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The Existence of God
and the Beginning of the Universe
William Lane Craig
William Craig earned a
doctorate in philosophy at the University of Birmingham, England, before taking
a doctorate in theology from the Ludwig Maximiliens Universitat-Munchen, West
Germany, at which latter institution he was for two years a Fellow of the
Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung. He is currently a visiting scholar at the
Universite Catholique de Louvain. He has authored various books, including The
Kalam Cosmological Argument, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz,
and The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to
Suarez, as well as articles in professional journals like British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, Zeitschrift fur Philosophische Forschung,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and Philosophia.
The kalam cosmological argument, by showing that the universe began to exist,
demonstrates that the world is not a necessary being and, therefore, not
self-explanatory with respect to its existence. Two philosophical arguments and
two scientific confirmations are presented in support of the beginning of the
universe. Since whatever begins to exist has a cause, there must exist a
transcendent cause of the universe.
Source: "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe."
Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991): 85-96.
Introduction
"The first question which should rightly be asked," wrote G.W.F.
Leibniz, is "Why is there something rather than nothing?"[1] This
question does seem to possess a profound existential force, which has been felt
by some of mankind's greatest thinkers. According to Aristotle, philosophy
begins with a sense of wonder about the world, and the most profound question a
man can ask concerns the origin of the universe.[2] In his biography of Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm reports that Wittgenstein said that he sometimes
had a certain experience which could best be described by saying that "when
I have it, I wonder at the existence of the world. I am then inclined to use
such phrases as 'How extraordinary that anything should exist!'"[3]
Similarly, one contemporary philosopher remarks, ". . . My mind often seems
to reel under the immense significance this question has for me. That anything
exists at all does seem to me a matter for the deepest awe."[4]
Why does something exist instead of nothing? Leibniz answered this question by
arguing that something exists rather than nothing because a necessary being
exists which carries within itself its reason for existence and is the
sufficient reason for the existence of all contingent being.[5]
Although Leibniz (followed by certain contemporary philosophers) regarded the
non- existence of a necessary being as logically impossible, a more modest
explication of necessity of existence in terms of what he calls "factual
necessity" has been given by John Hick: a necessary being is an eternal,
uncaused, indestructible, and incorruptible being.[6] Leibniz, of course,
identified the necessary being as God. His critics, however, disputed this
identification, contending that the material universe could itself be assigned
the status of a necessary being. "Why," queried David Hume, "may
not the material universe be the necessary existent Being, according to this
pretended explanation of necessity?"[7] Typically, this has been precisely
the position of the atheist. Atheists have not felt compelled to embrace the
view that the universe came into being out of nothing for no reason at all;
rather they regard the universe itself as a sort of factually necessary being:
the universe is eternal, uncaused, indestructible, and incorruptible. As Russell
neatly put it, " . . . The universe is just there, and that's all."[8]
Does Leibniz's argument therefore leave us in a rational impasse, or might there
not be some further resources available for untangling the riddle of the
existence of the world? It seems to me that there are. It will be remembered
that an essential property of a necessary being is eternality. If then it could
be made plausible that the universe began to exist and is not therefore eternal,
one would to that extent at least have shown the superiority of theism as a
rational world view.
Now there is one form of the cosmological argument, much neglected today but of
great historical importance, that aims precisely at the demonstration that the
universe had a beginning in time.[9] Originating in the efforts of Christian
theologians to refute the Greek doctrine of the eternity of matter, this
argument was developed into sophisticated formulations by medieval Islamic and
Jewish theologians, who in turn passed it back to the Latin West. The argument
thus has a broad inter- sectarian appeal, having been defended by Muslims, Jews,
and Christians both Catholic and Protestant.
This argument, which I have called the kalam cosmological argument, can be
exhibited as follows:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its
existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an
actual infinite.
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of
events is an actual infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal
regress of events cannot exist.
2.2 Argument based on the impossibility of
the formation of an actual infinite by
successive addition.
2.21 A collection formed by successive
addition cannot be actually infinite.
2.22 The temporal series of past events
is a collection formed by successive
addition.
2.23 Therefore, the temporal series of
past events cannot be actually
infinite.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its
existence.
Let us examine this argument more closely.
Defense of the Kalam Cosmological Argument
Second Premiss
Clearly, the crucial premiss in this argument is (2), and two independent
arguments are offered in support of it. Let us therefore turn first to an
examination of the supporting arguments.
First Supporting Argument
In order to understand (2.1), we need to understand the difference between a
potential infinite and an actual infinite. Crudely put, a potential infinite is
a collection which is increasing toward infinity as a limit, but never gets
there. Such a collection is really indefinite, not infinite. The sign of this
sort of infinity, which is used in calculus, is ´. An actual infinite is a
collection in which the number of members really is infinite. The collection is
not growing toward infinity; it is infinite, it is "complete." The
sign of this sort of infinity, which is used in set theory to designate sets
which have an infinite number of members, such as {1, 2, 3, . . .}, is ?. Now
(2.11) maintains, not that a potentially infinite number of things cannot exist,
but that an actually infinite number of things cannot exist. For if an actually
infinite number of things could exist, this would spawn all sorts of
absurdities.
Perhaps the best way to bring home the truth of (2.11) is by means of an
illustration. Let me use one of my favorites, Hilbert's Hotel, a product of the
mind of the great German mathematician, David Hilbert. Let us imagine a hotel
with a finite number of rooms. Suppose, furthermore, that all the rooms are
full. When a new guest arrives asking for a room, the proprietor apologizes,
"Sorry, all the rooms are full." But now let us imagine a hotel with
an infinite number of rooms and suppose once more that all the rooms are full.
There is not a single vacant room throughout the entire infinite hotel. Now
suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room. "But of course!" says
the proprietor, and he immediately shifts the person in room #1 into room #2,
the person in room #2 into room #3, the person in room #3 into room #4 and so
on, out to infinity. As a result of these room changes, room #1 now becomes
vacant and the new guest gratefully checks in. But remember, before he arrived,
all the rooms were full! Equally curious, according to the mathematicians, there
are now no more persons in the hotel than there were before: the number is just
infinite. But how can this be? The proprietor just added the new guest's name to
the register and gave him his keys-how can there not be one more person in the
hotel than before? But the situation becomes even stranger. For suppose an
infinity of new guests show up the desk, asking for a room. "Of course, of
course!" says the proprietor, and he proceeds to shift the person in room
#1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #4, the person in room #3 into
room #6, and so on out to infinity, always putting each former occupant into the
room number twice his own. As a result, all the odd numbered rooms become
vacant, and the infinity of new guests is easily accommodated. And yet, before
they came, all the rooms were full! And again, strangely enough, the number of
guests in the hotel is the same after the infinity of new guests check in as
before, even though there were as many new guests as old guests. In fact, the
proprietor could repeat this process infinitely many times and yet there would
never be one single person more in the hotel than before.
But Hilbert's Hotel is even stranger than the German mathematician gave it out
to be. For suppose some of the guests start to check out. Suppose the guest in
room #1 departs. Is there not now one less person in the hotel? Not according to
the mathematicians-but just ask the woman who makes the beds! Suppose the guests
in room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . check out. In this case an infinite number of
people have left the hotel, but according to the mathematicians there are no
less people in the hotel-but don't talk to that laundry woman! In fact, we could
have every other guest check out of the hotel and repeat this process infinitely
many times, and yet there would never be any less people in the hotel. But
suppose instead the persons in room number 4, 5, 6, . . . checked out. At a
single stroke the hotel would be virtually emptied, the guest register reduced
to three names, and the infinite converted to finitude. And yet it would remain
true that the same number of guests checked out this time as when the guests in
room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . checked out. Can anyone sincerely believe that such
a hotel could exist in reality? These sorts of absurdities illustrate the
impossibility of the existence of an actually infinite number of things.
That takes us to (2.12). The truth of this premiss seems fairly obvious. If the
universe never began to exist, then prior to the present event there have
existed an actually infinite number of previous events. Hence, a beginningless
series of events in time entails the existence of an actually infinite number of
things, namely, past events.
Given the truth of (2.11) and (2.12), the conclusion (2.13) logically follows.
The series of past events must be finite and have a beginning. But since the
universe is not distinct from the series of events, it follows that the universe
began to exist.
At this point, we might find it profitable to consider several objections that
might be raised against the argument. First let us consider objections to
(2.11). Wallace Matson objects that the premiss must mean that an actually
infinite number of things is logically impossible; but it is easy to show that
such a collection is logically possible. For example, the series of negative
numbers {. . . -3, -2, -1} is an actually infinite collection with no first
member.[10] Matson's error here lies in thinking that (2.11) means to assert the
logical impossibility of an actually infinite number of things. What the premiss
expresses is the real or factual impossibility of an actual infinite. To
illustrate the difference between real and logical possibility: there is no
logical impossibility in something's coming to exist without a cause, but such a
circumstance may well be really or metaphysically impossible. In the same way,
(2.11) asserts that the absurdities entailed in the real existence of an actual
infinite show that such an existence is metaphysically impossible. Hence, one
could grant that in the conceptual realm of mathematics one can, given certain
conventions and axioms, speak consistently about infinite sets of numbers, but
this in no way implies that an actually infinite number of things is really
possible. One might also note that the mathematical school of intuitionism
denies that even the number series is actually infinite (they take it to be
potentially infinite only), so that appeal to number series as examples of
actual infinites is a moot procedure.
The late J.L. Mackie also objected to (2.11), claiming that the absurdities are
resolved by noting that for infinite groups the axiom "the whole is greater
than its part" does not hold, as it does for finite groups.[11] Similarly,
Quentin Smith comments that once we understand that an infinite set has a proper
subset which has the same number of members as the set itself, the purportedly
absurd situations become "perfectly believable."[12] But to my mind,
it is precisely this feature of infinite set theory which, when translated into
the realm of the real, yields results which are perfectly incredible, for
example, Hilbert's Hotel. Moreover, not all the absurdities stem from infinite
set theory's denial of Euclid's axiom: the absurdities illustrated by guests
checking out of the hotel stem from the self-contradictory results when the
inverse operations of subtraction or division are performed using transfinite
numbers. Here the case against an actually infinite collection of things becomes
decisive.
Finally one might note the objection of Sorabji, who maintains that
illustrations such as Hilbert's Hotel involve no absurdity. In order to
understand what is wrong with the kalam argument, he asks us to envision two
parallel columns beginning at the same point and stretching away into the
infinite distance, one the column of past years and the other the column of past
days. The sense in which the column of past days is no larger than the column of
past years, says Sorabji, is that the column of days will not "stick
out" beyond the far end of the other column, since neither column has a far
end. Now in the case of Hilbert's Hotel there is the temptation to think that
some unfortunate resident at the far end will drop off into space. But there is
no far end: the line of residents will not stick out beyond the far end of the
line of rooms. Once this is seen, the outcome is just an explicable- even if a
surprising and exhilarating- truth about infinity.[13] Now Sorabji is certainly
correct, as we have seen, that Hilbert's Hotel illustrates an explicable truth
about the nature of the actual infinite. If an actually infinite number of
things could exist, a Hilbert's Hotel would be possible. But Sorabji seems to
fail to understand the heart of the paradox: I, for one, experience no
temptation to think of people dropping off the far end of the hotel, for there
is none, but I do have difficulty believing that a hotel in which all the rooms
are occupied can accommodate more guests. Of course, the line of guests will not
stick out beyond the line of rooms, but if all of those infinite rooms already
have guests in them, then can moving those guests about really create empty
rooms? Sorabji's own illustration of the columns of past years and days I find
not a little disquieting: if we divide the columns into foot-long segments and
mark one column as the years and the other as the days, then one column is as
long as the other and yet for every foot-length segment in the column of years,
365 segments of equal length are found in the column of days! These paradoxical
results can be avoided only if such actually infinite collections can exist only
in the imagination, not in reality. In any case, the Hilbert's Hotel
illustration is not exhausted by dealing only with the addition of new guests,
for the subtraction of guests results in absurdities even more intractable.
Sorabji's analysis says nothing to resolve these. Hence, it seems to me that the
objections to premiss (2.11) are less plausible than the premiss itself.
With regard to (2.12), the most frequent objection is that the past ought to be
regarded as a potential infinite only, not an actual infinite. This was
Aquinas's position versus Bonaventure, and the contemporary philosopher Charles
Hartshorne seems to side with Thomas on this issue.[14] Such a position is,
however, untenable. The future is potentially infinite, since it does not exist;
but the past is actual in a way the future is not, as evidenced by the fact that
we have traces of the past in the present, but no traces of the future. Hence,
if the series of past events never began to exist, there must have been an
actually infinite number of past events.
The objections to either premiss therefore seem to be less compelling than the
premisses themselves. Together they imply that the universe began to exist.
Hence, I conclude that this argument furnishes good grounds for accepting the
truth of premiss (2) that the universe began to exist.
Second Supporting Argument
The second argument (2.2) for the beginning of the universe is based on the
impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition. This
argument is distinct from the first in that it does not deny the possibility of
the existence of an actual infinite, but the possibility of its being formed by
successive addition.
Premiss (2.21) is the crucial step in the argument. One cannot form an actually
infinite collection of things by successively adding one member after another.
Since one can always add one more before arriving at infinity, it is impossible
to reach actual infinity. Sometimes this is called the impossibility of
"counting to infinity" or "traversing the infinite." It is
important to understand that this impossibility has nothing to do with the
amount of time available: it belongs to the nature of infinity that it cannot be
so formed.
Now someone might say that while an infinite collection cannot be formed by
beginning at a point and adding members, nevertheless an infinite collection
could be formed by never beginning but ending at a point, that is to say, ending
at a point after having added one member after another from eternity. But this
method seems even more unbelievable than the first method. If one cannot count
to infinity, how can one count down from infinity? If one cannot traverse the
infinite by moving in one direction, how can one traverse it by simply moving in
the opposite direction?
Indeed, the idea of a beginningness series ending in the present seems to be
absurd. To give just one illustration: suppose we meet a man who claims to have
been counting from eternity and is now finishing: . . ., -3, -2, -1, 0. We could
ask, why did he not finish counting yesterday or the day before or the year
before? By then an infinite time had already elapsed, so that he should already
have finished by then. Thus, at no point in the infinite past could we ever find
the man finishing his countdown, for by that point he should already be done! In
fact, no matter how far back into the past we go, we can never find the man
counting at all, for at any point we reach he will have already finished. But if
at no point in the past do we find him counting, this contradicts the hypothesis
that he has been counting from eternity. This illustrates the fact that the
formation of an actual infinite by successive addition is equally impossible
whether one proceeds to or from infinity.
Premiss (2.22) presupposes a dynamical view of time according to which events
are actualized in serial fashion, one after another. The series of events is not
a sort of timelessly subsisting world-line which appears successively in
consciousness. Rather becoming is real and essential to temporal process. Now
this view of time is not without its challengers, but to consider their
objections in this article would take us too far afield.[15] In this piece, we
must rest content with the fact that we are arguing on common ground with our
ordinary intuitions of temporal becoming and in agreement with a good number of
contemporary philosophers of time and space.
Given the truth of (2.21) and (2.22), the conclusion (2.23) logically follows.
If the universe did not begin to exist a finite time ago, then the present
moment could never arrive. But obviously, it has arrived. Therefore, we know
that the universe is finite in the past and began to exist.
Again, it would be profitable to consider various objections that have been
offered against this reasoning. Against (2.21), Mackie objects that the argument
illicitly assumes an infinitely distant starting point in the past and then
pronounces it impossible to travel from that point to today. But there would in
an infinite past be no starting point, not even an infinitely distant one. Yet
from any given point in the infinite past, there is only a finite distance to
the present.[16] Now it seems to me that Mackie's allegation that the argument
presupposes an infinitely distant starting point is entirely groundless. The
beginningless character of the series only serves to accentuate the difficulty
of its being formed by successive addition. The fact that there is no beginning
at all, not even an infinitely distant one, makes the problem more, not less,
nettlesome. And the point that from any moment in the infinite past there is
only a finite temporal distance to the present may be dismissed as irrelevant.
The question is not how any finite portion of the temporal series can be formed,
but how the whole infinite series can be formed. If Mackie thinks that because
every segment of the series can be formed by successive addition therefore the
whole series can be so formed, then he is simply committing the fallacy of
composition.
Sorabji similarly objects that the reason it is impossible to count down from
infinity is because counting involves by nature taking a starting number, which
is lacking in this case. But completing an infinite lapse of years involves no
starting year and is, hence, possible.[17] But this response is clearly
inadequate, for, as we have seen, the years of an infinite past could be
enumerated by the negative numbers, in which case a completed infinity of years
would, indeed, entail a beginningless countdown from infinity. Sorabji
anticipates this rebuttal, however, and claims that such a backwards countdown
is possible in principle and therefore no logical barrier has been exhibited to
the elapsing of an infinity of past years. Again, however, the question I am
posing is not whether there is a logical contradiction in such a notion, but
whether such a countdown is not metaphysically absurd. For we have seen that
such a countdown should at any point already have been completed. But Sorabji is
again ready with a response: to say the countdown should at any point already be
over confuses counting an infinity of numbers with counting all the numbers. At
any given point in the past, the eternal counter will have already counted an
infinity of negative numbers, but that does not entail that he will have counted
all the negative numbers. I do not think the argument makes this alleged
equivocation, and this may be made clear by examining the reason why our eternal
counter is supposedly able to complete a count of the negative numbers ending at
zero. In order to justify the possibility of this intuitively impossible feat,
the argument's opponent appeals to the so- called Principle of Correspondence
used in set theory to determine whether two sets are equivalent (that is, have
the same number of members) by matching the members of one set with the members
of the other set and vice versa. On the basis of this principle the objector
argues that since the counter has lived, say, an infinite number of years and
since the set of past years can be put into a one- to-one correspondence with
the set of negative numbers, it follows that by counting one number a year an
eternal counter would complete a countdown of the negative numbers by the
present year. If we were to ask why the counter would not finish next year or in
a hundred years, the objector would respond that prior to the present year an
infinite number of years will have already elapsed, so that by the Principle of
Correspondence, all the numbers should have been counted by now. But this
reasoning backfires on the objector: for, as we have seen, on this account the
counter should at any point in the past have already finished counting all the
numbers, since a one-to-one correspondence exists between the years of the past
and the negative numbers. Thus, there is no equivocation between counting an
infinity of numbers and counting all the numbers. But at this point a deeper
absurdity bursts in view: for suppose there were another counter who counted at
a rate of one negative number per day. According to the Principle of
Correspondence, which underlies infinite set theory and transfinite arithmetic,
both of our eternal counters will finish their countdowns at the same moment,
even though one is counting at a rate 365 times faster than the other! Can
anyone believe that such scenarios can actually obtain in reality, but do not
rather represent the outcome of an imaginary game being played in a purely
conceptual realm according to adopted logical conventions and axioms?
As for premiss (2.22), many thinkers have objected that we need not regard the
past as a beginningless infinite series with an end in the present. Popper, for
example, admits that the set of all past events is actually infinite, but holds
that the series of past events is potentially infinite. This may be seen by
beginning in the present and numbering the events backwards, thus forming a
potential infinite. Therefore, the problem of an actual infinite's being formed
by successive addition does not arise.[18] Similarly, Swinburne muses that it is
dubious whether a completed infinite series with no beginning but an end makes
sense, but he proposes to solve the problem by beginning in the present and
regressing into the past, so that the series of past events would have no end
and would therefore not be a completed infinite.[19] This objection, however,
clearly confuses the mental regress of counting with the real progress of the
temporal series of events itself. Numbering the series from the present
backwards only shows that if there are an infinite number of past events, then
we can denumerate an infinite number of past events. But the problem is, how can
this infinite collection of events come to be formed by successive addition? How
we mentally conceive the series does not in any way affect the ontological
character of the series itself as a series with no beginning but an end, or in
other words, as an actual infinite completed by successive addition.
Once again, then, the objections to (2.21) and (2.22) seem less plausible than
the premisses themselves. Together they imply (2.23), or that the universe began
to exist.
First Scientific
Confirmation
These purely philosophical arguments for the beginning of the universe have
received remarkable confirmation from discoveries in astronomy and astrophysics
during this century. These confirmations might be summarized under two heads:
the confirmation from the expansion of the universe and the confirmation from
thermodynamic properties of the universe.
With regard to the first, Hubble's discovery in 1929 of the red-shift in the
light from distant galaxies began a revolution in astronomy perhaps as
significant as the Copernican revolution. Prior to this time the universe as a
whole was conceived to be static; but the startling conclusion to which Hubble
was led was that the red-shift is due to the fact that the universe is in fact
expanding. The staggering implication of this fact is that as one traces the
expansion back in time, the universe becomes denser and denser until one reaches
a point of infinite density from which the universe began to expand. The upshot
of Hubble's discovery was that at some point in the finite past-probably around
15 billion years ago-the entire known universe was contracted down to a single
mathematical point which marked the origin of the universe. That initial
explosion has come to be known as the "Big Bang." Four of the world's
most prominent astronomers described that event in these words:
The universe began from a state of infinite density. . . . Space and time were
created in that event and so was all the matter in the universe. It is not
meaningful to ask what happened before the Big Bang; it is like asking what is
north of the North Pole. Similarly, it is not sensible to ask where the Big Bang
took place. The point-universe was not an object isolated in space; it was the
entire universe, and so the answer can only be that the Big Bang happened
everywhere.[20]
This event that marked the beginning of the universe becomes all the more
amazing when one reflects on the fact that a state of "infinite
density" is synonymous to "nothing." There can be no object that
possesses infinite density, for if it had any size at all it could still be even
more dense. Therefore, as Cambridge astronomer Fred Hoyle points out, the Big
Bang Theory requires the creation of matter from nothing. This is because as one
goes back in time, one reaches a point at which, in Hoyle's words, the universe
was "shrunk down to nothing at all."[21] Thus, what the Big Bang model
of the universe seems to require is that the universe began to exist and was
created out of nothing.
Some theorists have attempted to avoid the absolute beginning of the universe
implied by the Big Bang theory by speculating that the universe may undergo an
infinite series of expansions and contractions. There are, however, good grounds
for doubting the adequacy of such an oscillating model of the universe: (i) The
oscillating model appears to be physically impossible. For all the talk about
such models, the fact seems to be that they are only theoretically, but not
physically possible. As the late Professor Tinsley of Yale explains, in
oscillating models "even though the mathematics say that the universe
oscillates, there is no known physics to reverse the collapse and bounce back to
a new expansion. The physics seems to say that those models start from the Big
Bang, expand, collapse, then end."[22] In order for the oscillating model
to be correct, it would seem that the known laws of physics would have to be
revised. (ii) The oscillating model seems to be observationally untenable. Two
facts of observational astronomy appear to run contrary to the oscillating
model. First, the observed homogeneity of matter distribution throughout the
universe seems unaccountable on an oscillating model. During the contraction
phase of such a model, black holes begin to gobble up surrounding matter,
resulting in an inhomogeneous distribution of matter. But there is no known
mechanism to "iron out" these inhomogeneities during the ensuing
expansion phase. Thus, the homogeneity of matter observed throughout the
universe would remain unexplained. Second, the density of the universe appears
to be insufficient for the re-contraction of the universe. For the oscillating
model to be even possible, it is necessary that the universe be sufficiently
dense such that gravity can overcome the force of the expansion and pull the
universe back together again. However, according to the best estimates, if one
takes into account both luminous matter and non-luminous matter (found in
galactic halos) as well as any possible contribution of neutrino particles to
total mass, the universe is still only about one-half that needed for
re-contraction.[23] Moreover, recent work on calculating the speed and
deceleration of the expansion confirms that the universe is expanding at, so to
speak, "escape velocity" and will not therefore re-contract. According
to Sandage and Tammann, "Hence, we are forced to decide that . . . it seems
inevitable that the Universe will expand forever"; they conclude,
therefore, that "the Universe has happened only once."[24]
Second Scientific
Confirmation
As if this were not enough, there is a second scientific confirmation of the
beginning of the universe based on the thermodynamic properties of various
cosmological models. According to the second law of thermodynamics, processes
taking place in a closed system always tend toward a state of equilibrium. Now
our interest is in what implications this has when the law is applied to the
universe as a whole. For the universe is a gigantic closed system, since it is
everything there is and no energy is being fed into it from without. The second
law seems to imply that, given enough time, the universe will reach a state of
thermodynamic equilibrium, known as the "heat death" of the universe.
This death may be hot or cold, depending on whether the universe will expand
forever or eventually re-contract. On the one hand, if the density of the
universe is great enough to overcome the force of the expansion, then the
universe will re-contract into a hot fireball. As the universe contracts, the
stars burn more rapidly until they finally explode or evaporate. As the universe
grows denser, the black holes begin to gobble up everything around them and
begin themselves to coalesce until all the black holes finally coalesce into one
gigantic black hole which is coextensive with the universe, from which it will
never re-emerge. On the other hand, if the density of the universe is
insufficient to halt the expansion, as seems more likely, then the galaxies will
turn all their gas into stars and the stars will burn out. At 10[30 ]years the
universe will consist of 90% dead stars, 9% supermassive black holes, and l%
atomic matter. Elementary particle physics suggests that thereafter protons will
decay into electrons and positrons, so that space will be filled with a rarefied
gas so thin that the distance between an electron and a positron will be about
the size of the present galaxy. At 10[100] years some scientists believe that
the black holes themselves will dissipate into radiation and elementary
particles. Eventually all the matter in the dark, cold, ever-expanding universe
will be reduced to an ultra-thin gas of elementary particles and radiation.
Equilibrium will prevail throughout, and the entire universe will be in its
final state, from which no change will occur.
Now the question which needs to be asked is this: if, given sufficient time, the
universe will reach heat death, then why is it not now in a state of heat death
if it has existed for infinite time? If the universe did not begin to exist,
then it should now be in a state of equilibrium. Some theorists have suggested
that the universe escapes final heat death by oscillating from eternity past to
eternity future. But we have already seen that such a model seems to be
physically and observationally untenable. But even if we waive those
considerations and suppose that the universe does oscillate, the fact is that
the thermodynamic properties of this model imply the very beginning of the
universe which its proponents seek to avoid. For the thermodynamic properties of
an oscillating model are such that the universe expands farther and farther with
each successive cycle. Therefore, as one traces the expansions back in time,
they grow smaller and smaller. As one scientific team explains, "The effect
of entropy production will be to enlarge the cosmic scale, from cycle to cycle.
. . . Thus, looking back in time, each cycle generated less entropy, had a
smaller cycle time, and had a smaller cycle expansion factor than the cycle that
followed it."[25] Novikov and Zeldovich of the Institute of Applied
Mathematics of the USSR Academy of Sciences therefore conclude, "The
multicycle model has an infinite future, but only a finite past."[26] As
another writer points out, the oscillating model of the universe thus still
requires an origin of the universe prior to the smallest cycle.[27]
So whatever scenario one selects for the future of the universe, thermodynamics
implies that the universe began to exist. According to physicist P.C.W. Davies,
the universe must have been created a finite time ago and is in the process of
winding down. Prior to the creation, the universe simply did not exist.
Therefore, Davies concludes, even though we may not like it, we must conclude
that the universe's energy was somehow simply "put in" at the creation
as an initial condition.[28]
We therefore have both philosophical argument and scientific confirmation for
the beginning of the universe. On this basis I think that we are amply justified
in concluding the truth of premiss (2) that the universe began to exist.
First Premiss
Premiss (1) strikes me as relatively non-controversial. It is based on the
metaphysical intuition that something cannot come out of nothing. Hence, any
argument for the principle is apt to be less obvious than the principle itself.
Even the great skeptic David Hume admitted that he never asserted so absurd a
proposition as that something might come into existence without a cause; he only
denied that one could prove the obviously true causal principle.[29] With regard
to the universe, if originally there were absolutely nothing-no God, no space,
no time-, then how could the universe possibly come to exist? The truth of the
principle ex nihilo, nihil fit is so obvious that I think we are justified in
foregoing an elaborate defense of the argument's first premiss.
Nevertheless, some thinkers, exercised to avoid the theism implicit in this
premiss within the present context, have felt driven to deny its truth. In order
to avoid its theistic implications, Davies presents a scenario which, he
confesses, "should not be taken too seriously," but which seems to
have a powerful attraction for Davies.[30] He has reference to a quantum theory
of gravity according to which spacetime itself could spring uncaused into being
out of absolutely nothing. While admitting that there is "still no
satisfactory theory of quantum gravity," such a theory "would allow
spacetime to be created and destroyed spontaneously and uncaused in the same way
that particles are created and destroyed spontaneously and uncaused. The theory
would entail a certain mathematically determined probability that, for instance,
a blob of space would appear where none existed before. Thus, spacetime could
pop out of nothingness as the result of a causeless quantum
transition."[31]
Now in fact particle pair production furnishes no analogy for this radical ex
nihilo becoming, as Davies seems to imply. This quantum phenomenon, even if an
exception to the principle that every event has a cause, provides no analogy to
something's coming into being out of nothing. Though physicists speak of this as
particle pair creation and annihilation, such terms are philosophically
misleading, for all that actually occurs is conversion of energy into matter or
vice versa. As Davies admits, "The processes described here do not
represent the creation of matter out of nothing, but the conversion of pre-
existing energy into material form."[32] Hence, Davies greatly misleads his
reader when he claims that "Particles . . . can appear out of nowhere
without specific causation" and again, "Yet the world of quantum
physics routinely produces something for nothing."[33] On the contrary, the
world of quantum physics never produces something for nothing.
But to consider the case on its own merits: quantum gravity is so poorly
understood that the period prior to 10[-43] sec, which this theory hopes to
describe, has been compared by one wag to the regions on the maps of the ancient
cartographers marked "Here there be dragons": it can easily be filled
with all sorts of fantasies. In fact, there seems to be no good reason to think
that such a theory would involve the sort of spontaneous becoming ex nihilo
which Davies suggests. A quantum theory of gravity has the goal of providing a
theory of gravitation based on the exchange of particles (gravitons) rather than
the geometry of space, which can then be brought into a Grand Unification Theory
that unites all the forces of nature into a supersymmetrical state in which one
fundamental force and a single kind of particle exist. But there seems to be
nothing in this which suggests the possibility of spontaneous becoming ex nihilo.
Indeed, it is not at all clear that Davies's account is even intelligible. What
can be meant, for example, by the claim that there is a mathematical probability
that nothingness should spawn a region of spacetime "where none existed
before?" It cannot mean that given enough time a region of spacetime would
pop into existence at a certain place, since neither place nor time exist apart
from spacetime. The notion of some probability of something's coming out of
nothing thus seems incoherent.
I am reminded in this connection of some remarks made by A.N. Prior concerning
an argument put forward by Jonathan Edwards against something's coming into
existence uncaused. This would be impossible, said Edwards, because it would
then be inexplicable why just any and everything cannot or does not come to
exist uncaused. One cannot respond that only things of a certain nature come
into existence uncaused, since prior to their existence they have no nature
which could control their coming to be. Prior made a cosmological application of
Edwards's reasoning by commenting on the steady state model's postulating the
continuous creation of hydrogen atoms ex nihilo:
It is no part of Hoyle's theory that this process is causeless, but I want to be
more definite about this, and to say that if it is causeless, then what is
alleged to happen is fantastic and incredible. If it is possible for
objects-objects, now, which really are objects, "substances endowed with
capacities"-to start existing without a cause, then it is incredible that
they should all turn out to be objects of the same sort, namely, hydrogen atoms.
The peculiar nature of hydrogen atoms cannot possibly be what makes such
starting-to-exist possible for them but not for objects of any other sort; for
hydrogen atoms do not have this nature until they are there to have it, i.e.
until their starting-to-exist has already occurred. That is Edwards's argument,
in fact; and here it does seem entirely cogent. . . .[34]
Now in the case at hand, if originally absolutely nothing existed, then why
should it be spacetime that springs spontaneously out of the void, rather than,
say, hydrogen atoms or even rabbits? How can one talk about the probability of
any particular thing's popping into being out of nothing?
Davies on one occasion seems to answer as if the laws of physics are the
controlling factor which determines what may leap uncaused into being: "But
what of the laws? They have to be 'there' to start with so that the universe can
come into being. Quantum physics has to exist (in some sense) so that a quantum
transition can generate the cosmos in the first place."[35] Now this seems
exceedingly peculiar. Davies seems to attribute to the laws of nature themselves
a sort of ontological and causal status such that they constrain spontaneous
becoming. But this seems clearly wrong-headed: the laws of physics do not
themselves cause or constrain anything; they are simply propositional
descriptions of a certain form and generality of what does happen in the
universe. And the issue Edwards raises is why, if there were absolutely nothing,
it would be true that any one thing rather than another should pop into being
uncaused? It is futile to say it somehow belongs to the nature of spacetime to
do so, for if there were absolutely nothing then there would have been no nature
to determine that spacetime should spring into being.
Even more fundamentally, however, what Davies envisions is surely metaphysical
nonsense. Though his scenario is cast as a scientific theory,. someone ought to
be bold enough to say that the Emperor is wearing no clothes. Either the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of spacetime existed or
not; if so, then it is not true that nothing existed; if not, then it would seem
ontologically impossible that being should arise out of absolute non-being. To
call such spontaneous springing into being out of non-being a "quantum
transition" or to attribute it to "quantum gravity" explains
nothing; indeed, on this account, there is no explanation. It just happens.
It seems to me, therefore, that Davies has not provided any plausible basis for
denying the truth of the cosmological argument's first premiss. That whatever
begins to exist has a cause would seem to be an ontologically necessary truth,
one which is constantly confirmed in our experience.
Conclusion
Given the truth of premisses (1) and (2), it logically follows that (3) the
universe has a cause of its existence. In fact, I think that it can be plausibly
argued that the cause of the universe must be a personal Creator. For how else
could a temporal effect arise from an eternal cause? If the cause were simply a
mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions existing from
eternity, then why would not the effect also exist from eternity? For example,
if the cause of water's being frozen is the temperature's being below zero
degrees, then if the temperature were below zero degrees from eternity, then any
water present would be frozen from eternity. The only way to have an eternal
cause but a temporal effect would seem to be if the cause is a personal agent
who freely chooses to create an effect in time. For example, a man sitting from
eternity may will to stand up; hence, a temporal effect may arise from an
eternally existing agent. Indeed, the agent may will from eternity to create a
temporal effect, so that no change in the agent need be conceived. Thus, we are
brought not merely to the first cause of the universe, but to its personal
Creator.
Summary and Conclusion
In conclusion, we have seen on the basis of both philosophical argument and
scientific confirmation that it is plausible that the universe began to exist.
Given the intuitively obvious principle that whatever begins to exist has a
cause of its existence, we have been led to conclude that the universe has a
cause of its existence. On the basis of our argument, this cause would have to
be uncaused, eternal, changeless, timeless, and immaterial. Moreover, it would
have to be a personal agent who freely elects to create an effect in time.
Therefore, on the basis of the kalam cosmological argument, I conclude that it
is rational to believe that God exists.
NOTES
[1]G.W. Leibniz, "The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on
Reason," in Leibniz Selections, ed. Philip P. Wiener, The Modern Student's
Library (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 527.
[2]Aristotle Metaphysica Lambda. l. 982b10-15.
[3]Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (London: Oxford University
Press, 1958), p. 70.
[4]J.J.C. Smart, "The Existence of God," Church Quarterly Review 156
(1955): 194.
[5]G.W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man,
and the Origin of Evil, trans. E.M. Huggard (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1951), p. 127; cf. idem, "Principles," p. 528.
[6]John Hick, "God as Necessary Being," Journal of Philosophy 57
(1960): 733-4.
[7]David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, ed. with an Introduction
by Norman Kemp Smith, Library of the Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
1947), p. 190.
[8]Bertrand Russell and F.C. Copleston, "The Existence of God," in The
Existence of God, ed. with an Introduction by John Hick, Problems of Philosophy
Series (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1964), p. 175.
[9]See William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz,
Library of Philosophy and Religion (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 48-58, 61-76,
98-104, 128-31.
[10]Wallace Matson, The Existence of God (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1965), pp. 58-60.
[11]J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 93.
[12]Quentin Smith, "Infinity and the Past," Philosophy of Science 54
(1987): 69.
[13]Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1983), pp. 213, 222-3.
[14]Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism (Chicago:
Willett, Clark, & Co., 1941), p. 37.
[15]G.J. Whitrow defends a form of this argument which does not presuppose a
dynamical view of time, by asserting that an infinite past would still have to
be "lived through" by any everlasting, conscious being, even if the
series of physical events subsisted timelessly (G.J. Whitrow, The Natural
Philosophy of Time, 2d ed. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980], pp. 28-32).
[16]Mackie, Theism, p. 93.
[17]Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, pp. 219-22.
[18]K.R. Popper, "On the Possibility of an Infinite Past: a Reply to
Whitrow," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1978): 47-8.
[19]R.G. Swinburne, "The Beginning of the Universe," The Aristotelian
Society 40 (1966): 131-2.
[20]Richard J. Gott, et.al., "Will the Universe Expand Forever?"
Scientific American (March 1976), p. 65.
[21]Fred Hoyle, From Stonehenge to Modern Cosmology (San Francisco: W.H.
Freeman, 1972), p. 36.
[22]Beatrice Tinsley, personal letter.
[23]David N. Schramm and Gary Steigman, "Relic Neutrinos and the Density of
the Universe," Astrophysical Journal 243 (1981): p. 1-7.
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