Syrian branches and offices
together with delegates from Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq were present. It was
decided to convene a large 'national'
congress to work out details for a pan-Arab organisation and to set a new
starting point. An internal bulletin on this, entitled "A Party national
congress" was issued in July 1953.
The Battle over the
Baghdad Pact
The end of Shishakli's dictatorship at
the beginning of 1954 gave the Party complete freedom of movement to continue
the struggle against reactionary movements and the plans of imperialism. This
year witnessed, primarily, the all-out struggle against the Baghdad pact, the
outlines of which were becoming clearer after the visits of Turkish leaders to
the city.
In Iraq itself, the Party had only
limited possibilities for opposing the new imperialist project. It realized that
it would be difficult to block the pact with its own resources, but that at
least, it should start a movement for its rejection and arouse public opinion
against it. The opportunity occurred with the visit of the Turkish Prime
Minister, Adnan Menderes. Banners were put up in the streets and Faculties and
students called upon to strike. The authorities arrested a number of militants
and forced the others to go underground to continue the struggle.
In Jordan, the patriots, with the Party
in the vanguard, protested against the country's membership of the pact. The
ruler decided to dissolve the National Assembly. A new government under Tawfeeq
Abul-Huda was formed and falsified the election results in order to have a
puppet parliament -denounced by all the Jordan and patriotic movements. The
fight against membership of the pact continued throughout 1955. It was stepped
up on the visit of Jalal Bayar, the Turkish President at the beginning of
November and succeeded in preventing a final commitment being made.
In Lebanon in March 1954, the Baathists
organised or took part in student demonstrations. The Lebanese authorities
opposed them by force and there was one dead and several wounded. The American
University, at whose entrance the bloody clashes had taken (place, decided to
dissolve the student assembly and dismissed a large number of students,
including the Baathists.
In Syria, the Party played an important
part in denouncing the pact, especially in its newspaper AI- Baath which had
reappeared on April 8th. 1954, and succeeded in preventing the country from
joining. During the election campaign in the spring and summer of that year, the
Party succeeded in forcing the resignation of the government formed by the
alliance of the People's Party with the National Party, in order that a
non-party government should be responsible for organizing the elections. These
took place on September 24th. and the Party won sixteen seats spread over most
of the governorates.
The newspaper also started a campaign
strongly criticizing the Egyptian government's policy at that time. As a
principle, the Party held certain reserves as far as military regimes were
concerned and it was because the contradictory statements by Egyptian leaders on
pan-Arab policies showed that they lacked a clear idea of what these ought to
be. It also criticised the evacuation treaty with Britain, which the Party saw
as a backward step from total unconditional evacuation.
As far as internal matters were
concerned, the Party held its second national congress during the June of that
year. The first internal rules were approved and the first national Leadership
elected consisting of three members from Syria, two from Jordan and one each
from Iraq and Lebanon. Following on this, Lebanon and Iraq each held its first
regional congresses, -an indication that a new phase had been reached in
national and local organization.
The Party's Syrian regional assembly
took place on January 6th. 1955. Representatives from all the branch offices
together with the Syrian members of the national
Leadership, in particular the Party's
General Secretary Comrade Michel Aflaq, was present. At the meeting, a five
member executive committee was formed consisting of three members elected by the
Assembly and two nominated by the national Leadership, with the responsibility
for implementing the internal regulations.
A large proportion of the Syrian Baath's
activities in that year were taken up with local problems and the role of the
Party's Parliamentary members. In the Budget debates on January 22nd. the Party
stressed that «a capitalist economy in developing countries cannot be a national
economy». On the same day, the Baathist members put forward amendments to the
Labour legislation to help the working class and to give protection to the land
workers and their right to have a trade union. On June 4th.they put forward a
proposal for the nationalization of foreign oil companies in the country, after
having presented a detailed study of their operations.
All this did not prevent the Party from
giving special attention to the anti-pact struggle. In February 1955, it
attacked Iraq's foreign policy. It agreed to join the coalition government with
the aim of working out an independent Arab policy for Syria, especially after
Nuri
Sa'id had signed the pact with Turkey.
It reiterated, however, that «the present government is not the ideal one but it
is the one which we should accept since It is the outcome of parliamentary party
agreements".
The Party put up strong resistance to
the attempts to refute Syria's Arab nationalist policy. These attempts by the
groups supporting the imperialist pacts became more aggressive, and ended with
the assassination of Adnan al-Maliki, the Syrian Deputy Chief of Staff. The
objective was to weaken the nationalists' influence in the army.
In August 1955, the Party once again
opposed the election of Shukri al-Quwatli as President of the Republic even
though the two majority parties, the People's
Party and the National Party, supported
his candidacy. During the period of Sa'id al-Ghazzi's government, formed after
these elections, the Party remained in the opposition.
It put up strenuous objections to the
Franco- Tunisian agreement which destroyed the people's rights and gave its
support to Salih benYusif, the Tunisian leader of the opposition at the time.
In Iraq, the people's opposition to the
pacts and to Nuri Sa 'id's government increased, and the tracts and
demonstrations became more frequent. Suddenly, in June 1955, the reactionary
government launched a widespread campaign of repression against the Party
militants, during which they discovered
the hiding place of the only roneo machine used for printing the newspaper and
the tracts, and seized it. Twenty-two militants were arrested and a large
number forced to go into hiding. This reduced Party activities for several
months, but these were subsequently restarted with even greater energy.
In Lebanon, the Party initiated a
widespread campaign against the pacts. On January 14th. 1955, it published a
communiqué in the name of «The Free Arab Nationalists", and called for a
demonstration against the visit to Lebanon of the Turkish President, Jalal
Bayar. It also strengthened its internal organisation as a result of practical
experience, and defined the course of action to be followed by the progressive
Arab movements in the country.
In Jordan, the national movements
continued to fight against the Baghdad pact membership and the puppet
parliament. As a result of violent clashes with the police in which 80 people
were killed, the king had to dismiss the government, dissolve parliament and set
new elections for September 1956. Rimawi and Kamal Nasir were elected in
Ramallah, and Abdulla Na'was for Jerusalem, apart from a large number of
patriotic party candidates. In the same year, the Party organised active
demonstrations at the time of the visit of the British general Templer, and
demanded the dismissal of Glubb Pasha, the British Commander in Chief of the
Jordanian army.
In 1955 also, the Party came into being
in South Yemen and joined the workers Congress and the Trade Unions in Aden.
On the road to Unity
(1956-1958)
1956 was a positive year in our nation's
contemporary history not only in the anti-imperialist struggle of the
nationalization of the Suez Canal and the Anglo-French-Zionist attack on Egypt,
but also in the struggle for unity, for which in Syria, the Party played an
important part in promoting the union with Egypt.
The Egyptian breaking of the arms
embargo by turning to the socialist camp, and its hostile attitude to the
Baghdad pact were clear evidence of the liberating and anti-imperialist
character of the July revolution.
From that point onwards, the Party's
attitude to the revolution continued to improve and consideration was given to
the idea of creating an Arab national front to oppose all pacts which were aimed
at yoking the region, politically and militarily, to the imperialist sphere of
interest.
On April 17th. 1956, the anniversary of
the evacuation of Syria, the General Secretary issued a communiqué into which
the slogan for union between Egypt and Syria was introduced. He called upon the
militants to prepare the people for it and to put pressure on the government and
the parliament for its adoption. The Party explained that at this stage,
imperialist policy was primarily concerned with isolating Egypt, also the
Maghreb from the Mashreq, by providing "Israel" with arms so that it could
continue with its aggression against the Arab nation, and in putting up
proposals for pseudo-union with the objective of separating the Arabs from
Egypt. The main objective of this policy was the protection of the oilfields and
their communications, the safeguarding of their markets, and the establishment
of strategic bases.
In Syria, the government’s situation was
unstable.
The composition of the national Assembly
had not changed, and therefore did not reflect the major change in popular
opinion towards the Party .The government, of which the Party was not a member,
still had the confidence of the Assembly, but no longer that of the population.
The majority of parties agreed, for this reason, on the need to set up a
coalition government in order that there should be continuity in Syria's
policies. The Party declared that the basis for this coalition should be a
National Charter, which would satisfy everyone. On March 26th. 1956, it put
forward a project for a charter, part of which was a programme for a serious
confrontation with imperialism and Zionism as being an important step forward
towards the liberation and unity of the Arab countries. One of its most
important points was the proclamation of the union of Syria and Egypt as the
nucleus of total Arab unity and a realistic move in this direction. In Syrian
affairs, the Charter set out a clear defence policy, "which considered the whole
population, both men and women, civilians and military, in the front or in the
rear, as being in the service of national defence".
As was usual, the traditional parties
opposed the project, and in remaining firm, the Party precipitated a cabinet
crisis. The government resigned, and Lutfi al-Haffar, the symbol of conventional
politics, was asked to form a government. The Party's attitude foiled this
maneuver and the traditionalists were
compelled to invite it on its own conditions. In June, it held two key posts in
the new cabinet, the Ministries for Foreign and Economic Affairs.
Although some of the traditionalists
were opposed to the inclusion in its policy declaration of a clear reference to
the Union project, the Party held its ground and refused to bargain. Its
viewpoint was finally accepted and the project submitted to the national
Assembly, which unanimously approved it on July 6th. The government was
thereupon instructed to take the necessary steps for its implementation.
The Party's struggle for union went hand
in hand with its efforts to forge an effective solidarity with the Algerian
people in their uprising against French colonialism. It nominated May 8th,
as Algeria Day, the anniversary of the French 1945 massacres. It organised
demonstrations and strikes and demanded that the Arab governments should support
the Algerian revolution and boycott France. On June 1st. it strongly attacked
the
Syrian government when it discovered
that the Ministry of the Economy was exporting cereals to France. This attack,
and its repercussions amongst the people, was one of the reasons for the fall of
the government, leaving the way clear for a national coalition.
In Jordan, the early part of 1956 saw an
increase in the people's resentment against the attitude in favour of the
Baghdad pact. As a result, Samir Rifai's government fell and in March, Glubb
Pasha was dismissed. The way was clear for the formation of a national coalition
government, presided over by Suleiman Nablusi, in which Rimawi who held the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs represented the Party.
In Iraq, the Party spent the first half
of the year in strengthening its organisation. At the same time, it continued
its struggle against the reactionary regime. On February 24th. The anniversary
of the signing of the Baghdad pact by Nuri Sa'id, it published tracts and
organised demonstrations of solidarity
with the Jordanian people's uprising, and on March 11th. celebrated the
dismissal of Glubb Pasha as a step towards complete freedom from British
influence. On March 23rd. there was a demonstration of solidarity with the
Maghreb, particularly with Algeria, and on May 1st. it pointed out the
connection between the exploitation of the working class and colonial
exploitation with its subjugation of entire nations. In so doing, it explained
the main link between the national struggle and the class struggle in the Arab
revolution.
In Lebanon also, the Party organised
popular demonstrations, on January 12th. in support of the Jordanian people, and
at the beginning of April, with the Algerian people. On May 1st., it called for
the unity of the Arab working class and its trade unions.
It was at about this time that the Party
message began to spread amongst the Egyptian youth, especially in the
Universities of Cairo and Alexandria. Similarly it began to spread also in
certain parts of the Gulf, in Bahrain and the eastern side of the Arabian
Peninsula.
This extension of the movement was a
necessity before the Arab nation's battle started on Egyptian soil for the
nationalization of the Canal and the resistance to the tripartite aggression.
The close relationship which the Baath had with the Arab peoples had an enormous
effect in making Egypt the battlefield of the Arab nation and in planting the
feet of the struggle for unity into solid ground.
At the end of June 1956, three weeks
before the Canal nationalization, Jamal Abd-an-Nasser was elected President of
the Egyptian Republic, and approval was given to the constitution, which stated
clearly that Egypt was an indivisible part of the Arab nation. The Party
Leadership sent a telegram of congratulation and support for his actions:
"Continue with what you have begun, to lead Egypt towards social justice,
towards true democracy, towards effective support of the Arab struggle wherever
it may be, and towards the implementation of the union between Egypt and Syria".
After the nationalization of the Canal,
celebrated by the Baath and the Arab people, the broad outlines of the
imperialist plot against Egypt began to become clear.
The British Prime Minister, Eden,
convened a conference in London on August 16th. to discuss the nationalization.
The Party in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon made it into a day of support for
Egypt. The strikes and demonstrations could have left Eden in no doubt as to the
militant solidarity of the Arabs with Egypt.
In a powerful article, the Party founder
stated on August 23rd., two months before the aggression took place, that a
direct confrontation with imperialism was inevitable; furthermore, that the
Arabs should make the necessary preparations by embarking on a revolutionary
course which would answer the demands of the people.
Michel Aflaq reiterated that it was
possible for the Arabs, if they took as their base the Algerian revolution and
recently liberated Egypt, to work out the course of the struggle and to join it
in full confidence and assurance.
In September, in Damascus, a large
public meeting was held to support the Canal nationalization and to hold this up
as an example of Arab unity from the people's point of view. And from the moment
that the aggression began, the Baath militants brought out the people in
demonstrations of solidarity with Egypt.
In Syria, the militants blew up the
pipelines, using the oil weapon for the first time against the enemy. Training
camps were opened for volunteers from all the Arab countries, who came
especially from Lebanon and Jordan. The government ordered a general
mobilization to defend the country, and broke off diplomatic relations with the
aggressor countries.
In Baghdad, Nuri Sa 'id's government put
on the semblance of participation while scoffing at the Egyptian leaders. The
Party and others of the national Front organised violent demonstrations all over
the country, on which the authorities fired, causing scores of deaths and
hundreds of wounded.
Foreseeing the dangers ahead, the Iraqi
Party, after its third regional assembly, called for a renewal, in the 5th issue
of its newspaper 'The Socialist' (July/ August 1956) of the National Union
Front, a call which it repeated in November. It also opposed the statement by
Nuri Sa'id in London on October 14th. in which he called for a final settlement
of the Palestine problem by pushing the Israelis to enter into negotiations with
the Arabs. On October 28th the Party again called a general strike in solidarity
with the Algerian revolution.
In Jordan, the Party's participation in
the government was an important factor in maintaining the country's
non-alignment with the imperialist camp, and, up to a point, in line with Arab
aspirations. The Baathist Minister for Foreign Affairs played an important role
at the meeting in Beirut of the kings and presidents, held to decide upon a
unified Arab posture vis-a-vis the aggression.
In Lebanon, after President Camille
Shimun had clearly shown his complicity with imperialism by his refusal to break
off diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain, the Party helped to
mobilize the people against the government and demanded its resignation as a
protest against Camille Shimun's attitude. It joined in the forming of the
national opposition, which, in 1958, rose up against the Shimun regime.
The failure of the Franco- British
attack on Egypt tolled the knell of old-style imperialism. From then on the new
leader was America in the place of England and France. The Party, (in AI-Baath,
March 1957) revealed the broad outline of American imperialism's new plan, part
of which had been exposed by President Eisenhower in his address to Congress at
the beginning of 1957. He defined his principles, known as the Eisenhower
Doctrine, for "exploiting the breach in the Middle East". The Party said that
the plan envisaged the destruction of the Arab nationalist movement, which was
developing into a historically powerful force. This would be achieved by
dividing the people's struggle in the Maghreb from that in the Mashreq by
overthrowing and dispersing freedom movements, by setting up American bases,
and, for good measure, by stirring up fears of communism. These imperialist
projects became realities by their making the Saudi regime their headquarters,
by the way in which they won over Lebanon to the Eisenhower project, by the
stirring up of dissension among the allied movements in Jordan and by
encouraging the conspiracy against Syria.
The Party's forecasts proved to be
accurate. After a short time, in the spring of 1957, king Hussein of Jordan
turned against the national movements, dismissed the cabinet, purged the army of
patriotic elements and started a big campaign of arrests and prosecutions
against the national movements and against the Party in first place.
In Lebanon, Shimun tried to attack the
national movement and extend the State of Emergency, imposed on the pretext of
the aggression against Egypt, in order to restrict the activities of the
national militants. He falsified the legislative elections to keep the
opposition out of parliament. He repressed the people's angry demonstrations,
which the Party had played an important part in organizing in Beirut and other
towns. It was in the same year, in October 1957, that the Party published its
underground newspaper, The New Arab, and noticeably widened its popular base.
America succeeded in leading king Saud
into the fold, after which some minor disputes within the Hashimite family
caused him to go along with the current of liberation and to get involved with
charters and declarations as Egypt and Syria had done.
In Syria, plots and attempts to stir up
internal trouble followed one after the other and the economic blockade
increased. But the nationalist freedom movement led by the Baath Party, dealt
with them firmly. It was determined to carry on the struggle against
imperialism, for union with Egypt and alliances with socialist countries.
Imperialism then encouraged the Turkish government, which was in its pay, to
mass troops on the Syrian frontier in preparation for a major attack. The Party
and nationalist movements set about creating a people's defence force capable of
resisting an attack, and speeded up the measures for union with Egypt.
Between July 9th. and 12th. 1957, the
Party held a regional congress to go into organizational problems in the light
of its previous experience. Regional Leadership of nine members was elected with
Dr. Midhat al-Bitar as Syrian Regional Secretary. The Party now had a powerful
influence with the population, and this became evident during the partial
elections, which took place that year to replace those members who had been
sentenced for their participation in the imperialist plot against the country
.The Party won two seats, one in Damascus and one in Jabal Al-Arab, bringing the
total to eighteen.
In Iraq, the Party continued the
struggle against the most shamelessly reactionary of all Arab governments and
the one most involved in imperialism's plans. It also continued the people's
struggle, which had started after the tripartite attack on Egypt. When the
authorities re-opened the faculties and schools at the end of January 1957 on
the assumption that calm had returned to Iraq, student demonstrations, joined by
wide sections of the population, began, using the slogan: "No peace or stability
for Sa'id's government, nor for the hateful Baghdad pact while free men remain
in prison". The Commemoration of the forty victims during the demonstrations at
Najaf was yet another occasion for a new fight with the men in power. There were
several clashes at Mosul, Hilla and elsewhere. Hundreds of students in Baghdad
were arrested and the prisons and camps were filled with the free men of Iraq,
(Al-Ishtiraki No.8, February 1957).
The Party mobilized the Iraqi people on
a wide scale against the Eisenhower Doctrine and demanded a clear definition of
the responsibilities of the High Committee of the National Union Front, which
had been formed as an opposition alliance. Apart from the Baath, it consisted of
the Independence Party (Istiqlal), the National Party, the Democratic Party, and
the Communist Party. When Nuri Sa'id's government fell in August 1957, the Party
resolutely opposed the Ayyubi government, which only lasted four months and was
succeeded on December 22nd, by that of Abd-al- Wahhab who only confirmed the
Party's view of the pro-imperialist policy.
In Iraq the Party was effective in
galvanizing the people to join the struggle. It proved this capability at a time
when the Communist Party was torn by internal strife. The fourth regional
assembly was held at that time, November 1957, and devoted a large proportion of
its discussions to the condition of the National Union Front and the role of the
Party within it.
On the national scene, the Party had
been expanding in Egypt. Its General Secretary Michel Aflaq spent long periods
there with young people, with intellectuals and with militants. It was his
opportunity to explain and disseminate the Party's thinking in this large Arab
country.
UNION AND SEPARATION
(1958-1963)
It was evident that 1957
opened the road to one of the most important victories in contemporary Arab
history, namely, the union of Egypt and Syria, which took place on February
22nd. 1958, and for which the Party paid a high price. This price was the
dissolution of its organisation in the two countries. Although the Syrian
regional congress unanimously supported this, the young Party in Egypt gave a
warning against the seriousness of this decision in the light of their direct
experience of the regime.
The victory over union
gave a new impetus to the wave of nationalism and revolution in the region
during that year. The Algerian revolution, then in its third year, received a
powerful stimulus. The national struggle in Iraq found new energy at all levels
and led to the revolutionary explosion of July 14th.Revolution against the main
stronghold of imperialism and reaction in the region.
When the regime fell so
did the Baghdad pact, dragging with it the plans and dreams of old-style
imperialism. The Baath took part in the revolution and in the first government,
which followed.
In Lebanon, the birth of
the United Arab Republic met an immense response from the people. Young
Baathists led tens of thousands in demonstrations in all the towns. Thousands of
them went to Damascus to join in the celebrations. The ditch separating the
Lebanese Arabs, seeking
freedom, and the isolationist government in the pay of imperialism became deeper
and culminated in the insurrection, which broke out in
May 1958. It lasted for
five months and ended in the downfall of Camille Shimun after the attempt to
renew his mandate had been blocked and after departure of the Sixth Fleet which
had rushed to the help of the Lebanese government following the revolutionary
victory in Iraq.
The Party played a
leading role in this insurrection by starting it off in Tripoli before it broke
out in the rest of the country. It was one of the principal instigators in
Beirut, Baalbek, Sidon, Tyre, Nabtiya and Akkar. It dissociated itself from the
traditional movements, which also took part, by its care in avoiding any avowals
and by uncovering the selfish opportunism of some of the traditional leaders. It
energetically and openly opposed the action of the American Sixth Fleet, which
had landed marines on the Lebanese beaches, an attitude which accentuated the
differences with some of the traditional opposition leaders who kept silent on
this subject.
Despite attempts to
isolate the Party by the United Arab Republic's information services, which did
not take the people's view on the unfolding of events, its active participation
in the insurrection of 1958 had a big effect on its penetration amongst the
people and also on its membership which, after the Lebanese regional congress
had been held a few months later, quadrupled itself.
After a few months had
passed, the nationalistic revolutionary wave, which had gained new impetus with
the proclamation of the Egyptian-Syrian union, began to subside. This was the
result of the divisions in the Iraqi progressive camp between the nationalists
and the communists, and also in the ranks of the Union nationalist movements
between the Baath and Abd-an-Nasser who had differing viewpoints on the
application of this unique experiment of union.
During the period of the
Union, the Baath movement experienced, in the words of Michel Aflaq "the deepest
and most violent crisis in its history. It had contributed to the birth of an
historic event in the union between Syria and Egypt. Shortly afterwards it
suffered the cruel disappointment of seeing its project watered down in its
implementation. The crisis for the Arab vanguard is even more acute and complex
since, with time, it has come to realise that it did not measure up to the size
of the project and was not capable of sustaining and protecting it".
The Baath was aware of
the historic meaning of the first real experiment of union in Arab modem
history. It was aware also of the importance of the imperialist and reactionary
conspiracy aimed against it. But being a democratic people's movement, it
realized that the democratic content of this union was one of the conditions for
its development and progress and the guarantee of its continuance. It was
therefore necessary to level criticism at certain non-democratic practices,
which had occurred and hindered the role of the mass organizations in the
development and protection of the experiment.
This had opened up a
breach into which reactionary and imperialist agents were able to move in order
to carry out their plot. The result was the breakdown of the union on February
28th. 1961.
Since it is a
nationalist movement for unity, the Baath realized that the success of the pilot
union, and the kernel of this union, would be determined by the ability to hold
on to this vision of unity in all its forms and aspects. The dangers, which
threatened it, as Michel Aflaq said on the very day that the new republic was
born "the most serious dangers are those which are not immediately apparent; the
gravest of them is that there still remains the vestiges of the mentality and
interests associated with division and that the union has been woven with the
threads of division. This may mean that contradictions will arise and the
experiment fail". (February 23rd. 1958)
On the eve of union, the
Party gave a warning of the mortal danger, which threatened it. The General
Secretary said on February 20th. "If this republic's actions are confined to
local internal matters and if it does not fulfill its duty to its brothers in
other countries, its very existence will be threatened".
Some of the most
important of the differences between the Baath and the Nasser government were
the anti-democratic practices, the signs of domination of one country by the
other, and the tendency to retire within itself. The Party was always trying to
minimize these differences so that they would not affect the union, through its
bulletins, communiqués and everyday politics. On the other hand, there were many
organizations such as the information service and the civil service, which spent
their order to widen the split between the factions of the Arab revolutionary
movement. As a result of these errors, some Baathist ministers had to resign and
certain spokesmen of the regime spared no effort in attacking the past and the
militant activities of the Baathists. But the Party always tried to look only at
the positive sides of the union experiment and the government of the U.A.R.
(United Arab Republic) When relations were at their most difficult, it hastened
to support the socialist measures promulgated on July 22nd. 1961, underlining
the importance of worker participation in putting them into effect.
Its attitude towards the
breakdown in September was clear. It considered that it was the outcome of an
imperialist and reactionary plot, which had taken advantage of certain mistakes
to destroy the union. It called for its re-establishment on a popular democratic
basis. It stubbornly opposed the government, which followed upon the breakdown.
This government suspended the Al-Baath newspaper in October 1962 although not
more than thirteen issues had appeared; it court-martialed some Baathist
officers, some of whom were condemned to death for their union activities, and
it prosecuted its leaders and militants. The Party's policies were the object of
violent attacks in the mass media, in which joined all those who had contributed
to the breakdown whatever their political complexion. But in the end, the Party
made a powerful effort towards the downfall of the regime on March 8th. 1963.
All of this is irrefutable evidence of the Party's wish for union and its
nationalist identity.
In any event, the
attitude, which it had to adopt, was a very delicate one. With the Union
government it had to preserve the union and criticize the mistakes. With the
post-Union government it had to oppose it and call for the re-establishment of
the union. This headlong haste threw it into violent internal crises. Some,
during the union, wanted the Party to abandon its popular democratic and
revolutionary values as well as its historic and militant role to become a
simple cog in the machinery of government. Others, after the breakdown, wanted
it to become a tool of the separatists. However, in three national congresses,
the 3rd. held on August 27 September 1st. 1959, the 4th.in August 1960 and the
5th. in May 1962, the Party succeeded in reversing these trends and defining a
new starting point on the basis of its previous experience and the crisis, which
the Arab revolution was undergoing. From its experience of union and its
breakdown, it was able to strengthen its unitary, democratic and progressive
features and its historical role while perfecting its revolutionary techniques
with the masses of the people.
Although the union
experiment was a painful experience, this period saw the implantation and growth
of the organisation in several Arab countries where it had hitherto not existed,
especially in the Maghreb, Tunisia and Libya, in the Sudan, in the Arabian
Peninsula and North Yemen.
In Libya, the Party's
influence became so strong that the reactionary authorities, in August 1961,
believed that the Baathist youth were preparing to overthrow the monarchy. They
arrested more than a hundred Baathist militants from amongst the trade union and
student leaders, sectors in which the Party had been playing an important role.
In the Sudan, the
movement began in university and student circles whit the struggle against the
dictatorship of Ibrahim Abboud (1958-1964). The first Sudanese militants,
amongst whom was Mohammed Sulayman, were sent to prison on several occasions.
They took part in demonstrations and helped the people to overthrow the corrupt
military regime.
In the Arabian
Peninsula, the organisation began to take shape even though up until then it had
only had an influence with the students in the universities of Iraq, Syria,
Egypt and Lebanon. It now began to spread amongst the working class of the
eastern region and the students and intellectuals in other towns, especially
Riyadh.
In North Yemen, the
organisation came into being through the students who had returned to their
country. It spread in student and military circles and gave the Party a special
role in the revolution of September 26th 1962 which ended the monarchy. One of
its most important leaders was Lt. Ali Abd-al-Ghani, a young Baathist who became
vice-President of the Revolutionary Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs
was the seasoned Baathist Muhsin al-Ayni, another example of the eminent part
played by the Party's young men in preparing the revolution.
In Lebanon, the Party
emerged from the insurrection with greater strength, with more experience, and
more firmly rooted amongst the people. From then on, it took on the
responsibility for 'national' activity since the Party's headquarters had been
transferred there after its dissolution in Syria and the persecution it was
enduring in other countries. On the instructions of the National Leadership, it
applied for official registration. Its revolutionary and nationalist activities
were concentrated on social and regional work of a militant character and it
played an important part in the preparations for the 3rd and 4th National
Congresses, held in Lebanon.
An important Party
activity at the time was the provision of evidence of solidarity with the
people's movements in other Arab countries; the Algerian revolution, the
struggle for Arabism in Iraq and the Palestine question. For the latter, the
Party proposed the creation of a people's army of liberation for Palestine, and
in March 1961 called for a united front to achieve this goal. But apart from
this, it continued to broaden its base by leading the struggle together with the
Iraq Petroleum Company's workers, with the peasants, the tobacco growers and the
students who were fighting for the establishment of a Lebanese University. Its
platform was its newspaper, As-Sahafa (The Press), but this had to cease
publication for financial reasons in December 1960. The following February its
place was taken by the underground newspaper "AI- Ishtiraki").
In the legislative
elections of 1960, the Party Leadership decided that they would only put up one
candidate, Abd-al-Majid ar-Rafi'i, in Tripoli. His successful campaign gave him
a majority of more than 14,000 votes, but last minute falsifications robbed him
of his victory.
In Jordan, there were
many attempts to reorganize the Party after the government attack of 1957. But
the breakaway of Rimawi and the electioneering character of the Party made it an
easy target for the government. The militants, however, persevered in their
attempts at reconstruction, risking imprisonment, fines and exile. In doing
this, they made it clear to the Party as to what its attitude should be towards
most of the political events, which occurred in Jordan and the region. In Iraq,
the years 1959-1963 were one of the most spectacular in the people's national
struggle led by the Baath... When Qasim’s regime deviated from the unitary and
democratic goals of the July 14th-: revolution in order to win the support of
the Communist Party, the Baath opposed this trend and prepared for sacrifices
and a bitter fight.
At the first appearance
of deviation signs by the Communists, the Party immediately chided them while
being careful to maintain the cohesion in the ranks of the progressives. It
refused to react to the many provocations offered and called for a united stand
(AI- Tali'a, November 1958). It continued to do so after the massacres of the
minority groups following the abortive uprising of Shawwaf on March 8th. 1959.
On April 8th. the Party published a communiqué stating that, in spite of what
had happened and the waves of arrests, the way remained open for the situation
to be rectified. But these appeals received no answer.
The persecution of the
Baathists and the national factions increased: but at the same time the Party's
influence with the people grew stronger. Then In October 1959, there was an
attempt to assassinate Qassim. The attempt was criticised by the national and
regional congresses because it was a decision taken without consultation and was
not part of an overall plan to overthrow the regime. On the other hand, it was a
demonstration of the courage and inflexible will of the militants. This became
apparent during the trials, when a number of young militants were condemned to
death. The Party started a campaign in Iraq and abroad to save them, as a result
of which their sentences were commuted.
During these courageous
battles with the government, the Party took care to prevent itself from being
used by Qassim against the Communists after he had broke away from them. This
was explained in an internal bulletin dated April 8th. 1960. In a further one in
May,
it condemned the attacks
made on the Communists at a time when it was to the government's advantage to do
so.
In the name of the
National Leadership, the General Secretary of the Party sent a letter to the
Iraqi regional Leadership warning them against being drawn into acts of
vengeance on the Communists.
In 1960, the Baath had
spread into all sections of the population, and at the end of June 1960,
published its newspaper, The Workers Conscience. Two years later, in the summer,
it was involved in trade union struggles, exposing itself to all kinds of
pressure and intimidation.
Nevertheless it
continued to win through and its success was reflected in the increased
influence it had gained amongst the working class.
In the light of the
Communist Party's and the Nationalist Party's attitudes towards Qassim, the
Baath created, in 1961, a nationalist front to include the Independence Party,
the Nationalist League and the yet being exploited by the oil companies (this
was law N°. 80), the creation of a national oil company, the acquisition of
share capital in
the oil companies, the
setting up of a programme for Iraqization, an examination of their accounts, the
transfer of their headquarters from London to Baghdad and an increase in Iraq's
share of their profits.
In March 1961, the Party
started the famous petrol strike during which strikers clashed with the
authorities.
Eight of the militants
fell. This battle underlined the link between the Party's national and socialist
struggle. In November, it demanded the nationalization of the French owned part
of I.P .C. as a reprisal for the attacks on Algeria. This was the first specific
and practical use of the oil weapon in the battle.
1962 was the real
preparatory year for the revolution of February 1963. The Party carried on the
fight at all levels. It led it in workers trade union elections during the
summer, and, in the winter, for the students. This latter began by a strike in a
Baghdad secondary school, joined subsequently by the Faculties and Institutes.
It then spread to the primary schools outside of Baghdad, linking thereby
students’ grievances with political demands and preparing Iraq, after a strike
of six weeks, for the people's Ramadan revolution (February 1963).
Many of Iraq's sons have
been sacrificed in the struggle to preserve the Arab character of the country,
but they have always joined in the Party's and the nation's fight in all its
phases. It supported the United Arab Republic, even while criticizing its
machinery.
From the beginning it
strenuously opposed separation. It fought often for the Algerian revolution.
When Ben Bella came on a visit in 1962, he was surprised by the strength of the
Party. In defiance of the dictatorship, its members lined the route shouting for
long life for the Algerian revolution in the person of its leader, "Greetings
Ben Bella from the Baath Party, long live Ben Bella".
Ben Bella then asked his
companions: "Why has this party not taken over power?"
Only a few months
elapsed before the Party launched the first armed people's revolution in
contemporary Arab history.
The First Experience
of Power in Iraq
(February 8th
-November 18th 1963)
When the Party took over
power in Iraq after the revolution of Ramadan 14 (February 8th. 1963), the
highest hopes were placed in it since it clearly had the people's support.
Furthermore, it gave the appearance of being an organised political party with a
philosophy and a revolutionary force, which had never been seen before in the
region.
Iraq embarked
immediately on the road to unity, first of all with the tripartite Charter of
April 17th among Iraq, Syria and Egypt, from which President Nasser said he
would withdraw in his speech of July 22nd., 1963, the anniversary of the
Egyptian revolution, and subsequently the union between Iraq and Syria which was
approved by the 6th. National Congress October 5th - 23rd. On October
9th, during the congress, the first step, the union of the armed
forces, was proclaimed. This revolution also played an important part in
overthrowing the government, which had taken over in Syria after the separation.
As Michel Aflaq said, it came to avenge the unity of the plot, which had brought
about the separation.
Unfortunately, many
errors took place in this experiment and were denounced by the 8th. National
Congress when it analysed the setback of the Iraqi regime.
There had been no
serious study of the country's economic and social situation. The opposition
mentality which permeated the Party during the underground struggle, continued
when it was in power. The new leaders lacked experience. The Regional Leadership
failed to carry out its responsibilities within the Party, which caused a break
between the rank and file and the leadership. The military establishment was
also completely neglected. The selection of people for certain key positions was
done on the basis of personal relationships rather than Party criteria. There
was a withdrawal into itself and aggressiveness towards the army as well as
disputes between the Party and the National Guard.
Furthermore, the
National Directorate was slow in taking decisions at the opportune moment, and,
finally, no major revolutionary measures were enacted. All these factors helped
the reactionary elements with their plot to overthrow the regime on November
18th. 1963.
In spite of the
atmosphere of division within the Party after the November coup and the increase
in mutual accusation and suspicion between the militants and the leaders, the
Party was able to reorganize itself and overcome all the difficulties and
dangers. Less than ten months later it began to prepare to overthrow the regime.
Unfortunately the plan was discovered on September 5th. 1964 and the government
took the opportunity to give the Party a hard knock. A large wave of arrests
took place and tens of thousands of militants; their friends and supporters were
taken. Comrade Ahmad Hasan al- Bakr was one of the first to be arrested.
Those who escaped the
net continued the struggle with a rare courage. Comrade Saddam Hussein was at
their head, fighting underground a few weeks after the persecution started. He
sent a recording from his hiding place to Damascus on November 7th. 1964 in
which he described the savageness of the reactionary campaign against the Party
and the form of the conspiracy against Iraq. He promised the militants and the
Arab people that the fight would go on until the reactionary regime was
overthrown. After comrade Saddam was arrested, the Party cells in the secret
organisation fought on in spite of repression and arrest. The Party in other
countries gave its help to the militants and the Iraqi people. In Syria a week
of solidarity was organised November 6th. -12th.
1964 with demonstrations
and meetings, and Radio Damascus had a daily broadcast, in the evening, on Iraq.
When the June 5th. 1967
defeat took place, a large number of militant Baathists were still in prison in
Iraq, a fact that the Arab people noted as being a connection between the defeat
and the November 18th. 1963 conspiracy against the Party in Iraq and the
February 23rd.
The Experience of
Power in Syria
(March 8th.
1963-February 23rd. 1966)
The downfall of Qasim in
Iraq removed one of the main pillars of support of the separatist Syrian
government. Its collapse from then on was only a matter of time, accelerated by
the increase in the popular wave of support for unity and because the
reactionary character of the regime was becoming apparent once all the false
progressive pretences borrowed from certain past movements had been unmasked.
So when a group of
Baathist officers decided to bring it down on March 8th. 1963, they encountered
no difficulty and succeeded in winning the support of the pro-Nasser officers.
The result was a nationalist alliance, reflected in the National Revolution
Council and in the composition of the government. When the cabinet was
appointed, the Party's leading role was underlined because of its long existence
in the country and its unequivocal position towards separation. In addition,
another branch of the Bath had taken over power in Iraq, and in Syria itself,
many Baathist officers had been involved in the move to overthrow the separatist
regime.
The major role which it
had in the Syrian government and the revolutionary experiment in Iraq, led the
Party to propose a tripartite union of Egypt, Iraq and Syria. It was in fact, a
new form of a Charter for Union, issued on April 17th. and which took account of
all the previous mistakes. It particularly stressed the democratic and socialist
aspects of union, and the liberty of the political and people's organizations,
while taking account also of the circumstances prevailing in each country at the
time of the ratification of federal union.
This advanced proposal
triggered off an immense wave of nationalist and revolutionary fervor in the
region. In Jordan, demonstrations of support took place calling for membership
also of the new united republic. The government suppressed them severely and
threw thousands into prison including the Party's leaders.
A wave of patriotism
also spread over the Arabian Peninsula. Many militants for union turned to the
Party, placing their hopes in it and offering their services to prepare for the
change. In Bahrain there were popular uprisings. In the Lebanon, the Party and
the Palestinian organisation became active amongst the Palestinian people and
formed a group of sharpshooters under the Party's leadership. Many Baathists
left their work to go to Damascus in the expectation of concrete action.
Preliminary contacts
were made with the Arabs in occupied Palestine, especially with "Al-Ardh" (The
Earth) organisation. Young Baathists carried out reconnaissance operations in
the interior, including Jalal Ka 'Wash one of its most well known members and
one of the first to join the «Fath" in 1965. But this organisation did not last
long because the Party was engrossed with the exercise of government and with
internal problems.
Just as union raised the
hopes of the Arab people, so it raised the fears of Zionism and imperialism. The
conspiracy against it started immediately, by attempts to recreate in every
sector, suspicions and resentment and to renew the old quarrels between the two
protagonists on which union depended, the Baath and Nasser.
Certain members of the
Egyptian government, known for their 'suspect' connections (some were unmasked
later on, like Mustafa and Ali Amin), set about emphasizing the differences in
the press and on the radio. By making exaggerated claims about the Nasserite
elements in Syria and Iraq, they tried to force through changes to the detriment
of the Baath Party.
These moves aroused
fears amongst the Baathists that the same mistakes as before would be repeated,
and these fears were widely exploited by new members of the Party who were
unaware of its unity policy, its struggle and its history. This attitude was
just what the disloyal members of the Egyptian regime were looking for. The
quarrel broke out several times between the Baath and Nasser, but on each
occasion the Party hastened to resolve it. The final conciliation attempt was
the dispatch of a Party delegation with the authority to settle all matters of
contention, on the morning of July 18th. 1963. But during the flight, they were
surprised to learn that a bloody attempt at a coup d'etat by Nasserite elements
had taken place against the Syrian Baath. This only aggravated the conflict and
led President Nasser to announce Egypt's withdrawal from the tripartite charter
for union on July 22nd. Nasser was able subsequently to unmask a certain number
of the disloyal men who had sabotaged his relations with the Baath. Several
Egyptian sources are aware of this fact.
But the most serious and
revolting plot, which the Party has ever had, to face was that organised by the
factions hostile to unity, to democracy and to progressiveness. The history of
the government in Syria, which lasted three years, was that of a violent
conflict between the Party with its tradition of unity, its long militant
experience and its nationwide organisation, and a ruling group, exclusive in its
outlook, thinking and practice, and stranger to the Party's history and militant
popular principles, and relying mainly upon internal army loyalties to maintain
it in power.
During the conflict with
the Party, the group gave itself various names. Sometimes it called itself the
«military committee", pretending thereby to represent the military establishment
whereas in fact, it had imposed its authority on the military supposedly in the
name of the Baath (as came out during the army congress of April 1965).
Sometimes it regarded itself as the Regional Leadership so that it could deal
with local regulations.
This gave it the
opportunity to bypass the militants who had been Party members for a long time
and to infiltrate a large number of its own supporters, some of whom belonged to
the regional directorate even though they had not been members at the time of
the March takeover. They even called themselves the "exclusive Syrians" who had
left the Party after the 8th. National Congress. The March movement had proved
the falseness of their logic and of their alliance with the separatists.
The setback to the Iraq
experiment in November 1963 and the divisions that ensued at the 7th. National
Congress encouraged this group to reveal its exclusive, closely-knit aspects and
its hostility towards the Party.
Its leaders, after the
counter-revolution in Iraq in November lost the excuse, which had made them,
turn to the Party after the February revolution and before the March movement.
The National Directorate
tried by every means to redirect the governments course, to strengthen its ties
with the people and democracy, and to open up relationships with the patriotic,
progressive and unitary movements abroad, with the countries in the socialist
camp and the liberation movements throughout the world. It was in this way that
the Party should have demonstrated its unifying, progressive and universal
principles and its engagement, in the historical sense, in the Baath movement of
the Arab people, legacy of the Arab heritage, a movement with a revolutionary
ethic in its methods and its approach. (Speech by the General Secretary in 1965
on the anniversary of February 8th).
But all these attempts
were received sometimes with indifference and contempt, sometimes by rebellion
such as in December 1964 when the Regional Directorate
refused to carry out the
decisions of the National
Directorate for the
definition of the relationships between the Party and the government.
Then came the 8th.
National Congress in April 1965 whose purpose was to acquaint the national
organizations with the crisis in Syria and to explain clearly what was going on.
The Congress discussed various formulae, which only scratched the surface of the
crisis without bringing it to an end. The National Directorate then elected Dr.
Munif Razzaz as General Secretary of the Party, Comrade Michel ' Aflaq had
refused many times to put forward his candidature to the National Leadership.
But the Assembly
continued to regard his candidature as being the main strength of the congress
and elected him nevertheless to the National Directorate, but he subsequently
boycotted its meetings.
However, the situation
evolved and the group which ruled «the army in the name of the Party, the Party
in the name of the army and the people in the name of the Party and the army"
revealed itself. The military members broke away from it in groups. Disputes
broke out after the attempts to apply the Party decisions to forbid the
overlapping of responsibilities between Party, government and army. A special
regional congress was held in August 1965. Some Baath officers had been arrested
under the pretext of the internal regulations. This brought the crisis out into
the open and made it possible for the National Directorate to intervene
directly. On December 21st. it took the historic decision to dissolve the
regional directorate, to take over control and to appoint a Supreme Directorate
to help guide the Party in Syria and to recreate the Presidential Council.
Comrade Shibli Aysami was appointed vice-President and Salah al-Bitar asked to
form a government.
An enlarged national
Assembly was convened and the Party's leaders took care that it included
representatives of the majority of the country's progressive and nationalist
movements; approaches were also made to progressive Arab groups abroad. This was
so successful that the ruling group began to feel the reins of power slipping
out of its hands. It began to plot against the National Leadership and the
measures it had introduced. The coup d'etat took place on February 23rd. 1966.
A number of Party
leaders were arrested after a resistance that was especially lively in front of
the residence of the Chief of State Amin Hafiz, at that time a member of the
National Directorate. He took part personally and amongst the killed and wounded
were some of his own children. In Aleppo, young civilian and military members of
the Party who took over the radio for a time put up resistance. These activities
were the beginning of a widespread resistance, which the Party continues to this
day with its civilian and military leaders and militants.
The Putschists succeeded
in arresting a number of leaders but others escaped and continued to fight in
Syria for several months. Among them was the founder, Michel ' Aflaq, and the
General Secretary, Munif Razzaz. Others were arrested on the anniversary of the
Party's foundation, April 7th. 1966 included Shibli Aysami, the Assistant
General Secretary.
On September 8th. Salim
Hatum, one of the participants in the putsch of February 23rd., made an
attempted coup d'etat. This was used as an excuse for the most widespread reign
of terror ever experienced by the Party in Syria. Thousands were arrested and
tortured. Some were executed and others died from their ill treatment.
All this was done in the
name of the Arab Baath Socialist Party.
In order to justify this
split, the junta called itself "left wing" and embarked on a verbal auction on
national and social matters. Then came the attack of June 1967 and the renegade
Party started to blow the trumpets for a people's war of liberation while at the
same time ordering the army to abandon the almost impregnable position on the
Golan Heights without a fight. It is clear that, generally speaking, the defeat
and in particular, the loss of Golan, the support given to a negotiated
settlement of the Palestinian question, are the result of the premises of
February 23rd. and, before that, the conflict between the Party and its
counterfeit.
The history of the
Syrian experience is that of a violent internal conflict, for most of the time
between the Party and a clique, which wanted to change and diminish its role and
characteristics. But even so, the Party succeeded in introducing a series of
social and political changes which, had they been allowed to continue and
develop, would have made Syria into a beacon for the entire region.
The social changes had
finally liquidated the last bastions of feudalism through the new agricultural
reform law of June 1963, as well as that for agricultural production designed to
protect the farmer and provide for his basic needs.
A series of
nationalizations firmly set the course in non-capitalist direction -banks and
insurance companies from April 30th. 1963, external trade- imports in February
and exports in May 1965, the industrial sector in November and the oil resources
in December. Although some of these measures were taken in the midst of an
internal conflict and as a means of rallying Party support in order to redress
the situation, they were all carried out within the framework of the Baath
strategy and in accordance with the resolutions of the national and regional
congresses, following the advice and research of the National Directorate's
department of economic affairs.
On the national scene,
the Party succeeded in making the Palestine question one of the main points in
its militant activity. The Syrian government was the only one, which allowed the
fedayeen to act freely as from January 1965. It was also able to transform the
diplomatic climate amongst the Arabs in order to initiate discussions on the
Israeli plan for diverting the waters of the Jordan to the Negev so that
thousands of Jewish immigrants could be settled there.
In spite of the
differences existing with other Arab governments, the Party decided, during the
discussions on Palestine in the 8th. National Congress, not to mention them so
that all could move towards a united confrontation with the main enemy, Zionism.
It resisted all attempts to sidetrack the Palestine question into discussion of
forms of partition, paying indemnities and resettling the Palestinians in other
countries. It was in these circumstances that Syria participated in the first
three Arab Summit Conferences in Cairo, Alexandria and Casablanca. While there,
she was able to adopt a posture, which brought the Party out of the difficult
state of isolation in which it had been placed.
Syria also supported the
liberation movements in all the Arab countries. It supported the revolutions in
Eritrea and the Yemen, and always gave help to the Algerian revolution, which
was undergoing pressure from the Egyptian government.
On the international
scene, Syria played an important part with the non-aligned countries. It
supported all the liberation movements in the, world and tried to improve
relations with the socialist countries. This was difficult in the light of
previous problems between the Party and the Arab communist movement and the lack
of knowledge on the part of world communism at the time as to the historic
national, anti-imperialist organisation which was the Baath, and also, of
course, the instability of the situation in Syria.
Although the socialist
camp, from the beginning, welcomed the «left wing» leaders with open arms, the
Party did not take a negative view of this. But in National Directorate
statements and in articles in its newspaper Al-Ahrar, published in Beirut, it
asked the Soviet Union to make a more detailed study of the Party position, and,
forgetting past quarrels, to lay new foundations for the relationships between
the Arab revolutionary movement and world communism.
The experiences of March
8th. 1963 and the plot of February 23rd. 1966 had enormous repercussions on the
'national' activities of the Party. The 'disowning' move of February 23rd.
impeded the Party's struggle in Iraq for some time. It was subsequently used to
sow dissension and went as far as giving the names of the Iraqi Party leaders
even though they were in hiding.
A few weeks after taking
over power, the Damascus regime encouraged king Hussein to start a campaign of
arrests in the Party and national movement. The same thing with the Lebanese
government, ten days after the putsch, who arrested a large number of its
leaders, and this for the first time in the history of the Lebanese Party. They
were accused of «activities against an Arab government and of inciting an Arab
army against its commanders». And when Radio Damascus confused public opinion by
supposedly taking the side of the arrested leaders, the Putschists asked the
Lebanese Information service to hold them in prison.
The arrests went on for
three weeks, something unheard of in the Lebanese tradition of liberal
democracy, and it was a twofold form of revenge against the Party .The Lebanese
government, and the Secret Police in particular, were avenging the Party's
attitude towards the affair of the militant Palestinian, Jalal Ka'wash who died
under torture in a Lebanese prison on January 10th. 1966. The Party reported it
in its newspaper Al-Ahrar and organised demonstrations which resulted in a
number of casualties, whereas the Lebanese had been able to silence all other
protests, the patriotic movements included, on this subject. Secondly, the
Lebanese authorities were trying to curry favour with the put schist regime.
The latter had been
embarrassed by the speed and violence of the Party's reaction in the Lebanon,
both by the statements of the Regional Directorate and by the special regional
congress of February 28th. 1966 which had described the coup d'etat as «a
separatist, reactionary and dictatorial act». The Lebanese branch had also
supported the department of 'national relations' set up in Beirut by the
National Directorate with the objective of making contact with Party
organizations to explain the Syrian situation and to "prepare an emergency
national congress to define Party policy vis-a-vis the Deviationists".
This double challenge
only strengthened the Party's determination, and it continued to overcome all
the difficulties and dangers. It continued to publish its newspaper Al-Ahrar
from premises, which were bombed several times by agents of the Syrian
information service.
It continued to lead the
people's national struggle, especially in the days preceding the June war. It
set up committees for aid to Palestine and organised collections. The youth of
the Party joined the fight and some of its leaders, after the war, went to
Damascus to care for the wounded.
The Putschists movement
had no effect on the Party branches in the Sudan, Tunisia and Kuwait, for
example, nor on the student organizations in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy, Great
Britain or France. But nevertheless, there were some misunderstandings in the
organizational work in several Arab and other countries. These facts indicate
more and more clearly the 'undermining influence of the Putschists against the
first and largest nationalist, unitary and socialist party in the Arab world.
The Party after the
Defeat of June 5th 1967
(June 5th 1967 - 1974)
At the time of the June 5th defeat, most
of the Party leaders and militants were either in the prisons of Syria, Iraq and
Jordan, or were being persecuted and driven into exile, or were under close
surveillance in other countries. A necessary preliminary to the success of the
conspiracy against the unity, liberty and sovereignty of the Arab nation was the
neutralizing of the national movement and especially those in its vanguard. The
Baathists realized more than ever before, that the crises and bitter experiences
they were undergoing were part of the conspiracy aimed at the nation through
them in order that the instrument for revolution be destroyed.
They also realized that action on a
pan-Arab scale, at this crucial moment in history, had become an even more
urgent duty than ever.
The preparations for the 9th Congress
took place at a time of strengthening of the national unity of the Party and
were an opportunity to learn the lessons of the internal crisis and- the
national disaster. It was to be held in mid-February 1968. Comrade Michel Aflaq,
who had been in Brazil since 1966, sent a message saying: «The Arab people are
once more being offered the opportunity for serious revolutionary action, a
historic opportunity such as occurred a quarter of a century ago when our
movement was founded. Today a new movement can be built on solid ground". This
message renewed the zeal of the Party and stimulated its activities in the very
difficult circumstances, when every government, institution, movement and party
was under severe criticism for the parts they had played in the militant
activities of the period before the defeat.
After the 9th National Congress
(February, 1968)
While the 9th National Congress was
taking place in these delicate circumstances, the Party organizations had begun
to regroup their forces and' in a fair way, to resume their militant activities.
In Iraq, the Party was re-established amongst the people and after June 5th.led
the demonstrations. It was successful in the trade union elections and became
again the leader of the teacher's union, which had great influence in the
country, as well as in other unions.
In Syria, in the most difficult
circumstances, the Party set about reorganizing its ranks after its militants
had been released. This was on June 10th 1967 when the Golan fell and Damascus
lay open to the enemy divisions. The same thing happened in Jordan. In Sudan,
the militants were able to introduce the Regional Directorate's memorandum into
the meeting of the Arab Summit Conference, much to the astonishment of the kings
and presidents and the disavowals of the Syrian delegation. In Tunisia, the
Baathist youth played an important role in the student strikes and
demonstrations in protest against the severity of the sentences of the
demonstrators of June 5th. In Lebanon, the Party had been able to preserve its
organisation after the split, and play a part in the popular debates before,
during and after the war. It then decided to make common cause with
the Palestine armed struggle, and a number of young people, mostly
Palestinians, went off to one of the fedayeen training camps.
During the summer of 1967, the Party
formed an alliance for the support of the fedayeen from Lebanese territory, and
this became the nucleus of the widespread national support, which subsequently
built up around the Resistance.
The 9th Congress brought together
delegates from Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Sudan, and Tunisia and from
student organizations abroad. It was a propitious moment, therefore, for the
Party, in a special paper, to undertake a full analysis of the internal crisis
and of the June defeat, and to draw up the strategy to be followed in the
future. Emphasis was mainly on joint activities, the people's armed struggle,
and the contact with other revolutionary, socialist movements in the world and
with the Soviet Union in the first place. The Party also offered the hand of
friendship to all Arab patriotic and nationalist movements and to forget past
negative aspects.
The organizations followed the lines
laid down by the congress. In Iraq, the Party reinforced its links with the
Palestine Resistance. It organised a demonstration in its support after the
Israeli attack on Karama. It was then the turn of the regional secretary, Ahmad
Hasan al-Bakr to speak and to recommend the Baathist officers of the Iraqi
troops stationed in Jordan to keep close contact with the Resistance and provide
it with all the help it needed. This action strengthened it against the enemy in
the valley of Jordan.
In Syria, the Party proposed the
formation of a nationalist progressive front with the opposition –the Arab
Socialist Union, the Arab Nationalist Movement and the Arab Socialists. This
initiative scared the government, which started a wave of arrests, mainly of our
military and civilian comrades. They underwent severe torture and were kept in
prison for several months, until March 1969, when they were released at the time
of the conflict between the two wings of the regime.
In Lebanon, the Party continued to
collaborate with the Palestinian Resistance and took part in all the
demonstrations of support in preparation for it moving on to Lebanese soil. The
most important of these was the one at the funeral of the first Lebanese
sharpshooter to be killed in the ranks of the Resistance, in April 1968, and the
demonstration in protest against the "Israeli" military parade in Jerusalem on
May 2nd. There was also the surprise demonstration at Beirut airport on July
17th. 1968, on the arrival of the first American diplomat in the region since
the war. Stones and bottles were thrown by the Party youth and he were wounded
in the hand. The Lebanese authorities arrested some of the Party militants and
one of their leaders.
The Revolution of July 17th and 30th:
A new experiment and the long-term
prospects
The action, however, which made the
greatest impact on the Party's history was it success in Iraq in overthrowing
the reactionary government of Aref on July 17th. 1968 after an exhausting five
year struggle. Thirteen days later, the Party completed this historic act by
purging certain elements, which had imposed themselves on it.
The Revolution of July 17th and 30th.
placed the Party in a strong position in Arab political life. All eyes were
turned towards it and it had to shoulder new responsibilities. It was the
historic moment to prove the extent to which it had learned the lessons of
previous experience and setbacks.
The Revolution was able to chart a
course through all kinds of dangers and difficulties and to make steady
progress. It did this so well that after only a few years it became the
admiration of the Arab world and of many nations. It was clear that its leaders
were able to maintain a balance between the demands of a revolutionary doctrine
and the restrictions imposed by the complexities of reality.
The Revolution inherited difficult
political, social, economic and military problems, which were the result of
under-development and imperialist policy, and these were further complicated by
the conspiracies of reactionary movements. A further complication was the
immaturity and confusion in revolutionary outlook of many in the Iraqi patriotic
and nationalist movements.
The regional congress at the end of
November 1968, four months after the revolution, defined the policy to be
followed for dealing with this situation. The first problem was that of the
relationships between the national movements. By patience and perseverance, it
was possible to get to the heart of the matter, to bypass the inert stupidities
and suspicions and to establish clearly defined areas of cooperation between the
Party and the other movements. The fruit of these efforts was the creation of
the National Progressive Front on July 16th. 1973.
This course was evident from the early
days of the revolution, when the new regime ordered the release of political
prisoners, the reinstatement of civil servants dismissed for political reasons,
and the possibility for those in exile to return to Iraq. In spite of ups and
downs, this policy were maintained, and in November 1971, the Party put forward
the project for a National Action Charter as the basis for a programme for the
Front. Discussion of the project went on until its finalization at the end of
the summer of 1973, and was accompanied by various measures designed to
reinforce the links between the partners. It was through these that the Iraqi
Communist Party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party received permission to
publish their newspapers. They were part of the government and considered to be
allies before the Charter was signed or the Front officially created.
For the same reasons of internal
strength and because of its nationalist and humanitarian concern for the rights
of the minorities living amongst the Arabs, the Party set out to find a
democratic solution to the Kurdish problem. The outcome was the historic
Declaration of March 11th. 1970, which put an end to the fighting in the north
and recognized the principle of autonomy and national rights for the Kurds in
Iraq. The principles were quickly translated into political fact, ended the
emergency, united the country and released the Kurdish people's energies for
reconstruction and development and for the struggle against imperialism and
Zionism.
It needed great flexibility and infinite
patience to get to this point. The Party leaders had to make a clear and
categorical distinction between the legitimate wishes of the Kurds for their
national rights and the unexpressed wish of others to allow the Kurdish question
to be exploited and used according to circumstances in order to put pressure on
Iraq for gaining economic or political concessions, or even concessions on its
basic principles.
Exactly four years after declaration of
March 11th.and on the date decided upon for its implementation, the Party
leadership promulgated the law on autonomy.
During this period many methods had been
tried to bring Barazani to discuss the project with the other national
progressive parties, who had been kept informed of the negotiations between the
Baath and Barazani representatives. On its promulgation, the law had already
been amended to take account of the comments and proposals of progressive Iraqi
organizations and individuals. It was implemented and the legislative and
executive machinery put in place. The firmness of the revolutionary authorities
combined with the refusal of the great majority of the Kurdish people to return
to a state of civil war, is the explanation for Barzani's isolation. From then
on, he was forced to show unadorned his links with the external factions hostile
to Iraq's national revolutionary path, which wanted to damage the unity of the
country.
The Party considered that the unity of
the people and national movements provided the solid ground needed for joining
battle with the foreign monopolies in order to liberate Iraq and to achieve its
economic independence, the key to political independence. The Party also
realized that in order to have complete success, economic, political and
security conditions should be as sound as possible. A campaign was started,
therefore, a few months after the revolution and as soon as the Secret Service
had acquired all the information, against the espionage networks, of which the
main threads had been uncovered by the Party apparatus before the revolution.
The campaign ended in the execution of
the spies and cleansed the interior of agents and saboteurs.
The Party also realized that for the
economy to be dependent on one product, oil, would put it at the mercy of world
capitalism, and that to be free, it would have to diversify its sources of
revenue and supplies. So it made an agreement with Poland in April 1969, by
which it was helped in its own exploitation of the sulphur resources.
This finally dashed the hopes of the
capitalist monopolies of getting their hands on it.
The Party also set about developing
agriculture and industry so that they could play a greater part in the country's
economic life in diversifying sources of income and creating new jobs. An
intensive development in these sectors was planned, and facilities and
guarantees provided for the farmers and workers. In the agricultural sector,
national income increased from 202 million Dinars in 1969, the year following
the revolution, to about 302 million in 1972, that is, an annual growth rate of
15.3%». In the conversion industries' sector, national income increased, for the
same period, from 103 million Dinars to 154 million, and it is probable that
this will continue, to reach about 205 million in 1974. In other words, during
the period 1969-1974 the conversion industries will have an annual growth rate
of 14%. As leader of the working class movement, the Party has
been able to bring about a great number
of changes of a socialist nature. On May 2Oth. 1969, the law for agricultural
reform was amended. The indemnities to landowners were abolished, as was their
right previously to choose the situation for their land. A further law was
promulgated in 1970, which represented an important evolution in the protection
of farmers and the organisation of the return on agricultural production in a
socialist context. This production was demonstrated by the growing importance of
State farms, covering 101,000 hectares, collective farms with 160,000 hectares
and cooperative farms, which at that time covered more than 4 million hectares.
On the other hand, privately owned land, which did not fall into the preceding
categories, was not more than 1.4 million hectares. Thus the Party had gone a
long way towards liquidating feudalism, which had been very deeply rooted in
Iraq.
In industry, socialist change was
evident in the growing part played by the public sector, through the expansion
of the nationalized industries, the starting up of new projects, and the
establishment of basic industries such as steel and petro-chemicals, following
agreements with a number of countries. .
In commerce, the problem was to make a
success out of the nationalization of the export/import business and to get rid
of the corruption and backwardness of its agencies. The public sector was now
82% compared with 42% before the revolution.
When, at the end of 1971, the government
started negotiations with the oil companies, it was solidly based politically
and economically, enjoyed the confidence of the people and had a judicious oil
policy. The National Oil Company (I.N.O.C.) had been established, and in August
1969, an agreement was signed with the Soviet Union to help Iraq in exploiting
the North Rumaila oilfield. Every advantage had been taken of the increase in
oil revenues following the 1971 Teheran agreement. But nevertheless, Iraq had no
surplus, and it was with a deficit of 17.6 million Dinars in the budget and a
total accumulated deficit of 220 million that she went into the nationalization
battle.
During this glorious period in the
history of the Party and the Iraqi people, the people and their movements closed
their ranks in order to attack the monopolist companies and bring them to their
knees. The people demonstrated their readiness for sacrifice and the country was
carried away by patriotic enthusiasm. A few days before sending its ultimatum to
the companies the Baath Party leadership decided to appoint as ministers in the
government two members of the Communist Party and two nationalists. This was
part of the political preparation for the struggle and in accordance with the
Front policy set out in the National Action Charter.
When the period of the ultimatum expired
and the companies were putting forward their proposals, the revolution had
already made all the necessary political, economic and psychological
preparations for a final fight. It categorically rejected the companies'
attempts at last minute temporizing. On the day planned, the historic day of
June 1st., the comrade Party Secretary in Iraq announced the nationalization
decree.
The preliminary steps for
nationalization having been assured and the conduct of the fight on the
political, economic and technical fronts having been correctly organised, meant
that from the first days after the decree, nationalization was moving
successfully forward until the final victory on March 1st. 1973.
The nationalization struggle proved one
basic truth, which does not only affect Iraq, but is valid for all oil producers
and consumers. It proves that it is possible for a nation with the will to do
so, to extract and sell its oil and to challenge the monopolies. Furthermore, it
has revealed the fact that there is a serious lack of energy reserves in the
world. The oil companies hastened to make concessions to other oil producers in
the form of participation contracts. America started its big campaign on the
energy crisis, which, for many months, it had refused to acknowledge.
The nationalization victory went beyond
the frontiers of the country and was more than an economic victory. It was a
national political challenge to the movements hostile to the Arab nation. It
confirmed the policy followed by the Party in Iraq since the revolution, of
liberation; Iraq opened its country and resources to Arab liberation movements
and militant organizations, especially the Palestine revolution and that in
Eritrea to which Iraq gave unprecedented moral and material support.
During the period up to the war of
October 1973, the revolutionary government in Iraq had one national strategic
objective, the liberation of Palestine. It refused to make any concessions on
this and rejected all attempts to come to terms with the Zionist enemy in
exchange for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all or part of the territory
occupied in the 1967 war. Baghdad made efforts to close the Arab ranks in order
to prepare the ground for winning this objective. She prepared a national battle
plan to put forward at the tripartite summit conference of July 1970 in Tripoli
between Abd-an-Nasser, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Mu'ammar Gadaffi. But on June
19th. the Egyptian government accepted the Rogers plan and the project failed.
On several occasions the Party has made
attempts to create a union, especially in March 1972. Comrade Saddam Hussein
visited Damascus and Cairo with a project prepared by the Party for an Iraqi,
Syrian, Egyptian union for the combat. In January 1973, the
Iraqi delegation presented a plan for
economic, political and military preparation to the Council of Arab Ministers
for Foreign Affairs and Defence. The Iraqi government made several attempts to
regroup the Arab countries behind a comprehensive project for unity and leading
towards liberation. But these attempts never materialized.
Meanwhile the Egyptian and Syrian
governments were preparing for war, limited strategically in place and time.
They felt that the situation in Iraq would prevent
her from participating because of the
threat from Iran and the possibility of fighting breaking out in Kurdistan.
Nevertheless, the Iraqi government was
counting upon a limited military action in May or June.
On October 2nd 1973, a few hours after
war had broken out, the National and Regional Directorates held a meeting with
the Revolution Command Council. They decided to dispatch Iraqi forces to the
front, even though the war objectives did not correspond with the national
strategy adopted by the Party. But the meeting felt that an Iraqi participation
could help give additional military weight to the Arab forces and prevent the
enemy from winning new gains which he might use in future negotiations.
Participation could also provide a new element, which might lead to a change in
the effectiveness of the Syrian-Egyptian strategy in that it might, either in
whole or in part, further the objectives of Arab
liberation. At the least, it could
create a favorable atmosphere in which to move towards these objectives.
In order to protect the country's
eastern flank and allow troops to move towards the Golan, the Iraqi government
re-established diplomatic relations with Iran on October 7th. The army was
mobilized and began to move towards the Syrian frontier on the morning of
October 7th. The units sent to Syria on October 7th - 22nd consisted of two
armoured divisions (700 tanks) and three infantry brigades, one of mountain
troops and two of the special forces, one squadron of Mig 21s, one of Mig 17s
and one of Soukhoy 7s. To this should be added the two squadrons of Hawker
Hunters, stationed in Egypt since March, which flew operationally with the
Egyptian air force. This represented 75% of the Iraqi air force, 65% of its
Armour, and 20% of its infantry.
These units played an important role and
took part in the fighting around the Golan in spite of the unfavorable strategic
conditions under which they moved up to the front to join the battle. They
remained in Syria until the fighting stopped; the armistice was made without the
Iraqi government being consulted.
Iraq did not only use her armed forces.
She made use of the economic weapon by nationalizing the American holdings in
the Basra Petroleum Company on October
7th and the Dutch holdings on October
21st. The Iraqi people supplied their brothers in Syria with oil, economic aid,
munitions and replacement tanks, and showed their readiness to continue with the
fight in the framework of an all-out national war of liberation.
The Security Council voted the
cease-fire resolution on October 22nd. and Iraq was the first of the Arab
countries to reject it and demand that the fight go on. It tried hard to
persuade the Syrian government to do so.
This attitude reflected the Party's
steadfast view on solutions involving capitulation, which had been forced on the
nation in order to liquidate the Palestinian question and oppose the Arab
people's desire for freedom and unity.
On the international stage, under the
Party's leadership, Iraq became one of the bastions of the anti-imperialist
struggle. It was one of the first to break the international boycott of the
German Democratic Republic by recognizing it de jure on May 1st. 1969. It also
laid the foundations for cooperation with the socialist countries, firstly with
the Soviet Union, and with the non-aligned countries such as India, Sri Lanka
and the African countries. It was also able to initiate a new form of
relationship with Turkey after the visit there of comrade Bakr in 1972.
In its non-alignment policy, Iraq has
always tried, when the opportunity presented itself, to stress the Party's
principles on this. Positive neutrality and non-alignment are seen in the
context of freedom and a progressive, democratic and anti-imperialist right to
choose. Iraq has taken part in all the moves to strengthen this policy in
international politics and to encourage the movement for non-alignment. It has
taken part in the preparatory meetings for these conferences, and, as in Algiers
in 1973, in the conferences themselves.
Iraq has recognized the People's
Republic of Bangladesh and exchanged diplomatic representatives. It has
supported its application for membership of the non-aligned countries and of the
United Nations. A trade agreement, the first between Bangladesh and an Arab
country has been signed, and the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
visited Iraq during 1974.
Relationship with Yugoslavia was based
on friendship, respect and mutual understanding. Yugoslavia was a prominent
member of the group of non-aligned countries. The relation was strengthened in
every sphere since the 1974 visit of comrade Saddam Hussein, Deputy Secretary of
the Regional Directorate and Vice-President of the Revolution Command Council.
Relations with France in the economic,
technical and cultural fields have developed considerably on account of her
positive attitude to the nation's main causes, especially that of Palestine. The
visit to France of comrade Saddam Hussein in 1972 played an important part in
this development.
Relations with many African countries
have been enlarged in recent years. Visits at various levels and in various
spheres have been exchanged and cultural and economic agreements signed with
Somalia, the Central African Republic and Chad.
Diplomatic and economic relations have
been established for the first time with Latin American countries such as Cuba,
Venezuela and Brazil.
Iraq's revolutionary progress has
instigated many intrigues by its adversaries, most of which were foiled at an
early stage and the others when they were being attempted. The most serious was
that of January 20th. 1970, fomented by imperialism and reaction, and the
criminal attack of June 30th.1973, organised by certain members of the Secret
Service. These took advantage of the confidence placed in them for the technical
arrangements by the Party, and entered into a conspiracy. They succeeded in
assassinating comrade Hamad Shihab, a member of the Revolution Command Council
and Minister of Defence, as well as several others.
When the 8th. Regional Congress met, in
Baghdad, between January 8th-12th 1974, it already had behind it a rich
experience of militancy in many fields and on many levels. It passed judgment on
this experience by underlining the positive aspects, criticizing the mistakes
and shortcomings, and sketching the broad outlines of the Party's future policy
and the tasks, which lay ahead in the next phase.
After the 8th Congress, Iraq began to
play a more effective part on the Arab and international scene. Its leaders made
frequent visits to the progressive Arab countries and to friendly countries
throughout the world.
It took part in the 7th. Arab Summit
Conference in Rabat on December 26th. 1974 and explained clearly the
revolutionary and realistic principles upon which the Party was based in Iraq.
She had become the magnet, official and unofficial, for many leaders, movements,
organizations and congresses both Arab and international.
As a result of the considerable increase
in revenue following the increases in the price of oil, Iraq in 1974 made
enormous progress in her economic and social development. Laws were passed on
February 7th. Which increased salaries and reduced the price of services with a
consequent rise in the standard of living, especially for the working class.
Iraqi and Arab scientific specialists were invited to serve Iraq and were
provided with ample facilities.
During the same period, the country
became more involved in Arab common economic projects, regarded as being one of
the solid bases for unity .The decision to finance industrial projects in common
with Egypt, Syria and other Arab countries was the best way by which Iraq could
express its vision of unity and the maturity of the Party in its Arab policy,
without being concerned with the differences between the regimes.
The Party's National Activities (July
1968-1974)
The revolution of July 17th and 30th in
Iraq was the most spectacular Party action on the Arab and international
political scene, and an example of its militant existence on the pan-Arab level.
In other countries, however, the militants were no less active in continuing the
struggle, in deepening the roots of the Party among the masses and in pursuing
their national mission of confrontation with imperialism, division, exploitation
and the dictatorial and reactionary regimes.
In Syria, despite the difficult
conditions facing the Party as a result of the repression and confusion
instigated by the regime, which continued to use falsely the name and slogans of
the Party, the militants pursued the struggle against the dictatorship, which
had surrendered the country's rights. In May 1970, the regime began a wave of
arrests of militant civilian and military members of the Party, and forced
others to leave the country. They were brought before so-called courts, in
August 1971, accused of plotting against the movement. The sentences went from
the death penalty to life imprisonment or imprisonment for a period for a large
number of militants, the elite of the Party, including the founder and General
Secretary, comrade Michel Aflaq.
Protests came from all sides, from the
progressive and patriotic movements in Syria and abroad and even from some
members of the regime itself. The Chief of State had to suspend the sentences in
the following, November.
Despite the political changes taking
place on the Arab scene: especially in Syria, and despite the October war and
its repercussions on the regime, the prisoners were not released. During the war
itself, the appeals of imprisoned Baathist officers to be allowed to help defend
their country were not answered. When it became clear that the regime was
collaborating with the imperialist plans to force capitulation on the Arabs,
people's hopes, in Syria, were placed more and more in the Party. Arab and
international public opinion discovered daily the long-term aims of the plot,
which had been hatched against the Party ever since February 23rd. 1966. The
militants on more than one occasion after the October war, succeeded in breaking
the ring of terror surrounding the people and in distributing tracts in the
universities, schools and town districts.
This only increased the ferocity of the
repression, because occasionally the regime suspected the loyalty of certain
members of its own civilian and military organizations, which were then accused
of having been in contact with the Party.
In Jordan, the Party went into retreat
for a time, as did the majority of the national movement following the September
massacres and the liquidation of the Resistance in 1970 and 1971. The impact of
its ideas and programmes remained, however, and the authorities from time to
time arrested militants and accused them of being members of the Party's secret
organisation. Other operations were mounted to isolate the Baath youth both
materially and psychologically.
Before the massacres took place, the
Party had established a close union with the Resistance. It tried to extend its
activities amongst the Jordanian people in order to foil the enemy's regionally
based plan to divide it, even though the long term dangers of this were
underestimated by certain Resistance leaders.
In 1969 and 1970, the Jordanian Party
carried considerable weight amongst the workers and students, joining the
struggle of the cement workers as well as in other sectors. It continued to play
a part in other associations such as those of the lawyers, chemists, doctors and
engineers.
Just at the time when the Party had been
able to reorganize itself in order the better to carry out its tasks, the
September massacres hit at the heart of the Resistance and the national
movement. It should be mentioned here that it was difficult, and in Lebanon
also, to distinguish between the struggles led by the Baath and that of the Arab
Liberation Front. The latter had been founded at the beginning of January 1969
on the Party's Initiative and in accordance with the 9th. National Congress
resolutions. Its aim was to intensify its activities by resorting to a people's
armed struggle, and to widen the Arab national dimension of the Resistance,
which sometimes became extremely localized.
The Arab Liberation Front appeared on
the battlefield in Apri1, 1969, and began its first operations on the
anniversary of the Party's foundation. It thus became a vehicle through which
the Baath could participate in fedayeen operations and attempt to influence
certain errors of theory, practice and organisation of these operations.
When in Amman, the Front reinforced the
national unity of various Resistance elements and played an important role in
the struggle with "Israel" and the reactionary Jordanian conspiracy. Many Arabs
from different countries fell during these operations.
While the September massacres were going
on, the fighters of the Front fought effectively against the government troops,
and defended several districts of Amman. After September, the Front harassed the
regime with a series of blows, which led it to step up its campaign against the
militants and their leaders. It also firmly opposed the decision of the
Resistance Central Committee to evacuate Amman.
There they were surrounded and
massacred, and the Resistance ceased to exist in Jordan.
In Lebanon, the Front effectively
organised military operations against the enemy and resisted Zionist raids on
Lebanon on every occasion, especially on May 12th. 1970 when it lost four
militants, and in September 1972 when three others were killed.
The Front collaborated closely with the
Party in preparing the Palestinian and Lebanese people for the fight by training
and arming them. The Front and the Party were therefore able to play an
important part in resisting the plots hatched against the Resistance after it
had become established in the country, notably in April 1969, March 1970 and May
1973.
After several years of struggle, the
Front held its foundation congress in August 1972. Questions of military and
political organisation were discussed and a Central Committee elected. This was
the beginning of a new phase and was a reflection of the Front's growing
importance on the Palestinian scene. At the beginning of January 1973, the
National Palestine Council even adopted a project put forward by the Front,
which meant that it was fully integrated into the Resistance's institutions.
During the October war, the fighters and
members of the Front's popular organizations took part in operations against the
enemy on the Lebanese front. A number were even sent to Syria despite the ban on
their operating on Syrian territory. They also helped to reinforce the
Palestinian position when it was faced with certain proposals for a solution. In
this context it joined with similar organizations in rejecting all capitulation
proposals for disposing of the Palestine question.
A notable action of the Front after the
October war was in the preparation for a Unity March by the people to Damascus
and Baghdad in support of union between Iraq and Syria. At the last moment, it
was banned by the Syrian government, thereby showing its real attitude towards
the union of the two countries.
The Party's main activities in Lebanon
at this time were concentrated on the close association with the Palestine
Resistance both before and after its establishment on Lebanese soil. In this way
it could give living, tangible proof of the close connection between the fight
for freedom and that for the setting up of a democratic society, which was the
immediate objective in Lebanon, following the decisions of the 12th regional
congress held at the end of October 1968. For the first time in the history of
the Lebanese Party, there was discussion of reports and studies, which had been
carried out on the political, economic and cultural aspects of Lebanese society.
After examination and discussion, the congress drew up a plan for national
action, which the Party suggested, should be incorporated in a charter for the
creation of a national people's Front in Lebanon.
This regional congress took place
shortly before the first groups of fedayeen moved into the southern part of
Lebanon. The Party's and Lebanese national movement's first task was to protect
these first arrivals. At the end of the summer of 1968, the Party took the
initiative in forming the Arab People's Front with object of supporting these
units. The Front included the progressive Socialist Party, Fath members and
independent progressives. This was the nucleus of what became later known as the
Associated Arab Front, which held its first congress in Lebanon in November
1972, and its general assembly in Algeria at the end of December 1974, attended
by the Baath National Directorate.
The demonstrations on the anniversary of
the Balfour Declaration in 1968 provided the opportunity for the Lebanese
national movement and the Party to express support for the fedayeen and the need
for its protection.
This led to armed clashes with right
wing elements in certain Lebanese universities. The government, as a result of
its own internal contradictions, was compelled to suspend action against the
fedayeen until April 1969. It then attempted to liquidate the Resistance in the
south. The Party and national movements organised violent demonstrations on
April 23rd. and 24th. 1969, during which dozens of people were killed. The
government resigned and the political crisis went on for several months. It only
ended in October after a series of confrontations between the authorities and
the Palestinian Resistance in alliance with the national movement.
The Cairo agreement then authorized the
official presence of the Palestinian fedayeen on Lebanese soil, and removed the
refugee camps from Lebanese government control and placed them under Palestinian
administration. Despite its limitations and attached conditions, the agreement
crowned the victory of the Lebanese people's movement. It was then that the
doors were open for mass action in a democratic atmosphere, of which the most
visible signs were the possibility for the progressive parties to militate in
the open after they had been given the permission in August 1970.
The agreement still did not prevent
repeated attempts being made to stir up trouble. In March 1970, the right
launched an operation, which failed immediately, and the Party played an
important part, politically and militarily, in foiling it. But the most serious
attack on the fedayeen was in May 1973. The Party had to come out armed on to
the streets to defend the Resistance; its part in checking this new plot was so
evident that the people turned more and more resolutely towards it.
The close alliance between the Party and
the Resistance was not restricted to protecting it against the regime, but also
in resisting Israeli attacks on Lebanon, especially in the south. After the
attacks, hundreds of young people from all parts of the country went to the
south in the Party's name, to take up arms at their brothers' sides. This
happened particularly in May 1970, February, March and September 1972, and
during the October war of 1973. The Baathists resisted Israeli raids on the
frontier villages on many occasions. The most notable was the battle of Tayyiba
on New Year's Day 1975, when Party militants were killed when resisting a large
"Israeli" unit, which had attacked the village.
The Party was the first Lebanese
movement to raise the question of the south. In the light of the government's
almost total abnegation of its military, political and social responsibilities?
the Party emphasized the need to support the inhabitants and provide them with
the means to face up to Israeli attacks. So at the end of 1969, it issued
invitations to attend a national Conference for the support of the south.
Invited were the
Progressive movements and parties, and
certain practical steps were considered such as the construction of bomb
shelters in the frontier villages and social and economic measures which would
enable the inhabitants to remain in them.
However, the slowness of certain
national elements in playing their part in the Conference held the project up
for several years. In October 1972, the Party re-launched
it with the collaboration of several
Lebanese national organizations. The Conference started the work on the
shelters, dispensaries and schools, issued grants and took care of all the
problems in the south.
One of the most important aspects of the
Party's concern for the South-Lebanon question was the spectacular way in which
it led the uprising of the peasant tobacco growers against the Monopoly, during
the course of which several demonstrators were killed. The matter was then taken
up on a national scale in all circles.
In Lebanon, the Party operated also on
the national level in opposing the imperialist maneuvers and capitulation plans,
and in this way went far beyond the country's frontiers. On May 2nd. 1971, the
Party organised protest demonstrations in Lebanon and the region against the
American Secretary of State, Rogers; several of the main progressive
organizations abstained from these. Through its young feminine organisation, the
Party joined the women's demonstration against the visit of king Feisal on
September 28th. of the same year.
This was also its main instrument for
protesting, by student demonstrations, against the American diplomats' visits
after the October war, and it was the Party, which organised the success of the
large demonstrations on Kissinger's first visit to the region in December 1973.
Party action in Lebanon was principally
involved with local affairs, mainly social, and with the educational problem. In
Tripoli, the Party was behind a widespread public agitation against the
electricity monopoly (Qadisha), and by employing various means conducted an
effective fight. It also led the struggle in several regions, factories and city
districts. The most important of these took place when the Baalbek town council
was dissolved in the summer of 1972. Its president was one of the leading
comrades and was daily carrying out important work amongst the people. The
dissolution caused an explosion of the populace, which paralyzed the town for
two days, during which there were many demonstrations.
The Party also led the revolt in the
Hermel region to reclaim its essential rights.
Young Baathists were the pillars of
support for the many student agitations in Lebanon at this time, taking part in
the national organisation, «The Students Fight», or as members of the student
unions in the colleges and universities. The uprising in the American University
in 1974 was an extension of its long struggle against imperialist cultural
institutions. In its famous manifesto, in the name of the «Youth of the American
University", in March 1967, it had demanded its Lebanonisation.
In 1973 and 1974, the Party led the
struggle against rising prices, bread in particular. In March 1974, it succeeded
in breaking a baker's strike, which was demanding a price increase. The Party
set up people's committees in Beirut and other areas, which took over the
bakeries, baked the bread and distributed it to the population.
Side by side with the comrades in Iraq,
the Party led the struggle against the oil monopolies in Lebanon.
It organised rallies and national
conferences in support of Iraq. When nationalization was proclaimed, it led huge
demonstrations of approval in Beirut and other towns. It also supported the
nationalization of the I.P.C. pipelines, contrary to the Lebanese government
attitude, which sided with the Company against Iraq's interests.
Since conditions in Lebanon were
reasonably democratic, the Party's attitude towards elections was that they were
one of the means of fighting on the political front. The election campaign was
an opportunity to reveal its programme and to make contact with wide sections of
the people. In the spring of 1968, the Party had not won a seat although its
candidate in
Tripoli received a large number of
votes, but falsifications and other pressures deprived him of his victory. In
the following elections, June 16th. 1972, the Party entered Parliament for the
first time in the person of Abd-al-Majid ar-Rafi'i who had won a large number of
votes in Tripoli. The Party's campaign in other districts also had a certain
amount of success.
In Sudan, during this period, the
Baathists successfully disseminated the Party's ideas on socialism and unity
amongst the working people, the students and the intellectuals. Their activities
were carried out under difficulty and demanded many sacrifices. They played a
noteworthy part in organizing the
demonstrations at the time of the Arab Summit Meeting in Khartoum after the 1967
defeat, in the many fights for democracy with the reactionary regime which
preceded the military movement of May 1969, and in their continuous activities
to make this movement more democratic and progressive.
After the setback to the Hashim Ata
regime on July 19th 1971, the government tried to deal the Baath a severe blow.
It sentenced its most eminent militants' and dozens of its members to several
years in prison. This did not prevent the Baathists from continuing the struggle
on the democratic national and especially Unitarian socialist levels. During the
time of the Hashim Ata movement, the Party lost an eminent comrade, Mohammed
Suleiman, a member of the National Directorate, whose aircraft exploded in
flight on July 22nd when he was returning to join his comrades in Sudan.
In Tunisia, the Party had become a
growing political force while leading the student protests of the spring of 1968
against the sentences of their comrades who had led the June demonstrations. As
a result, the Tunisian authorities arrested many Party members and started a
defamatory campaign in the mass media.
The appearance of the comrades in court
was an opportunity to show their determination and to talk about their ideas.
Activity continued in Tunisia and included, particularly, the agitation amongst
students and certain workers in the autumn of 1970.
The Party had reorganized itself in many
countries, both Arab and foreign, after the disturbances and splits caused by
the serious crises which had shaken it on a national level. It was the Party in
the Yemen, which regained most influence in the country's events. It resisted
the reactionaries linked with Saudi Arabia, and constantly moved in the
direction of national democracy.
For this reasons it was the object of a
wide reactionary conspiracy to arrest and persecute the Party militants.
The Party's activities overall, were an
_expression of its national structure and its links with one Directorate which
gave it guidance, corrected mistakes, and provided the best conditions for
overcoming the difficulties of the struggle. After the revolution of July 17th
and 30th, the National Directorate transferred its headquarters to Baghdad,
where conditions were the best for setting up its agencies and offices,
centralizing its departments and tightening its links with Arab progressive
movements and the world socialist and liberation movements. After the return
from Brazil of the comrade General Secretary in the autumn of 1969, the
Directorate convened the 10th. National Congress for February 1970. The
political, organizational and financial reports were discussed and the
appropriate decisions taken. The Party's policies on unity, coalition actions,
the armed struggle and the rejection of capitulation solutions was confirmed.
The main tasks for the Party in Iraq were defined.
Following the l0th Congress, the
National Directorate, in addition to its work with the Party organizations,
established and developed relations with the people's movements and parties in
the Maghreb and the Mashreq and also with the organizations of the Palestinian
Resistance. It made contact with all of
them and their leaders and encouraged them to unite and put up a stronger front
for Palestine vis-a-vis the proposals for liquidating it.
At the beginning of 1974, the National
Directorate made an agreement with the People's Liberation Front in Oman,
underlining the need for unity and cooperation.
The comrade General Secretary visited
Democratic Yemen once again to reinforce Party links with the Nationalist Front.
The Directorate effectively supported the revolution in Eritrea so that it could
face up to all the traps, which threatened it. The National Directorate has
established close links with all world socialist parties and liberation
movements.
It has attended their congresses and
expressed sympathy with their struggles. Top level visits have been exchanged,
especially that to India of the Assistant General Secretary, all of which has
provided the basis for relationships between the Arab and world revolutions.
In the
name of God the Most Beneficent the Most Merciful
The Arab
Baath Socialist Party
One Arab
Nation, with an Eternal Mission
Unity,
Freedom, Socialism
God, grant us
an immense patience, strengthen our resolve, and give us triumph over the
infidels' lot.. "God is trustworthy in His words!"
The
Political Program of the Baath and its National Resistance:
(The Program
of Liberation and Independence)
The believer
Mujahid Baath and its heroic National Resistance, while widening their
operations and intensifying their actions backed by patriotic forces which
reject the occupation, its stooges, and its political arrangements, sustained by
a great Mujahid People, with whom stands the honorable sons and daughters of the
Arab and the Islamic nations and all the freedom-loving people in the whole wide
world, present their political program whose objective is to liberate Iraq and
to get its national independence, and to achieve the unity of its people and its
soil, and according to the priorities and order stated in this document based on
the followings:
FIRST: the total national independence and
that the occupier should acknowledge the following:
To fully
recognize the National Iraqi Resistance in all its armed and non-armed factions
as the sole representative of the great people of Iraq
To announce
the total and unconditional withdrawal from Iraq during a time schedule
determined in coordination between the heroic Iraqi Resistance and the occupier.
To
absolutely recognize Iraq sovereignty, its national and patriotic independence,
to safeguard its national unity as a people, as country and sacrosanct values
and riches, to reject every attempt and every law aiming to divide and dismember
Iraq.
To accept
serious, honest and constructive negotiations with the Resistance leadership or
with any one representing the Resistance based on the rights and the
non-negotiable principles of the homeland and liberation, in order to reach an
agreement of the total liberation and independence.
The US and
its allies should acknowledge their responsibility of the war and the
occupation. Iraq’s occupation constituted an aggression which has absolutely no
international legitimacy; it is immoral and unethical.
The US and
its allies must officially apologize to the people of Iraq about the crimes,
aggressions and violations the Iraqis endured, and to apologize to its national
leadership of all the unfair, destructive and unjust actions they undertook
against the people of Iraq.
When the
occupier announces his agreement to accept the above principles, the Baath and
its heroic Resistance leadership will agree to start serious and honest
negotiations based on the followings:
SECOND: The negotiations require the
occupier and its allies to accept all the national rights of the great people of
Iraq that represent the will of the people and its supreme national interests
are:
1 - The
total withdrawal from all Iraq, from its soil, its skies, and its waters without
any conditions or any restrictions.
2 - The
liberation of all the detainees, prisoners, and jailed , without any exception
and to consider the ongoing trials against Iraqis null and void, illegal and
unlawful, and to cancel all its consequences for they came under the bayonets of
a null and void occupation, and what has been built on void is void.
Also to
recognize the legitimacy of all the state government and non government
institutions, all laws and decrees in force that existed before the hated
Occupation.
3 - The
cancellation of the ongoing political process under the bayonets of the
occupation and the cancellation of all the resolutions, laws, political and
economical decrees signed against the international laws and rules, which
require that the laws and the rules should be those of the occupied land, and
which were in force when the occupation started. International law forbids the
occupier to issue any resolutions or any decree to achieve its interests or
those of his stooges.
4 - The
return of the Iraqi army and the other national armed forces to their assignment
according to their laws, their organizations and their traditions in force
before the occupation.
Also to
cancel the 'debaathification' bill and to recognize the Baath national,
patriotic, and human role into the leadership of Iraq and its construction as a
great political, social and ideological movement having a great human message to
offer, and to stop raiding, kidnapping and detaining the Party militants and
Mujahidins belonging to whatever factions.
5 - The
commitment to fully compensate all losses suffered by Iraq since 1991 and until
this very moment morally and materially, as individuals and as institutions
through a fund financed by the countries occupying Iraq and in particular the US
and Britain and the other countries which participated, supported and
facilitated the Occupation; after putting into evidence the huge losses endured
by the Iraqi state due to the organized and systematic destruction, the
plundering of factories, the pillage of funds, banks and antiquities etc.; in
the framework of a specialized committees to be chosen by the Iraqi Resistance
leadership; and the fund will be managed by a national government formed by the
Resistance and hence elected by the people.
6 - The
cancellation of all the unjust international resolutions issued against Iraq
since 1991 and until this moment and specially those dealing with border's
outline, compensations and every thing else.
7 - The
handing over of the collaborators, the spies and the traitors those who
committed the supreme crime of treason against the people, the homeland, in
order to try them lawfully and to get their just punishment for they
collaborated with the occupier to destroy Iraq, slaughter its people, loot its
national riches and violate its sacrosanct values.
Then, the
leadership of the Baath and its National Resistance will declare their national
project after the liberation according to the various agreements and accords
with all the Jihad and Resistance factions and based on the followings:
THIRD: The elections and the State affairs
management after independence:
The
leadership of the Iraqi Resistance will proceed to form a temporary Shura
Council which will include 50 to 100 patriotic personalities in amongst the
armed Resistance factions, parties, movements and patriotic personalities
resisting and rejecting the occupations and its stooges.
The Shura
Council which will include the resisting factions will form a national unity
government from Iraqi patriotic personalities known for rejecting and resisting
the occupation for a two-years period, supervised completely by the Resistance
leadership and the temporary Shura Council to undertake the following
responsibilities:
A -
To completely supervise the running of the State affairs and in every field.
B -
To achieve what has been agreed upon by the Resistance with the occupier in the
negotiations and in particular concerning the total and the unconditional
withdrawal of the invading forces from Iraq and the follow up to put into
practice the other paragraphs of the Liberation and National Independence
Agreement.
C -
To disband the militias which belong to the occupation and its allies without
any exception. To disband the present army, the police, and the security
apparatus formed under the occupation and by its decisions and to act to end
every kind of armed phenomenon in every part of Iraq.
D -
To re establish the former national Iraqi Army in all its formations and the
former national security forces in all their formations and bring life into all
the disbanded state institutions caused by the occupation's decision, and clean
up and liquidate the destructive consequences of these decisions and compensate
the injured parties materially and morally.
E -
To set a permanent constitution for the country by the Shura Council, to be
presented for a general popular referendum in order to organize the public and
the political life in all Iraq for a five-year period, after the Independence,
during which a president of the Republic and a parliament will be elected and
will guarantee the national and patriotic rights for Kurds and other minorities;
and through which everybody will live together along their ethnicity, religions,
communities in a kind of eternal national unity experienced by the people of
Iraq all through its glorious history; provided that the elected parliament be
authorized to add the required amendments in a way to suit the evolution and the
stability of the political, economical and security state of affairs in Iraq.
F -
To organize free, democratic elections according to the constitution after the
temporary period guaranteeing the participation of every political, movement,
party and currents in order to achieve the birth of a national democratic and
pluralistic regime, which respects human rights and safeguards public liberties,
safeguards the unity of Iraq and its people, achieves its independence and
guards its material and human riches.
G -
To set a global national reconciliation plan on the basis of this document
national rights and non-negotiable principles, such as meetings, dialogue,
understanding and reconciliation to be open to all Iraqis, as parties,
movements, and individuals who accept these principles and are ready to put them
into practice and to undertake whatever effort — Jihad — to snatch them,
provided that this reconciliation is preceded by a frank dialogue among all the
involved national forces on the Iraqi arena in the widest way to avoid the
errors of the past, follow the motto of "lets forget the past" and leave aside
the unending revenge politics; reject loggerhead and settling of scores, and
never direct the gun barrel except against the usurper occupier in order to free
the homeland and our sacrosanct values. This will create the spirit of a mutual
confidence to sow in amongst the souls of all Iraqis as a fundamental guarantee
to participate into the construction of Iraq after the liberation, away from
revenge, power-grabbing, blackmail, and arrogance from each other.
FOURTH: The relationship with the US and the
other countries of the world.
The Iraqi
armed Resistance and its governments will establish the best political, and
economical relationship with all the countries of the world except with the
usurper Zionist entity, which stole Arab Palestine, and in every way to
guarantee the mutual interests between Iraq and these countries, to set a
partnership in mutual interests and respect and the non-interference into each
other's internal affairs..
The Iraqi
Resistance leadership understands the nature of the importance of the US
interests as a superpower, and it is ready to establish good and permanent
relationship with the US, based on mutual respect and the non-interference in
the internal affairs according to the agreements, conventions and international
laws, to guarantee the mentioned interests and safeguard the sovereignty and the
independence of the countries and their peoples, and respect their choices and
guarantee their right to dispose with their national, material, human and
natural riches as they view right.
Also the
Resistance's leadership will establish the best relationship based on mutual
respect and mutual interests with all the direct neighbors of Iraq and
especially the brotherly Arab countries and respect all the international
agreements and conventions and never use force to find a solution for bilateral
differences except in self-defense and to defend the homeland and the people
against any external armed aggression.
FIFTH: This program is considered
from the Baath and its national Resistance's point of view as a complete,
convenient and objective introduction for the current situation in Iraq in order
to end the occupation, its consequences and its creation.
The Iraqi
Resistance will never accept half solutions or parts of solutions with the
occupier, for it will be not possible to accept a cease-fire and the fighting
here or there on the soil of Iraq to give the opportunity to push forward the
ongoing political process under the occupation's bayonets and its stooges.
Moreover, the Baath and the Resistance leadership utterly and totally reject the
principle of participating in any political action under the occupation's
bayonets and according to its will and desires.
The Baath
and its national Resistance leadership, while establishing its national program
for national liberation and independence is resolved to go ahead combating and
directing the war with the occupiers to snatch the independence of Iraq and to
build it in a national and democratic way. While establishing these
non-negotiable principles and basis represent the people and the homeland and
which can never be abandoned or set aside whatever the losses will be, The
Resistance leadership hopes that the occupier give himself a thought, return to
his senses and take the path of the truth, relying on reason, logic and history
and recognize these rights and commit himself to respect them. For the
liberation forces and the peoples' Resistance to get their freedom and achieve
their will can't be defeated or broken for God, the freedom loving peoples in
the world and the history are with them. They will triumph. God willing,
whatever time the combat may take with the occupiers and the invaders. There is
absolutely no other way for the occupier than to accept the non-negotiable
principles of the total liberation and complete independence from any kind of
hegemony, control, and exploitation but to sit on the negotiating table, to stop
the blood bath and receive some face-saving or face the horrendous and
ascertained defeat for its invading forces and the wrecking of its imperialistic
project for global hegemony and control. For victory comes only from God in the
highest, the Almighty..
Long live
Iraq… Victory to its heroic Resistance..
A salute
to the martyrs and to the Mujahideens!
Long live
Palestine, Arab and free!
God
grants success!
The Leadership of the Baath and its National
Resistance.
October
2006
*
Translated by Abu Assur.
al Moharer.net
THE BAATH IS MORE COHESIVE AND UNITED
By Ibrahim Ebeid
Unity has been a pursuit of the Arab Nation
since it has been afflicted with fragmentation. The Baath did not create the
demand or the objective of unity, but gave it a new understanding that makes it
realizable says the Founder of the Baath, Mr. Michel Aflak.
The Baath has adopted the fundamental
demands of the Arab Nation for Unity, Freedom and Social Justice and carried
this banner since the inception of the Baathist ideas in the mid thirties and by
1947, on April 7, the First Convention took place and the Arab Baath Socialist
Party was born.
Since the Establishment of the Arab Baath
Party the plots did not cease to crush this movement. The plots failed and will
keep failing because the Party has its ideas deep rooted in the history of the
Arab Nation, and it carries the legitimate aspirations of the Arab Population to
achieve One Arab Homeland united and free.
Every time the Baath was exposed to
conspiracies to ruin it and to split it, the Party reappeared to be healthier
and stronger.
The Imperialist Powers and their allies,
the Zionists and the Arab Reactionary Regimes discovered that this Movement was
formidable and was posing danger to their interests because it is calling for
radical changes against the imposed status quo of Arab fragmentations. These
Powers are desperately trying to keep the Arab Homeland divided and weak so they
enjoy the abundance of wealth that the regions have. One way to do it is destroy
the Baath and occupy Iraq.
Baathist Iraq under Saddam Hussein
represented the noble ideas of Arab Unity, Freedom and Arab Liberation. Saddam
Hussein built a very progressive and prosperous Iraq where healthcare and
schooling at all levels were free for all and where "o child was left behind'.
Science and technology barriers were broken; Iraq became the Mecca of the Arabs
and the progressive peoples around the World. Many Students from around the Arab
World were educated in Iraq and went back to their regions to participate in
building up a prosperous Arab Homeland; many scholarships were given to students
from the Third World Countries, especially from Africa and Latin America to
study in Iraq.
The Iraqi Leadership realized that
Palestine was the center of the struggle and Arab Liberation would not be
completed without the liberation of Palestine. The support of Palestine and its
Freedom Fighters and their families were unconditional.
The war against Iraq started in 1990 by
President Bush Senior, the infrastructure of the country was ruined. A Genocidal
Embargo that reaped millions of lives was imposed.
The wise and determined Leadership of Iraq
under the Baath challenged the embargo. It was able was able to rebuild Iraq.
Electricity and Water systems were quickly restored under the harsh conditions
of the Blockade. This scared the hell out of the US Administrations and their
Zionist Allies, Iraq was invaded in March 2003 and Baghdad was occupied in April
of the same year but the National Resistance was born and the Mother of All
Battles gained strength.
President Bush. Iran of the Safawid Mullahs
and their sectarian agents are sunk deep in their illusion believing that
lynching President Saddam Hussein and his colleagues and probably most of the
captured Iraqi Leadership would lead to the desperation of the Baath Party and
the Resistance and force them to abandon the fight for National Liberation and
Independence. Illusion is not reality. The Assassination of President Saddam
Hussein gave the Resistance determination and motivated it to continue the fight
more forcefully and faithfully to the principles of their Martyred Leader.
The President of the United States and his
colleagues, and their supporters think sending more troops to the slaughterhouse
of Iraq would force the Resistance to give up and surrender. It will not,
instead it will give a booster to the National Resistance and to the Iraqi
people. The Resistance is not the Sunni Fighters, nor it is the Al Qaeda, the
Resistance is genuine Iraqi, it is made up of Sunnis, Shiis, Christians,
Turkmen, Kurds and others. If they were some fanatic Sunnis and Qaeda as Bush
and Cheney claim then why the War is still going on? And why the Iraqis don’t
support the Occupation and the Government of the Green Zone?
The Bush Plan to integrate the Peshmergas
"Kurdish militias", the Mahdi Army and Badr Corpse "pro Iran sectarian
terrorists" with the Army and police force and the National Guard to launch
attacks under the guidance, protection and participation of the US occupying
forces against Baghdad liberated areas such as Al Karkh, Azamiya, Al Dorah,
Ameriyah, Al Fadl, Hay Al Jamiaah and others.
The United States intention is not to
achieve victory with these forces; these forces have failed in the Past, but to
nourish the feeling of vengeance among the Iraqis, by pushing them into bloody
battles that might lead to the disintegration of the country.
The American forces might hit some certain
elements of the Mahdi Army only as a tactic to help cover-up its effective role
in forcing the people of Baghdad eviction in a new way by integrating it, (the
Mahdi Army) with the collaborating Army or National Guard. This was the intended
role of the Mahdi Army since early last year as stated by the Baath Party of
Iraq. To confirm our allegation Moqtada Al Sadr ordered his group to rejoin the
Occupation Sectarian Government, and at the same time he instructed his
followers not to attack the US or the Occupying Forces. Attacking the
“Saddamists and the Baathists” was urged because they are "terrorists" and not
liberators in his words. This Army is part of the Occupation Powers of the USA
and Iran.
Some individuals who falsely pretend to be
Spokesmen for the Baath and the Resistance claim that Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, the
Secretary General of the Baath Party, and the Commander of the Iraqi National
Resistance is willing to accept a truce with the American occupiers in certain
areas of Iraq, to give a chance to the occupying forces to fight the sectarian
Mahdi Army and the Badr forces. This is not true but a desperate fabrication of
the Occupation Power stated a spokesperson of the Baath, in order to split the
Resistance. The US Occupation is using unprecedented measures to dislodge the
Baath Party, the backbone of the Resistance, believing if it succeeds then the
Resistance would vanish and disintegrate, and the Arab Nation’s back would be
broken, its ability to achieve freedom and independence would be relinquished
for hundreds of years to come. Those people who claim to have written letters
from Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri are liars and in no way they represent the Baath,
they never have been in the Baath Party according to the Baath and its
spokesperson.
Iran and the United States and some
neighboring countries of Iraq have joined the wagon, they are trying to split
the Baath Party. They are using a score of ex Baathists who either left Iraq and
the Party after the occupation because they were cowards or because they were
expelled. Mohammad Yousif Al Ahmad, Ghazwan Al Kubaissy and Mottni Mozher Awaad
are openly calling for a conference to take place in Damascus to replace the
Party Leadership. This call falls against the Bylaws of the Party and its
Internal Rules. The Party is well aware of these plots and its members cannot be
fooled.
This attempt is a desperate plot to
convince the leadership and the advanced Cadres of the Baath to attend this
"Conference' to be assassinated or captured? The Baath hopes that Damascus would
not be part of this trap and would not allow such a conference to take place in
Syria under these conditions.
According to our sources the Party in Iraq
is well cohesive and united behind its Leadership.
All the branches of the Party in the Arab
World have exposed these traitors and All Party Organizations inside Iraq and
out confirmed and support the leadership of Al Duri.
If the Anti War Movement does not take
serious steps to bring a stop to the Bush madness the price would be higher and
more lives would be lost only to satisfy the ego of the modern times Nero.
The Baath and the Resistance will triumph
and Iraq will be united and free.
Al-Moharer.net January 27, 2007
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