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Otto
Ohlendorf I, Otto Ohlendorf, being first duly sworn, declare- I was Chief of the Security Service (SD), Office III of the main office of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD (RSHA), from 1939 to 1945. In June 1941 I was designated by Himmler to lead one of the Einsatzgruppen, which was then being formed, to accompany the German armies in the Russian campaign. I was the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe D. Chief of the Einsatzgruppe A was Stahlecker, department chief in the Foreign Office. Chief of Einsatzgruppe B was Nebe, chief of office V (criminal police) of the main office of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. (RSHA) Chief of Einsatzgruppe C was first Rasch (or Rasche) and then Thomas. Himmler stated that an important part of our task consisted of the extermination of Jews-women, men, and children-and of Communist functionaries. I was informed of the attack on Russia about four weeks in advance. According to an agreement with the Armed Forces Supreme Command and Army High Command, the Einsatzkommandos within the army group or the army were assigned to certain army corps and divisions. The army designated the areas in which the Einsatzkommandos had to operate. All operational directives and orders for the carrying out of executions were given through the Chief of the Security Police and the SD (RSHA) in Berlin. Regular courier service and radio communications existed between the Einsatzgruppen and the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. The Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were led by personnel of the Gestapo, the SD or the criminal police. Additional men were detailed from the regular police and the Waffen SS. Einsatzgruppe D consisted of approximately 400 to 500 men and had about 170 vehicles at its disposal. When the German army in- * Defendant Ohlendorf testified in Court on 8, 9, 14 and 15 October 1947 (Tr. pp.475-755) 1947 Page
206 In the implementation of this extermination program, the Einsatzgruppen were subdivided into Einsatzkommandos, and the Einsatzkommandos into still smaller units, the so-called Sonderkommandos and Teilkommandos. Usually, the smaller units were led by a member of the SD, the Gestapo or the criminal police. The unit selected for this task would enter a village or city and order the prominent Jewish citizens to call together all Jews for the purpose of resettlement. They were requested to hand over their valuables to the leaders of the unit and shortly before the execution to surrender their outer clothing. The men, women, and children were led to a place of execution which in most cases was located next to a more deeply excavated antitank ditch. Then they were shot, kneeling or standing, and the corpses thrown into the ditch. I never permitted the shooting by individuals in group D, but ordered that several of the men should shoot at the same time in order to avoid direct personal responsibility. The leaders of the unit or especially designated persons, however, had to fire the last bullet against those victims which were not dead immediately. I learned from conversations with other group leaders that some of them demanded that the victims lie down flat on the ground to be shot through the nape of the neck. I did not approve of these methods. In the spring of 1942, we received gas vehicles from the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Berlin. These vehicles were made available by office II of the RSHA. The man who was responsible for the care of my Einsatzgruppe was Becker. We had received orders to use the cars for the killing of women and children. Whenever a unit had collected a sufficient number of victims, a car was sent for their liquidation. We also had these gas vehicles stationed in the neighborhood of the transient camps into which the victims were brought. The victims were told that they would be resettled and had to climb into the vehicle for that purpose. When the doors were closed and the gas streamed in through the starting of the vehicle, the victims died within 10 to 16 minutes. The cars were then driven to the burial place where the corpses were taken out and buried. I have seen the report of
Stahlecker (L-180), concerning Einsatzgruppe A, in which Stahlecker asserts that
his group killed 135,000 Jews and Communists in the first four months of the
program. I know Stahlecker personally, and I am of the opinion that [Signed] OHLENDORF Subscribed and sworn to before me this fifth day of November 1945 at Nuernberg, Germany. [Signed] Smith
W. Brookhart
"The
Einsatzgruppen Case" Case No.9 The United States of America --against-- Otto
Ohlendorf, Heinz Jost, Erich Naumann, Otto Rasch
Part VI Page 244 [Ohlendorf Direct Examination Testimony. Questions posed by his defense lawyer, Dr Aschenauer] A. The Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos were neither agencies nor parts of the organization of the Reich Security Main Office. They were mobile units set up for one single purpose which were set up ad hoc for certain assignments. The members of the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos were either conscripted or were taken from the members of the security police and SD. Or they were drafted to a large extent, for example, as drivers or interpreters, whereas a large membership of the Einsatzgruppen, by order of Himmler, was made available by companies of the Waffen SS or the regular police. These Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were no agencies or authorities, but they were military units. Q. Were the purposes and the orders of the Einsatzgruppen made known to the men and the leaders when they were drafted? A. No. This was not done. The leaders and men were given an order to report to Dueben or Pretzsch in Saxony. They did not get any information where they were to be committed, or what tasks they were supposed to do. Even after the units had been activated, the commanders and men did not know about it. Q. When was the area of operation made public? A. It was made known shortly before the units left for Russia, about three days before. Q. When was the order given for the liquidation of certain elements of the population in the U. S. S. R. and by whom was it handed over ? . A. As far as I recollect, this order was given at the same time when the area of operations was made known. In Pretzseh, the chiefs of offices I and IV, the then Lieutenant Colonels [Obersturmbannfuehrer] Streckenbach and Mueller gave the order which had been issued by Himmler and Heydrich. Q. What was the wording of this order? A. This special order, for such it is, read as follows: That in addition to our general task the Security Police and SD, the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos had the mission to protect the rear of the troops by killing the Jews, gypsies, Communist functionaries, active Communists, and all persons who would endanger the security. Q. What were your thoughts when you received this order of killings ? A. The immediate feeling
with me and with the other men was one of general protest. Lieutenant Colonel
Streckenbach listened to this protest, and, even gave us a few different points
which we could not know, but at the same time he told us that even he himself
had protested most strenuously against a similar order in the Polish campaign,
but that Himmler had rebuked him just Q. Did you consider this order as justified? A. No; I did not. I did not consider it justified because quite independently from the necessity of taking such measures, these measures would have moral and ethical consequences which would deteriorate the mind. Q. Did you know about plans or directives which had as their goal the extermination on racial and religious grounds? A. I expressly assure you that I neither knew of such plans nor was I called on to cooperate in any such plans. Lieutenant General [Obergruppenfuehrer] Bach-Zelewski testified during the big trial [before the International Military Tribunal] that the Reich Leader SS in a secret conference of all lieutenant generals made known that the goal was to exterminate thirty million Slavs. I repeat that I was neither given such an order nor was there even the slightest hint, given to me that such plans or goals existed for the Russian campaign. This is not only true for the Slavs but this is also true for the Jews. I know that in the years of 1938, 1939 and 1940, no extermination plans existed, but on the contrary, with the aid of Heydrich and by cooperation with Jewish organizations, emigration programs from Germany and Austria were arranged; financial funds even were raised in order to help aid the poorer Jews to make this emigration possible. In 1941, I personally helped in individual cases, where, for example, a representative of I. G. Farben called on me in order to overcome difficulties with the state police, when it was their intention also to let so-called bearers of secrets emigrate. Up to the very end I succeeded in giving such aid. Thus, at the beginning of the Russian campaign, I had no cause to assume that the execution order which we were given meant that any such extermination was planned or was to be carried out. During my time in Russia, I sent a great number of reports to the Chief of Security Police and SD in which I reported about the fine cooperation with the Russian population. They were never objected to. When Himmler was in Nikolaev in 1941, he neither made any reproaches about this, nor did he give me any other directives. I am rather convinced that where such an extermination policy was later carried out, it was not carried out by the order of the central agencies, but it was the work of individual people. Q. Did you give any thought to the legality of such a Fuehrer order? A. Of course I did. I knew the history of communism. From Page
246 PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Witness, when you refer to the Russian practice in the war against Poland, were you referring to the war of 1939 when Russia was your ally? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: Yes. This has nothing to do with it, or does not change the subject, the fact that Russia was our ally at the time. Q. No. I am just asking if that is the war you are referring to? A. Yes, this is the war. Q. Yes. Well, did Germany at that time also have the same practices ? A. I do not know that this
happened to the same extent. That violations took place cannot be doubted. A. Yes DR. ASCHENAUER: Is, in your opinion, the man who receives these orders obliged to examine them when they are given to him? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: This is not possible, legally or actually. According to the general legal interpretation in Germany, not even a judge had the possibility of examining the legality of a law or an order, as little as an administrative official could examine the administrative edict of a supreme authority. But even actually it would have been presumptuous because in the position in which every one of the defendants found themselves, we did not have the possibility of actually judging the situation. It also corresponds to the moral concept which I have learned as a European tradition, that no subordinate can take it upon himself to examine the authority of the supreme commander and chief of state. He only faces his God and history. Q. Didn't Article 47 of the Military Penal Code give you an occasion to interpret this execution order differently? A. It is impossible for me to imagine that an article which was created to prevent excesses by individual officers or men leaves open the possibility to consider the supreme order of the supreme commander a crime. Apart from this, again according to continental concept, the chief of state cannot commit a crime. DR. ASCHENAUER: What is your conviction about the actual background of the Fuehrer order which was given to you? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I have had no cause, and I still have no cause today to think that any other goal was aimed at than the goal of any war, namely, an immediate and permanent security of our own realm against that realm with which the belligerent conflict is taking place. Q. The prosecution states that the contents of the order and its execution was part of a systematic program of genocide which had as its aim the destruction of foreign peoples and ethnic groups. Will you please comment on this? A. I did not have any occasion to assume any such plan. I assure you that I neither participated in plans, nor did I see any preparation for such plans which would have let me assume that such a plan existed. What was told to us was our security and those persons who were assumed to be endangering the security were designated as such. Q. What observations did you yourself make in Russia about Page 248 A. The experiences in Russia showed me once and for all that here the propaganda of Goebbels had not stated the truth clearly enough. I was convinced that this state, which in order to gain its ends internally, had torn many millions from their families; in the process of separating the-Kulaks [well-to-do farmers] they took the adult population away three times from rural districts. This state would have even less consideration for a foreign population. It was obvious that the number of Jews in the general population in Russia, in relation to their number in the higher administration, was very, very small. The prosecution has submitted a report from my Einsatzgruppe to the army. In this report in enclosure No.2 it explained the situation of Jewry in the Crimea. Unfortunately, this enclosure was not available. It would have shown that in the Crimea, for example, up to 90 percent of the administrative and leading authoritative positions were occupied by Jews. The information service in the same field, conversations with innumerable Ukrainians and Russians and Tartars, and the documents which the prosecution submitted show that this was not only the case in the Crimea. For us it was obvious that Jewry in Bolshevist Russia actually played a disproportionately important role. Three times I was present during executions. Every time I found the same facts which I considered with great respect, that the Jews who were executed went to their death singing the "International" and hailing Stalin. That the Communist functionaries and the active leaders of the Communists in the occupied area of Russia posed an actual continuous danger for the German occupation the documents of the prosecution have shown. It was absolutely certain that by these persons the call of Stalin for ruthless partisan warfare would be followed without any reservation. Orally and in written form, the Bolshevists have attested enthusiastically to the fact that this partisan warfare was not only waged by the Communist Party and not only by the Communist functionaries: but as Stalin requested, it was waged by the population, by peasants, by workers, men, women, and children. This same literature is proud of the fact that it was waged with great treachery and cunning which the call of Stalin evoked in order to wage this war successfully. Thus our experiences in Russia were a definite confirmation of the Bolshevist theory and of the practice as we had learned about it before. Q. What orders did you give
to the Einsatzgruppen and Ein- A. Before I testify to the various facts, I would like to say the following: The men of my group who are under indictment here were under my military command. If they had not executed the orders which they were given, they would have been ordered by me to execute them. If they had refused to execute the orders they would have had to be called to account for it by me. There could be no doubt about it. Whoever refused anything in the front lines would have met immediate death. If the refusal would have come about in any other way, a court martial of the Higher SS and Police Leader would have brought about the same consequences. The jurisdiction of courts martial was great, but the sentences of the SS were gruesome. The orders for the execution in the past given in Pretzsch went to all Einsatzgruppen commanders or Einsatzkommando leaders who went along during the beginning of the Russian campaign. They were never revoked. Thus they were valid for the entire Russian campaign as long as there were Einsatzgruppen. Thus it was, therefore, unnecessary at any time to give another order of initiative and I did not give any individual order to kill people. I emphasize this, even though I was told in England two and a half years ago that the Russians had found a written order. My mission was to see to it that this general order for executions would be carried out as humanly as conditions would permit. Therefore, I merely gave orders for the manner of carrying out these executions. Q. What were these orders? A. These orders had as their purpose to make it as easy as possible for the unfortunate victim and to prevent the brutality of the men from leading to inevitable excesses. Thus I first ordered that only so many victims should be brought to the place of execution as the execution commandos could handle. Any individual action by any individual man was forbidden. The Einsatzkommandos shot in a military manner only upon orders. It was strictly ordered to avoid any maltreatment, undressing was not permitted. The taking of any personal possessions was not permitted. Publicity was not permitted, and at the very moment when it was noted that a man had experienced joy in carrying out these executions, it was ordered that this man should never participate in any more executions. The men could not report voluntarily, they were ordered. Q. What did you do to prevent a wide interpretation of these execution orders ? A. It was forbidden that the
commandos undertake any executions outside of the territory occupied by the
German army. Q. Why did you not prevent the liquidations? A. Even if I use the most severe standard in judging this, I had as little possibility as any of the codefendants here to prevent this order. There was only one thing, a senseless martyrdom through suicide, senseless because this would not have changed anything in the execution of this order, for this order was not an order of the SS, it was an order of the Supreme Commander in Chief and the Chief of State; it was not only carried out by Himmler or Heydrich. The army had to carry it out too, the High Command of the Army as well as the commanders in the east and southeast who were the superior commanders for the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos. If I could imagine a theoretical possibility, then there was only the refusal on the part of those persons who were in the uppermost hierarchy and could appeal to the Supreme Commander and Chief of State, because they had the only possibility of getting access to him. They were, after all, the highest bearers of responsibility in the theater of operations. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: May I ask a question, Dr. Aschenauer? Do I understand you to say, Witness, that the Supreme Commander in the East, that is of the Wehrmacht, also had orders to carry out this program of execution? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I know that the Supreme Command gave the commanders for the eastern campaign who had assembled on 30 March, not only information about the measures planned, but also directives to support the execution of these measures. The fact that SS and police units were used for these executions had only one reason; namely, that there was no guarantee for a systematic execution of these orders by the army troops but that one expected demoralization if army troops would be used. As the war progressed in the Southeast this principle was abandoned. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO:
Would you say that the army commander not only countenanced this program of executions but lent their active support to it? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: Yes. That is what I want to say. If I may give you two examples for that, the executions in Simferopol by the Einsatzkommando 11b were carried out on the order of the army, and the army supplied the trucks and the gasoline and the drivers in order to bring the Jews to the places of execution. The arrests of hostages were expressly carried out by order of the supreme commander of my army. He did not agree with the executions of these hostages, because the number of executions did not seem high enough to him and afterwards he told Seibert, the defendant here, to tell me that he himself would henceforth carry out the appropriate number of executions. Q. Did you not try in Nikolaev to dissuade the Reich Leader SS from this order? A. The situation in Nikolaev was especially depressing in a moral sense, because in agreement with the army, we had excluded a large number of Jews, the farmers, from the executions. When the Reich Leader SS was in Nikolaev on 4 or 5 October, I was reproached for this measure and he ordered that henceforth, even against the will of the army, the executions should take place as planned. When the Reich Leader SS arrived at my headquarters, I had assembled all available commanders of my Einsatzgruppe. The Reich Leader addressed these men and repeated the strict order to kill all those groups which I have designated. He added that he alone would carry the responsibility, as far as accounting to the Fuehrer was concerned. None of the men would bear any responsibility, but he demanded the execution of this order, even though he knew how harsh these measures were. Nevertheless, after supper, I spoke to the Reich Leader and I pointed out the inhuman burden which was being imposed on the men in killing all these civilians. I didn't even get an answer. Q. Could you not have refused to support the execution of this order ? A. For that I would have had to have the feeling of the illegality and the possibility of appealing to a higher authority, but I had neither of them. Q. Could you not have, after a certain period of time, tried to evade this order by sickness? A. As long as I thought in
political terms, I no longer considered myself as an individual person who only
could think and act responsibly for himself. After I had once become Chief of
the Einsatzgruppe, I felt responsible for the 500 men of this group. By
simulating illness, I could have evaded the mission, Q. Did you issue orders of execution? A. No. Q. Wherein lies your participation in the carrying out of these executions ? A. It is in three points. As far as the transportation conditions permitted, I convinced myself before the large executions whether measures had been taken at the place of execution, which would make possible the conditions I set down for these executions. The second, in order to take some burden from the Kommandos, I ordered that other distant Kommandos be detailed to support that Kommando which had to carry out an execution, and third, that, as far as possible, I tried either personally or through my men to carry out unexpected inspections during these executions. I wanted to make sure in that way that my orders about the manner of execution were being carried out. DR. ASCHENAUER: In the indictment it says that the task of the Einsatzgruppen was, first, to follow the German army into the eastern territories, and to eliminate Soviet functionaries, gypsies, Jews, and other elements of the civilian population which were considered racially inferior, or politically unwanted. Would you say something about that, Witness? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: First,
the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos never had the task to eliminate groups
of the population because they were racially inferior, and even so that was not
the main task. It was an additional assignment which, in itself, was foreign to
the actual task of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos, because never was
such a task of the security police or of the SD for that matter-and never by any
means, as it is mentioned in another place in the indictment-were they trained
for such exterminations and executions. Rather, the general task of the
Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos was that the security of the army
territory in the operational theaters should be guaranteed by them, and within
the framework of this security task the execution order was, of course, one of
the basic orders. But, in reality, the Einsatzgruppen's task was a positive one,
if I leave out this basic order for exterminations and executions. It must be
realized, of course, that a group of about 500 people who, on the average, Concerning the
security tasks, there were also tasks of reporting to the army about the
atmosphere within the population, the reaction of the population to German
measures and what disturbances and damages happened in the area on the part of
the Germans. In this manner plebiscites could be arranged which were useful to
the population and which saved us police measures. The situation in the Crimes
was much more difficult, although I was there a longer time than anywhere else
at a stretch, and I had the possibility to prepare political measures. Even here
the [Pages 254-268, and part of 269 omitted] CROSS-EXAMINATION [OF OTTO OHLENDORF] MR. HEATH: Mr. Ohlendorf, to
speed this examination I'd like to attempt to agree with you upon one or two
points. First, we. shall not quarrel about numbers. You have indicated that
Einsatzgruppe D under your command slaughtered something less than 90,000 human
beings. I understood you to suggest to the Court that this figure is exaggerated
although it appears in an affidavit which you have given. I ask you now to give
the Court the best estimate you possibly can of the minimum number of human DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: In my direct examination I have already said that I cannot give any definite figure, and that even the testimony in my affidavit shows that in reality I could not name any figure. Therefore, I have named a figure which has been reported "approximately". The knowledge which I have gained by this day through the documents and which I have gained through conversations with my men, make me reserve the right to name any figure and strengthen this reservation. Therefore, I am not in a position to give you a minimum figure, either. In my direct examination I have said that the numbers which appear in the documents are at least exaggerated by one-half, but I must repeat that I never knew any definite figure and, therefore, cannot give you any such figure. Q. You cannot give us a minimum figure? A. If the prosecution wishes I am, of course, prepared to give my reasons why I cannot give any figure. Q. Well, let me ask you-perhaps I can help you * * *. In any event, I can indicate to the Court one reason why you might have doubts about the numbers. In 1943 the Reich Leader SS, Himmler addressed the SS major generals at Poznan. You are aware of that speech, are you not? A. Yes. I have heard it myself. Q. Perhaps you recall his complaint; I will read it to you-" I come now to a fourth virtue, which is very rare in Germany-truthfulness. One of the greatest evils which has spread during the war is the lack of truthfulness in messages, reports, and statements, which subordinate departments in civil life, in the State, the Party and the services sent in to the departments over them." Of course, that was in 1943. Did you exaggerate the reports which you sent to the Reich Security Main Office? A. I certainly did not on my own initiative, but I had to rely on those things which were reported to me, and I know that double countings could not be avoided, and I also know that wrong numbers were reported to me. I have tied to avoid passing on such double countings or wrong statements, because the individual Kommandos did not know the figures of the neighbor units; nevertheless the reporting of wrong figures was not prevented-and especially the reporting of strange figures as for instance, the report from Chernovitsy. Here those figures are named for which the Rumanians in Chernovitsy were responsible. Q. Will you tell the Court
what bookkeeping and record-making system was maintained in Einsatzgruppe D to
keep track of the people slaughtered Q. Well, it is quite obvious that that is what happened. But tell us now who reported for Einsatzkommando 12, say, during the first six months of its operations, the killings by Einsatzkommando 12, to you? A. Einsatzkommando 12 itself. Q. And who was the man who reported to you? A. They were usually signed by the Einsatzkommando chief himself, in this case by the then SS Major [Sturmbannfuehrer] Nosske. Q. Very well, you relied on Nosske for truthful reporting of the numbers killed by his unit? A. I had no possibility to examine these executions because Nosske, was sometimes 200 or 250 kilometers away from me. Q. Witness, I don't mean to cut you off, but I think if I ask you now to attempt to make your answers as responsive as possible, I shall attempt to make my questions as explicit as possible-and I believe we both shall benefit. So, I ask you again-not why you did not check up on Nosske, but simply the question- Did you rely on Nosske for truthful reports of the slaughters committed by Einsatzkommando 12 ? A. I didn't understand the last part of the question. Q. Did you rely on Nosske for truthful reports of the numbers of persons slaughtered by Einsatzkommando 12 while it was under his command ? A. I was of the opinion that these reports were truthful. In the case of Nosske, however, in one case it was brought to my attention that the report was not truthful. But that was at a relatively early stage of Nikolaev. We found out that in this case Nosske reported figures which were not killed by his Kommando but by a strange unit. Q. Then in one instance at least, you did find your subordinate exaggerating the number killed by his unit? A. Yes. Q. Do you recall any other exaggerations by any other men in the unit under you? A. Yes, for example, in the case of 10a. Q. Yes. Do you recall an exaggeration in the case of lOa? A. Yes. In the case of 10a. Q. Any other Einsatzkommando do you recall exaggerating figures ? A. Not from my part, no. A. I can only repeat what I already have been saying for two and one-half years that to the best of my knowledge, about ninety thousand people were reported by my Einsatzkommandos. How many of those were actually killed I do not know and I cannot really say. Q. Very well, we will leave this after one more question. This figure ninety thousand is the best estimate you can give at this moment. I take it we must continue to read that with the qualification that you gave in direct testimony, that you think there is a great deal of exaggeration in it? PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Mr. Heath, I do not understand the witness to say that he regarded the figure ninety thousand to be an exaggeration. He states, and he stated not only here but before the International Military Tribunal, that his estimate of the number killed by the Einsatzgruppe D during the time he was in charge was ninety thousand, and he comes to that conclusion from the reports and that is what I understand he says today. MR. HEATH: I agree with your Honor. I had understood him to say that in the transcript his testimony was-go ahead. DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I am not quite in agreement with this answer, your Honor, insofar as I said that the number ninety thousand was reported as having been killed. But I cannot really say whether that number had been actually killed and certainly not that they were killed by the Einsatzgruppen, because, apart from exaggerations, I also knew definitely that the Einsatzkommando reported the killings which were carried out by other units. Therefore, I could only repeat that ninety thousand were reported. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Witness, you may perhaps not agree to what I have stated, but you will have to agree to what you stated yourself on 3 January 1946; you were asked : "Do you know how many persons were liquidated by the Einsatzgruppe D under your direction?" And you answered: "In the year between June 1941 and June 1942 the Einsatzkommandos reported ninety thousand people liquidated." DEFENDANT OHLENDORF : Yes. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO:
Question : "That included men, women, and children?" Answer:
"Yes." Question: "On what do you base these figures?"
Answer: "On reports sent by the Einsatzkommandos to the Einsatzgruppen."
Question: "Were those reports submitted to you?" Answer:
"Yes." PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Yes. MR. HEATH: I don't know that your Honor has had the opportunity to see it. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: No. I have not. MR. HEATH: He did make this statement with respect to the affidavit which you just read. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: It is not the affidavit. This is testimony put to him in Court. Mr HEATH: We can follow this up in the witness' testimony in direct examination. Witness, this is from your testimony of last week. You said: "If, of course, the figure of ninety thousand was named by me, I always added that in this fifteen to twenty percent are double countings, that is, on the basis of my own experience. I do not know any longer how I could have remembered the number of just ninety thousand, because I did not keep a register of these figures. The 'approximately' must have meant that I was not certain. It is evident that I mentioned this number of ninety thousand by adding a number of other figures. I do not mention this in order to excuse myself, as I am perfectly convinced that it does not matter from the actual fact whether it was forty thousand or ninety thousand. I mention this for the reason that in the situation in which we are today, politically speaking, figures are being dealt with in an irresponsible manner." That is the qualification that I had referred to. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: But that still does not in any way take away from what he said on 3 January 1946. MR. HEATH : I agree, sir, with you. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: That is the testimony of that day, and it still stands now as he gives this explanation and the Tribunal sees no difference between what he said then and what he said today, namely, that this estimate of ninety thousand is based upon the report which he personally saw. MR. HEATH: Alright, sir. DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: With what was just read by the presiding judge of my affidavit of 3 January 1946 I agree completely. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Yes. DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: Anything else which I have said on direct examination is merely a commentary to the testimony of 3 January 1946. P RESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Very well. MR. HEATH: Very well, sir. Mr. Ohlendorf, I had begun to ask Page
274 DEFENDANT OHLENDORF : Yes. Q. Now, I cannot pronounce it correctly, the Karaims were another sect whom you encountered in the south of Russia, and this sect had no Jewish blood, but it did share the religious confessions of the Jews. Is that right? A. Yes. Q. You submitted to Berlin the question whether the Karaims should be killed, and I understood you to say that the order you got from Berlin was you shall not kill them for they have nothing in common with the Jews except the confession? A. Yes. Q. Now during your direct examination you told this Court that you had no idea, and that you have no cause today to think that there was any plan to exterminate the Jewish race in existence, nor that you had any information of putting it into effect. Is that right? A. Yes. Q. Will you explain to the Court, please, what difference there was between the Karaims and the Krimchaks, except Jewish blood ? A. I understand your question completely in reference to the eastern Jews, in the case of the Jews who were found in the eastern campaign. These Jews were to be killed-according to the order-for the reason that they were considered carriers of bolshevism, and, therefore, considered as endangering the security of the German Reich. This concerned the Jews who were found in Russia, and it was not known to me that the Jews in all of Europe were being killed, but on the contrary I knew that down to my dismissal these Jews were not killed, but it was attempted at all costs to get them to emigrate. The fact that the Karaims were not killed showed that the charge of the prosecution that persons were persecuted for their religion is not correct, for the Karaims had that Jewish religion, but they could not be killed because they did not belong to the Jewish race. Q. I think, Witness, you
answered exactly what I had antici- Page
275 PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: I
disagree with you, Mr. Heath, that the witness has quibbled. I think he has
stated very clearly MR. HEATH : Yes, your Honor, I am attempting to get him to say the word blood and not the word Jews. That is the reason I was saying he is quibbling, but I am perfectly happy to leave it where it is. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: I think he has been rather forthright. MR. HEATH: Very well. Let's see, Mr. Ohlendorf, let's go for a moment to this order which you got at Pretzsch in the spring of 1941. Did you have any knowledge whatever of the purposes of the Einsatzgruppen before you went to Pretzsch? A. We merely knew that the Einsatzgruppen were to be set up. Q. But you did not know what they were to do? A. No. Apart from the fact that one has a definite idea about missions in which people of the Security Police and the SD were assigned. That is, of course, true. Q. Did you, at that time,
have any idea that the mission of the security police would be to slaughter Jews
and gypsies? Q. If you had known that that was going to be the purpose of the Einsatzgruppen to kill all Jews and gypsies and certain other categories, you would remember it today-would you not, Mr. Ohlendorf ? A. I can no longer say. Q. You were ordered three times to join the Einsatzgruppen, were you not? A. Yes. Q. And twice you refused? A. Yes. Q. The order in the first instance came from Heydrich? A. Yes. Q. The second order for you to become a member of the Einsatzgruppe came from Heydrich? A. Yes
Part VII
Page 276 Q. You refused both the first and the second order? A. Yes. Q. Why? A. For two reasons. For one thing, because I had not been a soldier and did not have any interest in the military; secondly, Page 277 because I was not a policeman, and had no interest for police work, and police work was against my nature; and third, because I had a genuine job to do in Berlin which I knew would not be replaced once I left it, and I wanted to do a job to which I had the best ability.Q. How did you refuse the first time? Will you tell us the circumstances ? Heydrich was your military superior, was he not? A. Yes. Q. You were fully convinced that every order, every military order must be obeyed without a question? A. That is expressing it very generally. Q. It is quite general, but to be specific, you killed all these people you have told us because you were ordered to do it, not because you wished to do it? A. I said often enough that I personally did not kill any people. I would like you to remember that or to question me about this matter. Q. I’ll come to that in due time. I shall ask you now again how you refused the first Heydrich order to join the Einsatzgruppe? A. Because I wanted to explain why it was not expedient for me to leave Berlin, and I said in my direct examination I was indispensable to the Reich Trade Group, that is, I had a note in my military passport which obligated me to work for the Reich Trade Group, and, therefore, Heydrich first had to consult me and remove this note. Therefore I had the chance to discuss these matters with him. Q. And in your direct testimony you said: "Twice, I was directed to go to Russia, and twice I refused." A. Yes. Q. Did you go to Heydrich and say: "1 refuse to go to Russia"? A. Not in that form, of course, but we spoke about these matters, and I used the tact which is necessary when discussing such matters with a superior that is usually customary. Q. On the second occasion what happened? A. The same thing. Q. Heydrich had selected you to go with the Einsatzgruppen, and twice you were able to persuade him to relieve you of that assignment ? A. When the last order came I could not evade it. How strenuously he insisted on this could be seen from the fact that Mueller and Streckenbach, Chief of the Gestapo and Chief of personnel, were of the opinion that it would not be expedient to give me an Einsatzgruppe, and they also protested to Heydrich about giving me the command of an Einsatzgruppe, but since Page 278 Q. I didn’t follow you there. Who was it that insisted, Streckenbach ? A. Heydrich insisted on it against the vote of Streckenbach and Mueller. Q. Heydrich, of course, knew at that time what the Einsatz-gruppen were to do in Russia ? A. I don’t know. Q. I beg your pardon? A. I don’t know whether he did. Q. Is it your idea that he organized these units without having any idea of what they were to do? A. He had an idea, all right, for he wanted to take every security job away from the army, whereas, up to that time he had detailed personnel to the army, and the army worked without letting him in on this work; therefore, he expanded his domination to include the operational areas. Q. This was a very secret preparatlon, was it not, of the Einsatzgruppen? A. Yes, of course, these were negotiations between Heydrich and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the High Command of the Army, and representatives of Heydrich and of these two agencies. Q. Well, then, it is a fair assumption that when Heydrich selected you to go to Russia in command, he knew what work you were going to perform in Russia, did he not? A. Whether he already had the Fuehrer Order I don’t know. I only knew the fact that the Einsatzgruppen were being set up. Q. Now at Pretzsch, Streckenbach told you, for the first time, you say, what the Einsatzgruppen were to do? A. Yes. Q. Now he had a special order? A. Yes. Q. In your direct examination you stated that the order read "as follows". Did you see the order yourself? A. No, I did not say, it read "as follows". I merely gave the contents, for I always said there was no written order. Q. I misunderstood you ; the transcript said, "Read as follows." So your understanding of the purposes of the Einsatzgruppen came from Streckenbach orally at Pretzsch? A. Yes. That is correct. Q. And you protested? A. Not only myself, but as I
said in direct examination, there was a general protest. A. I pointed out that these were missions which could not possibly be accomplished. It is impossible to ask people to carry out such executions. Q. Why? A. Well, I believe there is no doubt that there is nothing worse for people spiritually than to have to shoot defenseless populations. Q. If I may be a little facetious in a grim matter, there is nothing worse than to be shot either, when you are defenseless? A. Since this is meant ironically by you, I can imagine worse things, for example, to starve. Q. It is not meant entirely ironically. I have read the whole of your testimony, and I am impressed by the fact that not once did you express any sympathy or regret. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO : Mr. Heath, I don’t think that that observation is in place Mr. HEATH: I withdraw it, your Honor. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: You are not to comment on the witness. Ask him questions, and he is to answer them. What you think about him is of no consequence. MR. HEATH : I know that, your Honor, and I ask the Court’s forgiveness for having put the question. MR. HEATH: Now I want to say this-you have told the Court repeatedly that to your knowledge there was absolutely no purpose to exterminate races. You are charged here, of course, with war crimes which is one kind of killing, and crimes against humanity which is another kind of killing. You have told the Court that you have no reason today to believe that these killings were part of an extermination program. I want to ask you further, you are aware of this speech which Hitler made in 1933 at the Party rally in Nuernberg, and I would like to ask you, when I have read you this quotation, to comment on it. "But long ago man has proceeded in the same way with his fellowmen. A higher race, at first higher in the sense of possessing a greater gift for organization, subjects to itself a lower race, and thus constitutes a relationship which now embraces races of unequal value. There thus results the subjection of a number of people under the will often of only a few persons, a subjection based simply on the right of the stronger, a right which, as we see it in nature, can be regarded as the sole conceivable right because founded on reason." Do you recall that or any of the similar outgivings of Adolf Hitler during the period from 1933 on? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I have read this remark repeatedly
Page 282 General was considered to be honorary, and even a Frank was not considered to be able to mess it up because he had no spiritual strength. Q. That is one of your protests against the course of National Socialism, is it not, that psychopaths and irresponsibles were given power in this personal staff? A. I don’t think that it is a single case, but this has happened time and again in politics. Q. I understood you to say to the Court that most of your difficulties in the Party came from your opposition to those men who advocated total destruction of the objective or institutional state, is that right? A. Yes, that is correct. Q. You had been convinced by a year’s study of Mussolini’s personal autocracy that Italian fascism was a bad thing? A. Yes. Q. And it was bad because Mussolini had completely destroyed institutional restraints on men who wielded power? A. I would rather express it positively, because this was an unrestricted dictatorship in the form of a totalitarian state. Q. Very well. I think we say the same thing in different words, do we not? A. Yes, from the positive side. Q. In 1933, when Hitler, after he was made chancellor, had legal power to legislate by himself without the restraint of any constitution, was he not in precisely the same situation and did he not have the same power to act that Mussolini had acquired, from the legal standpoint? A. Yes, I understand you completely. The difference is that the one was National Socialist and the other was Fascist. Hitler for himself did not make up a constitution for an absolute state, but because he had a different opinion of the state he had himself given power for a definite period of time. And this was nothing else but a constitutional means, which during the parliamentary period of the Weimar Constitution was also used then, especially in the years 1931 and 1932, when paragraph 48 of the Weimar Constitution was the basic support of the government. This law giving a government the power must not let one conclude that Hitler wanted to establish a dictatorship, but he took a constitutional means, and I know that during the entire time of the Hitler government, even during the war, it was the idea to build a senate, a kind of parliamentary system ; and I know that several times Hitler complained to acquaintances that he still had not found any man who could rebuild the state for him and who could give Page 283 Q. Well, you went to Poland with Himmler in 1940? A. 1939. Q. 1939. All right. And Heydrich sent you along with Himmler, you say? Disputes arose between you and Himmler in 1939? A. They really were monologues because Himmler- Q. That’s all right, whether it was monologue or not. He reproached you that members of the SD in Poland had not been able to treat the Jews in a manner in which he had wanted, and that, you say "was a product of my education". What was it he wanted done to the Jews in Poland which he said you had failed to do? A. That is connected with the actions about which I have answered to the prosecutor on his previous questions. It was in the same city where differences between Streckenbach and Himmler occurred. It concerned the same actions. Q. You mean the actions under a Fuehrer Order, an order similar to the order which controlled you in Russia? A. Yes. During the direct examination I already answered the questions by the presiding judge, and today I answered your questions, that the contents were not the same, but a directive which was only given once concerning certain definite single actions. Q. Tell us how orders that you operated under in 1941 in Russia differed from the order which controlled killing of Jews in Poland in 1939 ? A. In Poland individual actions had been ordered, while in Russia, during the entire time of the commitment, the killing of all Jews had been ordered. Special actions in Poland had been ordered, whose contents I do not know in detail. Q. You have told the Court that the army was perfectly aware of this decree, or this order to kill, and that it had the obligation also to execute the order within its ability? Is that right? A. Yes, but I do not know that in this order insane persons were mentioned ; but I would have considered the insane persons just like anybody else because they would have come under the order if they, owing to their condition, would have endangered security -but not only because they were insane-for that reason I rejected this request. Q. You don’t mean to say that the persons you killed had to endanger security in order to be killed, do you? A. In the sense of the Fuehrer Order, yes. Q. Well, let’s not say about the sense of the Fuehrer Order. Page 284
A. Even if you don’t want to discuss the Fuehrer Order it cannot be explained in any other way. There were two different categories; one, where those people who, through the Fuehrer Order, were considered to endanger the security were concerned and, therefore, had to be killed. The others, namely, the active Communists or other people were people whose endangering of security was established by us and they were only killed if they actually seemed to endanger the security. Q. Very well. I repeat my question. Apart from the Fuehrer Order, and not because the Fuehrer Order assumed that every man of Jewish blood endangered the security of the Wehrmacht, but from your own experience in Russia, from your own objective witnessing of the situation in Russia, did every Jew in Russia that you killed in fact endanger security, in your judgment? A. I cannot talk about this without mentioning the Fuehrer Order because this Fuehrer Order did not only try to fight temporary danger, but also danger which might arise in the future. Q. Well, let us get back to it immediately, and let us see if we can’t talk about it without the Fuehrer Order. I ask you the simple question * * *. From your own objective view of the situation in Russia, did the Jews whom you killed, and the gypsies, endanger the security of the German army in any way? A. I did not examine that in detail. I only know that many of the . Jews who were killed actually endangered the security by their conduct, because they were members of the partisan groups for example, or supported the partisans in some way, or sheltered agents, etc. Q. Let’s put the partisans or those who were aiding the partisans completely aside. A. I will assist you, Mr. Prosecutor. Of course, at a certain time there were persons of whom one could not have said at that moment that they were an immediate danger, but that does not change the fact that for us it meant a danger insofar as they were determined to be a danger, and none of us examined whether these persons at the moment, or in the future, would actually constitute danger, because this was outside our knowledge, and not part of our task. Q. Very well. You did not do it then because it was outside of your task. I want you to do it today for this Tribunal. Will you tell us then whether in your objective judgment, apart from the Fuehrer’s Decree, all of the Jews that you killed constituted any conceivable threat to the German Wehrmacht [armed forces]. A. For me, during my time in Russia there is no condition Page 285 which is not connected with the Fuehrer Order. Therefore, I cannot give you this answer which you would like to have. Q. You refuse to make the distinction, which any person can easily make-you need not answer that. Let me make it clear then, in the Crimea-no, I believe near Nikolaev, Himmler came to see you in the spring of 1942, did he not, or fall of 1941? A. Beginning of October 1941. Q. You had then been working in that area a considerable number of Jewish farmers, is that right, and you had determined not to put them to death? A. Yes. Q. You made a determination then that those men did not then constitute any security threat whatever to the German armed forces? A. No; I did not make such a determination but, in the interest of the general situation, and of the army, I considered it more correct not to kill these Jews because the contrary would be achieved by this, namely, in the economic system of this country everything would be upset, which would have its effect on the operation of the Wehrmacht as well. Q. Then, I ask you the question again. Because these people were farmers, you concluded that it was wiser to get the grain they produced, than to put them to death? A. Also because of the danger that they might shelter partisans, yes ; I was conscious of this danger. Q. What danger, that they might shelter partisans in their houses ? A. That these Jews might have contact with the partisans. Q. So the only threat you saw to security was the possibility that the Jews would conceal partisans in their houses? A. No ; I only named this as an example. There might have been agents against us who could endanger us in every way. I only mentioned this as an example. Q. The same situation would exist in the case of the Krimchaks, wouldn’t it, or what do you call them, Karaims. A. Karaims. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Mr. Heath, I must confess a confusion here. I understand the witness to say, or perhaps you said it, that the reason the Jewish farmers were not executed is that they were used to bring in the harvest. Then a discussion ensued as to the possible threat that these Jews could bring to the security because they could house partisans. There must be a contradiction there; in one instance, they were a threat and, therefore, were subject to executions. Were they saved, or were they not saved? If they were saved, why, and if they were killed, why? Page 286 MR. HEATH: As I understood the witness, your Honor, he said he was balancing the desirability of getting in the harvest as against a potential threat. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: I see. MR. HEATH : He exercised discretion. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: And came to the conclusion that there was more to be gained by not liquidating. MR. HEATH : Precisely, so I understand it. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Is that correct? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I think it is even simpler. They were not farmers, they were craftsmen, who when there would be no longer work for them to do would endanger considerably the interests of the Wehrmacht. I never considered this problem in discussion but now Himmler came to me and ordered that these Jews were to be treated according to the Fuehrer Order, without any further discussion, and without any further consideration of circumstances. MR. HEATH : What about the gypsies. I believe you have no idea whatever as to how many gypsies your Kommando killed; have you ? A. No. I don’t know. Q. On what basis did you kill gypsies, just because they were gypsies? Why were they a threat to the security of the Wehrmacht ? A. It is the same as for the Jews. . Q. Blood? A. I think I can add up from my own knowledge of European history that the Jews actually during wars regularly carried on espionage service on both sides. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: You were asked about gypsies. MR. HEATH : I was asking you about gypsies, as the Court points out, and not Jews. * * *. I would like to ask you now on what basis you determined that every gypsy found in Russia should be executed, because of the danger to the German Wehrmacht? A. There was no difference between gypsies and Jews. At the time the same order existed for the Jews. I added the explanation that it is known from European history that the Jews actually during all wars carried out espionage service on both sides. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Well, now, what we are trying to do is to find out what you are going to say about the gypsies, but you still insist on going back to the Jews, and Mr. Heath is questioning about gypsies. Is it also in European history that gypsies always participated in political strategy and campaigns? DEFENDENT OHLENDORF : Espionage organizations during campaigns. Page 287 PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO : The gypsies did? A. The gypsies in particular. I want to draw your recollection to extensive descriptions of the Thirty Year War by Ricarda Huch and Schiller- Q. That is going back pretty far in order to justify the killing of gypsies in 1941, isn’t it? A. I added that as an explanation, as such motive might have played a part in this, to get at this decision. Q. Could you give us an illustration of any activity of a band of gypsies on behalf of Russia against Germany during this late war? A. Only the same claim that can be maintained as with regard to Jews, that they actually played a part in the partisan war. Q. You, yourself cannot give us any illustration of any gypsies being engaged in espionage or in any way sabotaging the German war effort? A. That is what I tried to say just now. I don’t know whether it came out correctly in the translation. For example, in the Yaila Mountains, such activity of gypsies has also been found. Q. Do you know that of your own personal knowledge? A. From my personal knowledge, of course, that is to say always from the reports which came up from the Yaila Mountains. Q. In an instance in which gypsies were included among those who were liquidated, could you find an objective reason for their liquidation ? A. From Russia I only knew of the gypsy problem from Simferopol. I do not know any other actions against gypsies, except from the one in Simferopol. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Very well. MR. HEATH: May I proceed, your Honor? PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Yes, please. MR. HEATH: Mr. Ohlendorf, you say the gypsies are notorious bearers of intelligence? Isn’t it a fact that the nationals of any invaded state are notorious bearers of intelligence. Didn’t the Americans bear intelligence, and the Germans bear intelligence, and the Russians bear intelligence for their countries when they were at war? A. But the difference is here that these populations, for example, the German population, or the American population have permanent homes, whereas gypsies being unsettled as people with-out permanent homes are more prepared to change their residence for a more favorable economic situation, which another place might promise them. I believe that a German, for example, is very unsuited for espionage. Page 288 Q. Mr. Ohlendorf, on the question of the order which you say you felt you had to honor and fulfill, the Fuehrer Order. It is a fact, is it not, that you could have failed in your duty as a soldier and escaped this without any penalty, in short, you could have played sick. A. I have already had this question addressed to me in the direct examination because I expected it. Q. Let’s see if you expect the next one-I suppose you do. At one juncture you were told by the Chief of Staff of the army above you, down there, in the south of Russia, that unless your collaboration with the army improved, he, Colonel Woehler-I forget his name-he would recommend your immediate dismissal in Berlin, so there was a way, was there not, where you could have avoided service merely by refusing to be agreeable with other military gentlemen. Is that right? A. This discussion with Woehler did not concern our debate but factual reproaches which were unfounded. And I did not do anything else than rectify untrue reproaches. Q. I am sorry, I didn’t understand that. Is it true that you were threatened with a recommendation for dismissal unless your collaboration with the army improved? A. No. It was the first word of the Chief of Staff, "If your cooperation with us does not improve, we will request that you be dismissed," and then a number of factual reproaches which were untrue, and I was merely given the chance by the Chief of Staff to reject these untrue charges. Nothing else was being discussed. I do not think that you expect that, in order to be relieved, I should have let myself and my men be wrongly accused. Q. No, no, I had no idea that you would do any such thing. I simply wanted to find out whether it was possible for you to win a dismissal from this job or task that you had by disagreeing with the military and you have said that it was. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO : Witness, I understand that there was a conference at Pretzsch when you first learned of this mission. How many of the defendants were present at that conference ? DEFENDENT OHLENDORF: I cannot say that for certain. Q. At the conference in-I am sure I will mispronounce this word-Nikolaev-how many of the defendants were present if you recall ? A. Merely Seibert was present then. Q. Who? A. Only the defendant Seibert was present. MR. WALTON: General, did you ever have the feeling that the Page 289 Fuehrer Order, about which so much has been said here, was an illegal order ? DEFENDENT OHLENDORF : No. Q. Have you ever heard, during your career, of the recognized laws and customs of war? A. Of course. Q. Have you ever heard of the Geneva Convention? A. Of course. Q. And have you ever heard of the Hague Convention? A. Naturally. Q. From your study of law, and your high rank in an organization subject to military law, did you not know that the killing of civilians in occupied areas, without any trial, is considered by both international law and the laws and customs of war to be plain murder, and nothing else? A. Yes. Q. Who was it, in one of your Kommandos, who had the power and the authority to decide whether a person was a Jew, or gypsy, or a Communist, and to order his execution? A. That was up to the Kommandos. Q. By that am I to presume that it was the Kommando leader, the commanding officer of that unit ? A. He was responsible for what happened in his field. Q. Was there any one else in a Kommando, the second in command, or the leading noncommissioned officer-could he decide whether a man was a Jew or a gypsy and order his execution? A. Before answering this question concretely I wish to point out that in considering the question of discretion as to how to carry out the order-the entire situation should be considered. For example, concerning the Jews, it was usual that the Kommandos called the Jewish elders to determine who was Jewish and who was not. The possibility to go beyond this decision was not given to the Kommandos. Therefore, they had to accept the statements of the Jews themselves as a basis of their orders. The Kommando chief could not go beyond this and carry out the executions independently but he had to rely on his officers who were, for instance, chiefs of Teilkommandos for these assignments. As the Tribunal knows, this question had already been decided before the war by order of the Fuehrer, through Keitel, insofar as individual officers had the opportunity to arrive at a decision whether or not a person was suspicious, and whether he might endanger the security. In my direct examination I have already explained that this statement went too far, in my opinion, and therefore, I gave the order that the suspicion must be confirmed. But to ask for more, for example, concerning the Jews, Page 290 than, to believe the statements of the Jewish elders could not have been expected of the Kommandos because there was no possibility of doing more. Doing more would have meant questioning the task.
Part VIII
Q. Then the registration list of the Jewish population handed to the Kommando leader by the Jewish Council of Elders was sufficient to denominate those named as Jews? A. In order to complete it, the Jewish elders themselves took the Jews to the registration place or the collection place. Q. Now, was the denouncement of a gypsy by a civilian suf-ficient identification that could cause his execution by Einsatzgruppe D? A. No. I remember cases in Simferopol where to identify gypsies the certification of two witnesses, at least, was required by the Kommando there. Q. These witnesses came, of course, from the civilian population of the area in which this man was arrested? A. Yes. Q. And these witnesses claimed to have known it? A. Yes. That was the difficulty, because some of the gypsies-if not all of them-were Moslems, and for that reason we attached a great amount of importance to not getting into difficulties with the Tartars and, therefore, people were employed in this task who knew the places and the people. Q. Then there was more investigation in the case of gypsies than there was in the case of a Jew, is that right? A. There were fewer gypsies than there were Jews and, as I said yesterday already, I only remember one great action in Simferopol. Q. You stated in your testimony last Wednesday, did you not, that you personally never issued execution orders. Am I correct? A. Yes. Q. Who issued orders for these executions? A. The procedure cannot be explained in one sentence because the order for execution as such had been given from the start in Pretzsch, and also later by the Reich Leader SS. But the Kommandos took it for granted that when they came to a larger city the solution of the Jewish question would be the first problem to be solved, and therefore, the executions developed, not from an order, but as a consequence of a number of occurrences-such as the consultation of a Council of Elders, registration, etc., until the final operation resulted. The same happened in the case of the executions themselves, where a number of organizational occurrences took place one after the other; a definite order was only given, really, at the moment when an officer stood before a 291 military unit and gave the order to shoot. Everything else develops, one occurrence following another. Q. In your direct testimony, and yesterday in some of your cross-examination, reference was made quite frequently to "the army". To what army, or army group, were you referring? A. In my case, to group 11,11th Army. Q. Now, who commanded the 11th Army when you were in command of Einsatzgruppe D? A. First, General Ritter von Schobert. He was killed. After that, there was a temporary assignment; and then later, Field Marshal von Manstein. Q. Did you ever have any contact-that is, official contact-with Army Group South during your career as commander of Einsatzgruppe D ? A. With the army Group South itself? No. Only with the army. The reason was that the 11th Army was independent, relatively. It had been intended as a nucleus for a new army group which was to operate in the Caucasus Mountains. The army units, at that time, were still in the Baltics in readiness. Q. How often were you in contact with General von Schobert, and later Field Marshal von Manstein? A. I reported to General von Schobert, as shown in the documents, on 12 June. Then I saw him again in the army casino once or twice. And von Manstein, I mostly saw in the Crimea on duty, as well as privately; for example, he put me in charge of recruiting Tartars. I also had personal discussions with him about the question of military commitments of my unit. Contact with the army became closer in time because the difficulties of the first months proved some officers so wrong that they had to apologize to me and now the other officers tried to eliminate these former differences. It took longest with Manstein. Not before the spring 1942 was I invited by him personally, for the first time, to his castle on the south coast, which he had set up for recuperation. There I was, together with my successor von Alvensleben, and three or four officers of the army, invited to his place one evening and I stayed there the night. The next morning I had breakfast with him, and then I travelled on. The second time I was privately invited was for the celebration when Sevastopol had fallen. Apart from that, there was constant contact with the army, owing to the fact that there was a liaison officer with the army who shared his billet with the counterintelligence officer; and beyond that, Herr Seibert, at least once a week, visited the Chief of Staff, the intelligence officers, or the chief of partisan warfare with whom arrangements were made. Naturally, I had more to do with the Chief of Staff than with the commander in chief. And for that Page 292 reason I visited him officially, repeatedly. Finally, after the winter of 1941, a very lively personal relation with the staff officer of the army took place in my casino. For example, during the Christmas celebration the staff of the army was completely represented, and also during my farewell party. Q. General, I think the translation came through incorrectly. The way I heard it when you were mentioning the commanders of the 11th Army, the name von Alvensleben came through as your successor. A. I want to complete this. Einsatzgruppe D was given to Colonel [Oberfuehrer] Bierkamp, but he was with Einsatzgruppe D only for a short time in the Crimea. The Crimea was given over to the civil administration and Alvensleben became SS and Police Leader for the Crimea, and in this he became my successor for that area and not in my position as chief of the Einsatzgruppe. Q. Then, from what you have just said in answer to the question, your personal and official contacts with the army under Field Marshal von Manstein were more frequent and more friendly than with his predecessor, General von Schobert? A. Yes. I believe he was only with the army for four weeks before he died in battle. Q. Can you remember now when Field Marshal von Manstein succeeded General von Schobert, that is, the approximate date? A. I cannot remember the exact date, but I think that von Man-stein became successor of von Schobert in September 1941 at the latest. Q. Did General von Schobert or Field Marshal Manstein ever issue orders to your Gruppe concerning executions? A. That question is too definite, Mr. Prosecutor. Such orders existed in various forms. For example, he told the defendant Seibert, who is present here, that retaliation measures which he had ordered were not sufficient, and for that reason he would have to take a hand himself, or, as I described concerning Simferopol, where the army requested that the liquidation of Jews be carried out immediately. Apart from that, there was the idea of killing certain persons like, for example, the insane people but I cannot always say, of course, that this was of the army itself. But the Einsatzkommandos were assigned to units or divisions, so that contact with the Kommandos, and, therefore, the issuing of individual orders were settled in the individual areas to smaller units rather than in the central offices. Q. Then Field Marshal von Manstein did personally issue instructions or orders concerning the executions in Simferopol about which we have spoken? A. No, I cannot say that, but an instruction came-so far as I Page 293 remember after discussing it with Braune-from the Quarter-master General, then Colonel Hanck, but in the organization of the army, it is natural that the Quartermaster General on his own authority cannot do such things without the approval of his commander in chief. I, therefore, cannot say that von Manstein knew about it, or that he ordered it. I am merely considering it to be so owing to the military situations. Q. It is highly probable that Field Marshal von Manstein did know and did instruct his staff officer to issue orders, is that correct? A. In any case, I cannot imagine that a staff officer can make such demands on his own authority. Q. General, who were the army officers with whom you usually had conferences about the activity of the Einsatzgruppen D? A. That was the intelligence officer. Q. Can you give me his name? A. First, Major Ranck, later his successor, Major Eisler, or Lieu-tenant Colonel Eisler; the counterintelligence officer, Major Riesen, and the chief of partisan warfare was Major Stephanus. The other staff officers I think are not of such great interest in this connection, that is, the operations officers, Colonel Busse, and an-other one, von Werner. They are the most important names I know of. Q. You say all of these were on the staff of General von Schobert, or Field Marshal Manstein. A. Yes. Q. Did these same officers whom you you orders for the execution of Jews? A. No. I cannot say that. Q. For the execution of gypsies? A. No. I cannot say that, either. Q. For the execution of the insane? have named hand down to A. As I said before, I do not definitely know whether this order was given by the central office, or from the medical offices, or from the regional offices. Q. Who issued the orders for the killing of active Communists and Soviet officials? A. For these groups the order was contained in the general Fuehrer Order. Q. I believe you testified a few moments ago that the liaison officer of Einsatzgruppe D with the 11th Army was the present defendant Seibert? A. No, the liaison officer was another man. Seibert belonged to my staff, and was in my billets, while the liaison officer was another Page 294 officer, who was in the staff of the army, and also shared his billets with the army. Q. Now, General, you have admitted here that during the time you commanded Einsatzgruppe D, an unidentified number of per-sons were executed by the units under your command, and I believe you testified further that the responsibility for the actual executions generally was with the Kommando leader, am I correct? A. Responsibility is a word which can be interpreted in different ways-those who gave the order were responsible. They were responsible for the carrying out. Q. Just as a matter of information, will you state in detail what normal channel the order went through from the authority issuing it to the man who actually pulled the trigger? A. I believe my entire examinations show that this order was given once, namely, in Pretzsch ; there the initiative was given, and, therefore, no new initial order was given in my time. I never received an initial order unless one would consider the order to segregate prisoners of war such an additional order. The original order, as I have said, was sent to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen, and to the Kommando leaders who were assembled. Q. This in effect is true. Because of the difficulty of communications in the area in which you found yourself, your Kommando leaders were largely, because of poor communications, independent units, were they not? A. The Kommando leaders were independent, there is no doubt about that. They had to be able to act independently for reasons as you gave just now. Q. And they made a great many decisions without having to consult either you or higher authorities, did they not? A. These decisions, Mr. Prosecutor, have to be stated more definitely. In this general form I cannot answer, yes or no. Q. I apologize. They created tactical situations without consulting higher headquarters, did they not? A. Of course. Q. Now to select these commanders, great care had to be exercised as to their ability. Their initiative and their general ability to do the job? A. Of course. Q. And they were entrusted with the command of a subunit of yours? A. It is rather difficult to answer this. Q. I will repeat, General. I shall rephrase the question. Because of their careful selection, you relied on their judgment in given situations, did you not? A. The Kommando leaders had certain tasks. These tasks they Page 295 had to carry out. I did not choose the Kommando leaders, or else they would have been quite different ones, but they were appointed by the Reich Security Main Office and they bad to carry out the tasks which they had been assigned to do ; I had to rely on it, that according to their best ability they would fulfill these tasks. But since I did not rely on it completely, I tried, by inspections, to find out whether the Kommandos were in order, and whether the tasks were carried out. Unfortunately, it was not possible to inspect them all ; some I could not visit even once within six months, because it was very difficult to get there. Unfortunately, I had no influence on the choice of Kommando leaders. Q. In your direct examination you have explained your position and relationship with the chief of the 11th Army. My question in connection with this topic may be, therefore, in a sense a little repetitious, but nevertheless, I would like you to answer this for the information of the Tribunal. Which were the special tasks which were assigned to you by the army on the basis of the so-called Barbarossa Decree? A. The basic task surely was to supply information and to look after the police tasks and the security of the army. Beyond that, the army gave definite detailed tasks, and these changed according to the situation. For example, in July and August, the harvest had to be brought in, and the rear had to be guarded; in November and December and January, to make inquiries about the partisans, and to fight them; immediate military commitments, and then again the information service. These changed according to the situation. MR. WALTON : At this time, may it please the Tribunal, I should like to submit to the witness for his examination the Document NOKW-266, Prosecution Exhibit 174. There are copies in the German language ready for distribution just as there are in the English now. MR. WALTON: Have you ever received this or a similar document containing this decree? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I should think that this is one of the drafts for the so-called Barbarossa Decree. I do not think that this draft actually constitutes the Barbarossa Decree, but considerable parts are contained in it. I believe that there are not a great number of differences in the contents. Q. Was there anything said in the Barbarossa Decree outlining the collaboration of the Sonderkommandos, and the army in the rear areas? A. I just forgot one thing. This text shows in this draft the Einsatzgruppen in the operational areas and also Einsatzgruppen Page 296 in the rear areas. There were no such double assignments. Only one Einsatzgruppe was assigned to the army, to each group, and the army group decided how they were to be used. Q. Whether they were to be used in the rear areas, or in the forward areas, the army decided that? A. Yes. Q. Now, isn’t it true, that this Barbarossa Decree, that Himmler’s orders based on it made it plain that the Sonderkommandos should carry out their missions under their own responsibility? A. That is not clear here, either, because the expression "own responsibility" I presume, means that the chief of the Security Police and the SD could give instructions to these Kommandos, which then were carried out on their responsibility; but it never meant that this happened beyond the authority of the army, or rather of the army group; and this limitation is shown in this draft. Because every time it says that the instructions are to be passed to the army and the army can make restrictions. The army can exclude areas ; it can make restrictions if the operational situation requires it. Later in the Barbarossa Decree, it says that operational necessity can cause the army to give instructions or to change them. This sense is revealed clearly in this draft, "own responsibility" never means beyond the actual authority of the Commander in Chief of the army, as contained in his task. This is shown in the assignment of the Einsatzgruppen and in the instructions of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces for the . competence of the Commander in Chief. Q. Then, General, in short, within the broad framework of the order, the Fuehrer Order, subject to the tactical situation at any time, which was the responsibility of the army, it was entirely up to the decision of the Einsatzgruppe as to how to carry out these missions, was it not? A. Yes. Q. Now then, did the responsibility mentioned in this draft of the Barbarossa Decree include executions? A. The Einsatzkommandos had the order, and the tasks to carry out certain executions, of course. Q. By the Barbarossa Decree? A. No. I did not say that. At least, I did not intend to say that. I do not know that in the Barbarossa Decree this order for extermination is contained. To repeat it: I do not know that in the Barbarossa-Fuehrer Order-anything was contained about the killing of certain groups of the population. Q. General, I won’t quarrel with you, but the testimony is very clear on your orders for execution. I leave that point at this time. Now, General, did it ever happen that the order of the commander Page 297 of the 11th Army, or his staff, was given directly to the Kommandos- these units which were subordinate to you? A. Which orders? Q. Any orders? A. Yes, of course. Q. How did you obtain knowledge of such orders, since they did not pass through your headquarters? A. For example, in a written order I was mentioned on distribution lists, therefore a written order to a Kommando was passed on to me. This of course, was only the case if they were orders by the army. Orders by a corps, or by the division I did not see, of course. Q. But you were informed of it through other distribution lists, after the order was actually given? A. Yes, so far as it was given by the army. Q. Were you ever informed if an army group, or an army corps gave an order to a subunit of yours? A. Whether I was informed ? Q. For instance, If the chief of Einsatzkommando 11b was detached from your headquarters, and attached to the army corps? Do you follow me? A. Yes. Q. And the tactical situation was such that the Einsatzkommando 11b should be committed for a certain specific task, the army group commander issued an order directly to the commander of the Einsatzkommando 11b? A. Yes. Q. Now, were you later, through official correspondence or through reports of your Kommando, informed that that actual order was given? A. Of course, in writing or orally if the Kommando leader considered it necessary that I should know about this event. Q. Then your information did not come from a copy of that order sent to you through official channels, but through the report of your Kommando leader? A. In that case, if the army had not given a written order, only that way, of course. If they had given a written order, on the whole, they would have given me a copy. Q. Then you obtained your knowledge of this type of orders from a report submitted to you by your Kommando leader? A. Yes. Q. General, was it the task of the liaison officer of the different units of the Einsatzgruppen to transmit such orders? A. I believe I must ask a preliminary question. By liaison officer you mean the officer who was in the staff of the army? Q. Yes. Page 298 A. In the document book such an occurrence is mentioned, the case of Romanenko. There, the document shows that the liaison officer got an order from the commander in chief and gave it to the Kommando itself immediately. This shows that the Kommando was in the place where the commander in chief was, while I was with the staff of the Einsatzgruppe about two hundred kilometers to the west. Therefore, if the commander in chief wanted to hand something to a Kommando, he could easily give such instructions to the liaison officer. MR. WALTON: Now I shall have to avail myself of the privilege of forgetting one or two questions. Your Honor, I should like to draw the witness’ attention back to some moments ago when I was asking him about who had the authority to make selections for executions. It is entirely out of the context now, but my attention has been called to it. I ask permission to go back and ask him. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: I recall that you did go over that subject, but there is no reason why you can’t go back to it. MR. WALTON : There is one class which I forgot to ask who made the selection. General, who made the selection of Communist and Soviet officials for execution? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: The procedure was that certain persons were arrested and these persons were taken to be examined, as is usual, by the police. The interrogating officer, mostly together with the Kommando leader, determined the result of the examination, and with that they determined whether the man endangered the security, or whether he did not, and they passed a judgment on this person. Q. It usually turned out, did it not, that a member of the Communist Party and a Soviet official of the Communist Party or of the civil administration were considered a definite threat to the security of the German Armed Forces? A. Yes. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO : Witness, in carrying out the procedure which you have just indicated, I assume that in many, if not all of the towns, that you would find yourself liquidating the governing authorities, the mayors, the councils, etc., because naturally they would be members of the Communist Party, is that true? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF : So far as I know the conditions in the cities or districts where the Einsatzkommandos entered, there was no administration any more, but the leading personalities had escaped or were hidden. MR. WALTON: General, how were the condemned people assembled for an execution ? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: In detail I cannot describe that. Page 299 Q. I believe you stated in the matter of the Jews that the registration through the Council of Elders stated who was a Jew. Now, if it was determined that so many would be executed, were the Council of Elders instructed to assemble so many people? A. To assemble the people, yes. Q. Now, was there any pretext given, either by the Kommando leader or by the Jewish Council of Elders, to get these people to assemble? A. Yes. For example, on the resettlement question. Q. They were told that they had to move or they would be moved to a place for resettlement, is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Now then, what disposition was made of these people after they had assembled in the market square or at the place designated? A. It was tried, for example, to compare whether registration lists were the same as the persons present. The persons were then assembled and then were taken to be executed. Q. Were they sometimes marched to the place of execution? A. No. They were taken there by trucks. I just described how in Simferopol the army gave trucks for this purpose. PRESIDINC JUDGE MUSMANNO: Did the council of Jewish elders know what was the real purpose of the demanding of this list of the Jews? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: Certainly not in my Einsatsgruppe. Q. Well, after the first contingent had been marched away or transported away, was it not then very obvious what the purpose of the obtaining of this list was? A. In a city the Jews were then assembled all at once, at one time, for example in barracks or in a large school or in a factory site. Q. Do I understand then that no executions took place until the council of Jewish elders had completed their work of making up the lists? A. Yes. MR. WALTON: Now, did you have any army directives or any orders stating the minimum distances from army headquarters where these people could be executed? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: In the case of Simferopol the army decreed that shootings should take place at a certain distance from the city. The same occurred at Nikolaev. Q. By certain distance do you mean a certain distance from the headquarters, or from the army installation, or from the city itself?
Part IX
Page 300 A. In Simferopol, from the city; in Nikolaev, from the head-quarters. Q. Now, what was the general method used in execution? A. Only one method was used by me. That was the military manner. Q. Am I to infer from that: execution by shooting? A. Yes. Q. In what position were these victims shot? A. Standing up or kneeling. Q. What disposition was made of the corpses of the executed victims? A. They were buried in that same place. The Kommando who carried out the executions had to prepare the burying so that no signs of the executions could be seen afterwards. Q. What was done with the personal property of the persons executed, General? A. The personal property was confiscated. The valuables, according to orders, were given to the Reich Ministry of Finance or rather to the Reich Bank. The personal property was at the disposal of the local Kommando and the city, except for exceptions in Simferopol where a group of the National Socialist Peoples’ Welfare Organization was assigned to the army who took care of the textile items. Q. Were all the victims, including the men, the women, and the children, executed in the same way? A. Until the spring of 1942, when by Himmler’s order it was determined that women and children be killed by gassing in gas vans. Your Honor, I ask to make a remark about a question in yesterday’s examination. I think a mistake arose to the effect that your Honor asked me whether from the reports from the Kommandos the fact that children were shot could be seen. If I have answered to the effect that this opinion was confirmed, that would be wrong. My confirmation in the IMT that men, women, and children are contained in the figures is merely a conclusion from the fact that Jewish men, women, and children were to be shot. In the reports which came from the Kommandos no such difference was made. Actually I do not remember any report where children-or figures of children-are mentioned. I repeat, the statement which I confirm: It was a conclusion I came to, based on the order. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: I understand then that a report indicating that 5,000 Jews had been killed would not specify so many children, so many women, but just 5,000 persons? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: Yes, yes. MR. WALTON: Let me refresh your memory, General, please. I believe you stated in answer to the last question that executions Page 301 were entirely in the form of shootings until the spring of 1942 when you received an order to have women and children executed by gas van. I am sorry I missed your statement as to where this order originated, or from whence this order came. DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: The order of the gas vans came from Himmler immediately and was given to special units who had these gas vans. Q. These units who had charge of the operation and the maintenance of the gas vans stayed with the vans all the time? A. Yes. I only saw it myself for a short time because it occurred shortly before I resigned, but the drivers remained there while the officer who had come along originally left later on ; but the reason for this was mainly that the vans were refused by the Kommando leaders, and I was not prepared to force the Kommando leaders to use these vans. The vans were practically not used. Q. General, have you yourself ever seen a gas van? A. Yes. Q. Will you give a short description of the physical appearance of a gas van to the Tribunal? A. It is an ordinary truck just like a box car. It looks like that, like a closed truck. Q. No windows in the gas van? A. I beg your pardon? Q. There were no windows? A. That is possible. Q. The back of the gas van, did it have a thick door which led into the interior of the gas van? A. Of course. Q. And this door was narrow where only one person could enter at a time? A. No. I believe it was an ordinary door as any other truck has. Q. Now were the people selected for execution induced to enter these vans? A. One could not see from the van what purpose it had, and the people were told that they were being moved, and, therefore, they entered without hesitation. Q. The same information was given them that they would be moved for purposes of resettlement? A. Yes. Q. General, could you estimate how many persons could be accommodated at one time in these vans? A. There were large vans and small vans. The small one might have taken 16 persons and the large one 30. Q. Did you even learn how long it would take to execute persons by the use of these lethal gas vans after they were subjected to gas? PaGe 302 A. As far as I remember about 10 minutes. Q. Did all of your Kommandos use these vans? A. No, because there were more Kommandos than vans. Apart from that one van was no good. They had come from Berlin. One van was sent to Taganrog immediately without my seeing it and never came back, and the other two vans remained in Simferopol. Q. Did Sonderkommando 10a ever use one of these vans? A. I already said that one van was sent to Kom ando 10a immediately. Q. I apologize, I missed it. Did l0b ever use one of these vans? A. No. I am not sure whether they did use it. I cannot swear to it, but I don’t think so. Q. I accept your answers as the best of your recollection and belief. Did Sonderkommando lla use one? A. No. As I said, the two vans were in Simferopol. Q. 11b, did it ever use one? A. 11b would have used it I think. Q. And Einsatzkommando 12, do you recollect that it ever had one? A. No. They certainly did not have one. Q. How many people do you estimate-I am sure that you do not remember the exact number, but how many people do you estimate were executed by these vans by Einsatzgruppe D? A. Please save my mentioning these figures because I don’t know anything about 10a and concerning 11b the van may have been used two or three times, I am not sure. I myself hardly saw the van, but only the first time, together with the physician, I had a look that the people went to sleep without any difficulties, and then I must have left. I don’t know whether it was used again. Q. Then some people were executed by means of the gas vans by your subunits? A. Yes. MR. HEATH : Mr. Ohlendorf, you have just said that you felt that you must respect this order unto your own death. A. Yes. Q. You have asked the Court to accept that coercion. Will you now tell the Court what your present judgment is of the order? Do you think it was a moral order or do you think it was a wrong order which you received from the head of the German State? DR. ASCHENAUER: I object to this question, your Honor. Only facts can be asked about and not opinions. MR. HEATH: May I answer, if your Honor please. A man who claims mitigation because of superior orders is putting himself in the position of saying, morally, I had no choice. If, in fact, he Page 303 A morally approved of a superior order and, therefore, would have acted without the coercion of it, if, in fact, he did not object to the coercion but merely lent himself to the course of action which he would have to follow without coercion, then a plea of mitigation fails entirely, and so here, if the defendant did these killings be-cause of the coercive effect of an order, with which he disagreed, that is one thing, but if Ohlendorf was himself in full agreement or in partial agreement with the purpose which Hitler had, then the mitigating effect of the coercion order is fully or almost fully lost. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Dr. Aschenauer, do you follow that argument? MR. HEATH : The plea is bad, if it is done willingly. DR. ASCHENAUER: I wish to point out that these are merely argumentations which have nothing to do with the testimony by the witness. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: The Tribunal has indicated that this is not the time for argument, but it would appear that the purpose behind the question is not in the nature of argumentation, but for the purpose of determining whether there can be any mitigation in the offense as charged by the prosecution in the indictment and for that purpose the question will be permitted. The objection is overruled. DEFENDANT OHLENDORF : Mr. Prosecutor, I have already replied to that question during my direct examination by stating that I considered the order wrong, but I was under military coercion and carried it out under military coercion knowing that it was given in a state of emergency and the measures were ordered as emergency measures in self-defense. The order, as such, even now, I consider to have been wrong, but there is no question for me whether it was moral or immoral, because a leader who has to deal with such serious questions decides from his own responsibility and this is his responsibility and I cannot examine and not judge. I am not entitled to do so. MR. HEATH : If your Honor please, that is exactly the state of the record and I respectfully submit that we yet have no answer. For this reason the witness has said he thought it was an un-justified order, because it was difficult or impossible of execution, when he was told- DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I didn’t say that. MR. HEATH: When he was told about it at Pretzsch, he thought it was impossible of execution. I think the very issue which he seeks to avoid is the crux of this question, namely, not whether it was a difficult order, or a wise order, from the standpoint of his, but whether it was right or wrong. The issue is a moral one. The Page 304 coercion of superior orders goes to the moral coercion, l and not to the wisdom of the order. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: But, Mr. Heath, hasn’t he answered your question ? MR. HEATH : He has said-he said it was a wrong order. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Now, what more do you want? Put another specific question and we will see if he hasn’t answered. It appeared to the Tribunal that he has answered, but put the question to him. MR. HEATH: You have said it was a wrong order. I want you only to tell me whether it was morally wrong or morally right. DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: May I correct beforehand that in my reply I never said whether it was a difficult or not a difficult order. That is an assumption which I don’t want to have in the record. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Then it must have been an error in transmission, because the Tribunal is under the impression that yesterday you stated in your original protest against the order that it was impossible of fulfillment or very difficult of fulfillment. Are we in error in that impression? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I said "inhuman", your Honor. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: I see, very well. The record indicates just what was said. Now, do you want to put another question? MR. HEATH: I put the same question-Was the order a moral one; was it morally right, or was it morally wrong? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I have just said that I do not think that I am in a position to decide on the moral issue, but I considered it to be wrong because such factors are able to bring such results which may have and, in my opinion, are bound to have immoral effects. But I do not think I am in a position to judge the responsibility of a statesman who, as is shown in history, rightly saw his people before the question of existence or nonexistence, or to judge whether a measure in such a fight against fate, for which this leader is responsible, is moral or immoral. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Do we extract from all that you have said, this thought that you are not prepared to pass upon whether the order was morally right or morally wrong, but you do say that the order could only lead to very bad circumstances which would be injurious to Germany itself. DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: Not only to Germany itself, your Honor. I consider this to be much more serious even. I see the order which Hitler gave, not as a first cause for this order, but I already consider it as a result of logical developments which may have started-or at least became very obvious-when in 1936, in our opinion, Germany was encircled. Such measures must further Page 305 such developments, for example, to the effect that instead of an understanding, hatred, revenge, and an exaggerated effort to gain security will become very strong and, therefore, the general in-security of the world will be increased. For example, causing effects, as can be described with the name "Morgenthau Plan" or requests, such as that Germany is being weakened in its greatness and strength so that this people will no longer endanger the security of anyone. That is what I meant by "effect" which might result from such factors, because they are intended for this, while I believe that throughout historical development at some time a chain of hatred or mistrust has to be broken in order to start anew some-where, and that, for example, I hoped would be achieved through National Socialism which owing to its national basis, must be respected by each individual people, but here the chain is continued, a sequence is continued, which instead of reconciliation breeds more hatred, and increases the craving for security. That is my opinion on this. MR. HEATH: May I put the question once more, if your Honor please? PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Yes, you may put the question and then the witness may answer it directly, or, if he feels he has already answered it, he may so indicate, or he may refuse to answer it. We will see what happens. MR. HEATH : I do not ask you for a judgment of Hitler’s morals ; I ask you for an expression of your own moral conception. The question is not whether Hitler was moral ; but what, in your moral judgment, was the character of this order-was it a moral order, or an immoral order? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: The question concludes itself, because you are not asking abstractly for a moral estimate of nothing-but a moral estimate and judgment about a deed of Hitler. And for that reason the judgment which I may make is a judgment on the deed of Hitler. Q. Then I may ask one more question, and this is the last one, your Honor. You surrendered your moral conscience to Adolf Hitler, did you not? A. No. But I surrendered my moral conscience to the fact that I was a soldier, and, therefore, a wheel in a low position, relatively, of a great machinery ; and what I did there is the same as is done in any other army, and I am convinced that in spite of facts and comparisons which I do not want to mention again, the persons receiving the orders-and all armies are in the same position-until today, until this very day. Q. It was not the coercion of the Hitler Order which overcame Page 306 your moral scruple. It was the fact that you had surrendered to Hitler the power to decide moral questions for you-is that right? A. That is an argumentation on your part which I never said. No, it is not correct. But as a soldier I got an order, and I obeyed this order as a soldier. Q. Well, as a soldier you still had a moral conscience-I suppose you did-which required, if you had a moral conscience, you had to judge the orders that came to you. You got an order from Adolf Hitler, and you tell us you accepted his moral judgment absolutely, whether right or wrong-is that right? A. That I accepted a moral judgment I certainly did not say. I think my answer will not be changed by the fact that you want me to make a certain reply. Q. Let us put it in the negative, then. You refused to make any moral judgment then, and you refuse now to make any moral judgment? A. The reason is-. Q. I am not asking you the reason. I am asking whether you refuse to express a moral judgment as to that time, or as of today. A. Yes. EXAMINATION PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Yesterday Mr. Heath put a question to you which perhaps we did not allow to be answered-but in view of what has now been stated perhaps we might go back just a moment. He asked you whether, when you received this order, any question arose in your mind as to its authenticity, namely, was the order of such a nature that it caused you to hesitate as to whether there could have been an error in it and would cause you to go higher than the officer who had given you this mission, in order to determine, positively, whether it was authentic or not. You remember that discussion? A. Yes. Q. Now, when you received this order-it did not come from Hitler, that is, it was Hitler’s, but he did not give it to you, it came from Streckenbach. A, It was handed on, yes. Q. Yes, very well. And his rank was not so high that an incredible statement by him could be questioned? A. Yes. Q. When this order was first presented to you, did it shock you to such extent that you wanted to inquire whether it truly was an order given by Hitler or not; or were you so satisfied that Hitler Page 307 knew what to do, and the circumstances were such that even that order could be a logical one, that you accepted it without misgivings, without questioning, without doubts, and without investigations? A. It was a shock and was dispersed, as I explained yesterday, through reaction towards Streckenbach, and Streckenbach argued on all those questions which your Honor just mentioned. So that during this discussion all the questions have been worked on al-ready, and finally. No other solution was left to us than to accept Streckenbach’s experience who knew through his discussion with Hitler that it was quite obvious that there was a Fuehrer Order here which under no circumstances could be cancelled. Q. You indicated a lack of desire to answer Mr. Heath’s question on the moral issue. You indicated that it wasn’t for you to decide the moral question at all. But with every order, with every demand, or request, there instinctively goes a moral appraisement you may agree with it or not-so when this order was given to you to go out to kill, you had to appraise it, instinctively. The soldier who goes into battle knows that he must kill. But he understands that it is a question of a battle with an equally armed enemy. But you were going out to shoot down defenseless people. Now, didn’t the question of the morality of that enter your mind? Let us sup pose that the order had been-and I don’t mean any offense in this question-suppose the order had been that you should kill your sister. Would you not have instinctively morally appraised that order as to whether it was right or wrong-morally, not politically, or militarily, but as a matter of humanity, conscience, and justice between man and man? A. I am not in a position, your Honor, to isolate this occurrence from the others. I believe during my direct examination plenty of questions of this kind have been dealt with. Probably with the occurrences of 1943, 1944, and 1945 where with my own hands I took children and women out of the burning asphalt myself, with my own hands, and with my own hands I took big blocks of stone from the stomachs of pregnant women ; and with my own eyes I saw 60,000 people die within 24 hours-that I am not prepared, or in a position to give today a moral judgment about that order, because in the course of this connection these factors seem to me to be above a moral standard. These years are for me a unit separate from the rest. Full of ruthlessness to destroy and to be inhuman-until today, your Honor, and I am not in a position to take one occurrence or rather a small event of what I experienced and to isolate it, and to value it morally in this connection. I ask you to understand that from a human point of view. Q. Your answer gave a certain date. You mention the years Page 308
1943,1944,1945. Naturally, these were years following 1941, when you were confronted with that issue. * * * * * * * MR. HEATH : The Court made inquiry on which it got no response from the witness, which was, I think, the ultimate question which your Honor was putting to him, namely, if you get an order from Hitler to kill your sister, would you have acted on the order, or would you have had any conflicting moral judgment about the nature of the order? There was no response, and I don’t know whether the Court thinks we have gone far enough with the questioning, or, whether we may ask for a response to that question? PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO : The Court would not insist on the question being answered because of its very nature, but it seems to me that it is a relevant question, but the witness may or may not answer, as he sees fit. MR. HEATH : May we then put the question to him, if your Honor please? Witness, if you received an order from Adolf Hitler to kill your own flesh and blood, would you have executed that order, or not? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I consider this question frivolous. The question is being put to me here by the prosecution, it deals with people-with life and death of people, and of millions of people who are near starvation even today, therefore, I can only state that the question is frivolous. Q. Then I understand you to say that if one person be involved in a killing order, a moral question arises, but if thousands of human beings are involved in it, you can see no moral questions ; it is a matter of numbers? A. Mr. Prosecutor, I think you are the only one to understand my answer in this way, that it is not a matter of one single person, but from the point of departure events have happened in history which among other things have led to deeds committed in Russia, and such an historical process you want me to analyze in a moral way. I do, however, refuse moral evaluation with good reasons as outlined so far as my own conscience is concerned. I am not refusing to answer this last question because it is just one person, in order to bring morality on the basis of numbers, but because the prosecutor now addresses me personally- Q. I shall not address you personally. Suppose you found your sister in Soviet Russia, and your sister were included in that category of gypsies, and she was brought before you for slaughter because of her presence in the gypsy band ; what would have been your action? She is there in the process of history, which you have described? DR. ASCHENAUER: I object to this question and I ask that this Page 309 question not be admitted. I think the subject has been dealt with sufficiently so that no other questions are necessary. This is no question for cross-examination. MR. HEATH: Your Honor, I believe we have met tests which we applied by putting one of his own flesh and blood in exactly the alleged historical stream in which he can form no judgment. I asked him now whether if he found his own flesh and blood within the Hitler Order in Russia, what would have been his judgment, would it have been moral to kill his own flesh and blood, or immoral. DR. ASCHENAUER: I ask for a ruling of the Tribunal upon my objection. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: The question indubitably is an extraordinary one, and ordinarily would not be tolerated in any trial, outside of a trial like this, which is certainly an extraordinary and a phenomenal one. We are dealing here with a charge, which to the knowledge of this Tribunal has never been presented in the history of the human race of a man who is here charged with the responsibility for the snuffing out of lives by the hundreds of thousands-not hundreds of thousands, but ninety thousand. If he were not charged with anything so monstrous as that, it would not seem to me necessary for him to answer the question on a moral issue, but if he is presented with an order by Hitler to dispose of his own flesh and blood, whether he would regard that as a moral issue, or not, I believe that is a question that is entirely relevant and is not frivolous, and the witness will be called upon to answer it. DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: May I please answer this question in the way it was put by the prosecutor, and the way it was originally put. I had not finished my statement why I considered this question frivolous, when the prosecutor interrupted me. MR. HEATH : The Court has ruled that the question is not frivolous, and it calls for an answer. I urge the Court or respectfully request the Court to ask the witness to answer the question. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: The ruling disposes of this, and the witness will answer the question, so that you do not need to urge or demand. MR. HEATH: I should have added your Honor, "or refuse to answer it, one way or the other." PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: I am disposed to believe that he will answer it. Let’s see whether he will answer it, or not. DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: I consider this question frivolous, because it brings a completely private matter into a military one; that is, it deals with two events which have nothing to do with each other Page 310 PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO : Witness- MR. HEATH: Your Honor- PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Let’s just keep in mind this situation. You are a defendant in a trial, and very serious charges have been brought against you. Your whole life and career are before this Court for scrutiny and examination. A question arises regarding an order which you received, and that order calls for the execution of defenseless people. You will admit that in normal times such a proposition would be incredible, and intolerable, but you claim that the circumstances were not normal, and, therefore, what might be accepted only with terrified judgment was accepted at that time as a normal discharge of duties. It is the contention of the prosecution, that regardless of the circumstances, the killing of defenseless people involved a moral issue, and that under all the circumstances you were to refrain from doing what was done. Now by way of illustration he advances, suppose that you had in the discharge of this duty been confronted with the necessity of deciding whether to kill, among hundreds of unknown people, one whom you knew very well. It seems to me that that is a relevant comparison. Now, let’s direct our attention to that very question, if you will, please. DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: If this demand would have been made to me under the same prerequisites that is within the framework of an order, which is absolutely necessary militarily, then I would have executed that order . MR. HEATH: That is all, sir. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Witness, I would like to ask one question. Were the men in your command entitled to any increase in pay because of the nature of the operation, or were they paid the regular salary which went to all soldiers? DEFENDANT OHLENDORF: At no time was there any advantage connected with that operation. Not at any time. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Now you were travelling in a territory which must have been very strange to you, and you had indicated that you had interpreters, but you must have been confronted with many language difficulties, because of dialects, and so on. Do you suppose that because of these language barriers that any errors might have occurred, so that even individuals under the broadest interpretation of that order were killed who should not have been killed? A. I don’t think so. The interpreter whom I had, for instance, my own interpreter was from Russia himself, and he knew the language and the conditions. Q. Very well. You stated yesterday the only reason why you did not wish your command was that of a fear your successor might Page 311 not he so considerate of your men as you were. In what way did you regard that considerate ; in what respect? A. Because I had experience from other Einsatzgruppen. Q. Well, you were considerate of them, but the Tribunal does not understand in what respect. Was it with regard to accommodations, with regard to food, with regard to the manner in which they had discharged this unpleasant duty? A. It was part of the complaints which I personally presented to Himmler in Nikolaev ; that, for example, the Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln had organized special detachments which had to carry out nothing but executions, and it is understandable that this would ruin these people spiritually, or make them completely brutal. This is an example of what I meant. Q. Very well. How much time did you spend, generally, in each community. I presume you were travelling all the time? A. I personally, or with my staff? Q. With your staff. With your unit, the Einsatzgruppe? A. I changed my headquarters when the headquarters of the army moved. I always joined the headquarters command of the army. Q. Now you said that you tried to avoid excesses. Just what do you mean by that? A. That, for example, an individual would carry out an execution on his own. Q. You mentioned this morning apropos something else, that there was a Christmas celebration in your organization. Did you have a Christmas celebration regularly every year? A. Yes. Q. Yesterday, you stated that you had attended three executions, and in each one of these executions the subjects were singing the International and that they were shouting their allegiance to Stalin, and you took from that their solidarity to the Bolshevist cause, and, as I understood your answer, you drew from that a justification for the order, namely, that these individuals had in effect declared their hostility to Germany, and, that, therefore, as a matter of security and self-defense, or as a war measure in itself, it was justifiable to dispose of them in the way they were disposed of? A. No, your Honor, I did not mean it that way. Q. I see. A. I was asked whether I saw any signs that the Fuehrer Order really was based on objective facts, and I meant these facts as one example to show that in these cases the victims actually expressed this attitude. This was not a basis for my action, only an example of what I saw myself. 312 Q. Did you take from their singing and from their shouts at that moment, that this reflected an attitude on the part of all that race, which called for aggressive measures on the part of the Reich?A. No. I was merely impressed by the fact that my three incidental visits always were attended by the same demonstrations on on the part of the victims. It was not a cause for me to act in any way. It was merely an illustration of the actual situation. Q. Now just one more question on this incident. When you observed this demonstration, did you feel any sense of relief that here indeed were enemies of your country, and, therefore, the order which you were executing did have some justification in fact? A. I have already expressed it a little more carefully yesterday, your Honor, because in any situation it is difficult to comment on this. I said that I watched this demonstration with respect, for I respected even this attitude, and I never hated an opponent, or an enemy, and I still do not do so today. PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Any further questions, Dr. Aschenauer?
DR. ASCHENAUER: Your Honor, I only have two more questions. They concern the document which was submitted by the protsecution. I believe it is Document NOKW—256, Prosecution Exhibit 174. There are two sentences "we received your directives from the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, and we are informed that we are under your command as far as restricting our mission on the part of the army is concerned." I want to ask one question. Did you ever have any responsibility of your own about these missions, including the executions, which went higher in responsibility than that of the Supreme Army Commander, as the executor of supreme command and which would have excluded the responsibility of the army commander in chief over life and death? A. No. This activity was carried out under the responsibility of the Supreme Commander. He alone had the executive power of command, and therefore he disposed over life and death. This responsibility was never limited. Q. Then do I understand you correctly if you say that your responsibility refers to the manner and type of the execution of the order? A. Yes, that is right. DR. ASCHENAUER: I have no further questions.
TRANSLATION OF
DOCUMENT NO-2890
AFFIDAVIT OF OTTO OHLENDORF, 24 APRIL 1947, CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ElNSATZGRUPPEN
I, Otto Ohlendorf, swear, depose, and state- 1. The Einsatzgruppen for the Eastern Campaign (Russia 1941) began as a result of an agreement between the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service on the one hand, and the Chiefs of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the High Command of the Army on the other. As I remember it, this agreement was signed by Heydrich and a representative of the High Command of the Army. On the basis of this agreement between the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the High Command of the Army, the Einsatzgruppen were to take over the political security of the front areas, which, up to the time of the Russian campaign had been the charge of the army units them-selves. The secret field police were to occupy themselves only with security within the troops to which they were assigned. 2. As far as I remember, this agreement took effect about three weeks before the start of the Russian campaign and was as follows :
3. During the Russian campaign there were four Einsatzgruppen, which bore the identifying letters A, B, C, and D. The Page 93 area of operation of each Einsatzgruppe was determined by the fact that the Einsatzgruppe was assigned to a certain army group or army, and marched with it. The Einsatzkommandos or the Sonderkommandos formed from them were assigned from time to time to areas designated by the army group or army. The Einsatzkommandos were divided into Sonderkommandos in order to have more small units available for the size of the area of operation. The areas of operation of the Einsatzgruppen were as follows:
4. All of the Einsatzgruppen were made up of a number of Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos. For example, Einsatzgruppe D, of which I was chief, had the Sonderkommandos 10a, 10b, 11a, 11b, and Einsatzkommando 12. 5. The personnel strength of the Einsatzgruppe varied. It usually consisted of a total of 500 to 800 men. Einsatzgruppe D belonged to the smaller of the Einsatzgruppen. The officers and noncommissioned officers of the Kommandos were composed of men on detached service from the state police, criminal police, and in limited numbers from the security service. Aside from these, the troops were largely made up of emergency service draftees [Notdienstverpflichtete] and of companies of the Waffen SS and order police. 6. The Einsatzgruppen had the following assignments: They were responsible for all political security tasks within the operational area of the army units and of the rear areas insofar as the latter did not fall under the civil administration. In addition they had the task of clearing the area of Jews, Communist officials, and agents. The last named task was to be accomplished by killing all racially and politically undesirable elements seized who were considered dangerous to the security. I know that the Page 94 Einsatzgruppen were assigned partly to the reconnaisance of guerrilla bands, fighting guerrilla bands, and to military tasks and, after completion of their basic assignments, were partly converted into combat units. All orders which pertained to the tactical and strategic situation or sphere of interest of the army groups or armies came from the commanding general, the chief of staff or counterintelligence officer of the army or army group to which the Einsatzgruppe was assigned. Orders concerning clearing out undesirable elements went directly to the Einsatzkommandos and came from the Reich Leader SS himself or by transmission through Heydrich. The commanders in chief were ordered by Hitler to support the execution of these orders. Through the so-called Commissar Order, the army units had to sort out political commissars and other similar undesirable elements themselves and hand them over to the Einsatzkommandos to be killed. The order pertaining to the sorting out of these elements from the prisoner-of-war camps was supplemented accordingly by executive orders from the High Command of the Army to the army units. The activity of the Einsatzgruppen and their Einsatzkommandos was carried out entirely within the field of jurisdiction of the commanders in. chief of the army groups or armies under their responsibility. 7. The reports of the
Einsatzgruppen went to the armies or army groups and to the Chief of the
Security Police and SD. Normally weekly or biweekly reports were sent to the
Chief of the Security Police and SD by radio and written reports were sent to
Berlin approximately every month. The army groups or armies were kept currently
informed about the security in their area and other current problems. The
reports to Berlin went to the Chief of the Security Police and SD in the Reich
Security Main Office. After the creation of the command [headquarters] staff of
the Chief of the Security Police and SD in about May 1942, this [staff] prepared
the subsequent reports. The command staff consisted basically of Gruppenfuehrer
[SS Major General] Muller, chief of office IV, and Obersturmbannfuehrer [SS
Lieutenant Colonel] Nosske, group chief in office IV, to whom specialists of
offices III, IV, and VI were available for coordinating the composition of the
reports. Questions which had to do with the personnel of the group and with
garrisons went to office I. Administrative questions and matters concerning
equipment were taken care of by office II. Information concerning the spheres of
life (SD) went to office III. The chief of office IV received reports on the
general security situation, including Jews and Communists. Information about the
unoccupied Russian areas went to office VI. I have read the above statement,
consisting of six (6) pages I have had opportunity to make alterations and corrections in the above statement. I have made this statement freely and voluntarily, without any promise of reward and was subjected to no threat or duress. Nuernberg, 24 April 1947. [Signature] OTTO OHLENDORF.
Document UK-81
[Appendix "A" I..1 to Affidavit sworn by Otto Ohlendorf at Nurnberg, 20 November, 1945.] After 'I joined the NSDAP in May 1925, I participated in all tasks which arose in the young and numerically small Party organization. I was at the same time Ortsgruppenleiter, treasurer and organizer of meetings. I distributed newspapers and leaflets, spoke in discussions at public meetings of other parties and served in the SA. Besides this, I, with three other Party members, were ordered to the SS service in 1926. However, at that time I did not engage in any SS activities because shortly thereafter I left my home town and was removed from the list of the SS. Therefore, I did not receive any SS identity card and learned of my then SS number 880 first in 1936 when, with reference to my early membership in the SS, I was again enrolled in the SS under my old number. Until 1936 I had no connection with the SS. During 1929-31 I spoke independently and on my own initiative at numerous Party meetings of the competent Gau Party Leadership at Hannover. At that time I studied at Goettingen and from there I worked especially in the town and area of Nordheim according to my own plan for the Party. I organized training courses and spoke at numerous evening discussions and public meetings. Despite my activity I remained a simple Party member as I avoided a too close connection with the official Party organs. Because of my own opinion at that time I was already separated from the real and personal ways of a Number of the leading Party members. After my first legal State Examination in 1931, I went to Italy as an exchange student for one year. My reason therefore was to become acquainted with a movement which supposedly was parallel to National Socialism, and which had had ten years of practice and unlimited possibilities to develop. I became acquainted with Fascism in theory and practice. I became thoroughly acquainted with its organization and leading personalities. I arrived at the conclusion that in the case of Fascism, it was not a question of a new conception of people and state which further developed the individualism, but that it was another system of absolute power which was formed around the person of Mussolini. The human beings and people in Fascism had no values in themselves, but were objects of the State and derived their value and recognition from the State as the sole reality. From this fact originated the irreconcilable contrast National Socialism, which is founded on the reality of the value of life in the individual human beings and the people, and, therefore, in contrast to Fascism subordinated the State to the needs of the people. After my return from Italy I stayed away from Party work until the assumption of power. I received no positive answer to the reports on Fascism which I sent to the Party Leadership and wanted first to become oriented on further development of the Party within the Reich. Furthermore, it was my definite resolution to continue my own life independently of the Party. After the assumption of power I, therefore, remained in legal training. At the meetings I mostly spoke on the theme of Fascism and National Socialism in order to point out the dangers which threatened National Socialism by copying the Fascist organizational forms and the insufficient differentiation from the Fascist program. I considered Fascism the primary opponent of National Socialism. In other European countries there already existed Fascist movements and Fascism conducted a continuous and purposeful propaganda all over Europe. Therefore, I considered the offer of Professor Jens Jessen to become his assistant at the Institute for World Economy at Kiel, to serve my purposes, especially because I could found a section for Fascism and National Socialism and in that way have a good opportunity to fight against the plans of introducing Fascism into National Socialism. Between 1933 and 1938, I attempted to obtain a total picture of the complete literature in German and Italian which concerned intellectual, cultural, sociological or economical themes, as well as State theories. Both this literature and the National Socialistic policy in practice showed after the assumption of power that the still immature National Socialistic ideology was diverted from the principles of its original world picture. Theorists, as well as responsible leaders in Party and State, believed that they could conquer temporary difficulties in State and economy, education and culture, only by use of old methods belonging to past stages of civilization. At this time, it was my greatest wish to write an analysis of the spiritual and formative impulses in the National Socialistic work of the present time in order to draw the attention of the leading National Socialist circles and young scientists to the spiritual principles which they used as supposedly National Socialist. However, foreign tendencies became increasingly stronger especially at first in the food economy and later on during the Four Year Plan in the rest of the economy, in communal politics, and in the complete field of science. Therefore, I accepted an offer in 1936, again from Professor Jessen, which gave me the opportunity by means of the SD des Reichsfuehrer's SS to report to the highest leader posts in Party and State and in such way advance my plans based on observation of the theoretical and practical development of people and State. As many personal and essential matters made this task difficult, I grasped this opportunity to participate in the execution of the original National Socialist principles with special satisfaction. These principles advocated, as the foremost goal of National Socialism, to develop the best characteristics of the people and to form them into a community of equality and to furnish the best possible spiritual and moral existence for the individuals of the people. I undertook the task with heart and soul when I worked in Reich Group Commerce and when I was Ministerial Direktor and permanent deputy of the State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Economy, I understood together with many others, that a necessary phase within the evolution would be strong controversies with the Party and State. Only against strong opposition of the old spiritual forces could the goal be achieved which would make the welfare and dignity of man the real conception of politics; also to achieve in the economy that man should become basis and decisive subject of the measures of the political economy, this especially because the economy is the most important and preponderant moulder of man's destiny. National Socialism seemed to be the first attempt to find a natural synthesis between the free, intended to be independent man of individualism and the actual bonds life compels on him in the community in which he finds himself. In order to achieve this synthesis, National Socialism ought to signify self consciousness, and the inner freedom of man, from which the laws for the natural order of the people's community could be recognized and accomplished. with conviction. This idea did not, however, find a period of calm in which it could be developed spiritually and in active daily life. The collapse of the National Socialist system in Germany has shown that the forces favoring highly developed human communities were not strong enough to carry through to this goal. Reproduced From:
OHLENDORF,
Otto
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