The Political Famine of 1932-1933"
from "The Ukraine:
Submerged Nation" William Henry Chamberlin 1944
Harvest of Despair (Soviet Engineered Famine in the Ukraine)
1933 - Video
Chapter 5 "The Ukraine Under The Soviets"
"...So it is impossible to say with certainty how many of the persons
executed, exiled, or imprisoned as a result of these trials were actually
working for an independent Ukraine and how many were merely sacrificed to
suspicion. It may, however, be affirmed with reasonable certainty that far more
Ukrainians suffered for political reasons under the Soviet rule than under the
"This is especially true if one counts among the victims of Soviet rule the
large number of relatively well-to-do peasants who were 'liquidated,' that is
dispossessed of their property and banished to forced labor as kulaks and the
larger number of people of all classes, mostly peasants, who perished in the
political famine of 1932-33. This famine may fairly be called political because
it was not the result of any overwhelming natural catastrophe or of such a
complete exhaustion of the country's resources in foreign or civil war as
preceded and helped to cause the famine of 1921-22.
"Partly because of the discontent with the new system of collective farming
and the lack of manufactured goods, partly because the government had returned
to methods of war communism, demanding arbitrarily all the peasants' surplus
grain, without defining clearly what was supposed to constitute 'surplus,' the
peasants in Ukraine had slowed down their productive effort. Climatic conditions
were also unfavorable, both in 1931 and in 1932.
"The situation that had developed by the autumn of 1932 might be briefly
summarized as follows. Despite the meager harvest, the peasants could have
pulled together without starvation if there had been a substantial abatement of
the requisitions of grain and other foodstuffs. But the requisitions were
intensified, rather than relaxed; the Government was determined to 'teach the
peasants a lesson' by the grim method of starvation, to force them to work hard
in the collective farm.
"Early in 1933 the Ukraine was declared 'out of bounds' for foreign
correspondents, so that there could be no widely circulated accounts of the
great human tragedy that was taking place there. Moscow was flooded with rumors
of widespread starvation, of carts going about the streets of Poltava and other
towns, picking up the dead. In the autumn of 1933, when the ban on travel in the
Ukraine by foreign journalist was lifted, I went with my wife, who was herself
born in Ukraine, to learn at first hand what had happened in the Ukraine. We
visited two widely separated regions, one in the neighborhood of Poltava, on the
left bank of the Dnieper, the other near the town of Bila Tserkva, on the right
bank. We also made systematic inquiries at railway stations as we traveled
across the country.
"No one, I am sure, could have made such a trip with an honest desire to
learn the truth and escaped the conclusion that the Ukrainian countryside had
experienced a gigantic tragedy. What had happened was not hardship, or
privation, or distress or food shortage, to mention the deceptively euphemistic
words that were allowed to pass the Soviet censorship, but stark, outright
famine, with its victims counted in millions. No one will probably ever know the
exact toll of death, because the Soviet Government preserved the strictest
secrecy about the whole question, officially denied that there was any famine,
and rebuffed all attempts to organize relief abroad.
"But every village I visited reported a death rate of not less than ten per
cent. This was not an irresponsible individual estimate, but the figure given
out by the local Soviets. For, while it was easy to tell credulous tourists in
Moscow that there has been no famine, it was impossible for local officials to
make any such assertion when every peasant with whom we talked was mentioning
friends and relatives who had perished, either from outright hunger or from
typhus, influenza and other diseases that always ravage a famine-weakened
"I retain an unforgettable impression of a village called Cherkassy, which is
seven or eight miles south of the town of Bila Tserkva. One the road to this
village an ikon showing the face of Christ had been removed, as part of the
official anti-religious policy of that time. But the crown of thorns, with
unconscious symbolism, had been permitted to remain.
"Walking through the dusty streets of the village one was impressed by the
sense of death and desertion. House after house seemed to be abandoned, with
window panes fallen in and corn growing mixed with weeds in gardens which had
been abandoned by their owners. The young secretary of the village Soviet, whose
name was Fischenko, reported that 634 out of the 2,074 inhabitants of the
village had died. There had been one marriage in the village during the last
year. Six children had been born, of whom one had survived. "It's better not to
have children than to have them die of hunger," said a woman with whom I talked
in the office of the Soviet.
'No,' argued the boy, 'if not children are born who can till the land?'
Another boy on one of the village streets called the death roll of his
friends and acquaintances:
"There was Anton Samchenko, who died with his wife and sister; three children
were left. In Nikita Samchenko's family the father and Mykola and two other
children died; five children were left. Then Grigory Samchenko died with his son
Petro: a wife and daughter are left. Gerasim Samchenko died with his four
children; only the wife is still alive. And Sidor Odnorog died with his wife and
two daughters; one girl is left. Gura Odnorog died with his wife and three
children; one girl is still alive."
"This kind of grim, stark chronicle could have been compiled in almost any
village in the Ukraine in that terrible winter and spring of 1932-33. In the
village of Zhuke, not far from Poltava, I went into a peasant house at random
and found a listless looking girl, fourteen years old. Her father was in the
fields; her mother and four brothers had perished during the famine. A woman in
Poltava declared that 'no war ever took from us so many people."
"This was certainly no exaggeration. If one should take ten per cent
mortality figure as normal (and from what I learned on the trip I think this
would be a conservative estimate) the number of deaths in the Ukraine must have
been over three million. While no official statistics about this tragedy have
been published there are two points of circumstantial evidence showing how the
population growth of the Ukraine was retarded. The proportion of the Ukrainian
population in the Soviet population, according to the census of 1939, was 17.5
per cent. It has been 20 per cent during the twenties. The absolute figure of
the Ukrainian population reported in 1939 was 30,960,221, indicating a decline
during the preceding decade."
"There has perhaps been no disaster of comparable magnitude that received so
little international attention. The Soviet method of stifling direct reporting
of the famine by refusing permission to correspondents to visit the stricken
regions until a new crop had been harvested and the outward signs of the mass
mortality had been largely eliminated proved very effective. Officially Moscow
officialdom continued to deny brazenly that there had been any starvation. Few
correspondents were inclined to risk difficulties with the censorship by sending
the story of events which had occurred some months in the past."
"The Ukrainians abroad, to be sure, learned through indirect channels of what
had happened to their homeland and made unavailable attempts to organize relief
and to bring the inhuman government policy that led up to the famine to the
attention of public opinion. The Ukrainians across the border in Poland
naturally received the fullest information and any enthusiasm that had existed
among them for communism was considerably cooled."
"Agricultural conditions gradually improved in the Ukraine, as in other parts
of the Soviet Union, after the crowning tragedy of forced collectivization, the
peasants gave up the struggle for individual landholdings. It is noteworthy that
the death rate was much higher among the individual peasants than among the
members of the collective farms during the famine. This is because the former
were subjected to more ruthless requisitions and did not get the benefit of the
tardy and inadequate relief measures which were organized for the collective
"...Official Soviet population figures tell a grim and unmistakable story of
the sufferings of the Ukraine under Soviet rule. About 30,000,000 people lived
in the territory of Soviet Ukraine, within its pre-1939 frontiers, in 1917. The
Soviet census of January 1, 1933, reported a population of 31,901,000 for the
Ukraine. And the latest Soviet census, of 1939, gives 30,960,221 as the
population of the Ukraine. So it appears that, for a period of over twenty
years, there was a negligible increase of population, while during the thirties
there was an actual decrease. There could be no more eloquent proof of the human
losses inflicted by civil war, two great famines (in 1921-22 and 1932-33), and
the mass deportations of so-called kulaks. Under normal conditions there would
have been an increase of at least thirty per cent in a prolific peasant country,
like the Ukraine, during a period of twenty-two years. The population should
have been about 40,000,000, not about 31,000,000, as recorded in the last Soviet
census. This would suggest that the abnormal losses of the Ukraine through death
and deportation (over and a above the normal death rate) must have been little
short of ten million."
"The Ukraine..A Submerged Nation" William Henry Chamberlin The Macmillan
Company New York, 1944 Pages 59-61, 73
William Henry Chamberlin was foreign correspondent for the "Christian Science
Monitor" for nearly twenty years. In 1922 he went to Russia as correspondent and
stayed there for 12 years.
"A Year of Horror"
Forty years ago, in 1932/1933, Russia perpetrated the most outrageous
genocide in the history of mankind. Over seven million Ukrainians, hundreds of
thousands of Don Cossacks, North Caucasians, Byelorussians, and other -Russians
fell victim to artificial famine, systematically organized by Russian
The Russian position in Ukraine had been undermined. Millions of Ukrainian
peasants resisted forced collectivization. The collectivization of agriculture
is not only an economic category, but also a military one. It is a tool of
Russia's domination over the subjugated nations. Collectivization is a Russian
way of life, which Russia imposes forcefully upon the oppressed peoples in order
to rule over them. It is a means of stifling private initiative, a totalitarian
form of imperio-colonialist domination.
Hundreds of thousands of privately owned farms are tantamount to hundreds of
thousands of points of resistance to the Russian way of life. A collectivized
village means total control over the farmer. It is a massive attempt at
mastering him. It is an attempt to prevent food assistance to the insurgents as
well. The collective farms in the subjugated countries are the Russian control
centers of this aspect of life too. A Ukrainian peasant is an individualist. He
despises collective economy. He stands for a peasant's private ownership of
land. Collectivization of agriculture, therefore, is a thoroughly political and
ideological category, not only an economic one.
A kolkhoz and private property means a collision of two worlds----Russia and
Ukraine----in the national and political respect. It is a clash of an amorphous
mass, a herd, a controlled by the tyrants and - the individuality which has its
own dignity, its own human and national "I". Collectivization is a leveling of
life in order to stifle everything creative in a human being. Collectivization
is a method of national oppression with the help of massive efforts to impose a
hostile ideology of life upon a subjugated nation.
The French, the English, the Dutch and the Belgians by no means imposed their
way of life upon the countries acquired by them. The Russian do the contrary.
They force their way of life upon the subjugated nations as a means of
And thus, for instance, in literature or art socialist-realism is a form of
Russian imperialism. It is an attempt at spiritual Russification, which hand in
hand with linguistic Russification is to force the subjugated peoples to accept
the "reality" of Russian slavery, the dictates of Russia, as the subject of
Militant atheism is a form of Russian imperialism in the religious sphere,
for, by destroying Christianity and other traditional religions, it attempts to
liquidate the millenary spiritual traditions of a nation and to reduce a human
being to cattle. The Russian official Kremlin-style "Orthodoxy", as a
Ceasaro-papist religion, as a "Church" which serves the Russian regime, is
another form of Russian imperialism, which follows the line of the "Third Rome".
Side by side with linguistic Russification there is an attempt at the
Russification of the spirit... Sovietization is Russification.
The Soviet people do not and cannot exist. There are only the Russian people
and the subjugated people. Widespread nationalization and socialization are also
a form of Russian colonialism in Ukraine and other subjugated countries. Scores
of millions of private owners in the subjugated nations are a difficult category
for total control. For this reason, all measures adopted by Russia in the
subjugated countries must be viewed as nothing other than the forms of Russian
imperialism and colonialism.
Forty years ago, Russia committed the greatest crime of genocide in order to
drive Ukrainians into the kolkhozes. Ukraine - the richest agricultural country
of Europe - lost over seven million inhabitants. Russia sent its troops to take
away the harvest, the bread, from Ukraine by force.
Hundreds of thousands of Russian troops plundered Ukrainian villages,
confiscating all grain and killing people. The Ukrainian peasant resisted
joining the kolkhoz, resisted giving his land to the Russians. An uneven battle
ensued. The Ukrainian village rose against collectivization. The peasants
perished in battle with Russian troops, but did not go to the kolkhozes. The
struggle continued for many months. The Russian armies crushed the peasants'
uprising against collectivization. They took bread from Ukraine to Russia.
The Ukrainian peasants perished by the millions in the villages and in the
streets of cities. Dantean scenes were the order of the day. Ukraine did not
succumb. When the mothers and children, and the elderly and the sick were dying
in the streets of towns and villages, the insurrection was crushed by the
Russians The Russian tyrants, Stalin and Molotov, temporarily crushed the
resistance of the Ukrainian nation at the price of millions of Ukrainian
Several million so-called kulaks, i.e. Ukrainian well-to-do farmers, were
forcefully deported to Siberia either to concentration camps or to dig canals.
At that time, the Ukrainian nation lost over ten million victims of Russian
However, Russia failed to break the Ukrainian nation. It revived again. The
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)
organized the struggle of the nation anew and continue to do so at present.
Ukraine continues to fight. The Ukrainian people will never forgive the Russian
occupants for the ten million victims of 'Russia's hunger siege of Ukraine.
On this fortieth anniversary of the greatest crime of genocide known in the
history of mankind, Ukraine warns the free world against the Russian tyrants who
are preparing a similar genocide for it.
It is a tragedy for the free world that is silent in the face of such
outrageous crimes and continues to support Russian domination over hundreds of
millions of people and scores of nations.
Forward from the Book:
"Genocide of the Ukrainian People"
The Artificial Famine in the Years 1932-1933
by Prof. Vasyl Plyushch
1973, Pages 5-6
Ukrainisches Institut fur Bildungspolitik Munchen e. V.
Munchen 80, Zeppelinstr. 67
All pictures to this
article were added by the Gnostic Liberation Front from:
BLACK FAMINE IN UKRAINE 1932-33
A STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE
UKRAINE, "the breadbasket of Europe" is a land
famous for its fertile black earth and its golden wheat. Yet, only forty
years ago seven million Ukrainians starved to death although no natural
catastrophe had visited the land. Forty years ago the people starved while
the Soviet Union exported butter and grain. While Moscow banqueted, Ukraine
Stark, cold, statistics, the accounts of thousands
of Ukrainian survivors and German; English and American eyewitnesses, as
well as confessions of Moscow's agents and the admission of Stalin himself:
All these have slowly seeped out of the Iron Curtain and have been piled
into a tremendous mountain of facts. The whole story, pieced together like a
jig-saw puzzle, ends with the biggest puzzle of all: Why did Moscow decide
to starve to death seven million Ukrainians?
THE CLOAK OF DECEIT:
THIS GREAT CRIME OF GENOCIDE AGAINST the Ukrainian people has not been
completely ignored by the history books of the world. Any history of the
Soviet Union will mention the triumph of "Collectivization" in which the
Kulaks, or well-off farmers, were "liquidated as a class." Collectivized
farming, which is today the most inefficient agricultural system in
existence, had to be instituted for Marxist reasons. The Kulaks (Kurkulsin
Ukrainian) constituted only 4 to 5% of the peasantry -- yet they endangered
the success of Communism!
The Communist Party on January 5, 1930, as part of
the first Five Year Plan, started the machinery of Collectivization rolling.
Collective is, incidentally Kolkhoz in Russian and Kolhosp in Ukrainian. The
Russian peasantry demonstrated little opposition to Moscow because of their
past tradition of communal farming. The Russian mir, or village commune,
where the land is owned by the village and not by the individual, had for
centuries prepared the Russians psychologically for Collectivization. On
July 30, 1930 the first RSFSR decree abolishing the mir was passed to make
way for the Collectives.
The Ukrainians, on the other hand, had an
independent, individualistic farming tradition of private ownershp of land.
The Russian communal spirit was comething completely foreign to the farmers
of Ukraine and so they opposed Moscow bitterly. While the collectivization
in the Russian Republic (RSFSR) went on schedule, the stubborn resistance of
the Ukrainians slowed it down to such a standstill that Moscow even had to
retreat temporarily. This was noted by Stalin in his famous "Dizzy with
Success" letter. One way the Ukrainian farmer showed his opposition to
collectivization was by slaughtering his livestock before joining. Later a
death penalty was passed for such an action. The folowing table shows the
tremendous drop in livestock:
Ukrainian Encyclopedia, page 1064
WHY DID THE FAMINE TAKE PLACE?
OPPOSlTlON TO COLLECTIVIZATION is only half the
story why Moscow created the famine in Ukraine. The Ukrainian opposition was
not only ideological, that is against Communism, but also political. Russian
nationalism reared its ugly head at this time. The Kremlin used the famine
as a political weapon to destroy Ukrainian aspirations for independence. At
the same time as the famine (1932-34) a wave of persecutions of thousands of
Ukrainian intellectuals, writers and leaders took place. Plots for
liberating Ukraine were discovered not only in the smallest villages but
even in the top ranks of the Ukrainian Communist Party itself. Purges took
hundreds of Ukrainians. Suicide was the escape of many. In 1933 the famous
writer Mykola Khvylovy and the veteran Ukrainian Communist, Mykola Skrypnyk,
both chose suidde.
"This famine," says the American authority William
H. Chamberlin, "may fairly be called political because it was not the result
of any overwhelming natural catastrophe or of ... a complete exhaustion of
the country's resources... "
THE STRANGEST WAR IN HISTORY
THE DEATH AND DESOLATION caused by the famine is
likened to war by many of the eyewitnesses. And in fact, the unequal
struggle between the peasants of Ukraine and the agent of the Russian
Kremlin certainly may be accurately called a "war". This Ukrainian-Russian
"war" between peasants armed with pitchforks and the Red Army and Secret
Police, was carried out mercilessly with no pity for the aged or young, nor
for women and children. According to Bertram D. Wolfe: "Villages were
surrounded and laid waste, set to the torch, attacked by tanks and artillery
and bombs from the air. A Secret Police Colonel, almost sobbing, told the
writer Isaac Deutscher:
"I am an old Bolshevik. I worked in the
underground against the Tsar and then I fought in the civil war. Did I
do all that in order that I should now surround villages with
machine-guns and order my men to fire indiscriminately into crowds of
peasants? Oh no, no!"
One Moscow agent, mighty Hatayevich, in
reprimanding Comrade Victor Kravchenko, one of 100,000 men "selected by the
Central Committee of the Party" to help in Collectivization said:
"... I'm not sure that you understand what has
been happening. A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry
and our regime. It's a struggle to the death. This year (1933) was a
test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them
who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective
farm system is here to stay, We've won the war."
Hatayevich, Secretary of the Regional Committee of
the Dnipropetrovsk Communist Party and one of the foremost Communist in the
Ukrainian SSR reveals here that the famine was intentional, that it took
millions of lives, and that he considered it a "war" aganst the Ukrainian
One woman in Poltava said, "No war ever took from
us so many people." This was true, since Ukraine's losses in 1932-33 were
greater than that of any nation that fought in the First World War. It
should be emphasized that the main weapon in this struggle was not tanks,
machine guns or bullets -- but hunger. Famine, a man-made "Collectivized"
famine, was the main cause of the loss of life in this "war," one of the
strangest in history.
STALIN'S CONFESSION TO CHURCHILL
WHEN SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL visited Stalin at the Kremlin in August, 1942 he
asked: " ... Have the stresses of the war been as bad to you personally as
carrying through the policy of the Collective Farms?"
"Oh, no" he (Stalin) said, "the Collective Farm
policy was a terrible srtuggle ... Ten millions," he said, holding up his
hands. "It was fearful. Four years it lasted. It was absolutely necessary
Stalin admits that a complete year of World War II
to him was less of a struggle than Collectivization! How gigantic the
opposition of the Ukrainian peasants must have been. Stalin went on to tell
the British Prime Minister that some peasants "agreed to come in with us"
and were given land to cultivate in Tomsk or lrkutsk (both in Siberia).
"But," Stalin added, "the great bulk (of the 10 million) were very unpopular
and were wiped out by their labourers (?)."
When Nikita Khrushchev "purged" Stalin in his 1956
secret speech, he didn't say a word about this Famine, the most immense of
Stalin's crimes. Instead, Khrushchev expressed concern over the "thousands"
of innocent Communists that had suffered from Stalin's diabolical suspicion.
It was on this occasion that Khrushchev said that Stalin considered
deporting the population of Ukraine, however as Khrushchev says: "The
Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of
them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, he would
have deported them also." In his book Khrushchev Remembers
(Boston, Little, Brown, 1970) the Soviet premier devotes a chapter to the
famine in Ukraine, 1945.
HOW MANY DIED?
"CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES place the number of deaths in Ukraine due to this
enforced famine, at about 4,800,000. Many recognized scholars, however have
estimated the number between 5 million to 8 million."
This statement from a United States Senate Document
(No. 122 of 1958) can be backed up with actual statistics squeezed out of
the Soviet press. The Russian government, however, took special measures to
keep secret the death toll. Of course, it has never admitted any statistics
or even the existence of the famine. But, indirect references were
accidentally made and it is possible to estimate that during the famine from
10% to 25% of Ukraine's population (32,680,700 in January 1932) starved to
Vasyl Hryshko, in his factual study says that in
1935 about 25,000 people died daily in the villages of Ukraine, or more than
1,000 per hour or 17 every minute. It was in early 1933 that the greatest
loss of life took place. In the first half of the year foreign travel in
Ukraine was banned. No newspaper correspondents were allowed to visit the
besieged country until the late summer and fall when signs of the famine had
been cleared up. The American journalist William Henry Chamberlin visited
Ukraine immediately after the ban on travel was lifted. He says every
village he visited had lost at least ten percent of its residents.
Hryshko sums up the statistics of 1932 and 1939 in
this way. When we compare the 32,680,700 persons living in Ukraine in 1932
with the 1939 figure of 30,960,200 we see that, taking into account the
normal 2.36 per cent annual increase, in seven years Ukraine had lost
7,465,000 persons. Of this number, Hryshko says, some 4,821,600 persons or
roughly 18.8 percent of the Ukrainian population, died in the years
The impact of the famine is shown in many ways.
Just before World War II a survey of the number of students was made. Since
children start school in the USSR at seven years of age therefore, seven
years after 1932 there should be an indication of the famine by a drop in
enrollment. Look at these figures:
Construction of the USSR, Moscow: Government Planning Pub., 1940,
The Russian Republic (where no famine took place),
shows a steady increase as did all seven other Soviet Republics, with the
exception of Armenia. Why did Ukraine have an absolute loss of 600,216
students and Byelorussia (also a famine area) 11,174? The tragic story of
these missing school children is written in the pages of the man-made
famine. Let us not forget that Stalin himself said "ten millions" some of
whom suffered death not from famine but as slave laborers in Siberian mines
and timber camps.
EYE WITNESSES SPEAK
HUNDREDS OF UKRAINIAN eyewitnesses of the famine
have told their tragic and unbelievable experiences in the book The
Black Deeds of the Kremlin, edited by S. 0. Pidhainy. The second
volume of this work is devoted exclusively to "The Great Famine in Ukraine."
It should be added that some of the people were able to travel to Moscow and
other areas because they were technicians, etc. They testify that while they
left Famine at the border of Ukraine or the Kuban (North Caucasus) area,
which is also Ukrainian populated, they found no evidence of hunger in
Russia or other Soviet republics, except Byelorussia. It is not possible to
give even a hint of the horror and pathos in Ukraine at the time.
Writer Arthur Kaestler:
Arthur Koestler, the famous writer who visited
Ukraine in late summer of 1932 and fall 1933 and who spent about three
months in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv writes in The God That Failed:
"I saw the ravages of the famine of 1932-1933
in the Ukraine: hordes of families in rags begging at the railway
stations, the women lifting up to the compartment window their starving
brats, which, with drumstick limbs, big cadaverous heads and puffed
bellies, looked like embryos out of alcohol bottles ..."
American Traveller Carveth Wells:
Carveth Wells, a world traveller, traveled through
Ukraine in July 1932 and describes the early stages of the famine in his
fascinating book Kapoot.
"The extraordinary thing was that the farther
we penetrated into the Ukraine, which used to be the 'Granary of
Russia', the less food there was and the more starvation to be seen on
"None of us knew what tragedies had been
enacted here ...
"We ourselves happened to be passing through
the Ukraine and the Caucasus in the very midst of the famine in July,
1932. From the train windows children could be seen eating grass. The
sight of small children with stomachs enormously distended is not at all
uncommon in Africa or other tropical countries, but this was the first
time I had ever seen white children in such a state."
Soviet Official Victor Kravchenko:
Victor Kravchenko was a Soviet official who escaped from the USSR Embassy in
the United States in 1944. He described his life in the book I Chose
Freedom. In 1933 he was one of the Communist agents assigned to
safeguard the new harvest, the "Harvest in Hell" as he calls it:
"Although not a word about the tragedy appeared
in the newspapers, the famine that raged ... was a matter of common
"What I saw that morning ... was inexpressibly
horrible. On a battlefield men die quickly, they fight back ... Here I
saw people dying in solitude by slow degrees, dying hideously, without
the excuse of sacrifice for a cause. They had been trapped and left to
starve, each in his own home, by a political decision made in a far-off
capital around conference and banquet tables. There was not even the
consolation of inevitability to relieve the horror.
"The most terrifying sights were the little
children with skeleton limbs dangling from balloon-like abdomens.
Starvation had wiped every trace of youth from their faces, turning them
into tortured gargoyles; only in their eyes still lingered the reminder
of childhood. Everywhere we found men and women lying prone (weak from
hunger), their faces and bellies bloated, their eyes utterly
Kravchenko was shocked to discover a butter plant
was wrapping its products in paper titled in English USSR Butter
"Anger lashed my mind as I drove back to the
village. Butter being sent abroad in the midst of the famine! In London,
Berlin, Paris I could see ... people eating butter stamped with a Soviet
trade mark. Driving through the fields, I did not hear the lovely
Ukrainian songs so dear to my heart. These people had forgotten how to
sing. I could only hear the groans of the dying, and the lip-smacking of
fat foreigners enjoying our butter ..."
At the same time Communist Party members and Soviet
officials, the privileged classes, were specially supplied with food. Some
of these, however, had a conscience and Comrade Somanov, Chief of the
Political Department said:
"Victor ... I'm of peasant origin myself and
the sufferings of my people hurt me deeply. Tears, blood, death, exile.
And why? The land is fertile, the people are hard-working. Why must we
let them starve and die and perish? The more I think of it the more
confused I get."
The famine was not caused by a lack of food in
Ukraine. This may seem a paradox but the cause of the famine was completely
the Kremlin's decision. It locked up Ukraine's food and guarded it from the
people. The Russian grain collectors did not take only the wheat from the
peasants but stripped them of all food. In one village near Odessa "they
collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and "in other
places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove." These are
not mentioned by Kravchenko. He does reveal however, that these millions
need not have died except at the whim of Stalin in Moscow. He says:
"When the first of the new grain was being
delivered to the granary near the railroad station, I made a discovery
which left me tremulous with horror. Stacked in the brick structure were
thousands of poods of the previous year's (1932) grain collections These
were the state reserves for the district ordered by the government,
their very existence hidden from the starving population by officialdom
Hundreds of men, women and children had died of undernourishment in
these villages, though grain was hoarded almost outside their doors!
"The peasants who were with me when we found
the 'State reserves' stared with unbelieving eyes and cursed in anger.
Subsequently I came to know that in many other parts of the country the
government hoarded huge reserves while peasants in those very regions
died of hunger. Why this was done only Stalin's Politburo could tell --
and it didn't."
"Since that date (1926) catastrophes have
befallen the rural folk of the Ukraine about 3,000,000 are reckoned to
have perished during the famine of the early thirties, and another
2,000,000 certainly have migrated (to Siberia?) as a result of
conditions which they have found intolerable."
The Ukraine: A History, by W.E.D.
Allen, Cambridge University Press, 1941, page 375.
"Hundreds of thousands of the recalcitrants
were transported to Siberia to work in the forest or mines. ... Others
starved during the famine which swept Ukraine in the early 1930's
particularly in 1932."
An Introduction to Russian History and
Culture, by Ivar Spector, D. Van Nostrand, New York, 1950.
"... Largely as a result of the forcible
collectivization of agriculture, a famine developed in Ukraine.
Starvation and all it accompanying diseases stalked unchecked through
the richest agricultural region in the Soviet Union, and within the
space of a few months hundreds of thousands if not millions of people
died in unimaginable misery."
A History of Russia, by George
Vernadsky, Philadelphia, Blakiston, 1944, page 337.
"The famine of 1930-31 followed close on the
heels of the chaos, which existed everywhere in agriculture, and in
Ukraine in particular the suffering and starvation reached a scale which
almost passes human comprehension."
A History of Russia, by George
Vernadsky, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1954, page 360.
"But among the ghastly fruits of the campaign
for collectivization was the 'man-made famine' of 1931-32 in the Ukraine
and the northern Caucasus, where it had been resisted most fiercely and
where the fields had lain almost totally neglected. There were millions
of deaths from starvation in these regions."
A Short History of Russia, by Richard
Charques, London, 1959, page 245.
"At the same time Stalin had just forced
through the collectivization of agriculture ... at a fearful price ...
First there were the millions of ruined lives, the lives of the rich and
middle peasants, the so-called kulaks, killed in the struggle, or exiled
to Siberia; then the three million dead in the great famine which swept
Russia by Daylight, by Edward
Crankshaw, London, Michael Joseph, 1951, page 100
young and want so much to live a while"
was written to K. Riabokin, a University Professor at Kharkiv,
by his niece Zina:
"Please, Uncle Do Take Me to Kharkiv."
"We have neither bread nor anything
else to eat. Dad is completely exhausted from hunger and is
lying on the bench, unable to get on his feet. Mother is blind
from the hunger and cannot see in the least. So I have to guide
her when she has to go outside. Please Uncle, do take me to
Kharkiv, because I, too, will die from hunger. Please do take
me, please. I'm still young and I want so much to live a while.
Here I will surely die, for every one else is dying ..."
received the letter at the same time that he was told of her
death. He says, "I did not know what to say or what to do. My
head just pounded with my neice's pathetic plea: `I'm still
young and want so much to live ... Please do take me, please
BERTRAM D. WOLFE
"The peasantry fought for its life with fowling
pieces and pitchforks. Uprisings embraced whole regions. Villages were
surrounded and laid waste ... Districts were stripped of their stocks of
grain and seed, then cordoned off to die of famine and plague."
Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost, by
Bertram D. Wolfe, Praeger, New York, 1957, page 165
"In 1932 the State decreed the death penalty
for stealing a bit of coal or grain from a freight train. Then the death
penalty was provided for the collectivized farmer who might steal from
the fields some of the product of his "collective labor;" then for the
willful slaughter of his own cattle; then for letting "cattle die by
neglect." "In March 1933, thirty-five officials of the Commissariat of
Agriculture were executed after being 'tried' ... for having 'willfully
permitted noxious weeds to grow in the fields.'"
Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost, by
Bertram D. Wolfe, Praeger, New York, 1957, pages 169-71
DR. EWALD AMMENDE
"... Official Soviet reports referred to the
1932 harvest as of medium quality: poor results or failure were never
mentioned. (page 29) 1933 was a particularly critical year for the food
supply of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, 1.8 million tons of grain and
other foodstuffs were exported ... In the first eight months of 1934,
during which period the acute lack of foodstuffs continued, the export
was even more considerable; 591,835 tons of grain, worth 13.6 million
roubles were exported ... via the Black Sea ports."
Human Life in Russia, by Dr. Ewald
Ammende, London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1936, page 46
"In the first fortnight of January (1933) ...
Stalin made a speech 'What is wrong,' Stalin asked in effect, 'on the
agrarian front? We are wrong, my comrades -- we, not the peasants nor
the weather, nor class enemies, but we Communists, who have the greatest
power and authority the world ever saw, yet have made a series of
blunders ... We miscalculated the new tactics of hostile forces of
boring from within, instead of engaging in open warfare.'"
"In April, 1933, I travelled through Ukraine to
Odessa, and ... a Red Army brigade commander (General) told me: 'We had
a communal farm in Ukraine attached to my regiment ... Everything went
well until a year ago (1932). Then the whole set-up changed. We began to
get letters asking for food. Can you imagine that, that they asked food
from us? We sent what we could, but I didn't know what had happened
until I went to the farm only a month ago (March 1933). My God, you
wouldn't beleive it. The people were almost starving. Their animals were
dead. I'll tell you more, there wasn't a cat or dog in the whole
village, and that is no good sign ... Instead of two hundred and fifty
families there were only seventy-three, and all of them were
half-starved. I asked them what happened. They said 'Our seed grain was
taken away last spring.' They said to me, 'Comrade Commander, we are
soldiers and most of us are Communists. When the order came that our
farm must deliver five hundred tons of grain, we held a meeting. Five
hundred tons of grain! We needed four hundred tons to sow our fields,
and we only had six hundred tons. But we gave the grain as ordered."
What was the result? I asked the brigade
"Barren fields," he told me. "Do you know that
they ate their horses and oxen, such as was left of them? They were
starving, do you know that? Their tractors were rusty and useless; and
remember, these folks weren't kulaks, weren't class enemies. They were
our own people, our soldiers. I was horrified ..."
USSR: The Story of Soviet Russia, by
Walter Duranty, New York, 1944, pages 194-5
"The more well to-do peasants continued to
resist the movement, and to dispose of their opposition, the Soviets
proceeded to liquidate them."
The Great Offensive, by Maurice
Hindus, New York, 1933, page 154
"Worst of all the excessive collection of
grain. This was carried out with especial vigor."
(Hindus, page 151)
"Thousands (of people) came to Moscow, because
they knew that in Moscow there was an abundance of food. The Ukraine
with its lovely lands and its lovely skies and its lovely white villages
was siezed with panic and gloom. The mortality of livestock from
starvation during this time was enormous."
(Hindus, page 153)
"I never had seen such an abundance of weeds in
the fields as there were in the summer of 1932. Sugar beet in the Kiev
area (Ukraine) were literally submerged in weeds."
(Hindus, page 154)
Hindus quotes the Commissar of Agriculture,
Yakovlev, who spoke in February 1933 about the Peremozhetz collective farm
in Odessa region of Ukraine. "Here," said Yakovlev, "was as choice a farm as
there was in that part of the country -- rich soil, superb climate -- Yet in
1932 it failed to fulfill the grain obligation to the government even though
the amount was reduced to one-fourth of what it had been the year before,
and many a family had in hand only scanty supplies of bread. Of its 153
horses, only 53 were left. The other 100 died of starvation."
"The same year (1932) also saw the outbreak of
the second great Soviet famine, in the Ukraine and along the Volga. It
claimed some five million further peasant victims -- deliberately
sacrificed by Stalin, who continued to dump Soviet grain on world
markets while those who had grown it were starving en masse. The new
dictator was very largely successful in concealing this disaster from
A Condse History of Russia, by Ronald
Hingley, New York, Viking Press, 1972, pages 172-73.
"The next famine, that of 1932-3 was created
artificially by the authorities as a means of breaking the resistance of
the peasants to the collectivization of agriculture; ... the grain was
removed from the countryside by armed detachments chiefly composed of
internal security troops and Komsomol members. (page 175) Millions of
peasants died of starvation or were deported and sent to forced labour
camps." (page 120).
A Concise Encyclopedia of Russia, by
S.V. Utechin, New York, Dutton, 1964.
CLARENCE A. MANNING
"It is difficult to estimate accurately the
number who perished in the famine, but it was approximately 4,800,000.
This is certainly an underestimate, although certain other calcu-
lations will place the number between five and six million."
Ukraine Under the Soviets, by
Clarence A. Manning, New York, Bookman Associates, 1953, page 101.
JOHN F. STEWART
"While no official statistics about this
tragedy have been published, there is a document - The Small Soviet
Encyclopedia of 1940, in which it is stated that Ukraine had in 1927
a population of 32 millions, and in 1939, only twelve years later, a
population of 28 million. Where had the 4 millions gone to, apart from
what should have been the natural increase of at least another 4
Tortured but Unconquerable Ukraine,
by John F. Stewart. Edinburgh, Scottish League for European Freedom, 1953.
93 Ukrainian Film Directed by Oles Yanchuk
Based On The Novel "The Yellow
by Vasyl Barka
"A Family's Struggle In Stalin's Man-Made Famine" "Famine-33"
Film Review by
Stephen Holden The New York Times, December 15, 1993
"The indelible images of human suffering that permeate Oles Yanchuk's film
"Famine-33" are memorable precisely because they are so far removed in tone from
the raucous, shoot-'em-up violence and hysteria of Hollywood movies. In this
drama of a Ukrainian family's struggle to survive a Government-created famine
that killed more than seven million (a quarter of the population) in 1933, the
suffering is etched in the stony faces of people too weary and weak to raise
"In an early scene, the members of an impoverished farming family solemnly
take turns dipping their ladles into the single bowl of watery soup that is
their only meal of the day. Later in the film, scores of villagers numb with
despair and hunger huddle silently in the pouring rain outside a Government
office until a truckload of armed soldiers arrives to disperse them. In the most
poignant scene, a little boy who has lost his parents calls for his mother as he
wonders panic- stricken through a snowy woodland where the trees are outnumbered
by crosses marking the dead."
"In the film's grimmest moment, a train stops on the side of a hill, and
Russian (Soviet) soldiers unload hundreds of dead bodies from a flatcar, tossing
them down a slope and into a burning pit. For every few bodies deposited, a log
is rolled to fuel the fire."
"Although the Katrannyks, the family portrayed in "Famine-33" are fictional,
the historical events covered by the film are real. In 1932 and '33, Stalin
instituted a program in which Soviet troops seized all the livestock, crops and
seed stocks grown in Ukraine, the Soviet Union's richest agricultural region,
deliberately bringing about mass starvation. One goal of the program was to
raise capital for Soviet industrialization by selling the grain abroad. A more
insidious goal was to force the independent farmers to work in collectives,
where they were patrolled by soldiers, and treated no better than serfs.
Integral to the program was the crushing of any notions of Ukrainian
independence through the destruction of churches and other cultural
"Famine-33" which opens today (December 15, 1993) at Film Forum 1 (New York
City), relies more on images than on words as it follows the inexorable
disintegration of the Katrannyks, a family of six, after Soviet troops invade
their house and remove their food supply. Shot mostly in grimy black-and-white,
the film occasionally explodes into misty pastel colors for scenes in which the
characters hallucinate a time of peace and plenty. The film has a dioramic
quality. Instead of following the day-to-day decline of the Katrannyks, it is a
series of tableaux of crucial moments in the lives of the family and their
"Technically the movie is quite crude. The screenplay written by Serhij
Diacheniko and Les Taniuk from Vasyl Barka's novel "The Yellow Prince," is
hardly more than a series of spoken captions. There is no conventional character
development. Everyone in the fiercely polemical film is an archetype. In those
few scenes that require acting, the performances are uneven."
"The Soviet forces that carry out the savagery are portrayed as uniformly
monstrous. They take sadistic pleasure in flaunting their grain, vodka and
sausages in the faces of the hungry and think nothing of slaughtering hundreds
of unarmed protesting farmers with machine guns. When Myron Katrannyk (Georgi
Moroziuk), the head of the household, is suspected of hiding a sacred chalice,
he is summoned to Communist party headquarters, suspended on a rack and beaten.
After he and his wife, Odarka (Halyna Sulyma), refuse to talk, they are held
prisoner and their children are left to fend for themselves. One of the perils
they face is being kidnapped and eaten."
"Famine-33" is a difficult movie to watch, but it has a stark monumentality.
As the camera lingers on the wasted faces and desolate terrain of a land without
hope, the film builds up a portrait of suffering and oppression that has
"Famine-33" Directed by Oles Yanchuk; written (in Ukrainian with English
subtitles) by Sherhij Diachenko and Les Taniuk, based on the novel "The Yellow
Prince," by Vasyl Barka; directors of photography, Vasyl Borodin and Mykhajlo
Kretov; edited by Mykola Kalandjonak and Victor Pacukevych. At Film Forum 1, 209
Houston Street, South Village (New York City); time: 95 minutes. This film is
ZGram - Where Truth is
July 25, 2002
from the Zundelsite:
I am doing a three-part
ZGram in the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33 that happened when my parents were in
their early twenties and studying in Odessa, the Ukraine. Therefore, I know this
story well from many personal accounts.
The following three
essays were taken from the exceppent Ukrainian website, UKAR, at
www.ukar.org My readers would be well
advised to visit and get a feel for the early thirties in that part of the world
- and the horror that came with Bolshewism - financed by Jewish banking
oligarchs in New York and carried out by mostly Jewish revolutionaries.
The first two Parts deal
with the actual famine. The third part deals with how it was shamefully reported
in America by a Jewish Communist, Walter Durante, who wrote for the New York
This is Part I
Collectivization and the famine
BY BOHDAN KRAWCHENKO
Special Edition issued by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee Edmonton Branch
October 14, 1983
In 1932 and 1933 millions of people in
Ukraine died of hunger. Unlike most famines, the one in Ukraine was not caused
by some natural calamity or crop failure, but was man-made.
The 1920s -
The peasantry - about 80 per cent of
Ukraine's population - had fought pitched battles against landlords during the
1917 revolution to realize its age-old dream of owning land.
When in 1918-19 the Bolsheviks occupied
Ukraine and made their first bid to collectivize peasant land, the Ukrainian
peasants resisted so fiercely that Lenin ordered "severe punishment" for any
Bolshevik who preached collectivization. During the 1920s, peasants organized
voluntary cooperatives and agriculture thrived.
In this period the Ukrainian people
forced the Bolsheviks to change their nationality policy. The Ukrainian language
displaced Russian in education, state administration and the mass media.
Ukrainians were recruited into the party
and government. Within the Communist Party of Ukraine there developed a powerful
Ukrainian wing which demanded an end to Russian domination in economic and
Stalin's policies in 1929 brought the
"golden era" to an end
In 1928 Stalin suddenly announced
accelerated industrialization in the form of the first five-year plan. The plan
was hastily put together and, as a result, billions of rubles were wasted.
By 1930 it became clear that Stalin's
government was running out of funds. Rather than rethink economic strategies,
Stalin ordered more grain to be squeezed out of the peasantry.
The quickest method of accomplishing
this, according to Stalin, was to establish collective farms by expropriating
all peasant land, grain reserves and livestock without compensation. Also,
collective farms would have to turn over all their produce to the state.
Interestingly enough, when the Nazis
occupied Ukraine, they did not abolish collective farms: they appreciated this
finely tuned instrument for the exploitation of the peasantry.
In Ukraine, collectivization had another
aim: to "destroy the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism - individual peasant
agriculture," according to the Soviet newspaper Proletarska Pravda, (22.1.1930).
It was in 1930 as well that Stalin
ordered the first of a series of purges of Ukrainian cultural and political
figures - all part and parcel of a program to roll back the achievements of the
national revival of the 1920s.
An essential component of forced
collectivization, according to Stalin, was the "elimination of kulaks as a
The word kulak conjures up an image of a
wealthy, grasping peasant. The reality had little in common with the myth.
In the 1920s there were laws banning the
sale and purchase of land and of its rent. Land was distributed on the basis of
the size of the peasant family. Some peasant households did, of course, own more
land than others. But these households also had larger families to support.
Compare the richest kulak in Ukraine
with an industrial worker. In the mid-1920s the average annual income per
working peasant in the richest peasant farm in Ukraine (comprising about 30
acres) was 200 rubles. The average worker, by contrast, made 521 rubles a year
and received many social-security benefits which were not available to the
When the campaign against kulaks began,
the Soviet regime was at a loss for a definition of the term and produced an
arbitrary set of criteria. For example, a household owning a motor of any kind
was classified as belonging to the kulak category.
Neither were kulaks those who hired
labor. As the Russian demographer M. Maksudov has shown, the majority of those
employing labor in the countryside were invalids of the First World War and the
revolution, widows and families with few children.
The campaign against kulaks, therefore,
had little to do with economic considerations. "Dekulakization" was intended to
rid the countryside of peasants (irrespective of their material standing) who
were most likely to organize and lead resistance to forced collectivization.
According to official Soviet surveys,
Ukraine had 71,500 kulak households in 1929. But according to official Soviet
sources, between 1930 and 1932, 200,000 kulak households or one million people
were "eliminated." The plan for the destruction of kulaks was overfulfilled by
almost 200 per cent.
Those who resisted collectivization were
either executed or sent to prison camps and their families were deported to
Siberia or the Russian Arctic circle. Peasant activists were deported with their
families to the northern regions of Russian.
Here is what some eyewitnesses wrote
about their experiences: "Barefooted and poorly clad peasants were jammed into
railroad cars and transported to the regions of Murmansk and the like. Peasants
were unloaded into snow about two metres deep. The frost stood at 75 degrees
below zero. Without even an axe or a saw we began building huts from tree
branches. In two weeks all the children, the sick and the elderly had frozen to
The death rate among Ukrainian peasants
deported to the Sverdlovsk region in Russia was typical: only 2,300 of the
original group of 4,800 survived the winter.
The suffering during the deportations
was terrible enough, yet it pales in comparison with what happened during the
famine of 1932-33.
By the spring of 1930 peasant resistance
to collectivization had reached such proportions that Stalin panicked and
ordered a temporary retreat. In an article entitled "Dizzy with Success," he
admitted that excesses had occurred and falsely pinned the entire blame on local
officials. Moreover, he reassured the peasants that membership in collective
farms henceforth would be "voluntary."
In the spring of 1930 there occurred a
mass exodus of peasants from collective farms. Thinking that Stalin's regime had
learned its lesson, peasants worked with a will and brought in an excellent
harvest - 23.1 million (metric) tons of grain.
But in the autumn of 1930 Stalin again
changed course. He ordered the drive for collectivization to be resumed and the
maximum amount of grain to be taken out of Ukraine. A third of the harvest, or
7.7 million tons of grain, was taken by the state.
The renewed collectivization drive
produced chaos in agricultural production. The peasantry was given no incentive
to produce. By the end of 1930, for example, 78 per cent of collective farms in
Ukraine had failed to pay peasants for the days that they had worked.
Ironically, peasants' payment in Ukraine (in kilos of food produce) was half
what it was in Russia. Reassured by his success of 1930, Stalin ordered the 1931
quota for grain delivery to the state to be set at the same level - 7.7 million
The 1931 harvest, however - 18.3 million
tons of grain - was 20 per cent smaller than in 1930. Almost 30 per cent of the
harvest was lost because of the breakdown of the transportation system.
Intent on exporting grain to finance
industrialization, Stalin ordered that it be requisitioned whatever the cost to
By the early spring of 1932, 7 million
tons had been taken. The amount was so great that the republic was short of seed
grain by 45 per cent.
Ukrainian officials knew that if the
rate of grain requisitioning continued, famine would break out. They argued with
Moscow for a major downward revision of Ukraine's agricultural obligations for
M. Skrypnyk, Commissar of Education, in
July 1932 recounted how, while touring the Ukrainian countryside, he had heard
from peasants that "we had everything taken away from us but the broom." V.
Chubar, head of the Ukrainian government, insisted that neither the peasants nor
his administration were at fault for the agricultural crisis, but that it was
due to the unrealistic plans of Moscow.
Stalin did lower the amount of grain to
be requisitioned in 1932 to 6.2 million tons, but this was still far above the
capacities of the Ukraine in view of that year's poor harvest - 14.6 tons.
Neither did Stalin relax the
collectivization drive and, as a result, agriculture was plagued by chaos.
Millions of tons of grain were lost.
Tightening the noose
Moscow sent a special mission,
accompanied by troops, to oversee the 1932 grain requisition.
Collective farms stopped distributing
food to peasants. For example, according to official statistics, only five per
cent of collective farms in Dnipropetrovsk province handed out food produce for
days worked in 1932.
To prevent peasants from feeding
themselves by taking collective farm produce, a law was passed in August 1932
stipulating the death penalty, and under exceptional circumstances, a ten-year
sentence in labor camps for "theft of socialist property." Thus, it was reported
in the Soviet press (Visti, 10.11.1932) that the Dnipropetrovsk court had
sentenced a group of hungry peasants to the firing squad for the theft of a sack
An obligatory delivery system was
established for each collective farm. The harvest was organized in the form of a
military operation, with soldiers guarding grain from the peasants. Officials
and peasants who did not fulfill their quotas were treated in accordance with
the infamous August 1932 decree.
On 17 December 1932 regulations were
tightened even further. A complete economic blockade was ordered of villages
that did not fulfil their obligations to the state: all trade, all shipments of
food and consumer goods, whatever their source, were prohibited.
Officials, wrote Malcolm Muggeridge,
"had gone over the country like a swarm of locusts and taken away everything
edible; they shot and exiled thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages;
they have reduced some of the most fertile land in the whole world to a
The famine finally subsided in 1934,
when the 1933 harvest was brought in. This was because, in the spring of 1933,
Moscow "lent" Ukraine seed grain. Moscow also reduced the quantity of grain to
be delivered to the state to five million tons, about one-quarter of the 1933
Soviet officials today deny that the
famine took place, although they do admit that there were problems due to
If that was the case, then Ukraine
should have suffered a famine in 1934, not in 1932-33. The 1934 harvest was the
worst in many years - 12.3 million tons.
But there was no famine in 1934 because
Stalin reduced the amount of grain from existing stocks to feed the population.
He could have done this in 1932-33, but he did not. Instead, he deliberately
exported 1.7 million tons of grain to the West to pay for industrial equipment.
The offers of international relief
organizations to assist the starving in Ukraine were rejected by the Soviet
government on the grounds that there was no famine, hence no need to aid its
The borders of Ukraine were closely
patrolled and starving Ukrainian peasants were not allowed to cross into Russia
in search of bread.
Harry Lang, editor of the left-wing
Jewish daily Forward, published in New York, visited Ukraine in 1933 and was
told by a high-ranking state official that six million people had perished from
Other estimates range from 6.5 to 8.5
million. We will never know the exact number.
We do know that according to the 1926
Soviet population census there were 31.2 million Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.
According to the 1939 Soviet census this number had dropped by 3.1 million to
28.1 million. (There was no emigration from the Soviet Ukraine in this period.)
Over a 13-year period, according to Soviet statistics, the number of Ukrainians
had diminished by 11 per cent. The population of the U.S.S.R., on the other
hand, increased by 16 per cent and the number of Russians by 28 per cent.
When the Ukrainian peasantry was under
attack in 1932-33, Ukrainian political and cultural leaders sprang to their
defense. Ewald Ammende, a German eyewitness who analysed this question, wrote in
1936: "The widest circle of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had entered the
struggle: teachers, students, Soviet officials, all thought it was their duty to
protest against a further sucking dry of their country.... The Soviet regime was
faced by a united people, a solid front, including everyone from the highest
Soviet officials down to the poorest peasants."
Ukrainian cultural and political leaders
paid a heavy price for refusing to become unwilling agents in the extermination
of their own people.
In 1933, at the height of the famine, a
massive purge was ordered in Ukraine. As P. Postyshev, Stalin's henchman in
Ukraine, pointed out, "almost all people removed were arrested and put before
the firing squad."
The purge continued virtually
uninterrupted until 1938, claiming the lives of 80 per cent of Ukraine's
creative intelligentsia. Thousands of priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
were killed, as were that church's 35 bishops.
The desire to stamp out a Ukrainian
national consciousness was so extreme that, according to the famous Russian
composer, Dmitrii Shostakovich, several hundred blind bandurysty - itinerant
folk singers - were executed.
Hundreds of thousands of party members
were shot. The purge was so thorough that by 1938 not a single secretary of the
Council of the People's Commissars in Ukraine (the cabinet), not even a single
deputy of Ukraine's parliament, the Supreme Soviet, was left.
The purges were intended to deal a
devastating blow to the existence of Ukrainians as a nation. At the 20th Party
Congress in 1956 Khrushchev said Stalin had even considered deporting all
Ukrainians to Siberia, but "there were too many of them and there was no place
to which to deport them."
With the famine and the purges, Stalin
had come as close to destroying a nation as his unrestrained power would permit.
- Where Truth is Destiny
July 27, 2002
Morning from the Zundelsite:
The first two Parts of
this three-part ZGram on the Russian famine of 1932-33 dealt with the actual
famine. This last part deals with how it was shamefully reported in America by a
Jewish/Communist journalist, Walter Durante, who wrote for the New York Times,
as reviewed more than six decades later by the Columbia Journalism Review,
Bloopers of the Century Blunders, hoaxes, goofs, flubs, boo-boos, screw-ups,
by John Leo
Leo is a syndicated columnist and a contributing editor of U.S. News & World
Garbled accident reports are hardly the
worst reportorial sins. The worst always involve getting it wrong on purpose.
The name of Walter Duranty comes up quickly. Duranty covered the Soviet Union
for The New York Times in the Stalin era. He is perhaps the only Pulitzer winner
that The Paper of Record would fervently like to forget.
At first a critic of the Soviet Union,
Duranty soon evolved into an enthusiastic supporter and state-of-the-art
propagandist. One of his favorite comments was, "I put my money on Stalin." When
friends asked about Stalin's tactics, Duranty liked to say "You can't make an
omelet without breaking eggs." Not that he noticed many broken eggs in Russia.
When Stalin engineered massive famine in the Ukraine to help break resistance to
Soviet control, Duranty told Times readers that "any report of a famine in
Russia today is an exaggeration or malignant propaganda." In 1933, at the height
of the famine, he wrote of abundant grain, plump babies, fat calves, and
"village markets flowing with eggs, fruit, poultry, vegetables, milk, and butter
at prices far lower than in Moscow." He added that "a child can see this is not
famine but abundance."
In fact, the death toll was enormous and
Duranty knew it. He told colleagues privately it was in the range of 10 million.
British journalist Malcolm Muggeridge said Duranty was "the biggest liar of any
journalist I ever met." But the Pulitzer committee praised Duranty's reports for
their "scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and clarity." Four
errors, arguably five, in a single phrase.
Eventually, Duranty's Soviet coverage
provoked debate among his editors and readers. To its credit, the Times
editorial page challenged his accounts. But in the genteel journalistic world of
that era, his reporting was never odious enough to get him recalled or fired.
The embarrassing Pulitzer has never been withdrawn or returned.
In these scandals, editors had plenty of
time to reassess or spike bad stories. That's a luxury the profession will have
less of in the twenty-first century. In an age of high-speed journalism, the
risks are greater and the decisions had better be sharper.
Thank you, Ernst Zundel!!!
Your efforts and superbly heroic struggle for Truth has landed you in prison.
First in the "free and tolerant" USA, then in "free and tolerant" Canada and
finally in the country of your birth, "free and tolerant" Germany.... All under
the "auspices" of those who were also responsible for the Ukrainian Holocaust of
To top it all off, I found to my unpleasant surprise, that when I clicked on the
internet address you gave us in 2002 of the
Ukrainian website, UKAR, at
, that gleeful Zionist Jews have taken over that very site.... How telling
indeed what is happening all over the world and proof, at least to me, that The
Protocols are exactly what I believe them to be, a blueprint of Jewish-Zionist
World Domination in the so called New World Order!!! Will the Ukrainians
appreciate your struggle? Or will they deny you like Peter denied Jesus?
Holger, Gnostic Liberation Front.
And Here Is
What I found When I clicked www.ukar.org
A Brave and Forthright Web
Site which I had Visited many times before:
THIS WEBSITE HAS BEEN SEIZED
In letters and
website postings, the previous owner of this website claimed that he had
been targeted by a number of prominent American and Canadian Jews, who
he collectively named "The WHARRRF Group of Seven".
F. David Radler,
Moshe Ronen, and
The previous owner
of this site claimed "...the WHARRRF Group of Seven...has an interest in
suppressing - by means of the Rambam litigation in Los Angeles, and
Canadian Human Rights Commission litigation in Ottawa ...Lubomyr
reviewed the background and public activities of these seven individuals
we, the new owners of this site, state that we firmly support all known
activities of the WHARRRF-ers, and we seize this website in support of
WHARRRF's anti-Nazi and anti-hate goals.
We intend to
eventually sell this website and it's domain name to the highest bidder
in order to assist in the funding of activities which aggressively
assist in bringing to justice the many Nazi war criminals remaining in
Canada. Special attention will be given to assisting in the
investigation of accused Eastern European Nazi collaborators.
(An unfortunately necessary note to some
previous viewers of this webpage, who are likely viewing the changed
UKAR website with horror: there is no "WHARRRF Group of Seven",
there is no conspiracy to use Kosher food as "a secret Jewish tax"
and, sadly, there was a Holocaust and many of it's perpetrators are
still living throughout Canada.
And, just an FYI to
that same small group of previous viewers: prosecution and the seizure
of your assets is a small part of can be expected to happen when you
harass the wrong Jews...and, be warned, it is no longer the 1940s and
these days there are very few "right" Jews to harass.)
|(To properly set the mood
for the viewing of this webpage, you are listening to a sound file of "Hatikvah",
the national anthem of the State of Israel.)
But, unfortunately, THEY
have NO shame.
hero' reporter remembered
Gareth Jones worked for David Lloyd George
Tuesday, 2 May 2006,
A plaque has been unveiled at
Aberystwyth University in memory of a murdered Welsh journalist dubbed
an "unsung hero" of Ukraine.
Gareth Jones exposed a famine in
the former Soviet Union in 1932 that killed millions, but was later shot
by bandits in Inner Mongolia in 1935.
During his brief career, Mr
Jones, from Barry in south Wales, also reported on the rise of Germany's
Ukraine's ambassador to the UK
attended the unveiling ceremony on Tuesday.
Mr Jones graduated from
Aberystwyth University in 1926. From 1930, he acted as a foreign affairs
advisor to the then former prime minister David Lloyd George.
This led to a career as a
journalist, reporting for newspapers including The Times, the Western
Mail, Daily Express, the New York Evening Post and the Manchester
As well as visiting the Soviet
Union, he reported on President Roosevelt in the United States, on
Mussolini's rise in Italy and the troubles in Ireland.
He was also in Leipzig the day
Adolf Hitler was made Germany's Chancellor in 1933, and later flew with
the dictator to a rally in Frankfurt and interviewed Hitler's head of
propaganda, Joseph Goebbels.
But perhaps his greatest
achievement as a journalist was his expose of the famine in Ukraine, the
Caucasus and Kazakhstan in 1932/3, which is estimated to have killed
between seven and 10 million people.
The story was reported around
the world, but the journalist was later banned from ever returning to
the Soviet Union.
"Gareth Jones, largely forgotten
except by his family, is today being called by Ukrainians 'The Unsung
Hero of Ukraine'," said his niece Margaret Siriol Colley.
"Seventy years ago Gareth
returned from the Soviet Union after his third visit and on March 29
1933, in Berlin, he made his grim press report revealing the
genocide-famine in Ukraine, the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and the Volga
region, the result of Stalin's ruthless determination to carry out the
five-year plan of collectivisation and industrialisation.
Gareth Jones' niece Margaret Siriol Colley (r) unveils
"The number of deaths has never
been truly ascertained but estimated that it was between seven to 10
At the unveiling ceremony on
Tuesday, Ukrainian Ambassador Ihor Kharchanko said Mr Jones was an
"outstanding figure who should be noted".
He added: "He should be seen as
a hero for what he did and for the way he put his life on the line."
Mr Jones' links with Aberystwyth
date back to the mid-1920s. He graduated from the town's university with
a first class degree in French.
In 1929, he gained another first
class honours from Trinity College, Cambridge in French, German and
He died aged 30 in suspicious
circumstances, according to his family. He was invited to Inner Mongolia
in 1935, but was kidnapped by Chinese bandits and killed.
Mr Kharchanko was joined by
senior representatives from the Ukrainian community in the UK and Canada
at the unveiling of the plaque at the university's Old College.
Today's establishment press still
shills for tyrants
By I.J. Toby Westerman
© 2000, WorldNetDaily.com, Inc.
Walter Duranty, the New York Times
Moscow correspondent from 1921 to 1934 and winner of the Pulitzer Prize in 1932,
ranks as one of the worst and most dangerous examples of sycophantry in
His consistent whitewash of Soviet rule,
including the man-made famine of 1932-33 -- in which as many as 10 million men,
women and children died -- stands as a disgrace to journalism and all those
calling themselves journalists.
Malcolm Muggeridge, author, journalist
and one-time socialist, was one of the few who were able to get into the
famine-ravaged lands of the U.S.S.R. and report on what he saw. Later,
Muggeridge described Duranty as "the greatest liar of any journalist I have met
in 50 years of journalism."
Duranty's misrepresentation of events --
and the contemporary response to them -- has a specific and immediate bearing
upon how today's news is presented, manipulated or unreported. Unfortunately for
the public, Duranty today has many spiritual descendants whose reporting is
colored by ideology and/or self-interest.
Because of Duranty's manipulation of the news in order to placate Soviet
authorities -- especially Josef Stalin -- rather than reveal the truth, the
scope of horror wrought by the communists in the pre-war U.S.S.R. was not fully
comprehended until many years later. As a result, the public could not really
gauge what communism was capable of, and what kind of man Stalin actually was.
Duranty's activities in the Soviet Union
have been revealed in Robert Conquest's "Harvest of Sorrow," and in B.J.
Taylor's "Stalin's Apologist." Further discussion of the 1932-33 famine is found
in the appropriate chapter of "The Black Book of Communism."
Though known, Duranty's falsification of
the news has never drawn the deep-seated wrath that one might expect, despite
the fact that his "reporting" made him complicit in the extermination of
millions of people. Duranty, in effect, was an accomplice to mass murder, but
his former employer, The New York Times, has expressed something in the order of
Stalin's man-made famine of 1932-33 is arguably the largest mass killing in
human history, probably surpassing even Hitler's extermination campaigns, and
extended in territory from the Ukraine to Kazakstan in Central Asia -- nearly
2,000 miles. The barbarity was enormous, but did not provoke Duranty to action.
The "reason" behind the slaughter was
the continuing struggle between the central government in Moscow and small
farmers in various regions who resisted collectivization of the land. It was in
those areas where resistance to collectivization was the strongest that the
An additional desired result of the
famine was the destruction of Ukrainian nationalism.
The great terror-famine had nothing to
do with poor harvests or even an inadequate supply of food. Not only was there
enough food, during the 1932-33 famine, the Soviet Union actually exported
In reprisal to resistance to earlier
attempts at collectivization, Stalin ordered that certain areas meet impossible
quotas of grain and other foodstuffs. The central government took everything
edible. Men and women were shot for eating produce from their own fields. The
numbers of dead mounted as the process of extermination proceeded.
The NKVD, predecessor to the
better-known KGB, was in complete control of the regions affected. At will,
roads could be blocked, villages isolated and, of course, individuals executed
without trial or warning.
Secrecy was vital. Though diplomats of
various nations did learn of Stalin's war of extermination, there would be no
threat to carrying the plan out as long as the general public outside the Soviet
Union remained ignorant.
Publicity regarding the famine would have caused great damage to the image of
the Soviet Union, its leader Josef Stalin and attempts to spread communist
On the rare occasion that an accurate
report on the famine was published in the press, reassurances quickly appeared
countering the original report and diluting its effect. Of all those involved in
famine disinformation, Duranty, as Moscow correspondent for the prestigious New
York Times, proved one of the most useful.
In 1932 Duranty wrote that there was no
famine, nor "is there likely to be." He knew differently. In September 1933,
Duranty detailed to British diplomats how many had died and where: The North
Caucasus and Lower Volga had lost 3 million people in the past year; Ukraine
lost 4 to 5 million, and the total, Duranty stated, could be as high as 10
The truth concerning the terror-famine
was difficult to assess, but Duranty knew it.
The NKVD had taken extreme measures to
isolate and destroy as much evidence as possible of the famine. Afflicted
villages, some losing as much as 100 percent of their population, were cut off
from the rest of the world. Flags indicating an epidemic were flown and roads to
the area were cut off. Secret trains were used that left for famine areas and
then traveled to remote rail spurs. The contents were carefully guarded by the
NKVD, but not even the best efforts of the secret police could forever hide the
identity of the cargo -- the corpses of the dead piled indiscriminately for
quick, anonymous, mass burial.
An historical error
Seventy years hence, The New York Times -- the outlet styling itself as the
newspaper of record with the motto, "All the news that's fit to print" -- still
lists Duranty among its Pulitzer Prize winners, despite its former Moscow
correspondent's participation in covering up mass murder.
The media watchdog group Accuracy in
Media has sought for years to set the record straight regarding Duranty and his
reporting. A.I.M. approached both the New York Times and the Pulitzer Prize
administrator about this matter. The Times indicated that it would cooperate
with the decision of the Pulitzer Prize administrator.
In a letter now a year old, Reed Irvine,
chairman of A.I.M., contacted Seymour Topping, the present administrator and
also a former Times Moscow correspondent, requesting that he take action on the
question of Duranty's award. In the letter, Irvine pointed out that Duranty
received special favors from Stalin's government, including a car and a
mistress, designed to ensure the correspondent's cooperation.
Duranty did cooperate, and the truth
about Stalin's policy of extermination remained hidden for years. Irvine
questioned if the award would have been given to Duranty at all if the truth
regarding Soviet influence upon the reporter had come to light.
Stating that "Trust in journalists and
the media is at a low ebb," Irvine challenged the Pulitzer Prize administrator
to meet the same standard as the National Academy of Recording Arts and
Sciences. In 1992 the Academy revoked a 1989 Grammy given to a musical group
that later was found not actually to have sung its own lyrics.
A.I.M.'s Roger Aronoff confirmed in a
recent telephone conversation with WorldNet that to date no action has been
taken on Irvine's request to Seymour. Beyond a "slap on the wrist" -- an oblique
acknowledgment that the Times correspondent's Pulitzer has been challenged -- no
other action has been taken in the Duranty case.
The whole scenario just begs the question, Why not? In an era when the past
crimes of the Nazis continue justly to elicit demands for punishment and
retribution, why have the crimes of the Soviets, and the activities of those who
cooperated with them, attracted so little attention in the establishment media
-- the media of the Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times?
Could it be because not much has changed
since the days of Walter Duranty? Let's fast-forward from the '20s and '30s to
the current era.
In its Jan. 1, 1990 edition, Time
magazine's Senior Editor Strobe Talbott explained why the newsweekly had
selected as its "Man of the Decade" -- not Ronald Reagan, who had broken the
back of the Soviet Union and brought down the Berlin Wall, but Mikhail
Wrote Talbott, "A new consensus is
emerging that the Soviet threat is not what it used to be. The real point,
however, is that it never was. The doves in the Great Debate of the past 40
years were right all along."
The Soviet Union was never a threat to
the United States? Gorbachev was a great leader? This analysis by Time's senior
editor would take on tremendous significance during the Clinton administration,
just a couple of years later. ...
The preceding is an excerpt of Toby
Westerman's in-depth cover story in July's WorldNet Magazine. In the balance of
the article, Westerman shows how Time's Senior Editor Strobe Talbott left
journalism to join the Clinton administration as the president's most trusted
adviser on Russia, and how "the establishment media still engage in denial and
derision, but never acknowledge the obvious truth. In this way, they continue as
the spiritual descendants of the New York Times' correspondent Walter Duranty."
The First Holocaust
Jewish Fund Raising Campaigns
with Holocaust Claims
During and After World War One
Following The Money
This chapter sketches
the very puzzling story of where the money raised in these fund raising drives
went in Russia at least according to the published sources. We will also cover a
few important points of historical background and touch on the political
situation in the Soviet Union in the early twentieth century, a period that is
largely forgotten or misunderstood today.
The American Jewish
Joint Distribution Committee's own yearly expenditures chart shows the amounts
of money the 'Joint' says they spent from 1914 through 1934 on relief. They had
two classifications of aid: emergency or general relief which included soup
kitchens, clothing, emergency medical care and rehabilitative or reconstructive
relief which consisted largely of setting up and operating trade schools, banks,
and farms. At the end of World War One, people were generous with their
contributions, but in the early 1920s collections dropped off year by year. In
1926, as featured in the last chapter, the promoters really got creative and
were successful in boosting collections. The aid raised during the war and in
the immediate postwar period was channeled into emergency relief, which they
also called general relief. Later, most of the money was spent on
reconstruction, or rehabilitative relief. By 1926, they were spending 81% of the
money on reconstruction, and in 1927, 86% according to their own figures.
Less than 20
percent of the funds sent to Poland actually went into emergency relief in 1927
according to chairman David A. Brown. The remainder was devoted to
"constructive undertakings" such as establishing cooperative banks in
Poland, financing tradesmen and artisans, and promoting Jewish agricultural
Also in 1927, a Max Steuer who had gone to Europe to investigate the relief
programs charged that 40% of the money raised
"disappeared in the manipulations by the
bankers on the subject of exchange."
Mr. Steuer quoted
a Dr. Greenebaum, a member of the Polish Parliament, who said that until
recently, "after the money had been transmitted, the exchanges were so
manipulated on the other side that at least 40 percent of the money was consumed
before a single dollar was distributed to any person for whom it was intended."
Steuer made other charges but also made it clear that he was referring to Polish
bankers and not American bankers.
As one would
expect, Steuer received a scathing in the press for questioning the actions of
the 'Joint'. On Monday, September 12, 1927, The New York Times
"Mr. David A. Brown
cited figures which would indicate that in Poland less than 20 percent of
the funds went into emergency relief. The remainder was devoted to
'constructive' undertakings. Mr. Henry Moskowitz in a recent public
statement expresses the opinion that a study of the Joint Distribution
Committee's accounts would show that in Poland the bulk of the relief money
went into the establishment of cooperative banks and other agencies for the
purpose of financing small tradesmen and artisans. Incidentally, this may
suggest what Mr. Steuer had dimly in mind - very dimly - when he made his
startling charges, and particularly his reference to manipulation of the
exchanges. If American dollars were converted into Polish zloty for the
creation of bank capital, it is conceivable that some losses may have been
incurred through the fluctuations of the Polish exchange."
Daily News was more blunt. They editorialized that Mr. Steuer had simply
removed himself from the role of a Jewish communal leader.
The actions of the
Committee were defended by both Louis Marshall and Felix Warburg. Warburg
deplored the wide publicity and insisted that Steuer had placed an exaggerated
value on hearsay testimony and was trying his case in the newspapers. Warburg
further stated that no good purpose had been served by Steuer's statement and
that the problem had been corrected.
Speaking at the
Constructive Relief Conference in October of 1927, Felix Warburg responded that
the policy of the Joint Distribution Committee has been based on a deep seated
respect for the Jewry of the old world and that the European Jews, long before
the war, had developed many conspicuous national and international philanthropic
associations. He said that the leadership of European Jewry had never been
questioned and that it was the general policy of the 'Joint' to work within
existing Jewish organizational structures in Europe.
Warburg wasn't recorded as saying anything about the starvation statistics that
had been claimed during the fund raising campaigns of the year before. But he
did offer the opinion that 1919 and 1920 were the blackest years in modern
Jewish history. During those two years, according to Warburg:
massacres and pogroms resulted in the murder of several hundred thousand
Jews. On the other hand, it witnessed a phenomenal revival of Jewish
activity, accompanied by intense social strife, and by a renaissance of
cultural and economic theories incident to the universal movements for
national self-determination and the recognition of racial minority rights."
claimed that there had been Ukrainian pogroms in the course of which nearly
200,000 Jewish men, women and children perished by fire and sword, constituting
one of the blackest pages of history.
The public quickly
forgot about Steuer's little criticism. In 1932, Felix Warburg was selected as
second only to Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in an honor roll of the ten
leading Jews in the United States. Others in that top ten included United States
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo and Harvard law professor Felix
Frankfurter as well as New York Times publisher Adolf Ochs and Rabbi
What kind of a
person was Felix Warburg? He was described as fun loving, a person who knew how
to relate to many different types of people. While highly respected and
genuinely liked as a leader within the New York establishment, he was not an
intellectual, a doer, not a thinker. Married to an heiress while maintaining
numerous girl friends openly, he was the kind of person who is incapable of
embarrassment, possessed of a cast iron gut, and publicly credible whether or
not he was being particularly truthful. The rap on Felix was that he was the
family flyweight and not bright enough for the Hamburg bank.
In reading this next
section, it's only fair to first point out the obvious, that to most of the
general public, Felix Warburg was an extremely wealthy Republican banker. We
will assume that he didn't at first want to have anything to do with Soviet
Russia. To me, saying that Jews were attracted to communism is about as fair as
saying that Germans were attracted to National Socialism. But it is a fact that
the private charity he headed funded agricultural colonies in the Soviet Union,
claiming that millions of Jews were starving in Europe, year after year.
colonies in Russia had been tried before under czarist rule. Before the
Communist revolution, there were Chibbat Zion branches in operation all over
Russia. This socialist agricultural movement was financially supported by Baron
Edmund de Rothschild who called them "my colonies" and put in agents to
supervise them. This didn't mean that Baron Rothschild approved of the Czar any
more than Warburg was attracted to communism. It's possible that both Rothschild
and Warburg thought that they could have a positive and moderating effect on
these respective regimes by being involved in a business relationship with them.
Or they could have become involved for other reasons, such as to facilitate
emigration from Russia, or to set up temporary settlements of people who could
later be moved to Palestine.
Of course there's the
obvious humanitarian reasons. With the benefit of hindsight, any attraction to
Marxist ideology seems odd and incredible. But we must briefly mention a few of
the writers and thinkers whose works were influential during that period and
whose ideas could have motivated leaders and opinion makers from Rothschild and
Warburg on down to the lowliest commissar and GULag enforcer. They are largely
forgotten now perhaps for the good reason that their ideas have not stood the
test of time.
A Hebrew novelist
extolled readers to cease to be Jews in a theoretical religious sense and to
become Jews in their own right as a living and developing nationality. Nachman
Syrkin predicted that the Jews would redeem the world which crucified them and
that their role in human history was a uniquely chosen role, which in the future
through the agency of Zionism would usher in the socialist millennium.
Syrkin said in 1918 that the Jewish people is socialist not by necessity but
because the revolution was declared on Mt. Sinai.
A chief rabbi of Palestine, Abraham Kook, wrote that a consistent application of
all the laws of the Torah in social and economic matters would not tolerate the
capitalist system. Moses Mendelssohn, who was the founder of Jewish rationalism,
"The progress of
modern civilization has come to be regarded as a sort of 'Messiah' for the
final solution of the Jewish problem."
Dov Ber Borochov
was a leading exponent of Marxist Zionism. He wrote The National Question and
the Class Struggle in 1905, which was widely read by Jews living in Russia
at the time. Writing in the scientific, jargon ridden, lumberingly constructed
style of Marxist analysis
Borochov argued that just as the class struggle is waged for the material means
of production, there is also a national struggle waged for "spiritual"
(language, customs, mores) and territorial conditions of production. Borochov
theorized that the normally antagonistic classes within a conquered or oppressed
nationality unite in identifying with the oppressed proletariat. According to
Borochov, even upper classes of an oppressed nationality think and act like
oppressed proletariat because of the history of the whole nationality having
been oppressed. By this twisting of Marxist gibberish, Jewish nationalism was
transformed into a progressive movement of national liberation by interpolating
the class struggle into Zionism.
The New Standard
Jewish Encyclopedia explained Boroshov's theory this way:
ideological contribution was his Marxist analysis of the economic structure
and social situation of the Jewish people, pointing to the physical
inevitability of territorial concentration in Palestine as a means of
occupational redistribution and normalization."
History of Zionism first published in 1919, chronicles that during the
Communist revolution of 1917 at Odessa, a port on the black sea, entire
battalions of Zionist soldiers bore through the town behind blue and white
banners proclaiming: "Liberty in Russia, land and liberty in Palestine".
A hundred and fifty thousand men followed these banners to which the military
Governor of Odessa insisted on showing honor publicly.
In the course of the Russian civil war between the reds and the whites, the
Jewish population rallied massively to the Red Army, and its intelligentsia was
recruited into the Soviet state apparatus.
Leon Trotsky, as the head of the Red Army in 1919, accepted the proposition from
Paole Zion that Jewish "national battalions" be constituted to organize
the defense of the Jewish population and win it over to the new Bolshevik
In 1922, it was reported that a strong Jewish army organized for self-protection
was well equipped with rifles, ammunition, and machine guns and numbered 500,000
strong. In a town called Spalla, the Jewish Volunteer Army, well armed, engaged
in guerrilla warfare with a band of several hundred bandits, which ended with
the Jews entering the town. Order was established immediately and several
thousand former residents who escaped a series of massacres two or three years
before began streaming in from all parts of Russia and Rumania. The Jewish army
was founded by young Zionist groups and therefore had religious as well as
Beginning in 1924,
Jewish colonies totaling 1.5 million acres were established in the Crimea, the
Zaporozje, Cherson, and Odessa districts, in Caucasia and in White Russia. Also
in 1924, at a luncheon at Kuhn & Loeb in New York, a program was worked out to
involve the Joint Distribution Committee in some of these projects. The Joint
Distribution Committee began financing Soviet Jewish agricultural settlements in
Ukraine and the Crimea with a mixture of donated money, loaned money, and Soviet
funding. These settlements became a bizarre hybrid of Park Avenue charity and
Marxist agriculture. Some of the Jewish settlements founded by Agro-Joint were
Zionist colonies settled by people who saw the Crimea as a stepping-stone on the
road to Palestine. Thirteen of the colonies had Hebrew names. According to
statistics published in Yehuda Bauer's book, My Brother's Keeper,
which was financed with a generous grant from the Joint Distribution Committee,
there were 112 Agro-Joint colonies in the Crimea in 1928.
The Soviet government contributed 500,000 rubles for the Agro-Joint settlements
each year and placed this budget at the disposal of Agro-Joint.
The new Soviet
government considered the Jews to be a formerly oppressed nationality entitled
to their own territorial regions. In accordance with the Soviet scheme of
national autonomy, these regions were governed as autonomous Jewish districts.
Schools, Colleges, law courts, police forces and the entire machinery of
government were conducted in Yiddish. There were also traveling theaters,
publications, movies, radio and lectures. Jewish workers were recruited for new
factories all over Russia. In Asia near the Manchurian border, the New Jersey
sized territory of Biro-Bidjon was, in time, also declared a territory
exclusively for Jewish settlers. It was prestigious being Jewish in the Soviet
Union during the 1920s and the first half of the thirties and perhaps long after
that. It was a time of state protection for Russian Jews. They were assumed to
be faithful allies of Soviet Power and therefore to be trusted in promoting
policy. The Soviet government gave the Jewish theater a first class building in
the middle of Moscow and large state subsidies for its work, and its creative
figures received generous titles and medals which guaranteed them privileges and
material comforts within the Soviet system.
In the spring of
1927, Felix Warburg went to the Soviet Union, traveling from Vladivostok to
Moscow, claiming to have toured forty of the Agro-Joint colonies in the Crimea
and Ukraine. Warburg's party traveled by private railroad car and toured more
remote regions in two chauffeured limousines. Felix laid a cornerstone for a
Felix Warburg high school and visited a settlement named Felix Warburg No. 4 and
Upon his return he told a fund raising rally in Chicago:
"I wish you had been
with us on our trip through Russia. Good friends had warned us not to make
the trip, that it was dangerous, that we were going to a country where
everything would be supervised and we would get predigested food in regard
to the things we wanted to see. Nothing of the kind has happened. In no
country we visited were we as free from formalities and granted such
absolute freedom as in Russia.
[...] The work in Russia has
been a great success, not only from the sentimental standpoint but also from
the financial standpoint. It is difficult to realize that untrained Jewish
people from the cities should have been brought to these farms and in the
third year should begin seriously to pay back the loans, heavy loans, but
that is the truth. Everything given to them is noted down by them in a book.
Whenever they look at the book they know what they owe to the mutual credit
society, and they know what they owe to the Kassas and they know what they
owe to the Jews of America."
Julius Rosenwald, the
owner of Sears, was a heavy donor to the American Jewish Joint Agricultural
Corporation and a settlement was also named after him.
To the Communists it was
blood and not religion that determined Jewishness. Anti-Semitism in the Soviet
Union was prosecuted as a crime against the Jewish nationality. It was a crime
against racism. Communists supported what they called "spiritual" aspects
of the people. These spiritual aspects were myths, folkways, customs and so
forth and should not be confused with religion, which the communists opposed.
While religious Christianity, Islam, and Judaism were persecuted as religions
within the communist system, the Jewish people were favored as an historically
oppressed nationality like the Georgians or the Armenians.
In 1928, the
Central Committee of the Communist party in Moscow appointed a special committee
to combat anti-Semitism. The special committee's program provided for a
systematic campaign by trained personnel beginning within the Communist Party
and also within schools including colleges. The campaign against anti-Semitism
was introduced into the schoolbooks, motion pictures, the press, and literature.
Public debates on anti-Semitism were held and excursions to the Jewish colonies
arranged. A campaign against anti-Semitism was also conducted in the Red Army
and in the trade unions. It became a crime against the state. The highest
disciplinary penalties were provided in the program recommended by the committee
for those found guilty of anti-Semitic practices and particularly for those
opposing the Jewish colonization work.
The head of the
Moscow State Theater and seven other officials of the State Theater were
dismissed for their anti-Semitic practices.
A Moscow dispatch to The Jewish Telegraph Agency reported that four "Pogromists"
were sentenced to death and nine to prison terms of from one to ten years.
During a conference on combating anti-Semitism held in the All-Russian Communist
Club, a Moscow District Court Judge stated that disciplinary punishment had been
inflicted upon seventy persons in Moscow during the first ten months of 1928 for
The battle against
anti-Semitism became an election campaign issue in White Russia.
ignorance, alcoholism and anti-Semitism read a poster placarded in the
In a separate
report, two ringleaders found guilty of attacking the Jewish Colony No. 3 were
sentenced to death. Two other members of the band were sentenced to imprisonment
followed by deportation. The Chief of Police and his assistant received
eighteen-months jail sentences and the chairman of the regional Soviet was
sentenced to one year in prison.
press was reporting that the principal cause of anti-Semitism in industrial
centers was the influence of the "Kulaks" (wealthier peasants) upon
former peasants now working in factories. A reporter from The Jewish
Telegraphic Agency investigated and reported in a dispatch from Minsk:
non-Jewish workers interviewed by the correspondent agreed in blaming the
Kulaks for using their influence over the new factory hands for the purpose
of promoting anti-Semitic disturbances and thus making trouble for the
Soviet government. The Kulaks are especially incensed at the government's
insistence upon its plan for the eventual socialization of agriculture."
In one show trial
eight workers including three Communist party members were charged with
tormenting a Jewish working girl. In order to achieve the maximum publicity, it
was staged in the largest available hall and advertised throughout Russia. The
President of the White Russian Supreme Court presided over a bench of judges,
and the chief prosecutor of the White Russian Republic personally conducted the
case for the state. The President of the White Russian Academy of Sciences and
the dean of the Minsk faculty of Law also appeared as "prosecutors on behalf
of public opinion". Intending to serve as a warning to other offenders, the
sentences at Soviet show trials tended to be draconian. According to the
indictment, a Jewish girl was first habitually mocked and later roughly handled.
She was told she would be put in an oven and then water was thrown over her.
Then she tripped and fell on her face and finally was brutally kicked on the
ankle with a wooden clog. Such rowdyism was all too frequent with White Russian
workers during that period. Almost an exactly similar case occurred almost
simultaneously in a nearby town at another factory with a non-Jewish girl as the
victim, but no action was taken.
Why did the
Bolshevist party decide to hold a full-dress political anti-Semite 'show trial'
at the White Russian capital Minsk? A major reason given in a New York Times
report covering this trial was that the Soviet elections were about to begin
and the Communists hoped to use these elections to smash the power of the Kulaks
once and for all. In White Russia much land had recently been taken from the
Kulaks and a small part of it was utilized to form new Jewish land colonies. As
a result there had been a certain amount of terrorization of the new Jewish
colonists. The Communists then hit back with this slogan:
comes from the Kulaks."
It was also
decided to thrash out this case with the utmost publicity because such acts were
prevalent in the area and an increase could have become politically dangerous in
an atmosphere of discontent generated by a bad harvest, crushing taxation on the
villages and a shortage of goods in the towns. Even the official "Jewish
section" of the Communist party directorate in Moscow often soft-pedaled
anti-Semitism in order not to supply enemies of the Soviet regime and the
anti-Socialist Jewish press abroad with opportunities for "fantastic pogrom
defendants were accused of "counter revolution" although the alleged
facts hardly seemed to justify such a terrible charge. The Soviet Chief
Prosecutor (Krylenko) at this trial wanted the death penalty by shooting for
Class One offenders found guilty of counterrevolutionary activities and prison
for an indefinite term for Class 2 offenders. He stated:
circumstances will these criminals belonging in Class 2 be allowed to return
home. After their release from prison they will be exiled for life to remote
places out of harm's way."
The central issue
at the trial was whether the defendants were guilty of an act of a
counter-revolutionary nature (Class One). The judge sought to establish the
connection of the defendants' acts with the influence of the Kulaks, wealthy
peasants, and Nepmen. Nepmen were new economic policy men - small businessmen
who had been allowed to operate under Lenin after the famine of 1921-1922, but
were later taxed out of existence. The four major defendants were found guilty
of anti-Semitism and rough treatment of their fellow worker and received prison
In a separate show
trial four months later, 24 other Russian workers charged with anti-Semitism
received prison sentences. The trial attracted wide attention, and hundreds of
people crowded the court to hear the decision, which was issued at 5 o'clock in
the morning. At the same time during a meeting held in Moscow, Anatole
Lunatcharsky, Commissioner of Education, said he could understand those who
opposed the Soviet Government but could not see how followers of communism could
maintain the claim that "Jews govern us".
The Soviet war on
anti-Semitism coincided with the period after Lenin's death in 1924 when Joseph
Stalin was jockeying for power. He was a man who spent a lifetime portraying
himself as an internationalist and as a determined foe of anti-Semitism.
Stalin's bitterest enemy, Leon Trotsky, called Stalin a clerk, an embezzler of
ideas, timid and unintelligent, but never said anywhere that Stalin was
motivated by anti-Semitism.
Stalin, an early
editor of Pravda, had first came to public attention with the publication
of his article "Marxism and the National Question" in the Communist
theoretical journal Enlightenment one year before the start of World War
One in 1913. This article dealt with what Marxists should do after the
revolution with all of the non-Russian nationalities that had been conquered and
forcibly made a part of Russia by the Czars. Stalin argued for the creation of
locally autonomous regions (colonies, reservations) for the historically
oppressed nationality groups where their language, folkways and traditions would
be respected. In this politically charged article, Stalin wrote at length on the
Jewish nationality, describing them as not a nation but something mystical,
intangible and otherworldly. This article established Stalin as the Bolshevik
authority on the national (actually the nationalities) question. Lenin appointed
Stalin the Commissar of Nationalities Issues in the first Bolshevist government.
In April of 1922, at Lenin's insistence, Stalin was elected to the newly created
post of general secretary of the Communist party.
Less than a year
after becoming the undisputed dictator of the Soviet Union with his public
statements viewed as national policy, Stalin made his most famous statement
about anti-Semitism. Stalin characterized it as "the most dangerous survival
"National and racial
chauvinism is a remnant of man hating customs characteristic of the era of
cannibalism. Anti-Semitism is an extreme expression of racial chauvinism and
as such is the most dangerous survival of cannibalism. It is useful to the
exploiter for it serves as a lightning rod enabling capitalism to evade the
blows of the toilers.
'It is a danger to
the working people for it is a false path leading them into the jungles and
away from the right road. Communists cannot but be irreconcilable enemies of
anti-Semitism. In the Soviet Union it is rigidly prosecuted and militant
anti-Semites are punishable by death under the law."
and "lightning rod" analogies were standard communist orthodoxy. Karl
Kautsky, a principal theorist of the second Marxist International, wrote in 1903
that the czarist regime used the Jews "as a lightning conductor during the
storms that gather over the autocracy". Lenin always condemned anti-Semitism
in the clearest and most intransigent fashion. In 1918, he signed a decree
calling it a "mortal danger for the entire revolution and as a menace to the
workers and the peasants". Engels saw the struggle against anti-Semitism as
a priority task of the international workers' movement writing in
Arbeiterzeitung, the daily newspaper of the Austrian Socialists, that "we
owe much to the Jews [...] Marx was of pure Jewish blood, Lassalle was
Jewish, very many of our best comrades are Jewish".
And Karl Marx said:
"The stiffest form
of opposition between Jew and Christian is religious. How is this to be
resolved? By abolishing religion".
Marx also said
that man emancipates himself from religion politically by relegating it from
public to private law.
Stalin's supporters were dedicated, not particularly intellectual party
officials who had never been outside the Soviet Union. His group brought a
rigid, totalitarian, small mindedness to Marxist social theory.
When the theories proved to be unworkable, they became
even more dogmatic, brutal, and even murderous in their insistence on carrying
them out. Lazar Kaganovich was probably the biggest and certainly the most
durable butcher during the Stalinist era. Sometimes using the alias Kosherovitz,
he was the Soviet official most responsible for the Ukrainian famine of
1932-1933. Some have even argued that Kaganovich was the real master at the
Kremlin and Stalin a mere puppet.
The only English
language biography about this killer of over twenty million people was written
by Stuart Kahan, an American writer whose aunt Rosa was Stalin's third wife and
who is therefore also the nephew of Lazar Kaganovich, but more about that later.
Kahan worked as a journalist for the New York Times. In the 1980s, he
visited and interviewed Kaganovich who was retired and living in a Moscow
apartment. A courageous book based on interviews with family members commingled
with family history and lore, it is a fascinating and highly readable biography.
But it spares the family and treats even Lazar Kaganovich in a relatively
friendly manner, to the extent that it is ethically possible. While the only
available biography about this biggest mass killer of the twentieth century is
largely positive, it's amazing that this book exists at all.
Kahan wrote that
during the first year of the 'Great Terror' Kaganovich supervised the killing of
nearly half a million people as mass purges swept across the country like a
deranged prehistoric animal.
While he was in power, eight towns' names were changed to Kaganovich in addition
to the Moscow subway initially being named after him. He was assigned to the
Cheka (later called the OGPU, then the NKVD, and still later the KGB), an
investigative agency that became a political police force of organized terror.
Stalin assigned Kaganovich the task of keeping his second wife under
surveillance and reporting back on her activities. After she committed suicide,
Kaganovich introduced Stalin to his younger sister Rosa who was a medical doctor
at a clinic in Moscow and within a year Rosa Kaganovich became Stalin's third
and last wife.
sidekick during that period was a young Nikita Khrushchev who as a Shabes Goy in
the Ukraine lit the Sabbath lights and started the stoves for the Jewish high
politicos on Saturdays.
Khrushchev wrote in his biography that as a Russian peasant he first met
Kaganovich in 1917 and owed his early career to Kaganovich. Kaganovich was
Khrushchev's boss from 1928 to about 1938 and again from 1946 to 1948.
Kahan wrote that
Kaganovich took great pleasure in having 16 major Cossack villages removed to
Siberia because he blamed the Cossacks for persecuting Jews under the Czars.
He participated in demolishing the church of Christ the Savior in Moscow for a
new palace of Soviets. The holy week monastery was turned into a theater for use
by party members:
"People were afraid
to laugh. It was as if a huge blanket had been dropped over their mouths."
Kahan wrote of an
interesting and possible account of Stalin's death. According to Kahan, after
Stalin's first stroke Rosa (Dr. Rosa Kaganovich Stalin, Stalin's wife)
prescribed for him pills called dicoumarol, an anticoagulant also used in rat
poison. Large amounts are lethal, but taken in small amounts, dicoumarol retards
blood clotting making another stroke less likely. After his first stroke, Stalin
took dicoumarol twice a day. Later Rosa secretly quadrupled the dosage, which
eventually poisoned him. The problem with the story is that Kahan implicates
Molotov, Bulganin, and others in the inner circle as plotters in Stalin's
demise. It is not very likely that Stalin would have no friends in his own inner
circle but this theory protects Rosa and Lazar Kaganovich from total
Maybe Stalin really was killed by a Jewish doctor, namely his wife. An autopsy
might tell us for sure.
Hard to believe stories
about killer doctors have been around for a long time in the Soviet Union. An
earlier 'doctors plot' was one of the excuses for the Soviet Great Terror of the
1930s. Briefly, this earlier tale and its resultant consequences went like this:
In 1934, Bukharin, Yagoda, and other rightists in contact with Trotsky were
plotting to assassinate Stalin, Voroshilov, Kirov, Menzhinsky, Molotov,
Kuibyshev, Kaganovich, Gorky, and Zhdanov, just about the entire Soviet
leadership. They plotted to accomplish this through physicians slowly ruining
the health of these leaders. As directed by the plotters, the physicians
deliberately gave bad advice and mistreatment for illnesses especially to the
cardiovascular system. Injections and stimulants were administered in a way
calculated to surreptitiously kill the patient. In that way, Menzhinsky was
murdered and his position in the leadership was assumed by Yagoda.
When Gorky, the
internationally famous literary figure, contracted a serious case of influenza
and died, it was soon rumored that his doctor deliberately aggravated his
condition, murdering Gorky. Soon they were saying that Trotsky had ordered that
"Gorky must be physically exterminated at all costs" due to Gorky's
prestige and because he was very devoted personally to Stalin. These and similar
fictional 'crimes' were prosecuted at three trials held at the height of the
Great Terror before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in
August 1936, January 1937, and in March 1938.
At the 1936 trial, Zinoviev and Kamenev were brought from prison where they were
serving out terms on previous convictions. The prosecutors established that an
intimate relationship had developed between Leon Trotsky on the one hand and
Alfred Rosenberg and Rudolf Hess of National Socialist Germany on the other
hand. At the conclusion of the third trial in 1938, the murdering doctors and
other plotters were convicted and shot by a firing squad.
During the great
terror, from 1936 to 1938, Stalin approved a plan to summarily shoot tens of
thousands of people establishing target figures for shootings by province. There
was socialist competition between NKVD departments to find the most spies. N.I.
Ezhov, Stalin's secret police chief at the height of the Great Terror, cynically
and knowingly forced confessions from innocent people. Stalin personally signed
death sentences including a record 3,167 in one day. Eventually Ezhov was
arrested, convicted, and shot for the crime of "leftist overreaction" and
was replaced by Beria.
The old line Bolsheviks were arrested and shot in a move that may have actually
been popular with some of the lower classes because there was so much bitterness
accumulated against the misery that the revolution had caused to the Russian
Closing this chapter
with a note concerning the Soviet 'doctors plot' of the 1950s, according to
author Kahan, six of the fifteen doctors who were charged were Jewish, but the
official news of the arrest only reported nine of the fifteen names, including
all of the six Jewish names. It therefore looked to the world like most of those
arrested were Jewish, which is typical of the misconceptions that are repeated
to this day. For example, online Encarta Encyclopedia reports:
"In 1953 fifteen
doctors, most of them Jewish, were arrested and charged with murdering
important Soviet officials on orders from the Joint Distribution Committee,
a Zionist organization."
||Editorial, New York Times,
September 12, 1927.
||"Steuer Puts Blame on Polish
Bankers", New York Times, September 7, 1927.
||Editorial, New York Times,
September 12, 1927.
||"Warburg Assails Steuer's
Charges", New York Times, September 9, 1927.
||Report on the Activities of the
Joint Distribution Committee, Constructive Relief Conference, Chicago,
IL, October 22-23, 1927, p. 4.
||Ibid., pp. 9-11.
||New York Times, December
||R. Chernow, op. cit.
(note 34), p. 289.
||David J Goldberg, To the
Promised Land - A History of Zionist Thought, London/New York:
Penguin Books, 1996, p. 117.
||Enzo Traverso, The Marxists
and the Jewish Question, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1994, p. 51.
||Nahum Sokolow, History of
Zionism 1600-1918, vol. 1, London/New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1919, p. xvii.
||D. Goldberg, op. cit.
(note 146), p. 126.
||The New Standard Jewish
Encyclopedia, seventh edition, 1992.
||N. Sokolow, op. cit.
(note 148), vol. 2, p. 38.
||E. Traverso, op. cit.
(note 147), p. 7.
||Quoted by Joseph Nedava,
Trotsky and the Jews, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of
America, 1972, p. 114.
||"South Russian Jews Raise
Strong Army - Organized for Self-Protection, It is Said to Number Now
500,000 Soldiers", New York Times, December 20, 1922.
||Y. Bauer, op. cit. (note
56), p. 60.
||Ibid., p. 65.
||E. Traverso, op. cit.
(note 147), p. 155; Arkady Vaksberg, op. cit. (note 108), pp.
||R. Chernow, op. cit.
(note 34), pp. 289-304.
||"After Three Years, The
Progress of the Jewish Farm Colonies in Russia", Reports of Dr.
Joseph A. Rosen, Felix M. Warburg, and James H. Becker, Delivered at the
Constructive Relief Conference of the Joint Distribution Committee and
the United Jewish Campaign, Chicago, October 22-23, 1927.
||"Communist Body Acts",
New York Times, May 20, 1928.
||"Russian Communists War on
Anti-Semitism", New York Times, May 13, 1928.
||"Death Decreed for
Pogromists", New York Times, July 8, 1928.
Disciplined", New York Times, October 14, 1928.
||"War on Anti-Semitism
Feature in Soviet Election Campaign", New York Times, January
||"Two to Die for Pogrom",
New York Times, September 3, 1929.
||"Holds Kulaks Responsible -
Investigators Blame Wealthier Peasants for Russian Anti-Semitism",
New York Times, December 30, 1928.
||"Anti-Semite Show Trial
Opens at Minsk," New York Times, January 20, 1929.
Several Russians Get Prison Terms for Treating Girl Roughly", New
York Times, January 22, 1929.
||"Soviet Still Wars on
Anti-Semitism", New York Times, May 19, 1929.
||Albert Resis (ed.), Molotov
Remembers, Conversations with Felix Chuev, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee
Inc., 1993, p. 87.
||"Stalin Hits Anti-Semitism -
Says It is 'Most Dangerous Survival of Cannibalism'", New York
Times, January 15, 1931. This statement was made in Moscow on the
previous day to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
||E. Traverso, op. cit.
(note 147), p. 26.
||Morris Stockhammer (ed.),
Karl Marx Dictionary, New York: Philosophical Library, 1965, p. 121,
214. Both quotes are taken from Marx's Papers on the Jewish Question.
||Strobe Talbott (ed.),
Khrushchev Remembers - The Last Testament, Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co., 1974, p. 150.
||Walter Laqueur, Stalin - The
Glasnost Revelations, New York: Scribner's, 1990, p. 251.
||Stuart Kahan, The Wolf of
the Kremlin, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987, p.
||Ibid., p. 158.
||Strobe Talbott (ed.), op.
cit. (note 174), p. 544f.
||S. Kahan, op. cit. (note
176), pp. 158-165.
||Ibid., p. 178.
||Ibid., pp. 257-265.
||Albert E. Kahn, Michael Sayers,
The Great Conspiracy - The Secret War Against Soviet Russia,
Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1946, p. 262 et al.
||John Arch Getty, Roberta T.
Manning, (eds.), Stalinist Terror. New Perspectives,
Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. pp. 14, 34, 42.
||Walter Laqueur, op. cit.
(note 175), p. 273f.
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