|
Race,
Genetics and Evolution
THE
SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND OF THE NAZI
"RACE PURIFICATION" PROGRAM, US & German Eugenics, Ethnic
Cleansing,Genocide,Population Control ...
Development
of Neo-Darwinism
and the Genetic Approach to Life
A Few Thoughts on IQ and
the Wealth of Nations By
Steve Sailer
Race, genetics, and human reproductive strategies
by J. Philippe Rushton
Genetic, Social &
General Psychology Monographs,Vol. 122 02-01-1996.
Abstract
The international literature
on racial differences is reviewed, novel data are reported, and a distinct
pattern is found. People of east Asian ancestry and people of African ancestry
average at opposite ends of a continuum, with people of European ancestry
averaging intermediately, albeit with much variability within each major race.
The racial matrix emerges from measures taken of reproductive behavior, sex
hormones, twinning rate, speed of physical maturation, personality, family
stability, brain size, intelligence, law abidingness, and social organization.
An evolutionary theory of human reproduction is proposed, familiar to biologists
as the r-K scale of reproductive strategies. At one end of this scale are
r-strategies, which emphasize high reproductive rates; at the other end are
K-strategies, which emphasize high levels of parental investment. This scale is
generally used to compare the life histories of widely disparate species, but
here it is used to describe the immensely smaller variations among human races.
It is hypothesized that, again on average, Mongoloid people are more K-selected
than Caucasoids, who are more K-selected than Negroids. The r-K scale of
reproductive strategies is also mapped on to human evolution. Genetic distances
indicate that Africans emerged from the ancestral hominid line about 200,000
years ago, with an African/non-African split about 110,000 years ago, and a
Caucasoid/Mongoloid split about 41,000 years ago. Such an ordering fits with and
explains how and why the variables cluster.
DISCUSSION OF "RACE" shows little sign of diminishing, despite efforts
to debunk the concept. Downgrading the idea of race, however, not only conflicts
with people's tendency to classify and build histories according to putative
descent but also ignores the work of biologists studying other species (Mayr,
1970). In his 1758 work, Linnaeus classified four subspecies of Homo sapiens:
europaeus, afer, asiaticus, and americanus. Most subsequent classifications
recognize at least the three major subdivisions considered in this article:
Mongoloid, Caucasoid, and Negroid. This classification does not rule out making
finer distinctions within these major races.
Those objecting to the idea of race call definitions arbitrary and subjective
(Diamond, 1994; Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984; Yee, Fairchild, Weizmann,
& Wyatt, 1993). The main empirical reasons given for negating the race
concept are (a) the degree of variance within any one race, (b) the disagreement
as to exactly how many races there are, and (c) the blurring of distinctions at
category edges because of admixture. For example, with respect to
classification, Diamond (1994) surveyed half a dozen geographically variable
traits and formed very different races depending on which traits he picked.
Classifying people using anti-malaria genes, lactose tolerance, fingerprint
whorls, or skin color resulted in the Swedes of Europe being placed in the same
groupings as the Xhosa and Fulani of Africa, the Ainu of Japan, or the Italians
of Europe.
Many of Diamond's (1994) classifications, however, make no sense because they
have little, if any, predictive value beyond the initial classification. In
science, the validation of constructs such as race depends on a network of
predictive relationships, including item, subject, and sample aggregations.. As
I show in this article, the construct validity of the three major
races--Mongoloid, Caucasoid, and Negroid--has been established at the behavioral
level across both time and national boundaries. If race were simply arbitrary,
consistent relationships of the type to be presented in this article would not
be found.
A race, it should be clear, is what zoologists term a geographic variety or
subdivision of a species, characterized by a more or less distinct combination
of traits (morphological, behavioral, physiological) that are heritable.
Zoologists have identified two or more races in many mammalian species. In
humans, the three major races--Mongoloids (commonly "Asians"),
Caucasoids (commonly "Whites"), and Negroids (commonly
"Blacks")--can be distinguished on the basis of obvious differences in
skeletal morphology, hair and facial features, and molecular genetic
information. Forensic anthropologists regularly classify skeletons of decomposed
bodies by race. For example, narrow nasal passages and a short distance between
eye sockets mark a Caucasoid person, distinct cheekbones characterize a
Mongoloid person, and nasal openings shaped like an upside down heart typify a
Negroid person (Ubelaker & Scammel, 1992). In certain criminal
investigations, the race of a perpetrator can be identified from blood, semen,
and hair samples. To deny the predictive validity of race at this level is
nonsensical.
The currently accepted view of human origins, the "African Eve"
theory, posits a beginning in Africa some 200,000 years ago, an exodus through
the Middle East with an African/non-African split about 110,000 years ago, and a
Caucasoid/Mongoloid split about 41,000 years ago. Evolutionary selection
pressures in the hot savanna, where Negroids evolved, differ from pressures in
the cold Arctic, where Mongoloids evolved (Stringer & Andrews, 1988). in my
book Race, Evolution and Behavior (1995), I proposed that the farther
north the populations migrated from Africa, the more they encountered the
cognitively demanding problems of gathering and storing food, gaining shelter,
making clothes, and raising children successfully during prolonged winters. As
the original "out-of-Africa" populations evolved into present-day
Caucasoids and Mongoloids, they developed larger brains, slower rates of
maturation, and lower levels of sex hormone, and with these changes came
reductions in sexual potency, aggressiveness, and impulsivity and increases in
family stability, forward planning, self-control, rule-following, and longevity.
The prevailing social science paradigms are giving way to gene-culture
co-evolutionary perspectives. During the 1980s, there was an increased
acceptance of behavioral genetics and evolutionary theorizing. Discoveries in
medical genetics heralded what was to come with gene therapy becoming a
possibility for a variety of classic psychological disorders. A renewal of
interest in human origins also characterized the 1980s, with Africa identified
as the Garden of Eden. Eve was thought to be a long-armed, thick-boned,
well-muscled, dark-skinned woman who lived some 200,000 years ago on the East
African savanna. She appeared on the front cover of Newsweek (January 11,
1988) and served as the center of a debate on the evolution of modern humanity.
However, work on racial differences in behavior, though a necessary concomitant
of these revisionist viewpoints, was not included in them and constituted an
embarrassment. On the topic of race, a righteous conformity has come to prevail.
Most work on racial differences has focused on Blacks and Whites in the United
States, where the achievement of Whites is disproportionately higher than that
of Blacks. Ever since Jensen's (1969) monograph in the Harvard Educational
Review, a controversy has raged over whether the causes of this disparity
involve genetic as well as environmental factors (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981;
Loehlin, Lindzey, & Spuhler, 1975). Extensive surveys show that a plurality
of experts believe that Jensen was correct in attributing a portion of the
racial variation to genetic differences (Snyderman & Rothman, 1987). The
debate was widened by data available on (a) Black samples in Africa, the
Caribbean, and elsewhere (most Black people live in postcolonial Africa); (b)
Asian samples in the Pacific Rim (one third of the world's population); and (c)
characteristics in addition to mental ability, showing the same worldwide racial
ordering in brain size, personality, speed of maturation, crime rates, family
structure, and sexual behavior (see Table 1).
The central theoretical questions are as follows. First, why should Caucasoids
average so consistently between Negroids and Mongoloids on so many dimensions?
Second, why is there an inverse relationship between brain size and gamete
production across the races? It is not simply differences in cognitive ability
that require explanation. A network of evidence, such as that shown in Table 1,
allows more chance of finding powerful theories than do single dimensions drawn
from the set. Nonetheless, it must be emphasized at the outset that there are
overlaps in most distributions. Because average differences between races are
typically only between 4% and 34%, it is problematic to generalize from a group
average to a particular individual.
Maturation,
Personality, and Social Organization
In the United States, Black
babies have long been known to have a shorter gestation period than White
babies. By week 39, 51% of Black children have been born, whereas the figure for
White children is 33% (Niswander & Gordon, 1972; Polednak, 1989). Similar
results have been observed in Europe, where women of European ancestry have been
compared with women of African ancestry (Papiernik, Cohen, Richard, de Oca,
& Feingold, 1986). Papiernik et al. (1986) reviewed other observations that,
although Black babies are born earlier, they are physiologically more mature
than White babies, as measured by pulmonary function and amniotic fluid. I am
unaware of data on Asian babies.
Black precocity in physical maturation continues through life. On
well-standardized tests, scores indicate that Black babies from Africa, the
Caribbean, and the United States mature faster on measures made from birth to 12
months in coordination and head lifting, in muscular strength and turning over,
and in locomotion; at 15 to 20 months, Black babies are more advanced in the
ability to put on clothing (e.g., Bayley, 1965; Freedman, 1974; but see Warren,
1972, for a critique of the early African data). In contrast, on
well-standardized measures, Asian children are more delayed than White children.
Asian children typically do not walk until 13 months, compared with 12 months
for White children and 11 months for Black children (Freedman, 1979). Regarding
dental development, African samples begin the first phase of permanent tooth
eruption at age 5.8 years and finish at 7.6 years; Caucasoids begin at 6.1 years
and finish at 7.7 years; and Mongoloids begin at 6.1 years and finish at 7.8
years (Rushton, 1995, p. 149, with data from Eveleth & Tanner, 1990).
Behavioral life-cycle traits show a similar set of differences among the three
populations. These include age at first intercourse and age at first pregnancy,
as well as longevity. For example, at all ages, Blacks have higher mortality
rates from numerous causes than Whites in the United States, and the gap has
widened over the last 30 years (Polednak, 1989). Asians have lower mortality
rates than Whites.
With respect to personality, data show that across ages, across traits, and
across methods, Blacks are more uninhibited in temperament than Whites, and
Whites are more uninhibited than Asians. For infants and young children,
observer ratings are the main method used, whereas for adults, the use of
standardized tests is more frequent (e.g., Vernon, 1982). For example,
researchers in a study carried out in French-language Quebec examined 825 4- to
6-year-olds from 66 countries. These immigrant children were rated by 50
teachers in preschool French-language-immersion classes. The French-Canadian
teachers consistently reported (a) better social adjustment and less
hostility/aggression for the Mongoloid children than for the Caucasoid children
and (b) more social adjustment and less hostility for the Caucasoid children
than for the Negroid children (Tremblay & Baillargeon, 1984).
Rushton(1985) indexed behavioral restraint by low extraversion and high
neuroticism scores from the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, using data
collected from 25 countries around the world. Averaging across these samples,
Rushton found 8 Mongoloid samples (N = 4,044) to be less extraverted and more
neurotic than 38 Caucasoid samples (N = 19,807), who were less extraverted and
more neurotic than 4 African samples (N = 1,906).
Social organization depends on following rules. Such behavior can be indexed,
for example, by marital functioning, mental durability, and law abidingness. On
all of these measures, the rank ordering within the United States is Asian >
White > Black (Jaynes & Williams, 1989). The 1.5 million individuals of
Asian descent in the United States are very rarely perceived as a "social
problem," for they have significantly fewer divorces, out-of-wedlock
births, or incidences of child abuse than do Whites, and, in fact, they are very
seldom studied. Black family structure, however, has been studied intensively.
Since the 1965 Moynihan report documented the high rates of marital dissolution,
high frequency of female heads of families, and numerous illegitimate births,
the figures cited as evidence for the instability of the Black family have
tripled (Jaynes & Williams).
The race/crime relationship found within the United States, with Asians being
most law abiding, Africans least law abiding, and Europeans intermediate, has
been found within other multiracial countries, such as Britain, Brazil, and
Canada (Rushton, 1990). Moreover, the pattern has been found in China and the
Pacific Rim, Europe and the Middle East, and Africa and the Caribbean.. The
global nature of the pattern is shown in data analyzed from INTERPOL yearbooks,
showing that African and Caribbean countries had double the rate of violent
crime (murder, rape, and serious assault) than did European countries, which had
three times the rate of violent crime than did Asian countries (Rushton, 1990).
Hormones and
Reproductive Potency
The average woman produces one
egg every 28 days in the middle of the menstrual cycle. Some women, however,
have shorter cycles than others, and some produce two eggs in a cycle. Both
events translate into greater fecundity because of the opportunities provided
for conception. Occasionally, double ovulation results in the birth of dizygotic
(two-egg) twins. The races differ in the rate at which they double ovulate. The
frequency of dizygotic twins per 1,000 births is less than 4 for Mongoloids, 8
for Caucasoids, and 16 or greater for Negroids (Bulmer, 1970). Subsequent
reviews of twinning rates in the United States (Allen, 1988) and Japan (Imaizumi,
1992) have confirmed these data.
Gonadotropin levels differentiate the races in the predicted direction and may
underlie the difference in rates of multiple birthing. Testosterone levels may
underlie other behavior traits differentiating the races, for they have been
found to be 19% higher in a sample of Black U.S. college students than in their
White counterparts (Ross et al., 1986). In an older group of U.S.. military
veterans, Blacks measured 3% higher in testosterone level than Whites (Ellis
& Nyborg, 1992). Another study, of testosterone metabolites, showed a 10% to
15% higher incidence in Black Americans than in White Americans and a still
lower incidence in the Japanese in Japan (Hixson, 1992).
Rushton and Bogaert (1987) reviewed the literature on frequency of sexual
intercourse. For example, Hofmann (1984) examined worldwide premarital coitus
rates among young people in high school and found that African adolescents were
more sexually active than Europeans, who were more sexually active than Asians.
The same pattern has emerged from surveys carried out within the United States,
where this pattern also holds for sexual activity after marriage. For example,
Rushton and Bogaert (1987) averaged data from a representative cross-cultural
review by Ford and Beach (1951) and found that Oceanic and American Indian
peoples' self-reported rates of sexual intercourse per week ranged from 1 to 4,
U.S. Whites' ranged from 2 to 4, and Africans' ranged from 3 to 10. Subsequent
surveys support these data. For married couples in their 20s, the average
frequency of intercourse per week for the Japanese and Chinese in Asia is 2.5 (Asayama,
1975; Bo & Wenxiu, 1992, Table 7), whereas for American Whites it is 4, and
for American Blacks, 5 (Fisher, 1980).
Racial differences also appear on measures of sexual permissiveness, amount of
thinking about sex, and sex guilt. Abramson and Imari-Marquez (1982) observed
that each of three generations of Japanese Americans showed more sex guilt than
matched Caucasian Americans. In studies carried out in Britain and Japan, using
a sex fantasy questionnaire, Iwawaki and Wilson (1983) found that British men
reported twice as many fantasies as Japanese men, and British women admitted to
four times as much sex fantasy as Japanese women did. By contrast, Blacks
reported not only having had intercourse with more casual partners but also with
fewer feelings of distaste than did Whites.
Rushton and Bogaert (1987, 1988) examined updated data from the Kinsey Institute
for Sex Research (Gebhard & Johnson, 1979) that eliminated sources with
known sexual bias, such as prostitutes. Black/White differences were compared on
41 variables. For men and women, college-educated Whites were found to be most
sexually restrained, college-educated Blacks least, and non-college-educated
Whites intermediate. This pattern was found for early onset of premarital,
marital, and extramarital sexual experience; number of sexual partners; and
frequency of intercourse. For women, the races were also differentiated on speed
of onset and incidence of pregnancy, short duration of the menstrual cycle, and
number of orgasms per act of coitus (see Table 2).
Cognitive
Abilities
The literature on the global
distribution of intelligence test scores was reviewed by Lynn (1991). Mongoloid
populations, measured in North America and the Pacific Rim, had average IQs in
the 101 to 111 range. Caucasoid populations in North America, Europe, and
Australasia had average IQs ranging from 85 to 115, with an overall mean of
about 100. Negroid populations living south of the Sahara, in North America, in
the Caribbean, and in Britain had average IQs in the 70 to 90 range. Lynn's
(1991) estimate of 70 for the IQ of African Blacks has been confirmed in two
subsequent studies. In one study, the Wechsler Test was administered to a
representative sample of children in Zimbabwe (Zindi, 1994), and in the other
study, researchers examined Ethiopian immigrants to Israel (Lynn, 1994). In both
studies, the IQs of the Africans were found to be just under 70.
Questions remain about the validity of using tests for racial comparisons.
However, because the tests show similar patterns of internal item consistency
and predictive validity for all groups, and the same differences are found on
relatively culture-free tests, many psychometricians think that the test scores
are valid measures of racial differences (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994;
Snyderman & Rothman, 1987). Also, novel data about speed of decision making
(reaction time) show the same racial pattern as do test scores. Investigations
have been done with 9- to 12-year-olds from six countries. In these studies, the
children had to decide which of several lights was on or stood out from others,
and then they had to move a hand to press a button. All children can perform the
tasks in less than one second, but children with higher IQ scores perform these
elementary tasks faster than do those with lower scores. Lynn (1991) found that
representative Asian schoolchildren from Hong Kong and Japan were faster in
reaction time than were similar White children from Britain and Ireland, who, in
turn, were faster than were similar Black children from South Africa (see also
Lynn & Shigehisa, 1991). Using the same decision-time tasks, as well as
those involving retrieval of well-learned facts from long-term memory,
researchers also found this same three-way pattern of racial differences in
California samples (Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Whang, 1993, 1994).
Brain Size
A small but robust relation has
been firmly established between cognitive ability measured by both educational
attainment and IQ tests and brain size. The correlation between test scores and
brain size (estimated from magnetic resonance imaging [MRI], which, in effect,
constructs a three-dimensional picture of the brain in vivo), averages at about
.40 (Andreasen et al., 1993; Egan et al., 1994; Raz et al., 1993; Wickett,
Vernon, & Lee, 1994; Wilierman, Schultz, Rut-ledge, & Bigler, 1991). The
MRI measure of brain size, more accurate than previous methods used, results in
a substantial increment over correlations of about .20 between head perimeter
and measures of intelligence, reported since the turn of the century (Broman,
Nichols, Shaughnessy, & Kennedy, 1987; Galton, 1888; Wickett et al., 1994).
The head perimeter/IQ relation has been found within samples of Asians as well
as Whites (Rushton, 1992b). Jensen and Johnson (1994) found that head size is
significantly correlated with IQ within families (i.e., among same-sex full
siblings, with age partialed out), thus indicating a functional relation between
brain size and IQ.
Although racial differences in brain size were widely believed to exist by
researchers in the 19th and early 20th centuries, more recent researchers
suggested that differences disappear when corrections are made for body size and
other variables (Gould, 1981). Modern studies (described below), however, have
confirmed the earlier findings. Three main procedures have been used: weighing
wet brains after death, filling empty skulls with lead shot and then measuring
the volume of filler, and converting external head sizes into cranial volume.
Data from all three sources converge on the conclusion that, after statistical
corrections are made for body size, Mongoloids average about 17 cm3 (1 cubic
inch) more than Caucasoids, who average about 80 cm3 (5 cubic inches) more than
Negroids.
For brain weight at autopsy, Ho, Roessmann, Straumfjord, and Monroe (1980a,
1980b) provided original data for 1,261 adults 25 to 80 years old from
Cleveland, Ohio. Ho et al. excluded those brains that were obviously damaged,
and they measured all brains using well-standardized procedures. Sex-combined
differences were found between 811 Whites (1,323 g, SD = 146) and 450 Blacks
(1,223 g, SD = 144). These sex-combined differences remained significant after
controlling for age, stature, weight, and body surface area. In the introduction
to their article, Ho et al. (1980a) briefly reviewed studies from Japan and
Korea, which Rushton(1988) averaged to find a sex-combined brain weight of 1,351
g, higher than that of Caucasoids.
For endocranial volume, an international database of up to 20,000 skulls for 122
ethnic groups was computerized and classified by climate and region by Beals,
Smith, and Dodd (1984). A 2.5-cm3 increase in brain volume was found with each
degree of latitude. Geographic differences emerged. Table 2 in Beals et al.
(1984, p. 306) contains data that show that sex-combined cranial capacity from
26 Asian populations averaged 1,380 cm3 (SD = 83), from 10 European groups =
1,362 cm3 (SD = 35), and from 10 African groups = 1,276 cm3 (SD = 84). When
Beals et al. (1984, Table 5) identified continental areas in relation to the
presence or absence of winter frost, the geographic differences became even more
pronounced (19 Asian groups = 1,415 cm3, SD = 51, 10 European groups = 1,362
cm3, SD = 35; 9 African groups = 1,268 cm3, SD = 85)..
As to external head measurements, several studies have been conducted, and
evidence has been found (including measurements from a data set compiled by
Herskovits, 1930) of a Mongoloid advantage, which is often cited as showing an
absence of racial differences. Yet the data actually show (Rushton, 1993) that
for 5 male Mongoloid samples, average external head measurement equals 1,451 cm3
(SD = 22); for 9 Caucasoid samples it is 1,421 cm3 (SD = 49); and for 12 Negroid
samples it is 1,295 cm3 (SD = 44). In another study, Rushton(1991) calculated
cranial capacities for 24 (male only) international military samples collated by
the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. After adjusting for
stature, weight, and body surface area, Rushtonfound that cranial capacities of
Mongoloids averaged 1,460 cm3 and of Caucasoids 1,446 cm3. For a stratified
random sample of 6,325 U.S. Army personnel measured in 1988 for fitting helmets,
Rushton (1992a) found that, after adjusting for stature, weight, sex, and rank,
543 Asian Americans averaged 1,416 cm3 (SD = 104), 2,871 European Americans
averaged 1,380 cm3 (SD = 92), and 1,387 African Americans averaged 1,359 cm3 (SD
= 95). Finally, Rushton(1994) examined 40 samples compiled in 1990 by the
International Labour Office in Geneva from tens of thousands of men and women 25
to 45 years old. After adjusting for the effects of stature and sex, 6 east
Asian groups = 1,308 cm3 (SD = 37), 18 European groups = 1,297 cm3 (SD = 38),
and 4 African groups = 1,241 cm3 (SD = 38).
After converting adult sex-combined brain weight data from grams to the
equivalent in cm3 (1 cm3 = 1.036 g) and averaging across all the studies,
Rush-ton (1995) found that, in brain size, Mongoloids = 1,364 cm[sup 3],
Caucasoids = 1,347 cm3, and Negroids = 1,267 cm3. Differences due to method of
estimation within a race are smaller than differences between the races.
Overall, Rushton(1995) calculated a world average brain size of 1,326 cm3; Beals
et al. (1984) calculated it at 1,349 cm[sup 3].
Racial differences in brain size and IQ are revealed early in life. Data
collapsed across social class from the National Collaborative Perinatal Project
show that, of the sample studied, the 19,000 Black infants had smaller head
perimeters at birth, were shorter in stature, were lighter in weight, and had an
earlier age of gestation than the 17,000 White infants (Broman et al., 1987). By
7 years of age, catch-up growth favored the Black children in body size but not
in head perimeter. Head perimeter at birth correlated with IQ at age 7 years
from .10 to .20 for both the Black and the White children.
Additional analyses show that Black/White differences in brain size are
correlated with Black/White differences in mental ability. In a sample of
adolescents, Jensen (1994) found that the greater the differences between White
and Black children on 17 cognitive tests, the higher were the correlations of
the test scores with head size, r = .533, p < .05; with unreliability of
measurement controlled, r = 0.715, p < .01. In a study of 14,000 4- and
7-year-olds, the White and Black samples differed by about I standard deviation
in IQ, and they differed significantly (p < .001) in head size (White >
Black), even with age, height, and weight statistically controlled (Jensen &
Johnson, 1994). It is noteworthy that there was no difference in average head
size between White and Black children who were matched on IQ scores (and on age,
height, and weight).
Heritability
of Racial Differences
Theories of racial differences
based on 100% cultural transmission have formidable problems accounting for the
physiological traits such as speed of dental and physical maturation, brain
size, gamete production, and testosterone production as well as the data on
within-race heritability and the consistency of the racial rankings across time
and cultures. Direct evidence for between-group heritabilities also exists. For
example, the racial differences in multiple birthing are independently heritable
through the race of the mother and not through the race of the father, as found
in Mongoloid-Caucasoid crosses in Hawaii and Caucasoid-Negroid crosses in Brazil
(Bulmer, 1970).
Because higher heritabilities are stronger indicators of underlying genetic
substrates than lower heritabilities (which by definition imply environmental
influence), the heritabilities can themselves be used to test theories. If genes
are important, then racial differences should be most pronounced on tests with
high heritabilities. Jensen (1973, chapter 4) found that Blacks and Whites were
indeed most differentiated on genetically influenced tests and least
differentiated on environmentally influenced tests. In one study of 543 pairs of
siblings, Jensen (1973) found a .67 correlation between the heritability of 13
tests and the magnitude of the Black/White difference. Subsequently, Black/White
differences were found to be most pronounced on more g-loaded tests, that is,
the general factor common to diverse cognitive tests (Jensen, 1985). The g
loadings, the purest measures of cognitive ability, are related to a number of
biological variables, including brain-evoked potentials, heritability
coefficients determined from twin studies, and the degree to which children's
test scores are depressed by inbreeding and raised by out breeding (Jensen,
1987).
Building on Jensen's work, Rushton(1989) carried out a study using as genetic
weights the amount of inbreeding depression found on 11 tests from the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children. Inbreeding depression occurs when harmful
recessive genes combine, an event more likely in offspring of closely related
parents. Estimates of inbreeding depression had been calculated from 1,854
cousin marriages in Japan by Schull and Neel (1965) and shown to be related to
the g factor by Jensen (1983). As the g loadings (data from Jensen, 1985) and
in-breeding depression scores (data from Rushton, 1989) increase, the magnitude
of the Black/White difference in scores on the same 11 Wechsler tests becomes
larger (see Figure l). The inbreeding prediction was sufficiently strong to
overcome generalization from the Japanese in Japan to Blacks and Whites in the
United States and so constituted a conservative test of the genetic hypothesis.
There really is no explanation for the inbreeding effect and its ability to
predict Black/White differences in scores on IQ tests other than a genetic one.
Transracial adoption studies also reveal genetic influence. There have been at
least three studies of Korean and Vietnamese children adopted into White
American and White Belgian homes (Clark & Hanisee, 1982; Frydman & Lynn,
1989; Winick, Meyer, & Harris, 1975). As babies, many of these children had
been hospitalized for malnutrition. Nonetheless, they excelled in academic
ability with IQs 10 or more points higher than national norms. In contrast,
Weinberg, Scarr, and Waldman (1992) found that at age 17, Black and mixed-race
children adopted into White middle-class families performed at a lower level
than the White siblings with whom they were raised. Adopted White children bad
an average IQ of 106, an aptitude based on national norms at the 59th
percentile, and a class rank at the 54th percentile; mixed-race children had an
average IQ of 99, an aptitude at the 53rd percentile, and a class rank at the
40th percentile; and Black children had an average IQ of 89, an aptitude at the
42nd percentile, and a class rank at the 36th percentile..
Moderate to high heritabilities are well established for numerous traits from
adoption, twin, and family studies. Noteworthy are the 80% heritabilities for IQ
test scores found in adult twins reared apart (Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal,
& Tellegen, 1990). Inherited genetic influence on mental ability has also
been found among non-Whites, including African Americans, Chinese Americans, and
the Japanese in Japan. Additional genetic research has built a strong case for
heritable factors in personality, psychopathology, violent crime, and other
social variables (Plomin, Owen, & McGuffin, 1994). Standard inductive
reasoning requires that these high within-group heritabilities be generalized to
the differences between groups in the same way that environmental factors are.
If poor nutrition has an effect within Whites and Blacks, then it is likely to
have an effect between Whites and Blacks. As we have seen, the evidence
indicates that genetic effects also operate on the between-group differences.
Life-History
Theory
The explanation proposed for
the pattern of international evidence summarized in Table 1 lies in primate
life-history theory. A life-history is a genetically organized suite of
characters that evolved in a coordinated manner so as to allocate energy to
survival, growth, and reproduction. One influential life-history theory is that
of r-K selection, proposed by E. O. Wilson (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967; Pianka,
1970; Wilson, 1975). At one extreme are r-strategies, emphasizing gamete
production, mating behavior, and high reproductive rates, and at the other
extreme are K-strategies, emphasizing high levels of parental care, resource
acquisition, kin provisioning, and social complexity. As Johanson and Edey
(1981, p. 326) succinctly summarized: "More brains, fewer eggs, more
'K'." Table 3 contains a summary of the traits thought to covary with r-K
reproductive strategics. Each individual, subspecies, and species has evolved a
characteristic life cycle adapted to the particular ecological problems
encountered by its ancestors (Wilson, 1975).
Species are, of course, only relatively r and K. Thus rabbits are K-strategists
compared with fish but r-strategists compared with primates. Primates are all
relatively K-strategists, and humans may be the most K of all. The life phases
and gestation times of primates display a natural scale of prolongation ranging
from lemur, to macaque, to gibbon, to chimp, to early humans, to modem humans
with a consistent trend toward K (Lovejoy, 1981; Schultz, 1960). Note the
proportionality of the indicated phases in Figure 2. With each step in the
natural scale, populations devote a greater proportion of their reproductive
energy to subadult care, with increased investment in the survival of offspring.
The postreproductive phase of life is restricted to humans.
Dental development (which I related to racial differences earlier in this
article) is a maturation variable that accurately reflects primate
life-histories. Smith (1989) correlated the age at eruption of first molar with
life-history factors. First molars are the earliest permanent teeth to erupt in
primates and are stable in many aspects of their growth. Smith found that,
across 21 primate species, age at eruption of first molar correlated .89, .85,
..93, .82, .86, and .85 with the body weight, length of gestation, age at
weaning, birth interval, sexual maturity, and life span. The highest correlation
was .98 with brain size. She interpreted her data in terms of the r-K
life-history model.
Brain size is the key factor acting as the biological constant determining the
rank order of many cross-species variables, including the number of individuals
comprising the group cohesively maintained through time (Dunbar, 1992), speed of
maturation, degree of infant dependency, and longevity (Harvey & Krebs,
1990; Holman, 1993). The hominid brain has tripled in size over the last 4
million years. Australopithecenes' brain averaged about 500 cm3, the size of a
chimpanzee's. Homo habilis' brain averaged about 800 cm3, Homo erectus' brain
about 1,000 cm3, and modern Homo sapiens' brain about 1,350 cm3. If the en-cephalization
quotient, the expected brain ratio given a certain body size, is plotted over
the same evolutionary time frame, the increase is proportionately less, although
still substantial. On the most recent calculations, the figures go from 2.4 to
5.8 (McHenry, 1992).
Metabolically the brain is an expensive organ. Representing only 2% of body
mass, the brain uses about 5% of the body's basal metabolic rate in rats, cats,
and dogs, about 10% in rhesus monkeys and other primates, and about 20% in human
beings (Armstrong, 1990). Across primates, large brains are also expensive in
life-history tradeoffs, requiring a more stable environment, a longer gestation,
a slower rate of maturation, a higher offspring survival rate, a lower
reproductive output, and a longer life (Harvey & Krebs, 1990). Unless large
brains substantially contributed to fitness, therefore, they would not have
evolved.
A comparison of the pattern of racial differences summarized in Table I with the
attributes listed in Table 3 suggests that Mongoloids are more K-selected than
Caucasoids, who in turn are more K-selected than Negroids.
Out of
Africa
Knowledge about racial
differences in reproductive strategies may help in choosing between alternative
theories of racial origins. Africa, as Darwin surmised, is "the cradle of
mankind," with Australopithecus, Homo habilis, and Homo erectus all making
their first appearance there. However, two very different theories are currently
competing to explain how racial differences evolved during the final stages of
hominid evolution. These are the single-origin and the multiregion-origin
theories (see Figure 3).
Both models assume that, between 1 million and 2 million years ago, Homo erectus
emerged out of Africa to populate Eurasia. The models are divided on whether the
descendants of these erectus populations (the Neanderthals in Europe, Beijing
Man in China, and Java Man in Indonesia) gave rise to modern ancestors, or
whether the erectus groups were evolutionary dead ends supplanted by a wave of
anatomically modern people arising in Africa less than 200,000 years ago.
The single-origin, or "African Eve," theory proposes that fully modern
human beings emerged recently, about 200,000 years ago, from a primeval African
population. After a dispersal event in the Middle East about 100,000 years ago,
they migrated into all corners of the world. In the process, specific racial
features developed, and existing Neanderthal and Homo erectus populations were
replaced. A strong version of this theory holds that no genetic mixture took
place between the modern and the older populations, and that after the
African/non-African split about 100,000 years ago, a Caucasoid/Mongoloid split
occurred about 40,000 years ago (Nei & Roychoudhury, 1993; Stringer &
Andrews, 1988).
The multiregion-origin theory holds that, over a 1-million-year period, modem
races evolved in parallel in Africa, Europe, and Asia through intermediate
stages from Homo erectus. Thus, Europeans evolved from Neanderthals, Chinese
from Beijing Man, and Australian Aborigines from Java Man. Unique morphological
features are seen to persist from the archaic populations to modem ones,
including (a) the prominent noses of modern Europeans and those of Neanderthals
(200,000 to 35,000 years ago), (b) the flat faces and shovel shaped incisor
teeth of modern Chinese and those of Beijing Man and the Zhoukoudian fossils
(500,000 to 200,000 years ago), and (c) the continuous brow ridge of modern
aboriginal Australians and those of Java Man and the Ngandong fossils (700,000
to 100,000 years ago). Necessary to this view, much gene transfer must have
occurred among the various groups to keep them evolving in concert (indicated by
arrows in Figure 3).
Although it is not crucial for the r-K thesis which of the two (or other)
approaches turns out to be correct, the single-origin model provides a more
parsimonious explanation for why Caucasoids average so consistently between
Mongoloids and Negroids. The racial-geographic succession fits with and explains
how and why the variables cluster. No consistent pattern of character appearance
is expected from multiregional models based on long periods of separation with
unknown amounts of gene flow. Because of the closeness of the separation times,
the single-origin model also explains why heritabilities are predictive across
races.
A multiregional model was once proposed to explain racial differences. Coon
(1962) postulated a separate but parallel evolution for several subspecies of
Homo erectus occurring simultaneously in various regions of the world over about
I million years. He proposed that each of these subspecies crossed the critical
threshold to sapient status at different times. To account for observed
differences in cranial capacities (see also Coon, 1982), he suggested that
African populations "lagged behind" the other races. His theory has
been rejected by other multiregionalists, who now hypothesize much gene flow
between the subspecies to keep them evolving in parallel (Frayer, Wolpoff,
Thorne, Smith, & Pope, 1993). In fact, both the behavioral-genetic and
molecular-genetic data suggest that substantially more relatedness exists among
human populations than is likely from either Coon's (1962) model or from the
modern alternatives. The generalizability of the heritabilities (e.g., Figure 1)
shows that the variegated cognitive structures of the populations are extremely
similar.
Challenges
and Rejoinders
Some critics have charged that
the data I have presented on racial group differences (Table 1) were
misleadingly selected and, by implication, that if a more representative
sampling of the literature had been carried out, the null hypothesis would have
been supported (e.g., Cain & Vanderwolf, 1990; Fairchild, 1991). However, if
the racial differences were truly randomly distributed around a mean of zero
difference, then these critics should have been able to point to just as much
evidence occurring in the opposite pattern. This they have been unable to do.
The principle of aggregation, a major methodological point, must be kept firmly
in mind when discussing racial differences. This principle states that the sum
of a set of multiple measurements is a more stable and unbiased estimator than
any single measurement from the set. One reason for this principle is that there
is always error associated with measurement, and combining several measurements
allows the errors to average out, thereby providing a more accurate picture of
relationships in. the population (Rushton, Brainerd, & Pressley, 1983).
Critics can always deconstruct a data set to identify particular elements not
conforming to the general pattern and then conclude that the general pattern
does not exist. This logical fallacy is akin to finding that some women are
taller than some men and so denying that men are, on average, taller than women.
I have applied the aggregation technique to several published data sets
purporting to show racial rank orders contrary to those depicted by me (Rushton,
1995). With respect to brain size, Zuckerman and Brody (1988) showed that one
sample of Black Americans had a larger cranial capacity than one sample of
Nordic Swedes; Cain and Vanderwolf (1990) showed that one 1986 Negroid series
had a larger cranial capacity than one 1923 Caucasoid series; and Groves (1991)
showed that one sample of African Xhosa had the second largest cranial capacity
of 61 different populations. However, when these data sets were aggregated, I
found each time that the Mongoloid-Caucasoid-Negroid average ordering held. For
example, using the cranial capacity data given by Groves (1991), the
sex-combined averages for Mongoloids, Caucasoids, and Negroids are,
respectively, 1406, 1385, and 1331 cm3.
For crime figures, it can be shown that on some self-report measures the racial
differences become minimal or even nonexistent. But when the frequency of
offending or more serious offending is taken into consideration, the expected
racial differences re-emerge (e.g., Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). Crime
differences are also shown to vary enormously from offense to offense, from
geographic area to geographic area, and from decade to decade (Roberts &
Gabor, 1990), but again, when the figures are aggregated, the typical racial
differences emerge. Critics are unable to explain why aggregation results in
predictable patterns.
Another error that critics make is to focus on highly salient minor points and
so obscure the larger picture. Thus, concerning reproductive behavior, Weizmann,
Wiener, Wiesenthal, and Ziegler, (1990, p. 8; 1991) ridiculed references to the
ethnographic record (e.g., French Army Surgeon, 1898/1972), calling it "anthroporn"
because it contained "a recipe for do-it-yourself penis enlargement
employing an eggplant and hot peppers." They thereby sidestepped my global
review of sexual behavior and AIDS.
Although extreme environmentalists used to suggest that within-race
heritabilities might be set at zero (e.g., Kamin, 1974), this position is no
longer credible. Instead, it is now argued that because genetic by environment
interactions are so ubiquitous, it is impossible to disentangle causality and
apportion variance (e.g., Lerner, 1992). Bouchard (1984) replied to this general
point by referring to the Minnesota study of monozygotic twins reared apart.
Bouchard asked: If context and interaction effects are so important, how can it
be that siblings raised apart grow to be significantly similar to each other,
with their degree of similarity being predicted by the number of genes they
share? The presence of genetically based stabilizing systems that drive
development into common channels is clearly implicated.
One critique of my application of r-K theory to human populations is that I get
wrong the climatic conditions most likely to produce K-selection (Anderson,
1991; Weizmann et al., 1990, 1991). Some have followed Barash (1982) and assumed
that K-selection is greatest in the tropics, where Negroids evolved, and
r-selection greatest in temperate and Arctic conditions. This premise, however,
is incorrect. Predictability is the ecological necessity for K-selection, and
this can occur in either a stable environment or a predictably variable one like
the Arctic (Rushton & Ankney, 1993). What has apparently been misunderstood
is that sub-tropical savannas, because of sudden droughts and devastating viral,
bacterial, and parasitic diseases, are especially less predictable for
long-lived species than are temperate and Arctic environments. Although the
Arctic climate varies greatly over 1 year, it is highly predictable, though
harsh, over time (Calvin, 1991).
Many researchers hold that environmental explanations are sufficient to explain
racial difference. In the 1950s, a toilet-training variant of Freud's theory
held that African children, not trained to control their bowels until a
considerably later age than European children, developed an extraverted culture
with values of sensual self-expression and a relaxed heterosexual attitude to
sex. At the other end of the scale were Asians, who were toilet trained at a
very early age and thereby became puritanically self-disciplined. From the 1960s
through the 1980s, social learning theory dominated. This approach emphasized
the importance of role models and incentives through the family, the mass media,
and the educational system.
Most recently, an "environmental" r-K theory has been espoused (see
Figure 4). Belsky, Steinberg, and Draper (1991, p. 647) succinctly described two
diverging pathways: One is characterized, in childhood, by a stressful rearing
environment and the development of insecure attachments to parents and
subsequent behavior problems; in adolescence, by early pubertal development and
precocious sexuality; and in adulthood, by unstable pair bonds and limited
investment in child rearing; the other is characterized by a stable and secure
childhood and longer lasting marital bonds in adulthood.
Several longitudinal studies have confirmed this expected pattern of covariation
(see Chisholm, 1993). These environmental variables add important perspective to
my genetic polymorphism viewpoint. Some theorists have gone further, however,
and insisted that the racial pattern can be explained entirely from a
life-history perspective "without necessitating any underlying genetic
variability" (Mealey, 1990, p. 387). However, there is no environmental
factor known to cause an inverse relation between brain size and gamete
production or to produce covariation across so multifarious a set of variables.
Postulating some genetic variance is indispensable to explaining the consistency
of the racial ordering. A mixed 50% evolutionary and 50% environmental model
fits the data better than either the 100% environmental or the 100% genetic
alternatives.
Discussion
The r-K theory of racial group
differences may help to explain other individual and group differences,
including those of social class, law-abidingness, health, and longevity. One
advantage of an evolutionary perspective is the focus it brings to underlying
physiology. A person's position on the r-K dimension might be set by a hormonal
switch mechanism. Reproductive strategies need to be coherent and harmonized,
not with some traits going to one pole and other traits going to the opposite
pole. Because hormones go everywhere in the body, they are uniquely able to
exert more or less simultaneous effects and coordinate widespread development
and functioning.
One simple switch mechanism to account for a person's position on the r-K
dimension is level of testosterone. A model based on one proposed by Nyborg
(1994) is shown in Figure 5. At the beginning of the inverted U-shaped curve,
the men with the most testosterone (T5) would be farthest from the zenith of K,
with intermediately androgenized men (T3) closer and men with the least
testosterone (T1) closest. With increasing degrees of estrogenization (E1 to
E5), women move away from optimum. Such a model can accommodate both genetic and
environmental effects. The initial setting is genetically based with
environmental factors then modifying and fine-tuning the system. In this model,
Mongoloids are T2/E2, Caucasoids are T3/E3, and Negroids are T4/E4.
Finally, r-K theory may help to explain the "fertility paradox."
Fisher (1958) asked why civilizations have declined. He showed that ruling
groups fail to reproduce themselves because of low fertility, and he
hypothesized a trade-off between the capacity for economic success and
fertility. According to r-K theory, this trade-off may be even more profound
than Fisher realized, being related to a whole complex of characteristics partly
genetic in origin. When there are abundant resources, selection pressures are
off, and natural selection favors r-genotypes so that that segment of the
population expands. Eventually, a saturation point is reached and, following
Malthus, the population crashes. With selection pressures back on, K-genotypes
are again favored. These cycles occur with rodents (Krebs, Gaines, Keller,
Myers, & Tamarin, 1973), and a direct parallel is suggested with human
beings. Thus, the r-K dimension may apply not only to demographic trends but,
ultimately, to the very sweep of history.
In conclusion, it is time to end the relative neglect of theorizing about racial
differences in behavior. International data show a distinct pattern. Asians and
Africans average at opposite ends of a continuum that ranges over 60 anatomical
and social variables, including brain size and testosterone. with Europeans
intermediate. The pattern can be explained adequately only from a gene-based
evolutionary perspective. If all people were treated the same, most racial
differences would not disappear. This does not mean that environmental factors
are unimportant for individual development. But, to deny or obfuscate the
reality of a genetic basis for racial differences, as so many critics of the
race concept have done, does not change reality.
This research was supported by grants from The Pioneer Fund and draws on my book
Race, Evolution and Behavior (1995). I am grateful to C. D. Ankney, D. N.
Jackson, R. Lynn, and A. R. Jensen for valuable comments.
TABLE 1
Relative Ranking of Races on Diverse Variables
TABLE 2
Analysis of Kinsey Data on Race and Socioeconomic Status Differences in Sexual
Behavior
TABLE 3
Some Life-History Differences Between r and K Strategists
[Note: see original text for graphs and diagrams]
GRAPHS: FIGURE 1. Regression of Black/White differences on g loadings (Panel A)
and on inbreeding depression scores (Panel B). The numbers indicate subtests
from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised: 1 coding, 2
arithmetic, 3 picture completion, 4 mazes, 5 picture arrangement, 6
similarities, 7 comprehension, 8 object assembly, 9 vocabulary, 10 information,
11 block design. From Race, Evolution and Behavior (p. 188), by J.P.
Rushton, 1995, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Copyright 1995 by Transaction
Publishers. Reprinted by permission.
GRAPH: FIGURE 2. Progressive prolongation of life phases and gestation in
primates.
DIAGRAM: FIGURE 3. Alternative models for the evolution of the human races:
Multiregional and single origin.
DIAGRAM: FIGURE 4. Developmental pathways of divergent reproductive strategies.
From Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper (1991, p. 651, Figure 1). Copyright 1991 by
the Society for Research in Child Development. Reprinted with permission.
DIAGRAM: FIGURE 5. Sex hormone model for coordinating development across body,
brain, and behavioral traits.
References
Abramson, P. R., & Imari-Marquez,
J. (1982). The Japanese-American: A cross-cultural, cross-sectional study of sex
guilt. Journal of Research in Personality, 16. 227-237.
Allen, G. (1988). Frequency of triplets and triplet zygosity types among U.S.
births, 1964. Acta Geneticae Medicae et Gemellologiae, 37, 299-306.
Anderson, J. L. (1991). Rushton's racial comparisons: An ecological critique of
theory and method. Canadian Psychology, 32, 51-60.
Andreasen, N. C., Flaum, M., Swayze, V., O'Leary, D. S., Alliger, R., Cohen, G.,
Ehrhardt, J., & Yuh, W. T. C. (1993). Intelligence and brain structure in
normal individuals. American Journal of Psychiatry, 150, 130-134.
Armstrong, E. (1990). Brains, bodies and metabolism. Brain, Behavior and
Evolution, 36, 166-176.
Asayama, S. (1975). Adolescent sex development and adult sex behavior in Japan.
Journal of Sex Research, 11, 91-122.
Barash, D. P. (1982). Sociobiology and behavior (2nd ed.). New York: Elsevier.
Bayley, N. (1965). Comparisons of mental and motor test scores for ages 1 - 15
months by sex, birth order, race, geographic location, and education of parents.
Child Development. 36, 379-411.
Beals, K. L., Smith, C. L., & Dodd, S. M. (1984). Brain size, cranial
morphology, climate and time machines. Current Anthropology, 25, 301-330.
Belsky, J., Steinberg, L., & Draper, E (1991). Childhood experience,
interpersonal development, and reproductive strategy: An evolutionary theory of
socialization. Child Development, 62. 647-670.
Bo, Z., & Wenxiu, G. (1992). Sexuality in urban China. Australian Journal of
Chinese Affairs, 28, 1-20.
Bouchard, T. J., Jr. (1984). Twins reared together and apart: What they tell us
about human diversity. In S. W. Fox (Ed.), Individuality and determinism. New
York: Plenum.
Bouchard, T. J., Jr., Lykken, D. T., McGue, M., Segal, N. L., & Tellegen, A.
(1990). Sources of human psychological differences: The Minnesota Study of Twins
Reared Apart. Science, 250, 223-228.
Broman, S. H., Nichols, E L., Shaughnessy, P., & Kennedy, W. (1987).
Retardation in young children. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bulmer, M. G. (1970). The biology of twinning in man. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cain, D. P., & Vanderwolf, C. H. (1990). A critique of Rushton on race,
brain size and intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 11,
777-784.
Calvin, W. H. (1991). The ascent of mind: Ice age climates and the evolution of
intelligence. New York: Bantam.
Chisholm, J. S. (1993). Death, hope, and sex: Life-history theory and the
development of reproductive strategies. Current Anthropology, 34, 1-24.
Clark, E. A., & Hanisee, J. (1982). Intellectual and adaptive performance of
Asian children in adoptive American settings. Developmental Psychology, 18,
595-599.
Coon, C. S. (1962). The origin of races. New York: Knopf.
Coon, C. S. (1982). Racial adaptations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Diamond, J. (1994). Race without color. Discover, 15(11), 82-89.
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1992). Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in
primates. Journal of Human Evolution, 20, 469-493.
Egan, V., Chiswick, A., Santosh, C., Naidu, K., Rimmington, J. E., & Best,
J. J. K. (1994). Size isn't everything: A study of brain volume, intelligence
and auditory evoked potentials. Personality and Individual Differences, 17,
357-367.
Eisenberg, J. E (1981). The mammalian radiations. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Ellis, L., & Nyborg, H. (1992). Racial/ethnic variations in male
testosterone levels. Steroids, 57, 72-75.
Eveleth, P. B., & Tanner, J. M. (1990). Worldwide variation in human growth
(2nd ed.). London: Cambridge University Press.
Eysenck, H. J., & Kamin, L. (1981). The intelligence controversy. New York:
Wiley.
Fairchild, H. H. (1991). Scientific racism: The cloak of objectivity. Journal of
Social Issues, 47, 101-115.
Fisher, R. A. (1958). The genetical theory of natural selection (2nd ed.). New
York: Dover.
Fisher, S. (1980). Personality correlates of sexual behavior in Black women..
Archives of Sexual Behavior, 9, 27-35.
Ford, C. S., & Beach, F. A. (1951). Patterns of sexual behavior. New York:
Harper & Row.
Frayer, D. W., Wolpoff, M. H., Thorne, A. G., Smith, F. H., & Pope, G. G.
(1993). Theories of modern human origins: The paleontological test. American
Anthropologist, 95, 14-50.
Freedman, D. G. (1974). Human infancy. New York: Halstead.
Freedman, D. G. (1979). Human sociobiology. New York: Freeman.
French Army Surgeon. (1898/1972). Untrodden fields of anthropology (2 vols.).
Paris, France: Carington. (Reprints available from Krieger, Huntington, NY)
Frydman, M., & Lynn, R. (1989). The intelligence of Korean children adopted
in Belgium. Personality and Individual Differences, 12, 1323-1325.
Galton, F. (1888). Head growth in students at the University of Cambridge.
Nature, 38, 14-15.
Gebhard, P. H., & Johnson, A. B. (1979). The Kinsey data: Marginal
tabulations of the 1938-1963 interviews conducted by the Institute for Sex
Research. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders.
Gould, S. J. (1981). The mismeasure of man. New York: Norton.
Groves, C. P. (1991). Genes, genitals and genius: The evolutionary ecology of
race. In P. O'Higgins & R. N. Pervan (Eds.), Human biology: An integrative
science. Nedlands, Australia: University of Western Australia, Centre for Human
Biology.
Harvey, P. H., & Krebs, J. R. (1990). Comparing brains. Science, 249,
140-145.
Herrnstein, R. J., & Murray, C. (1994). The bell curve. New York: Free
Press.
Herskovits, M. J. (1930). The anthropometry of the American Negro. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Hixson, J. R. (1992, October 20). Benign prostatic hypertrophy drug to be tested
in prostate CA prevention. The Medical Post, p. 17.
Ho, K-C., Roessmann, U., Straumfjord, J. V., & Monroe, G. (1980a). Analysis
of brain weight: I. Adult brain weight in relation to sex, race, and age.
Archives of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, 104, 635-639.
Ho, K-C., Roessmann, U., Straumfjord, J. V., & Monroe, G. (1980b). Analysis
of brain weight: 1I. Adult brain weight in relation to body height, weight, and
surface area. Archives of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, 104, 640-645.
Hofman, M. A. (1993). Encephalization and the evolution of longevity in mammals.
Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 6, 209-227.
Hofmann, A.D. (1984). Contraception in adolescence: A review. 1. Psychosocial
aspects. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 63, 151-162.
Imaizumi, Y. (1992). Twinning rates in Japan, 1951-1990. Acta Geneticae Medicae
et Gemellologiae, 41, 165-175.
Iwawaki, S., & Wilson, G. D. (1983). Sex fantasies in Japan. Personality and
Individual Differences, 4, 543-545.
Jaynes, G. D., & Williams, R. M., Jr. (Eds.). (1989). A common destiny:
Blacks and American society. Washington, DC: National Academy Press,
Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement?
Harvard Educational Review, 39, 1-123.
Jensen, A. R. (1973). Educability and group differences. London: Methuen.
Jensen, A. R. (1983). The effects of inbreeding on mental ability factors.
Personality and Individual Differences, 4, 71-87.
Jensen, A. R. (1985). The nature of the Black-White difference on various
psychometric tests: Spearman's hypothesis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8,
193-263.
Jensen, A. R. (1987). The g beyond factor analysis. In R. R. Ronning, J. A.
Gover, J. C. Conoley, & J. C. Witt (Eds.), The influence of cognitive
psychology on testing. Hills-dale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Jensen, A. R. (1993). Spearman's hypothesis tested with chronometric
information-processing tasks. Intelligence. 17, 47-77.
Jensen, A. R. (1994). Psychometric g related to differences in head size.
Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 597-606.
Jensen, A. R., & Johnson, F. W. (1994). Race and sex differences in head
size and IQ. Intelligence, 18, 309-333.
Jensen, A. R., & Whang, P. A. (1993). Reaction times and intelligence: A
comparison of Chinese-American and Anglo-American children. Journal of Biosocial
Science, 25, 397-410.
Jensen, A. R., & Whang, P. A. (1994). Speed of accessing arithmetic facts in
long-term memory: A comparison of Chinese-American and Anglo-American children.
Contemporary Educational Psychology, 19, 1-12.
Johanson, D.C., & Edey, M. A. (1981). Lucy: The beginnings of humankind..
New York: Simon & Schuster.
Kamin, L. J. (1974). The science and politics of IQ. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum..
Krebs, C. J., Gaines, M. S., Keller, B. L., Myers, J. H., & Tamarin, R. H.
(1973). Population cycles in small rodents. Science, 179, 35-41.
Lerner, R. M. (1992). Final solutions: Biology, prejudice, and genocide.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Lewontin, R. C., & Rose, S., & Kamin, L. J. (1984). Not in our genes.
New York: Pantheon.
Loehlin, J. C., Lindzey, G., & Spuhler, J. N. (1975). Race differences in
intelligence. San Francisco, CA: Freeman.
Lovejoy, C. O. (1981). The origin of man. Science, 211, 341-350.
Lynn, R. (1991). Race differences in intelligence: A global perspective. Mankind
Quarterly, 31, 255-296.
Lynn, R. (1994). The intelligence of Ethiopian immigrant and Israeli
adolescents: International Journal of Psychology, 29, 55-56.
Lynn, R., & Shigehisa, T. (1991). Reaction times and intelligence: A
comparison of Japanese and British children. Journal of Biosocial Science, 23.
409-416.
MacArthur, R. H., & Wilson, E. O. (1967). The theory of island biogeography.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mayr, E. (1970). Populations. species, and evolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
McHenry, H. M. (1992). How big were the early hominids? Evolutionary
Anthropology. 1, 15-20.
Mealey, L. (1990). Differential use of reproductive strategies by human groups?
Psychological Science. 1, 385-387.
Moynihan, D. (1965). The Negro family: The case for national action. Washington,
DC: United States Department of Labor.
Nei, M., & Roychoudhury, A. K. (1993). Evolutionary relationships of human
populations on a global scale. Molecular Biology and Evolution, 10, 927-943.
Niswander, K. R., & Gordon, M. (1972). The women and their pregnancies.
Philadelphia, PA: Saunders.
Nyborg, H. (1994). Hormones, sex, and society: Westport, CT: Praeger.
Papiernik, E., Cohen, H., Richard, A., de Oca, M. M., & Feingold, J. (1986).
Ethnic differences in duration of pregnancy. Annals of Human Biology, 13,
259-265.
Pianka, E. R. (1970). On "r" and "K" selection. American
Naturalist, 104, 592-597.
Plomin, R., Owen, M. J., & McGuffin, P. (1994). The genetic basis of complex
human behavior. Science, 264, 1733-1739.
Polednak, A. P. (1989). Racial and ethnic differences in disease. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Raz, N., Torres, I. J., Spencer, W. D., Millman. D., Baertschi, J. C., &
Sarpel, G. (1993). Neuroanatomical correlates of age-sensitive and age-invariant
cognitive abilities: An in vivo MRI investigation. Intelligence, 17, 407-422.
Roberts, J. V., & Gabor, T (1990). Lombrosian wine in a new bottle: Research
on crime and race. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 32, 291-313.
Ross, R., Bernstein, L., Judd, H., Hanisch, R., Pike, M., & Henderson, B.
(1986). Serum testosterone levels in healthy young Black and White men. Journal
of the National Cancer Institute, 76, 45-48.
Rushton, J.P. (1985). Differential K theory and race differences in E and N..
Personality and Individual Differences, 6, 769-770.
Rushton, J.P. (1988). Race differences in behaviour: A review and evolutionary
analysis. Personality and Individual Differences, 9, 1035-1040.
Rushton, J.P. (1989). Japanese inbreeding depression scores: Predictors of
cognitive differences between Blacks and Whites. Intelligence, 13, 43-51.
Rushton, J.P. (1990). Race and crime. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 32,
315-334.
Rushton, J.P. (1991). Mongoloid-Caucasoid differences in brain size from
military samples. Intelligence, 15, 351-359.
Rushton, J. P. (1992a). Cranial capacity related to sex, rank and race in a
stratified random sample of 6,325 U.S. military personnel. Intelligence, 16,
401-413.
Rushton, J. P. (1992b). Life history comparisons between Orientals and Whites at
a Canadian university. Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 439-442.
Rushton, J. P. (1993). Corrections to a paper on race and sex differences in
brain size and intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 15,
229-231.
Rushton, J.P. (1994). Sex and race differences in cranial capacity from
International Labour Office data. Intelligence, 19, 281-294.
Rushton, J.P. (1995). Race, evolution and behavior: A life history perspective.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Rushton, J.P., & Ankney, C. D. (1993). The evolutionary selection of human
races: A response to Miller. Personality and Individual Differences, 15,
677-680.
Rushton, J.P., & Bogaert, A. F. (1987). Race differences in sexual behavior:
Testing an evolutionary hypothesis. Journal of Research in Personality, 21,
529-551.
Rushton, J.P., & Bogaert, A. F. (1988). Race versus social class differences
in sexual behavior: A follow-up of the r/K dimension. Journal of Research in
Personality, 22, 259-272.
Rushton, J.P., Brainerd, C. J., & Pressley, M. (1983). Behavioral
development and construct validity: The principle of aggregation. Psychological
Bulletin, 94, 18-38.
Schull, W. J., & Neel, J. V. (1965). The effects of inbreeding on Japanese
children. New York: Harper & Row.
Schultz, A. H. (1960). Age changes in primates and their modification in man. In
J. M. Tanner (Ed.), Human growth (pp. 1-20). Oxford: Pergamon.
Smith, B. H. (1989). Dental development as a measure of life-history in
primates. Evolution. 43, 683-688.
Snyderman, M., & Rothman, S. (1987). Survey of expert opinion on
intelligence and aptitude testing. American Psychologist, 42, 137-144.
Stringer, C. B., & Andrews, P. (1988). Genetic and fossil evidence for the
origin of modern humans. Science, 239, 1263-1268.
Tremblay, R. E., & Baillargeon, L. (1984). Les difficultes de comportement
d'enfants immigrants dans les classes d'accueil, au prescolaire. Canadian
Journal of Education, 9, 154-170.
Ubelaker, D., & Scammel, H. (1992). Bones: A forensic detective's casebook.
New York: HarperCollins.
Vernon, P. E. (1982). The abilities and achievements of Orientals in North
America. San Diego: Academic Press.
Warren, N. (1972). African infant precocity. Psychological Bulletin, 78,
353-367.
Weinberg, R. A., Scarr, S., & Waldman, I.D. (1992). The Minnesota
Transracial Adoption Study: A follow-up of IQ test performance at adolescence.
Intelligence, 16, 117-135.
Weizmann, F., Wiener, N. I., Wiesenthal, D. L., & Ziegler, M. (1990).
Differential K theory and racial hierarchies. Canadian Psychology, 31, 1-13.
Weizmann, F., Wiener, N. I., Wiesenthal, D., & Ziegler, M. (1991). Eggs,
eggplants and eggheads: A rejoinder to Rushton. Canadian Psychology; 32, 43-50.
Wickett, J. C., Vernon, P. A., & Lee, D.C. (1994). In vivo brain size, head
perimeter, and intelligence in a sample of healthy adult females. Personality
and Individual Differences, 16, 831-838.
Willerman, L., Schultz, R., Rutledge, J. N., & Bigler, E. D. (1991). In vivo
brain size and intelligence. Intelligence, 15, 223-228.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Wilson, J. Q., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1985). Crime and human nature. New York:
Simon & Schuster.
Winick, M., Meyer, K. K., & Harris, R. C. (1975). Malnutrition and
environmental enrichment by early adoption. Science, 190, 1173-1175.
Yee, A. H., Fairchild, H. H., Weizmann, F., & Wyatt, G. E. (1993).
Addressing psychology's problems with race. American Psychologist, 48,
1132-1140..
Zindi, F. (1994). Differences in psychometric performance. The Psychologist, 7,
549-552.
Zuckerman, M., & Brody, N. (1988). Oysters, rabbits and people: A critique
of "Race Differences in Behaviour" by J.P. Rushton. Personality and
Individual Differences, 9, 1025-1033.
New World Order
Bob Djurdjevic
Reproduced From: SINERGIE
EUROPEE
THE
SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND OF THE NAZI
"RACE PURIFICATION" PROGRAM, US & German Eugenics, Ethnic
Cleansing,Genocide,Population Control ...
©1995-1998
Theodore D. Hall, Ph.D, Leading Edge International Research Group
In the conclusion of his
remarkable book The Nazi Doctors--Medical Killing and the Psychology of
Genocide, Robert Jay Lifton writes of a visit to Auschwitz: "I went to the
camp a few years ago and was shown the many exhibits maintained there, exhibits
that leave nothing to be added concerning the evil human beings can do to other
human beings. But the one that left the most profound impression on me was the
simplest of all: a room full of shoes, mostly baby shoes."
Genocidal campaigns are not
new. They occurred before the Holocaust; and they are occurring at this moment.
What distinguishes the Nazi "race purification" extermination
program from other genocidal campaigns is its "scientific" character.
At a mass meeting in 1934, Nazi Deputy Party Leader Rudolf Hess stated,
"National Socialism is nothing but applied biology." "The entire
Nazi regime was built," Lifton writes, "on a biomedical vision that
required the kind of racial purification that would progress from sterilization
to extensive killing." As early as the publication of Mein Kampf (1924-26),
Lifton indicates, "Hitler had declared the sacred racial mission of the
German people to be 'assembling and preserving the most valuable stocks of basic
racial elements [and] . . . . slowly and severely raising them to a dominant
position.' . . ."
Where did the
"biomedical vision" of Hitler and his party originate? The primary
sources were: Darwinian biology and evolutionary theory; Social Darwinism, the
evangelistic dissemination of Darwinism; and a pseudo-science called
"eugenics." In the first several decades of the twentieth century,
eugenics was considered by many as humanity's best hope for the future. It
played the role now played by "genetic engineering." It was applied
Darwinism. The following outlines, briefly, the nature of these related sources:
Today, our orthodox theory
of biology and evolution is "neo-Darwinism." Neo-Darwinism combines
what is called "classical Darwinism" with modern genetics. Classical
Darwinism dates from 1859, the year in which English naturalist Charles Darwin
published On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, subtitled
(note carefully) The Preservation of the Favoured Races in the Struggle for
Life. Despite the fact key premises underlying Darwin's theory were unproven
scientifically, the theory was embraced by numerous scientists and intellectuals
as if it was gospel -- the Gospel of Science. In a relatively short time, the
Origin replaced the Bible as western civilization's preferred authoritative text
on the subject of the nature of life on Earth. In 1871, Darwin published the
even more controversial The Descent of Man.
The major premises of
Darwinism may be summarized as follows:
(1) The first premise, the
concept of the evolutionary transformation of one species into others, was
derived from the "Transformism" of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, who founded
evolutionary science in 1809 with the publication of Philosophie Zoologique. In
his History of Creation (1873), evolutionist Ernst Haeckel writes, "To him
[Lamarck] will always belong the immortal glory of having for the first time
worked out the Theory of Descent, as an independent scientific theory of the
first order, and as the philosophical foundation for the whole science of
Biology." Indeed, the very term "biology" was coined by Lamarck.
Darwin became acquainted
with the work of Lamarck through his friend and mentor, the eminent geologist
Charles Lyell. Volume II of Lyell's Principles of Geology, which contains a long
exposition of the Lamarck theory, was received by Darwin in South America in
1832, in the first of his five years engagement as ship's naturalist on the
H.M.S. Beagle.
(2) The second premise of
Darwin's theory is that "natural selection" is the cause of divergence
in species, i.e., the origin of species. The first published mention of the idea
of Nature-as-selector is in Rousseau's "Discourse on the Origin and
Foundations of Inequality Among Men" (1755). In a discussion of the
conditions of life in ancient Sparta, Rousseau writes, "Nature used them
precisely as did the law of Sparta the children of her citizens. She rendered
strong and robust those with a good constitution and destroyed all the
others."
A more immediate source was
the evolutionary theory of English naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace, who
committed to paper a theory of evolution by natural selection prior to the
completion of Darwin's work. In June of 1858, Wallace submitted to Darwin an
unpublished work titled "On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart
Indefinitely from the Original Type." Shortly thereafter, Darwin wrote to
Lyell, "Your words have come true with a vengeance -- that I should be
[could be] forestalled. You said this when I explained to you here very briefly
my view on Natural Selection depending on the struggle for existence. I never
saw a more striking coincidence; if Wallace had my M.S. written out in 1842, he
could not have made a better short abstract! Even his terms now stand as heads
of my chapters . . . . "
Had Wallace simply published
his manuscript, he would have had priority with regard to the concept of
evolution by natural selection. Instead, priority went to Darwin. The
questionable means by which priority was conferred on Darwin are discussed in a
fascinating book by Arnold Brackman titled A Delicate Arrangement.
Darwin's understanding of natural selection derived from his work with breeding.
The breeding of plants and animals Darwin called "artificial
selection;" the breeding that occurs in "the wild" he called
"natural selection." Early in the Origin, Darwin defines natural
selection in these (anthropomorphic) terms: "Natural selection is daily and
hourly scrutinizing . . . . every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that
which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly
working . . . . at the improvement of each organic being . . . ." In
effect, Darwinism replaces the traditional belief that order in nature is the
result of a divine presence (God) with the idea it is the result of a natural
presence (Natural Selection).
(3) The third premise in
Darwinism is that the drive behind evolution is the sexual-reproductive
instinct. Given the tremendous influence of this drive, life is an incessant
struggle for existence:
"A struggle for
existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which all organic beings tend
to increase. Every being . . . must suffer destruction . . . otherwise, on the
principle of geometrical increase, its numbers would quickly become so
inordinately great that no country could support the product. Hence, as more
individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there must in every case be
a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same
species, or with the individuals of distinct species, or with the physical
conditions of life. . . ." The basic premise ("the high rate at which
all organic beings tend to increase") and the "principle of
geometrical increase" are, as Darwin indicates, "the doctrine of
Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom. .
. . "
The Malthus in question is
the Rev. Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), famous "pessimist" and
author of one of the most influential essays in modern times -- the "Principle
of Population" (1798). In this essay, Malthus argues that because
"all animated life [tends] to increase beyond the nourishment prepared for
it," there can never be real progress or happiness for mankind. Give man a
little more bread than usual, he'll breed more than usual, wiping out his little
gains. Populations increase by geometrical progression, Malthus asserted, while
the means of subsistence increase by only mathematic progression. Thus man is
doomed to procreate himself into destitution. Malthus, one of the founders of
the "dismal science" of economics, painted visions of a future filled,
inescapably, with starving and diseased multitudes.
Before Malthus and his
nightmarish visions, the rulers of Europe looked upon large populations as
assets; after the "Principle of Population," they began to view
the same populations as liabilities, potentially disastrous liabilities. The
revolution in America and the abortive revolution in France had made it very
clear that masses can be lethal to the ruling classes, and Malthus provided just
the perspective the rulers of Europe were looking for. The masses are totally
unprincipled. Populations must be strictly controlled. In 1789, the first year
of the French Revolution, the European country with the largest population was
France. The statistics were on the wall, and the rulers of Europe were not slow
in reading them.
In the opening half of the
nineteenth century, throughout Europe, members of the ruling classes gathered to
discuss the newly discovered "Population problem" and to devise ways
of implementing the Malthusian mandate, to increase the mortality rate of the
poor: "Instead of recommending cleanliness to the poor, we should encourage
contrary habits. In our towns we should make the streets narrower, crowd more
people into the houses, and court the return of the plague. In the country we
should build our villages near stagnant pools, and particularly encourage
settlements in all marshy and unwholesome situations," and so forth and so
on.
The Reverend Malthus, who
took the understandable precaution of publishing his "Population"
essay anonymously (in 1798), is the prototype of the Nazi-style social theorist.
"Malthusianism," as it was called, found adherents throughout Europe,
but few of these dared to express their opinions outside the private chambers of
fellow believers. By the end of the century, however, the Malthusians were out
of the closet.
In Germany, "racial
scientists" openly advocated the killing of unwanted members and segments
of the population. One of these scientists, Adolf Jost, "issued an early
call for direct medical killing in a book published in 1895 . . . The Right
To Death (Das Recht auf den Tod)." Jost argued that for the sake of the
health of the social organism, the state must take responsibility for the death
of individuals. Adolf Jost was a mentor to Adolf Hitler, who agreed 100 percent.
"The state must see to it that only the healthy beget children,"
Hitler said. "The state must act as the guardian of a millennial future. .
. . It must put the most modern medical means in the service of this knowledge.
It must declare unfit for propagation all who are in any way visibly sick or who
have inherited a disease and can therefore pass it on."
Between the first decade of
the nineteenth century and the last, what was it that occurred that made
Malthusianism "respectable?" Darwinism. Specifically: Darwin's
adoption of the "Malthus doctrine" as his third premise. In the third
premise is a foundation of the Third Reich. In effect, if not intent, Darwinism
is Malthusianism, re-presented in the guise of true science. Under the banner of
Darwinism, "The Only True & Sacred Biology & Evolution," the
Malthusians and their masters were able to wreak havoc in our civilization.
Among their legacies are the ravages of the imperialists in the late nineteenth
century, the lethal socialisms that have plagued our century, the world wars,
holocaust after holocaust, and very possibly one or more of the serious diseases
which now afflict humanity.
****************
In Palo Alto, early 1994, I
attended a lecture on evolution by a distinguished Stanford professor. The
professor began his lecture with the bald statement, "Today, the science of
evolution is synonymous with Darwinism." The professor paused, smiled.
There were no challenges from the audience, and so he continued, repeating the
"truisms" of Darwinism, truisms that are not true but only seem so
because they've been repeated so often. Unlike any other scientific theory I
know of, Darwinism has survived refutation after refutation. In 1971, Norman
Macbeth, a Harvard-trained lawyer who made the study of Darwinian theory his
avocation for many years, published quite a good critique of Darwinism -- Darwin
Retried. One of Macbeth's major concluding points, which is well documented,
is that most Darwinists have little confidence in their own theory. The eminent
Karl Popper calls the book "an excellent and fair, though unsympathetic
retrial of Darwin." (What "sympathy" has to do with science I do
not know.) It is 1995, almost twenty-five years later. Darwinism is still our
orthodox biology.
In 1986, Australian
scientist Michael Denton published Evolution: A Theory in Crisis,
a thoroughgoing critique of Darwinism which concludes that the much-celebrated
theory is "the great cosmogenic myth of the twentieth century."
"One might have expected," Denton writes, "that a theory of such
cardinal importance, a theory that literally changed the world, would have been
something more than metaphysics, something more than a myth." Practically
in the same breath, Denton remarks that "Darwinism remains . . the only
truly scientific theory of evolution."
Denton's confusion is
understandable. It is difficult to believe that a theory with so little merit
could have become so profoundly entrenched in our science -- and in the
conventional wisdom. Isn't science supposed to free us from myth? Darwinism may
remain the teflon orthodoxy for another twenty-five years. That should not
dissuade us from the vital work of critique. So far, we've analyzed Darwinism
into its three basic premises. How valid (strong) are those premises?
(1) The strength of
Darwinism is in the first premise, the Lamarckian premise of the evolutionary
transformation of one species into others. Lacking sufficient data, Lamarck
viewed the evolutionary line as strictly linear. Species A produces B, B
produces C, C produces D, and so on. In 1855, Alfred Wallace re-articulated the
premise,
arguing that the
evolutionary line may be branched, i.e., Species A may produce C as well as B, B
may produce D, E and F, etc. Further, Wallace argued, evolutionary steps are not
necessarily "progressive" (more and more perfect), as Lamarck had
maintained.
The Wallace articulation
came to be known as "the Sarawak Law." Every species has come into
existence coincident both in time and space with a pre-existing closely allied
species. The long and short of it is: When the Lamarck-Wallace premise fell into
Darwin's hands, it was in good shape scientifically. It was, and is, a valid
premise, supported by much evidence.
(2) Darwin's second premise,
that natural selection is the cause of divergence in species, is what is called
an "empty generalization." It sounds good, but it tells us nothing. If
I were to tell you that the cause of divergence in species was the
"environment," would you find that an adequate explanation? No, of
course not. "You must be more specific," you would say. "What is
it, specifically, in the environment that causes divergence?" "Natural
selection" is no more specific than "environment."
It is not difficult to
understand why so many scientists have accepted the premise of natural selection
uncritically. It does seem to be an explanation more in the scientific direction
than "Zeus," for instance, of "Jehova." Nevertheless,
natural selection is simply a "false scent" that takes us nowhere,
except deeper and deeper into the woods. Darwin himself was uneasy with the
term. In the sixth and last edition of the Origin, he says that survival of the
fittest is a "more accurate" expression of what he had previously
called natural selection. Interestingly, the phrase "survival of the
fittest" was coined not by Darwin, but by philosopher-evolutionist Herbert
Spencer some seven or eight years before the publication of the Origin. By 1872,
the phrase had become the common catchword (slogan) for Darwinism. Darwin laid
claim to it ("selected" it, we should say), preferring it over the
meaningless natural selection.
Further, the concept of
natural selection was tied too closely to Alfred Wallace, the talented young
evolutionist who had been totally eclipsed by Darwin. (When the famous theory of
evolution was first presented, it was called the "Darwin-Wallace"
theory. A correct title would have been the "Wallace-Darwin" theory.)
The phrase "survival of the fittest" was the product of one of
Darwin's most ardent apostles. Mr. Spencer was quite delighted Darwin adopted
the phrase.
(3) Darwin's third premise
-- the so-called "Malthus doctrine" -- has no scientific validity, and
it never did. In the modern jargon of critique, we would call the Malthus
doctrine an example of "reductive, or simplistic, sexual determinism."
(Sigmund Freud is whipped routinely by contemporary commentators for having
fallen into the trap of sexual determinism.) The idea that "all animated
life" is governed exclusively by the sexual-reproductive drive was
suggested to Malthus by early eighteenth century reports regarding goats that
had been released by buccaneers on certain of the Galapagos islands circa the
1670s. The reports indicated that the goats had multiplied to the point that
scarcely a bit of vegetation was left.
Malthus read the reports and
concluded that human beings, if left to their own devices, would do the same
thing. They would reproduce themselves right out of house and home, to the point
the entire population would be left without a can of beans. This conclusion is
the pseudo-scientific basis of the "Malthus doctrine" that Darwin so
enthusiastically embraced, and amplified -- by his declaration that it
"applied . . . to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom."
Any form of reductive
determinism is the intellectual equivalent of a tar pit. Malthus was trapped in
his own tar. In later life, he endeavored to correct the erroneous doctrine, but
by then, it was too late. The doctrine had become a part of our common stock of
"true ideas about the way things are." Thus it is that Darwin writes
with such certainty, that "There is no exception to the rule, that every
organic being naturally increases at so high a rate, that if not destroyed
[Italics mine], the earth would soon be covered by the progeny of a single pair
. . . ."
"Even slow-breeding man
has doubled in twenty-five years," Darwin continues, "and at this
rate, in a few thousand years, there would literally not be standing room for
his progeny." This "Malthus-Darwin doctrine," let us call it, was
the basis for much hysteria in the ruling classes of the last century. The
Malthus-Darwin doctrine clearly suggested that the human population of the
planet had become a problem. "If not destroyed," to use Darwin's
phrase, this population would soon leave the planet as barren as the
goat-infested Galapagos islands. The Malthus-Darwin doctrine had no scientific
basis whatsoever; it was based on the erroneous reasoning of Malthus. Darwin
should have known better. Perhaps he did. Whatever the case, the doctrine was a
big hit with the rulers of the last century, a strong incitement -- sanctioned
by science -- to over-run the planet before others did so.
Suddenly, the nations of
Europe found themselves with "surplus populations." The Age of
Imperialism was born, as nation after nation entered the race to acquire foreign
lands and foreign countries, not because of greed, but because of national
survival. The nations that would survive into the future would be those in
possession of vast tracts of land for the dumping of surplus population. In a
very short time, all of Africa was carved up by the European nations. Aboriginal
peoples of that continent who objected to slavery were slaughtered. Many great
tribes -- tribes that for thousands of years had existed in balance with their
environment -- were eradicated in the "African Holocaust."
Imperialistic competition
for "empire" (i.e., colonies throughout the world) was probably the
principal reason for World War I. In 1901, Arthur Dix, the editor of two Berlin
journals, writes, "A timorous people, which knows not how to use its
elbows, may of course put a stop to the increase in its population -- it might
find things too narrow at home. The superfluity of population might find no
economic existence. A people happy in its future, however, knows nothing of an
artificial limitation; its only care can be to find room on the globe for a
livelihood for other members of its own race."
In Britain as Germany's
Vassal (1912), German Social Darwinist (and retired general) F. Von Bernhardi
writes, "In the interest of the world's civilization it is our duty to
enlarge Germany's colonial empire. Thus alone can we politically, or at least
nationally, unite the Germans throughout the world, for only then will they
recognize that German civilization is the most necessary factor in human
progress. We must endeavor to acquire new territories throughout the world by
all means in our power, because we must preserve to Germany the millions of
Germans who will be born in the future, and we must provide for them food and
employment. They ought to be enabled to live under a German sky, and to lead a
German life." Given such attitudes -- not only in Germany, but throughout
Europe -- war became inevitable. It was inevitable for another reason as well:
War was viewed by Bernhardi
and his many Social Darwinist colleagues in Europe as "an indispensable
regulator" of populations. "If it were not for war," Bernhardi
writes, "we should probably find that inferior and degenerate races would
overcome healthy and youthful ones by their wealth and their numbers. The
generative importance of war lies in this, that it causes selection, and thus
war becomes a biological necessity."
The German word for
"colonies around the world in which to dump surplus populations" was
"Lebensraum" -- living space. For the Germans, the loss of the First
World War meant, among other dire things, the loss of their lebensraum. The
punitive reparations demanded by the victors was a serious matter; far more
serious was the fact that Germany was physically contracted and stripped of her
colonies. This contraction of Germany was, from the point of view of the
Darwinists in that country, a death sentence. With the empire-building option
blocked (momentarily at least), German social planners began to focus more
exclusively on internal options for guaranteeing the survival of the German
race.
In 1923, Fritz Lenz, a
Germany physician-geneticist who became a leading ideologue in the Nazi racial
purification program, complained bitterly that Germany under the Weimar
Constitution was falling far behind America in the all-important field of
eugenics, the science of improving the race by means of "selection" of
degenerate individuals and groups for sterilization: "Lenz complained that
provisions in the Weimar Constitution (prohibiting the infliction of bodily
alterations on human beings) prevented widespread use of vasectomy techniques;
that Germany had nothing to match the eugenics research institutions in England
and the United States (for instance, that at Cold Spring Harbor, New York, led
by Charles B. Davenport and funded by the Carnegie Institution in Washington and
by Mary Harriman)." Mary Harriman was the widow of the railroad tycoon E.
H. Harriman. Both E. H. Harriman and Andrew Carnegie had been great admirers of
Herbert Spencer, who was the chief conduit in America for Darwinian dogma.
In historical context,
"eugenics" may be defined as applied Darwinism. The founder of
eugenics is Francis Galton, a cousin of Darwin's and the author of several
highly influential books on heredity, including Hereditary Genius (1869),
Inquiries into Human Faculties (1883), and National Inheritance
(1889). Not long after Galton published the last-named book, a group of
so-called "racial scientists" became quite active in Germany. (Also
influential in the formation of the group was German Social Darwinist Ernst
Haeckel, who declared that the various races may be defined as separate
species.) One of these scientists was Adolf Jost, previously cited as the author
of The Right to Death (1895). The main thesis of this book is that the
final solution to the population problem is state control over human
reproduction. The book is couched in the rhetoric of (Darwinian) natural rights.
The state has a natural right and a sacred responsibility to kill individuals in
order to keep the nation, the social organism, alive and healthy.
Later advocates of
state-medical killing, such as law professor Karl Binding of the University of
Leipzig and Alfred Hoche, professor of psychiatry at the University of Freiburg,
would stress the therapeutic value of destroying "life unworthy of
life." The destruction of such life is "purely a healing
treatment." Between the world wars, sterilization became the most preferred
tool for the control of population. The fact the Weimar Constitution did not
allow sterilization was no small matter; Social Darwinistic scientists and their
followers saw it as a dire threat to the nation. "If the power to fight for
one's own health is no longer present," Hitler wrote, "the right to
live in this world of struggle ends."
To understand why
sterilization was such an important issue for the Social Darwinists, we need not
look far. "In civilized man," Ernst Mayr (America's dean of Darwinism)
writes, "the two components of selective value, adaptive superiority and
reproductive success, no longer coincide. The individuals with above-average
genetic endowments do not necessarily make an above-average contribution to the
gene pool of the next generation." Indeed, Mayr continues, "shiftless,
improvident individuals who have a child every year are certain to add more
genes to the gene pool of the next generation than those who carefully plan the
size of their families. Natural selection has no answer to this predicament.
[Italics mine} The separation [in] the modern society of mere reproductive
success from genuine adaptedness poses a serious problem for man's future."
In other words: When humans
are in the state of nature, their numbers (and their quality as biological
organisms) are effectively controlled by natural selection. In the struggle for
existence, the fittest usually win, and the weakest usually lose. The winners
get to pass on their winning genes; the losers get to skulk away and die. When
man becomes "civilized," however, the game changes. The weak are no
longer destroyed. Indeed, the weak are protected by unnatural do-gooder
religions and philosophies. They are given advantages they have not earned. They
have nothing to do in life but reproduce, and reproduce they do -- "a child
every year," according to Mayr. While those who are unworthy of life
proliferate right and left, the genuinely superior find themselves more and more
restricted, more and more disadvantaged in the evolutionary struggle.
Thus it is Mayr issues his
dark prognosis . . . this situation "poses a serious problem for man's
future." Mayr's view is essentially a contemporary re-statement of the old
eugenics propaganda. When Hitler and his Nazis commenced their programs of
sterilization and extermination, they were operating on the firm conviction that
for the sake of the German people and the future of man, National Socialism must
take over where Natural Selection left off. In Darwinism -- both classical and
neo-Darwinism -- natural selection is the only ordering principle in nature. If
the principle of natural selection is thwarted by misguided man, what is the
inevitable result? Disorder, degeneracy, and destruction.
In a great many ways, the
Nazi movement was a crusade against what they perceived as degeneracy, a crusade
in the name of the new god . . . Science. The legacy of the Malthus-Darwin
doctrine is sad indeed. The mandate it gave our rulers was, "Control
population and progress . . . or perish." From this mandate arose two
political strategies that were to make the twentieth century the most cruel and
barbaric on record. One of these strategies was strictly Malthusian: "Do
nothing for the masses except that which accelerates their destruction."
This was called "laissez-faire" . . . don't interfere. The other
strategy saw in totalitarianism, the complete control of society by the state,
the only satisfactory answer to the population problem. Most of the
"socialisms" of our century fall in this category.
Reproduced gratefully from: http://www.trufax.org/
Key
Figures, Philosophies in the rise of Materialistic Scientism & Church of
Scientism
Germany
Copyright 1995
- Leading Edge Research Group
"Racial Science"
of Ernst Haeckel
Racial Science:
(1880’s-1945) “Racial science” in later 19th century Germany was based on
the declaration of Ernst Haeckel that the races are “separate species.” Once
the concept of races as “separate species” was defined, the next step was to
distinguish between “progressive races” and “regressive races”
(species), and then making “scientific” recommendations regarding “eugenic
improvement.” One highly influential race scientist was Alfred Jost, author of
The Right to Death (1865). The main thesis of the Jost book was that the
“final solution” to the “population problem” is state control over human
reproduction. The book is couched in the rhetoric of (Darwinian) “natural
rights.” The state, according to Jost, has a “natural right” and “sacred
responsibility” to kill undesirable individuals in order to “keep the
nation, the social organism, alive and healthy.” This so-called “right”
was the basis for the “race purification” programs of the Third Reich.
Another key individual was Alfred Ploetz, Social Darwinist and founder (1904) of
the German Society for Racial Hygiene. Ploetz looked to Galton as his scientific
mentor.
Bismarkian Militarism
“Blood and Iron”
Militarism: Not until 1860’s were the German states unified into Germany, by
Karl Otto Eduard Leopold Bismark-Schonhausen, usually referred to simply as “Bismark,”
(1815-1898). Bismark set the tone of the new German empire in 1862, when he
said, “Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities are the mighty problems
of the age to be solved, but by blood and iron.” The “Iron Chancellor”
originated these measures for the working classes; it was the foundation for
state socialism. His methodology is sometimes referred to as “paternalism.”
The Germany military at the turn of the century, educated in the “school of
Blood and Iron,” took to Social Darwinism like tanks to battle (an appropriate
parallel to “ducks to water.”) One key military opinion leader in early 20th
century Germany was retired General Bernhardi, who is quoted in chapter three:
“If it were not for war, we should probably find that inferior and degenerate
races would overcome healthy and youthful ones of their wealth and their
numbers.” The generative importance of war lies in this, that it causes
selection, and thus war becomes a biological necessity. Combine race science
with Bismarkian militaristic paternalism, and we have the formula for the Third
Reich, personified in Adolph Hitler.
German-American Eugenics
Liaison
German-American Eugenics
Liaison (1919-1939): Under the highly punitive terms of the Versailles Treaty,
Germany was physically contracted and stripped of her colonies. In Social
Darwinistic terms, this contraction was not simply a punishment, it was a death
sentence. Any country [that subscribed to Malthusian beliefs] that did not
“have room to dump its surplus population,” would perish. Blocked in terms
of discharging its “surplus population” into colonies, Germany was compelled
to find an internal solution to the “population problem.” It was no
alleviation that vast numbers had perished in the First World War. The blood of
the noblest had been shed, it was believed, and “the blood of the
degenerates” now threatened to inundate Germany. Race scientists found in
America the model they were looking for--the precedent of sterilization and
other means of control of “undesirable population” on a significant scale.
Fritz Lenz
In 1923, Fritz Lenz, a
German physician-geneticist who became a leading ideologue in the Nazi race
purification programs, complained bitterly that Germany, under the Weimar
Constitution (which prohibited the infliction of bodily alterations on humans),
prevented widespread use of vasectomy techniques, and that Germany had nothing
to match the eugenics research institutions in England and the United States.
During the 1920’s and 1930’s, there was a significant flow of eugenics
information from the United States to Germany, which was later used by Hitler to
provide his genocidal programs with the appearance of scientific legitimacy.
Eugenics was not simply a German interest, so the propaganda machine declared,
it is a “science” practiced throughout the world. Best references are the
oft-cited Lifton book, The Nazi Doctors, and Stefen Kuhl’s The Nazi
Connection--Eugenics, American Racism and German National Socialism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994).
The Third Reich
The Third Reich (1933-1945):
As early as the publication of Mein Kampf (1924), Hitler declared that the
sacred survival mission of the German people was the “assembling and
preserving of the most valuable stocks of basic racial elements [and]...slowly
and severely raising them to a dominant position.” The Third Reich was a
powerful machine designed to do just that, to assure the worldwide dominance of
the Germanic genes, the “basic racial elements.” Hitler was no madman--he
was the ultimate Social Darwinist demagog.
The Kaiser Wilhelm Society
During the period of Hitler,
the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (KWG), Germany’s most prestigious scientific
institution, focused a great deal of its attention on eugenics. The KWG operated
between 1911 and 1945. If Hitler had won, it would now be the “Vatican” of
Scientism. See Science, Technology and National Socialism, by Monika Renneburg
and Mark Walker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Note especially an
essay by Herbert Mehrten (“Irresponsible Purity,” etc.), which makes the
very important point that “pure science” is no valid justification for
participation in scientific work involved in destructive or questionable
political programs. “Pure science” is then defined as irresponsible.
The Nuremberg Trials
The Nuremberg Trials: As
showcase for the display of righteous indignation, the Nuremberg trials were
very effective. As a means for determining the causes behind the horror
perpetrated by the Third Reich, the trials were an abject failure. A few notorious
leaders of the Third Reich were condemned and disposed of. Most of the
scientists associated with the Reich were quickly assimilated into the
scientific and intelligence establishments of the Allies. The scientific vision
underlying the Third Reich--Social Darwinism--was of course never brought to
trial. A few fanatical puppets of the paradigm were slain. The paradigm itself
remained, and remains to this day.
Reproduced gratefully from: http://www.trufax.org/
Development
of Neo-Darwinism
and the Genetic Approach to Life
Copyright 1995 -
1998, Leading Edge Research Group
"[August] Weismann
[German biologist, 1834-1914] was not a botanist. Like [T.H.] Huxley, his status
is that of a believer; for when we ask him whether the small random variations
in nature are important enough to decide between the life and death of the
creature, he replies with great candor: 'Even one who, like myself, has been for
many years a convinced adherent of the theory of selection, can only reply: We
assume so, but cannot prove it in any case. It is not upon demonstrative
evidence that we champion the doctrine of selection as scientific truth; we base
our arguments on quite other grounds.'" --Jacques Barzun
In our century, Darwinism
has triumphed as an orthodoxy, as a "rallying point of innumerable
scientific, philosophical, and social movements." Mr. Darwin became the
oracle, as Barzun suggests, and the Origin of Species the "fixed
point with which Evolution moved the world."
As the quotation which heads
this chapter suggests, the central doctrine in Darwinism--Natural Selection--was
understood, even by adherents, to be lacking in scientific merit. "No
one," said William Bateson, "can survey the work of recent years
without perceiving that evolutionary orthodoxy developed too fast and that a
great deal has got to come down."
Why did Weismann and other
scientists become to-the-death defenders of a theory that they should
have attacked?--as unscientific. Ignorance is ruled out. By his own
confession, Weismann was fully aware of the inadequacy of Natural Selection
as a scientific doctrine. The famous Bateson and many others hurled a few
epithets at Darwinism, but they did not succeed in generating a
"reformation" in evolutionary theory, even though a reformation was
clearly needed.
Substituting "Natural
Selection" for "Providence"
Barzun addressed this
question over fifty years ago and came up with the following possible
explanation: "By substituting Natural Selection for Providence, the new
science could solve a host of riddles arising in practical life, though by the
same exchange the new science had to become a religion." In contemporary
language, what occurred in the last century was a major "paradigm
shift." The Biblical paradigm was no longer fully convincing. Ever since
the Enlightenment took hold in the mind of Western humanity, the power of the
Church had waned steadily. Religion in the nineteenth century was not the
authority (and tyrant) it had been. It had entered into a pacific old age.
Western civilization was ready for a basal paradigm shift, and the apparent best
candidate around for new paradigm was Darwinism. In actuality, the best
candidate for a new paradigm was Transformism, but this theory was in effect
destroyed by the ridicule of Cuvier and cohorts.
Darwinism wasn't, as Barzun
suggests, the great liberator or anything like that. The liberation of the
Western mind from the dogma of the Church had already been accomplished. What
the West was looking for was a new, trustworthy vision of existence.
In other words, it was
simply time for a new "Truth." "We do less than justice to the
men of the nineteenth century who first did battle for evolution," Barzun
writes, "if we think that it was altogether for secret or unconscious
economic motives that they clung to Darwinism. A man like Huxley may have been
tempted by his pugnacity and evangelical passion to over-state his conclusions,
but he was neither stupid nor dishonest. He had the highest kind of courage, and
Calvinistic desire to be chosen for the right reason, which for him was the
possession of truth. 'Science and her methods,' he declared, 'gave me a resting
place independent of authority and tradition'. Darwinism, for better or worse,
happened to have become the chief representative of the scientific alternative
to religious dogma.
The Weismann Compromise:
Betrayal of the Integrity of Science
We can understand and
appreciate the psychological and practical necessities motivating Huxley and
peers, but at the same time, we cannot condone the "Weismann
compromise"--the promulgation of a theory as scientific which, in fact, is
unsupported by evidence. Weismann not only promulgated a doctrine (Natural
Selection) he knew to be unsupported, he attacked the Transformism of Lamarck by
spurious means.
Weismann's "final
refutation" of Lamarck amounted to nothing more than this: He cut off the
tails of several generations of mice, and then concluded that if Lamarck had
been correct, the progeny would be without tails. This ridiculous experiment was
based upon the presumption that Weismann was a fully qualified
representative of the environment. Lamarckism holds that evolution is a
product of interactivity between organism and environment. Darwinism, as
developed by Weismann and other "Neo-Darwinists," came to the
conclusion that the source of evolutionary change is within the organism (random
genetic mutation), not in the environment.
More needs to be said about
the Weismann compromise. As an event, it represents not simply a case of
over-zealousness, but the continuation of a fateful betrayal of the integrity of
science that began with the Cuvier attack on Lamarck. Giraffes and (other) red
herrings aside, the theory of Lamarck is basically correct. Evolution is a
matter of interactivity between organism and environment. The membrane of the
biological cell, as we know, contains numerous IMPs (integral membrane
proteins), each of which operates as a frequency receiver/transducer. The
receptor component of the IMP detects and "captures" a particular
frequency item, and the effector component accomplishes, in one way or another,
the transduction of the item across the membrane barrier. The cell membrane,
therefore, may be likened unto a radio receiver. It is designed to "pick
up" frequencies from the environment. The equivalent of the "broadcast
station" is not within the cell, it is (as we say) in the
environment.
Neo-Darwinism in the Realm
of DNA
The Neo-Darwinian view that
the DNA is origin of all biological expression simply ignores that possibility
that the cellular membrane has something to do with biological expression.
" Direct influence of the environment on the genetic materials is
impossible," Mayr writes. In the past few years, a number of research
projects have demonstrated specific mechanisms by which environmental signaling
affects the genetic structure directly. As it becomes increasingly obvious that
primacy is in the environment and that physiological primacy is in the cellular
membrane and not the DNA, the orthodoxy is casting about for new ways of
defending the DNA primacy doctrine. One of the more inventive members of the
orthodoxy (Francis Crick) is promoting the hypothesis that the DNA came from
outer space.
If the nucleus and its
genetic materials was in fact the origin of all biological expression, then we
would expect that the removal of the same would cause the death of the cell.
When cells are enucleated (have their nuclei removed), however, they continue to
live and operate--until they simply cannot get along without new parts. The
genes contain blueprints for all new parts.
In contrast, if the IMPs
(frequency receivers) in the cellular membrane are cut, then the cell goes
comatose. If the receptors are not replaced by visceral processes, the cell
dies.
There are a dozen other
proofs of the physiological primacy of the cellular membrane. Why is it that the
Neo-Darwininsts have so stubbornly insisted on the primacy of the genes? Why is
it that they still insist on the primary of DNA doctrine?--despite mounting
evidence that the doctrine is incorrect.
The answer to this question
lies not in the arena of science per se, but in the political
"environment" of modern biology and evolutionary theory.
Pardon our repetition in the
following paragraphs. The issues discussed are so critical, we must re-view the
underlying paradigmatic politics from time to time, in the light of our
developing thesis. So, again ... the traditional form of government in the West
is theocratic monarchy. Western monarchy is an expression of the Biblical
monotheistic paradigm. One God above, one monarch below. The monarch rules by
"divine right." Who administers the doctrine of divine right?
The Church.
Challenge to the Old Order
Any threat to the authority
of Bible and Church was a threat to the traditional order--the monarchical
system. The hated Inquisition and other institutions of religious suppression
operated in Europe for hundred of years. They could not have done so without the
sanction of the kings and queens and without the blessings of the clergy and
nobility.
In modern times, two great
challenges to the authority of the traditional rulers and their guidebook, the
Bible, arose. One was science, which is based on the idea that truth is be found
through direct observation and verified through objective experimentation. Who
do you prefer to trust where the question of (say) the center of the solar
system is concerned? Do you trust the clergy and their Bible?--or do you trust
Galileo and his telescope?
"Cartesianism,"
the philosophy of Rene Descarte, held that the world was a gigantic machine. It
was not just a stage on which moral dramas were played out, but a fabulous
mechanism, a super-version of the royal gardens at Versailles. The eyes of
Western Humanity began to turn away from the Bible and the pulpit and the
stained-glass cross ... and toward nature.
Along with modern science
"natural theology" arose--the second great challenge to the
traditional order. "Deism" and other forms of natural theology are
based on the idea that the Word of God is to be found in nature rather than in
that compilation of ancient testimonies we call the Holy Bible.
With the American
Revolution, Deism became a very active threat to the "Western way of
life." When Jefferson argued that the Colonies must seek independence, he
justified his position by appealing to "the laws of Nature and of Nature's
God." "Nature's God" is not the Biblical God.
The Americans succeeded, and
following their revolution, they outlawed the institution of
"aristocracy." When the French attempted a revolution of the same
sort, however, they were defeated by coalitions of monarchists and by
self-sabotage--by handing over sovereignty to Napoleon.
If the old order had had a
battle cry, it would have been "Deism must be destroyed!" Under the
Biblical paradigm, the flow of power (sovereignty) is from God the Source (the
ultimate sovereign) to the king (the temporal sovereign), to the nobility, who
are appointed by the king. Overseer of this "transfer-of-power" system
is the Church. The Deistic vision of existence cuts out completely royalty,
aristocracy and clergy from the power flow. In the Deistic vision, the flow of
power is from God to Nature, the "Living Scriptures." Who is next in
line? Those who are closest to Nature--common people.
Elitist Reaction to the
Egalitarian Revolution
Science and Deism came
together in the work of Jean Baptiste Lamarck. The evolutionary theory of
Lamarck supports the Deistic vision of existence as an egalitarian affair,
rather than the Biblical vision of life as hierarchical order. The first
"new world order" is egalitarian rather than elitist.
Are we beginning to get the
picture? Science (as represented by Lamarck and those of his ilk) and Deism were
simply not acceptable to those who ruled Europe in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. It was not possible for the elites of Europe to defeat the
new "visions of existence" that were emerging so powerfully in the
West. The only practical recourse these rulers had was to "own," to
control, the new forces as much as possible.
The Transformism of Lamarck
was not just the first theory of evolution, it was the first scientific basis
for a new holistic basal paradigm. Another such basis would not emerge until the
"New Physics" was born in the first decades of the twentieth century.
Transformism was genuinely revolutionary. Had the French Revolution succeeded,
Transformism would be heralded today as the first of the New Sciences. Instead,
Transformism fell (like the revolutionaries in France) before the onslaught of
the reactionaries--the forces of the old paradigm.
What the reactionaries of
Europe in the early nineteenth century needed was a "science" that saw
nature not as "the living word of God," but as a dark and frightful
thing--a menacing reality that would cause the common people to cry out for
protection. As we all know, political elites happen to be in the protection
business.
Classical Darwinism was the
means by which the old paradigm elitists of the middle nineteenth century
"took over" science. Darwinism was, and is, a reactionary
pseudo-science. Its most basic premise is that there is no moral guidance force
called "God," there is nothing in fact to warrant the idea that life
has any kind of purpose--divine or otherwise--whatsoever. Life is a dark and
brutal struggle, and when we seek scientifically the truth as to the
"meaning" of life, we find no evidence at all of "meaning."
Life is without meaning. Life forms emerge out of haphazard processes, and
whether they live or die is determined by haphazard Natural Selection. For well
over a hundred years, this view of existence has been recognized as the
"official, scientific truth." It is incorrect.
The Concept of
"Scientific Selection"
At the beginning of our
century, classical Darwinism had lost its luster in scientific circles. Where
was the evidence for Natural Selection? There was none. Weismann knew. Others
knew. Natural Selection was an assumption, nothing more than an hypothesis.
"We are reasoning in a circle," Weismann writes, "not giving
proofs, and no one who does not wish to believe in the selection value of the
initial stages can be forced to do so."
At the same time, a
challenge to classical Darwinism arose among the pioneers in genetics. De Vries,
a Dutch biologist, asserted in 1901 that there were two kinds of
variation--"the random variations previously observed by Darwin, and what
he himself called 'mutations,' or sizable divergence's from the parent
form...." The work of Bateson (from 1894 and on) suggested that small
random changes (viewed by Darwinists as the primary means of evolution)
"did not accumulate through long ages and were in fact irrelevant to
evolution."
In addition to these
challenges to the orthodoxy came publication of the work of Gregor Mendel, a
Moravian abbot who had completed in the mid-nineteenth century "some
beautifully simple and clear experiments on the proportions in which the
characters of the common or garden pea are inherited upon crossing." The
new biology was ceasing to be interested in unprovable hypotheses and turning
its attention to the microscopic world, where "invisible determinants did
the work of evolution prenatally."
For the most part, the
pioneers of genetics did not view themselves as elaborating upon Darwinism in
any sense. If anything, they tended to see themselves as establishing a basis
for a more scientific theory of evolution.
The doctrines of Darwinism
seemed to crumble, almost visibly. The idea that evolution is a very slow,
minute step by step process, for instance. "Do the new lights on heredity
and variation," asked Bateson, "make the process of Evolution easier
to understand? On the whole they do,.... An Evolution by definite steps is more,
rather than less easy to imagine that one proceeding by the accumulation of
indefinite and insensible steps." Early critics of Darwin, especially
Samuel Butler, received apologies, Barzun indicates, and "biographies of
Lamarck took on a eulogistic tone." Once again, as in the previous century,
the forces of reaction moved into action.... with the result that classical
Darwinism and the new genetics were combined into a new theory of evolution, one
titled "Neo-Darwinism." The father of Neo-Darwinism is August Weismann.
Underlying Neo-Darwinism is
the ingenious thesis of August Weismann that there is a proof of Darwinism, but
the proof is not to be found in the visible world.... it's to be found in the
microscopic world.
The classical Darwinian idea
that variation is the result of "the struggle of existence" is
replaced by the idea that variation comes from a kind of microscopic struggle.
In 1976, this idea was taken into the land of total absurdity by Richard
Dawkins, in The Selfish Gene. According to Dawkins, writes Niles Eldredge
, "there are in life but two kinds of entitities: replicators and vehicles
.... Genes are replicators, but they can't exist and operate on their own. Genes
need a vehicle--an organism--to house and nourish them and to facilitate their
replicative functions. It isn't organisms (the mere vehicles) that are competing
for reproductive success, but the genes themselves. Organisms as vehicles are
simply the unwitting dupes of their genic components."
What happens to
"Natural Selection?" It is reaffirmed by the new orthodoxy, but
reaffirmed as a means of evolution that no longer operates "in the
clear." Religions and various other misguided institutions have interfered
with the natural course of evolution, and thus it is necessary for responsible
parties to take up the burden of ensuring the continuance of evolutionary
progress--through genetic engineering. Under the new orthodoxy, Natural
Selection is regarded simply as a long-ago reality, and "scientific
selection" is viewed as humankind's best hope for the future. ~
Reproduced gratefully from: http://www.trufax.org/
The
Suppressed Ideas of Kropotkin on Evolution
Kropotkin
Basis for a Cooperative
Economy in Russia
By Ronald Logan
In his book, Bully for
Brontosaurus, scientific historian Stephen Jay Gould devotes a chapter to
presenting Peter Kropotkin's views on biological evolution. Kropotkin is best
known as a Russian revolutionary anarchist who believed in cooperative, rather
than hierarchical and competitive, human relationships, and in devolving the
power of the central state to local communities. It is less well known that his
political views were based on a sophisticated view of evolution.
Kropotkin's ideas on
evolution contrasted sharply with those of Victorian English intellectuals such
as Thomas Huxley, who stated: ". . . the animal world is about on a level
of a gladiator's show . . . whereby the strongest, the swiftest, and the
cunningest live to fight another day." To the Victorian Darwinists, this
view of nature gave substance to Thomas Malthus' belief in survival of the
fittest, and bolstered the social Darwinist ethos of competition and unbridled
private property rights.
Kropotkin could not accept
Huxley's "gladiatorial" Darwinism as a valid account of evolutionary
biology, believing instead that the predominant way in which species achieve
success is through cooperation, not competition. (Kropotkin acknowledged the
prevalence of inter-species conflict; it was intra-species conflict with which
he took exception.) He also believed that nature provides guidance for human
morality through its emphasis on sociability and cooperation, not unrestrained
competitiveness.
Rather than adopt a view of
nature which supported his political thesis, as do most social philosophers,
Kropotkin's political views evolved from his scientific experience. As a young
man, he spent five years as a naturalist studying the geology and zoology of
eastern Russia. During this period, he observed that living things coped with
the harsh Siberian environment primarily through cooperative behavior. In his
book, Mutual Aid, written as a rebuttal to Huxley's essay, "The Struggle
for Existence in Human Society," Kropotkin stated: "During the
journeys which I made in my youth in Eastern Siberia and Northern Manchuria . .
. I failed to find--although I was eagerly looking for it--that bitter struggle
for the means of existence among animals belonging to the same species, which
was considered by most Darwinists as the dominant characteristic of struggle for
life, and the main factor of evolution."
Kropotkin abhorred the
social vision of the gladiatorial evolutionists: "They conceive of the
animal world as a world of perpetual struggle among half-starved individuals,
thirsting for one another's blood . . . They raise the 'pitiless' struggle for
personal advantages to the height of a biological principle which man must
submit to as well." Countering the social Darwinists, Kropotkin asserted,
"If we . . . ask Nature: 'who are the fittest: those who are continually at
war with each other, or those who support one another?' we at once see that
those animals which acquire habits of mutual aid are undoubtedly the fittest.
They have more chances to survive, and they attain, in their respective classes,
the highest development of intelligence and bodily organization." From his
observation that mutual aid gives evolutionary advantage to living beings, he
derived his political philosophy--a philosophy which stressed community and
cooperative endeavor.
Kropotkin was not alone
among Russian intellectuals in questioning British Darwinism. Rather, as Gould
points out, "he represented a standard, well-developed Russian critique of
Darwin, based on interesting reasons and coherent national traditions." The
Russian school of evolution based its criticism of Darwin not only on their
observations of natural history, but also out of political antipathy to social
Darwinism. Daniel Todes, in his article "Darwin's Malthusian Metaphor and
Russian Evolutionary Thought" (published in Isis, the leading history of
science journal), observed that objections to the Western competitive world view
were shared by Russian radicals and conservatives: "Radicals, who hoped to
build a socialist society, saw Malthusianism as a reactionary current in
bourgeois political economy. Conservatives, who hoped to preserve the communal
virtues of tsarist Russia, saw it as an expression of the 'British national
type.'"
Nineteenth-century Russian
evolutionary theory had little impact on the development of biology or political
theory in the Western industrial world, but the issues Kropotkin and his
colleagues raised remain relevant. Now that Russia is in the process of choosing
a new political and economic future, the substance of Kropotkin's vision of
nature and society warrant reconsideration.
The Modern
View
A century has passed since
Kropotkin challenged the British evolutionists. How has a hundred years of
accumulated scientific knowledge influenced the debate over fierce competition
versus mutual cooperation as the primary mechanism of species survival? Relevant
evidence comes mainly from two sources: biology (particularly ecology) and
social psychology.
A good analysis of the
biological evidence is presented in the book, The New Biology, by Robert Augros
and George Stanciu, summarized in their paper, "The Biology of Aggression
and Cooperation" (Noetic Sciences Review, Winter 1989). Augros and Stanciu
begin their analysis by observing that Darwin relied on eighteenth-century
reductionist methodology, which tries to understand the whole through analysis
of its parts. "He split nature into all its separate parts, individual
plants and animals, and saw that everything was trying to reproduce itself as
much as it could . . . Then when he put all those isolated organisms back
together, he thought it was clear that such reproduction would lead to a
shortage of space, of food, and other necessities of life. There was going to be
severe competition, and therefore all of nature was going to be at war."
The inevitable conclusion of reductionist methodology is that nature must be
ruled by conflict.
The reductionist premise is
a core assumption of the Western intellectual paradigm. But this premise has
come under sustained attack by a diversity of scientific disciplines, including
biology (increasingly influenced by ecology, which focuses on the interactive
processes in living systems). Biologists dissatisfied with reductionism are
attempting to articulate a new biology, one which looks at wholes, at systems,
and at synergisms (as well as at the functioning of parts). From this new
biology we find, as Augros and Stanciu report, that "nature uses
extraordinarily ingenious techniques to avoid conflict and competition, and that
cooperation is extraordinarily widespread throughout all of nature."
Nature avoids competition in
various ways: by separating species geographically into differing habitats; by
sorting species into unique niches within habits; by spatial division according
to gradations of environmental factors, such as oxygen content at different
levels of a body of water; by territorial demarcations, as when cats mark out
with their scent the space which is theirs; and by establishing dominance
hierarchies within social groupings of animals.
Cooperation is fostered
through a wide array of symbiotic arrangements. Many plants produce tasty
fruits, which animals eat, later depositing the undigested seeds. The intestinal
bacteria of grazing animals makes possible the breakdown of cellulose fibers
into digestible fatty acids. Egyptian plovers get their food by cleaning
parasites off the bodies of rhinoceroses. And clown fish are given protection by
anemone, while serving as bait for the fish that the anemone eat. These are only
examples of inter- species cooperation--intra-species cooperation is even more
commonplace.
At the time Kropotkin
challenged British Darwinism, the scientific study of human behavior was in its
infancy: Wilhelm Wundt had just begun the first psychology laboratory in
Leipzig. In the debate as to whether competition or cooperation is more
characteristic of human nature, the young field of psychology was mute. Today,
however, there is a vast body of social psychology literature on this question.
Alfie Kohn, author of No
Contest: The Case Against Competition, spent seven years reviewing more than 400
research studies dealing with competition and cooperation. Prior to his
investigation, he believed that "competition can be natural and appropriate
and healthy." After reviewing research findings, he radically revised this
opinion, concluding that, "The ideal amount of competition . . . in any
environment, the classroom, the workplace, the family, the playing field, is
none . . . . [Competition] is always destructive" (Noetic Sciences Review,
Spring 1990).
According to Kohn, there are
three principle consequences of competition. First, it has a negative effect on
productivity and excellence. This is due to increased anxiety, inefficiency (as
compared to cooperative sharing of resources and knowledge), and the undermining
of inner motivation. Competition shifts the focus to victory over others, and
away from intrinsic motivators such as curiosity, interest, excellence, and
social interaction. Studies show that cooperative behaviour, by contrast,
consistantly predicts good performance--a finding which holds true under a wide
range of subject variables. Interestingly, the positive benefits of cooperation
become more significant as tasks become more complex, or where greater
creativity and problem-solving ability is required.
The second effect of
competition is that it lowers self-esteem and hampers the development of sound,
self-directed individuals. A strong sense of self is difficult to attain when
self-evaluation is dependent on seeing how we measure up to others. On the other
hand, those whose identity is formed in relation to how they contribute to group
efforts generally possess greater self- confidence and higher self-esteem.
Finally, competition
undermines human relationships. Humans are social beings; we best express our
humanness in interaction with others. By creating winners and losers,
competition is destructive to human unity and prevents close social feeling. In
the competitive mode, people work at cross purposes, or for personal gain. Some
come out ahead, some behind; some win, some lose. It becomes impossible for
people to move together, as is necessary for a harmonious human society.
Biology and social
psychology are not the only disciplines which support cooperation as the natural
basis for human interaction. Ethnological studies indicate that virtually all
indigenous cultures operate on the basis of highly cooperative relationships.
Anthropologist Nancy Tanner has presented evidence to show that the predominant
force driving early human evolution was cooperative social interaction, leading
to the capacity of hominids to develop culture. And industrial psychology now
promotes "worker participation" and team functioning because it is
decisively more productive than hierarchical management.
Beyond
Science
In 1910, while lying in his
death bed, Leo Tolstoy dictated his last letter, a letter of advice to his son
and daughter. He told them: "The views you have acquired about Darwinism,
evolution, and the struggle for existence won't explain to you the meaning of
your life and won't give you guidance in your actions, and a life without an
explanation of its meaning and importance, and without the unfailing guidance
that stems from it is a pitiful existence. Think about it. I say it, probably on
the eve of my death, because I love you."
Tolstoy's concerns about the
Darwinism of his time were vindicated by history. In America, social Darwinism
justified the unbridled economic exploitation of the robber barons. America's
first billionaire, John D. Rockefeller, ruthlessly built up his Standard Oil
monopoly believing that his efforts were sanctioned by the natural order. He
said: "The growth of large business is merely a survival of the
fittest."
In Germany, social Darwinism
supplied justification for German militarism during World War I. Vernon Kellogg,
an American biologist stationed during the war at the headquarters of the German
Great General Staff, later described the Darwinian views of the German military
officers in his book Headquarters Nights: "The creed of the Allmact
["all might" or omnipotence] of a natural selection based on violent
and competitive struggle is the gospel of the German intellectuals; all else is
illusion and anathema.... That human group which is in the most advanced
evolutionary stage . . . should win in the struggle for existence, and this
struggle should occur precisely that the various types may be tested, and the
best not only preserved, but put in position to impose its kind of social
organization on the others, or, alternatively, to destroy and replace
them."
We now know that the
dominant evolutionary thinking of Tolstoy's day was flawed, and that the
minority view of Peter Kropotkin lies closer to the truth. But does this mean
that "the new biology" should now become the basis for our moral
truths and our social institutions?
It would certainly be unwise
to ignore or dismiss the compelling findings of biology and social psychology.
The post-reductionist, holistic science of our time can supply us with deep
insights into the general laws of nature--our own included. But can
materialistic science, even formulated with an enlightened holistic paradigm,
provide what Tolstoy wished for his children: a foundation for meaning and
guidance for our lives?
The problems with
materialism as a foundation for human values are twofold. First, science studies
the phenomena of a dynamically changing world, and its theories and paradigms
about the world are also constantly evolving. As Paul Samuelson once expressed:
"funeral by funeral, theory advances." The truths of science, while
often robust, are not permanent, but subject to change. Human society is also
part of the changing world, and must progressively adapt to new ideas and
institutions. But finding purpose in human life is a different matter. We have
innate need, many believe, to find purpose in that which is eternal and
infinite.
The second problem with
materialism is that mind is subtler than matter. The use of knowledge about the
physical universe to define value structures for directed by the mind is
inherently limited, as there are realms of human experience that transcend
physicality. To limit our understanding of ourselves to that which can be
explained materially is to restrict the comprehensive, integrated development of
the human personality.
There is a growing consensus
that the post-modernist episteme will not have materialist foundations. But
neither is there much sentiment for a retreat to idealism. Idealism has been
expressed in Socrates' fascistic vision of society lorded over by philosopher
kings, in Shankaracharya's philosophy that the world is illusion, in medieval
religion's obsession with heaven and obliviousness to suffering, and in Hegel's
glorification of individual sublimation to the state. Its long history of
defective and detrimental philosophies has discredited idealism as a basis for
human welfare. If both scientific empiricism and idealistic philosophy are
inadequate, then what alternative faculty of knowing can provide us with meaning
and proper moral guidance?
Tolstoy's answer was that
truth can only be achieved by looking within oneself, that a transcendent reason
and power flows from within us, and that our highest purpose is to do its will.
Tolstoy formulated a philosophy of Christian mysticism, but his core ideas are
generally consistent with what Aldous Huxley (grandson of Thomas) termed the
"perennial philosophies." Huxley perceived that certain common themes
have been expressed by humanity's great seers--those who derived their teachings
from personal illumination, revelation or mystical experience. Though living in
different times and cultures, their teachings share fundamental beliefs and
values.
The American humanistic
psychologist Abraham Maslow studied "peak experiences"--the kinds of
experience out of which the perennial philosophies originated. He termed the
cognitive state that arises during peak experiences "B-cognition," or
cognition of being. He detailed his research in his book, Religions, Values and
Peak Experiences, where he wrote that his "most important finding was the
discovery of . . . B-values or the intrinsic values of Being." He went on
to observe that "this list of the described characteristics of the world as
it is perceived in our most perspicuous moments is about the same as what people
through the ages have called eternal verities, or the spiritual values, or the
highest values."
What do those whose values
are derived from B-cognition have to say about the issue of contention between
Huxley (the Darwinist) and Kropotkin? The consensus is definite: love and
cooperation, not conflict and competition, are the eternal verities which should
guide human relations.
Beyond
Capitalism
P.R. Sarkar was a
twentieth-century philosopher and spiritual teacher who was as concerned with
social justice as he was with spiritual liberation. Sarkar, like others who
espouse the perennial philosophy, believed that the B-cognition, or intuitional
mode of knowing, is inherently synthetic. In contrast to reductionism and the
rationalist approach to knowledge, which is analytical in nature, intuitional
faculty of mind tends toward wholeness--its ultimate reach being a state of
unitary consciousness in which individuals directly identify with the cosmic
whole, rather than with a limited ego state.
Those who acquire synthetic
knowledge inevitably develop a growing sense of the unity and interconnectedness
of life. Based on this universal spiritual perception, Sarkar believed it
possible for humanity to recognize its integrated, interdependent existence, and
move collectively to achieve its material, psychic and spiritual aspirations. He
termed this ideal "universalism."
Sarkar rejected competition
and upheld cooperation: "In every field of collective life there should be
cooperation amongst the members of society." In this respect, his thinking
is not novel; it has been espoused by many people of wisdom. But he went beyond
other spiritual philosophers in his use of perennial philosophy values to
formulate socio-economic theory.
Sarkar insisted that
collective efforts should take the form of "coordinated cooperation,"
not subordinated cooperation. Subordinated cooperation occurs "where people
do something individually or collectively, but keep themselves under other
peoples' supervision." Coordinated cooperation occurs "between free
human beings, each with equal rights and mutual respect for each other, and each
working for the welfare of the other." In relation to this ideal form of
social relationships, he observed that none of the present socio-economic
systems are based on coordinated cooperation, but on subordinated cooperation,
and that this "results in the degeneration of society's moral fabric."
Sarkar formulated a
spiritual perspective on wealth: "This universe is created in the
imagination of the Supreme Entity, so the ownership of this universe . . . does
not belong to any particular individual; everything is the patrimony of us all.
Every living being can utilize their rightful share of this property. . . . [T]his
whole animate world is a large joint family in which nature has not assigned any
property to any particular individual."
Sarkar termed this
conception of wealth "cosmic inheritance," and made clear its
implications for economic theory: "According to genuine spiritual ideology,
the system of individual ownership cannot be accepted as absolute and final,
hence capitalism, too, cannot be supported." Cosmic ownership also
undermines "state capitalism"--communism's command economy system in
which there is state ownership of wealth.
Based on his premises of
universalism, coordinated cooperation, and cosmic inheritence, Sarkar formulated
an alternative economics which he called "cooperative economics."
Cooperative economics is an aspect of his comprehensive socio-economic
philosophy, called PROUT.
While Sarkar rejected the
rigidities of rationalism and reductionism, he did not reject rationality and
empiricism. Though he relied on spiritually derived truth to provide the
premises and basic value structure of PROUT, he emphasized that fleshing out
this economic theory requires close observation of human nature, and of social
and economic dynamics. By insisting that social theory follow from social
experience, Sarkar avoided many utopian errors.
For example, while Sarkar
agreed with Kropotkin in rejecting capitalism, his economic theory takes a much
different position on production incentives. Kropotkin, like Marx, advocated
"from each according to their ability, to each according to their
needs." In Sarkar's view, this high sounding ideal "will reap no
harvest in the hard soil of the world." Without suitable motivation,
productivity declines, and society as a whole suffers. In PROUT, therefore,
"Meritorious people should certainly receive greater
amenities"--though PROUT does not sanction material incentives beyond what
is needed to promote the common welfare.
New
Foundations for Russia
Cartesian reductionism
formed the epistemological basis for Malthusianism and social Darwinism, which
in turn provided intellectual rationale for the greed of capitalism. Dialectical
materialism attempted to create an antithesis to reductionist thinking, but its
materialism brought spiritual poverty. And, by promoting such utopian notions as
the classless society and production without material incentive, its materialism
capitulated to idealism and floundered on its inner contradictions. Both
capitalism and communism have failed to adequately serve human welfare, and have
eroded the moral, cultural and ecological fabric of the world. The future of
humanity must lie with a new economics, erected on sounder foundations.
Economist Jaroslav Vanek, in
his paper "Towards a Strategy of Democracy, Political and Economic, in
Russia," points out that communal economic activity had deep roots in
Russia's pre- Revolution village economies. This tradition of cooperation
apparently came to the fore in 1917. According to Professor George Gurvitich, a
participating witness to the October revolution, there was a brief nine month
period immediately following the Russian Revolution when an embryonic economic
system based on democratic cooperation prevailed. This system was supported in
early Bolshevik Party congresses--until party leaders imposed political and
economic centralism.
As in 1917, Russia finds
itself poised at a momentous juncture, with a choice of futures spread before
it. Were Russia to choose a cooperative economy to replace communism, there
would be much supporting logic: consistency with the traditional values of
village life; revival of the initial economic ideal chosen by the people
following the downfall of Tsarist tyranny; the vindicated evolutionary views of
Kropotkin; contemporary scientific understandings of human nature; and
compatibility with the sentiment for social equity which socialism imbued in the
Russian psyche.
But beyond the compelling
logic of tradition, science, and economics, there is a more profound reason for
Russia to adopt economic cooperation: cooperation is supported by spiritual
truth. For those, like Tolstoy, who insist that humans need an enduring source
of meaning in their lives and the guidance of proper values, cooperative
economics is congruent with the eternal verities. It is the economic system
Tolstoy would have wanted for his children, and for all of the children of
mother Russia.
This article
was originally presented as an opening address at the Symposium on the
Humanistic Aspects of Regional Development, held in September 1993 in
Birobidzhan, Russia, and co-organized by Proutist Universal and the Institute
for the Complex Analysis of Regional Problems.
From Prout Journal, Vol 6,
No 3
Reproduced gratefully from: http://www.trufax.org/
A
Few Thoughts on IQ and the Wealth of Nations
http://www.vdare.com/sailer/wealth_of_nations.htm
A Few
Thoughts on IQ and the Wealth of Nations
By Steve
Sailer
I want to contribute some
observations about the landmark book [17]IQ and the Wealth of Nations by
[18]Richard Lynn of the U. of Ulster and Tatu Vanhanen of the U. of Helsinki. It
was the subject of an extremely informative Feb. 27th [19]VDARE.COM review by
[20]J. Philippe Rushton, which this is intended to complement.
The book's content is
irresistible - at its heart is a table of the average IQ scores of 81 different
countries, most drawn from studies published in peer-reviewed scientific
journals. The national average IQs range from 107 for Hong Kong to 59 for
Equatorial Guinea.
Lynn and Vanhanen
benchmarked their IQ results so that Britain is 100. America scores 98 on this
scale, and the world average is 90. IQ's are assumed to form a normal
probability distribution ("[21]bell curve") with the standard
deviation set at 15. Here are a few examples:
Percentile of GDP Per Cap
National Avg. Person Purchasing
Nation Avg. IQ Relative to UK Power Parity
Eq. Guinea 59 0.3% $ 1,817
Nigeria 67 1% $ 795
Barbados 78 7% $ 12,001
Guatemala 79 8% $ 3,505
India 81 10% $ 2,077
Iraq 87 19% $ 3,197
Mexico 87 19% $ 7,704
Argentina 96 39% $ 12,013
US 98 45% $ 29,605
China 100 50% $ 3,105
UK 100 50% $ 20,336
Italy 102 55% $ 20,585
Japan 105 63% $ 23,257
Hong Kong 107 68% $ 20,763
Admit it, you want to know
what the rest of the table says! Beyond satisfying sheer curiosity, though, the
strong correlation between IQ and the wealth of nations is of world-historical
importance. From now on, no public intellectual can seriously claim to be
attempting to understand how the world works unless he takes IQ into account.
How much can
we trust these IQ results?
As soon as I received the
book, I turned to Appendix 1, where Lynn and Vanhanen describe all 168 national
IQ studies they've found - an average of just over two per country.
Are the results internally
consistent? In other words, when there are multiple studies for a single
country, do they tend to give roughly the same answer?
I expected a sizable amount
of internal divergence. I spent 18 years in the marketing research industry, so
I know how expensive it is to come up with a nationally representative sample.
Further, Lynn and Vanhanen use results from [22]quite different IQ tests. They
rely most on the non-verbal Raven's Progressive Matrices, which were designed to
be used across cultures, even by illiterates. Yet, they also have a lot of
results from the [23]Wechsler exams, which are more culture dependent - the
Wechsler include a vocabulary subtest, for example. And they report results from
other IQ tests, including a few from the oddball Goodenough-Harris Draw-A-Man
test. Also, sample sizes vary dramatically, from a few dozen in some obscure
countries to 64,000 for one American study. Finally, some studies were of
children, others of adults.
This doesn't sound
promising. Nevertheless, the results show a high degree of internal consistency.
Here are the first eight countries for which they have multiple scores:
Argentina: 93 and 98
Australia: 97, 98, and 99 Austria: 101, 103 Belgium: 99, 103, 98 Brazil: 88, 84,
90, and 85 Bulgaria: 94, 91 China: 100, 92.5, 103.4 Democratic Republic of
Congo: 73, 72
That's not bad at all. In
fact, leaving aside China, the results are remarkably consistent. There are, of
course, a few countries for which different studies came up with quite divergent
results, especially Poland, where the two scores Lynn and Vanhanen found were 92
and 106. Still, the correlation among results when there are two or more studies
for a country is a striking 0.94.
You shouldn't take every
score on faith. The reported IQ for Israel (only 94????!!!) has elicited much
criticism. Lynn has replied that he wanted to publish the data as he found it,
even if some of it looked implausible. His hope is to encourage further research
to resolve seeming anomalies.
The IQ structures of the two
giga-countries, China and India, demand more intense study, in part because the
future history of the world will hinge in no small part on their endowments of
human capital. The demography of India is especially complex due to its caste
system, which resembles Jim Crow on steroids and acid. By discouraging
intermarriage, caste has subdivided the Indian people into an incredible number
of micro-races. In India, according to the dean of population genetics, [24]L.L.
Cavalli-Sforza, "The total number of endogamous communities today is around
43,000..." We know that some of those communities - such as the Zoroastrian
[25]Parsees of Bombay - are exceptionally intelligent.
But we can't say with any
confidence what is the long run IQ potential of Indians overall. Their current
IQ score (81) is low, especially compared to China (100), the other country with
hundreds of millions of poor peasants. Yet, keep in mind just how narrow life in
rural India was for so long. In 1952, on the fifth anniversary of independence,
the Indian government commissioned a survey to find out if the average Indian
villager had heard yet that the British had gone. The study was quietly
cancelled when early results showed that the average villager had never heard
that the British had ever arrived!
It appears likely that some
combination of malnutrition, disease, inbreeding, lack of education, lack of
mental stimulation, lack of familiarity with abstract reasoning and so forth can
keep people from reaching their genetic potential for IQ. Lynn himself did early
studies demonstrating that malnutrition drives down IQ. The co-authors conclude
their book by recommending that
"The rich countries'
economic aid programs for the poor countries should be continued and some of
these should be directed at attempting to increase the intelligence levels of
the populations of the poorer countries by improvements in nutrition and the
like."
A clear example of how a bad
environment can hurt IQ can be seen in the IQ scores for sub-Saharan African
countries. They average only around 70. In contrast, African-Americans average
about 85. It appears unlikely that African-Americans' white admixture can
account for most of this 15-point gap because they are only around 17%-18% white
on average, according to the latest genetic research. (Thus African-Americans
white genes probably couldn't account for more than 3 points of the gap between
African-Americans and African-Africans.) This suggests that the harshness of
life in Africa might be cutting ten points or more off African IQ scores.
Similarly, West Africans are
significantly shorter in height than their distant cousins in America, most
likely due to malnutrition and infections. The two African-born NBA superstars,
[26]Hakeem Olajuwon and [27]Dikembe Mutombo, are both from the [28]wa-benzi
[people of the (Mercedes ) Benz]upper class. Only the elite in Africa gets
enough food and health care to grow up to be NBA centers.
This also implies that
African-Americans might be able to achieve higher IQs too, although the
environmental gap between white Americans and black Americans appears to be much
smaller than between black Americans and black Africans. As [29]I pointed out in
VDARE in 2000, the most promising avenue for improving African-Americans' IQs is
by promoting breastfeeding among blacks mothers, who nurse their babies at much
lower rates than whites.
In fact, we know that IQ is
not completely fixed over time because raw test scores have been rising for
decades, about 2 to 3 points per decade. To counteract this, the IQ test-making
firms periodically make it harder - in absolute terms - to achieve a score of
100. Lynn was possibly the first scientist to make this phenomenon widely known,
although New Zealand political scientist James Flynn has gotten more [30]credit
for this recently. And, indeed, Lynn and Vanhanen scrupulously adjust the test
results in their book to account for when each test was taken.
While the causes of the
Lynn-Flynn Effect remain rather mysterious, it does resemble several other
ongoing phenomena. For example, human beings are getting taller, living longer,
and having fewer of their babies die during infancy.
One might expect IQ scores
to converge as the richest nations experience diminishing marginal returns on
improvements in nutrition, health, and education. By way of analogy, consider
how, after 1950, average height has not grown as fast in already well-fed
America as it has in rapidly developing East Asia.
It's unlikely the Japanese
will ever be as tall on average as, say, Lithuanians or Croatians or
African-Americans. But the gap has closed. This partial convergence in height is
why you now see 6'-2" East Asian baseball pitchers like [31]Hideo Nomo and
[32]Chan Ho Park starring in the American big leagues. Last year [33]Wang Zhizhi,
7'-1" became the first Asian ever to join the NBA.
Perhaps that kind of
convergence will happen with IQ scores someday. But the evidence that it is
happening now isn't terribly strong. The odd thing about the Lynn-Flynn Effect
is that it doesn't seem to have had much impact on comparative rankings of IQ
over time. The smart seem to keep on getting smarter.
For instance, one of the
best-documented examples of a country with rising raw IQ scores is the
Netherlands (current IQ: 102). But even as far back as the[34] 17th Century, the
general opinion of mankind was that the Dutch had a lot on the ball.
One potential explanation
for why IQ gaps don't seem to be narrowing (for example, the white-black IQ gap
in America has been about 15 points for 80 years or so) was [35]offered by Flynn
recently. He argued that smart people, because they find cognitive challenges
pleasurable, seek out more mentally stimulating environments, which in turn
exercise their brains more, making them even smarter. This suggests, for
example, that the Dutch will tend to become, [36]say, Internet addicts demanding
constant fixes of new information and argument, and thus continue to grow in
mental firepower.
While unproven, Flynn's
suggestion seems possible. In absolute terms, it's a [37]virtuous circle. But it
seems unlikely to lead to the closing of the relative gap.
Ultimately, though, it is
hard to avoid concluding that intellectual and income differences between
nations stem to some extent from genetic differences. The results simply cluster
too much by race. All the countries populated by Northeast Asians score between
100 and 107. The European-populated lands score between 90 and 102. Southeast
Asian nations cluster in the low 90s. The Caucasian countries in North Africa
and western Asia score mostly in the 80s. And so forth.
The correlation between
national IQ and national income is very high. For the 81 countries, the r is .73
for GDP measured in purchasing power parity terms (which makes poor nations with
lots of subsistence farmers look better off than they do in standard measures of
just the cash economy). In the social sciences, correlations of 0.2 are said to
be "low," 0.4 are "moderate," and 0.6 are "high."
So 0.73 is most impressive.
This doesn't mean that a
high IQ alone is the cause of a high income. Causation probably runs in both
directions, in another virtuous circle. Rich countries tend to produce enough
food to stave off malnutrition, for instance, which probably leads to higher
IQs, which leads to even higher food production due to more sophisticated
farming techniques.
Interestingly, per capita
income correlates almost as strongly with a nation's level of economic freedom
as it does with its level of intelligence. But that's in large part because
economic freedom and IQ correlate with each other - at the high level of 0.63.
Freedom and brains probably
contribute to each other. Although there are obvious exceptions, countries with
smart workers (and smart leaders) tended to find that the capitalist system
generated wealth. So there was less impetus to experiment with command economies
than in places where free enterprise wasn't getting the job done.
But it could also be that
freedom exercises the brain - West Germans averaged 103 while East Germans
scored only 95. My pet theory is that having to make [38]all the choices between
products available in a successful capitalist economy stimulates mental
development. (I believe this because, as I get older and stupider, I
increasingly find shopping to be intellectually exhausting.) But evidence for
this is not abundant.
Culture can play a role as
well - at the extreme, contrast two countries with almost identical per capita
GDPs: Barbados and Argentina (at least before Argentina's recent economic
collapse). [39]Don't cry for Argentina, because it is blessed with ample IQ
(96). But it's dragged down by a notorious lack of economic and political
self-discipline. In contrast, [40]Barbados, despite an average IQ of 78, is one
of the most pleasant countries in the 3rd World due to its commitment to
maintaining a veddy, veddy English culture.
Still, these two countries
are close to being the exceptions that prove the rule. The explanatory power of
the "cultural realist" models like Thomas Sowell's are necessarily
more limited than those of "biocultural realist" like Richard Lynn. In
general, cultures that emphasize, say, foresight are generally found in
countries where people have enough IQ to be foresighted. Maybe people in
northern countries tend to have higher IQs because people too unintelligent to
effectively prepare for winter tended to get removed from the gene pool.
The IQ-income correlation is
not perfect either. But even where it breaks down - most notably with China - IQ
helps explain otherwise puzzling developments like the recent headline in the
New York Times announcing "[41]Globalization Proves Disappointing."
Globalization, or the
fast-paced growth of trade and cross-border investment, has done far less to
raise the incomes of the world's poorest people than the leaders had hoped, many
officials here say. The vast majority of people living in Africa, Latin America,
Central Asia and the Middle East are no better off today than they were in
1989..."
On the other hand, hundreds
of billions in private investment have poured into China, which, despite its
parasitical ruling caste, has enjoyed strong economic growth.
So what's the story behind
this story? Apparently, capital flows to where wages are low but IQs are high -
pre-eminently China, where the average IQ is two points higher than the U.S.
already and likely to go higher as economic development continues.
In contrast, these other
regions (with the exception of Argentina) average IQs of 90 or less, sometimes
considerably less.
This is not to disparage
free markets - there's no alternative. The point is simply that humans differ
greatly in productive capacity, so not everyone benefits from economic
competition to the same extent.
The implications for
immigration policy are clear.
First, any conceivable level
of immigration to America is insufficient to make any difference in the welfare
of the billions of foreigners living in poverty.
Second, in a world where the
average IQ is 90, America's nepotism-driven immigration system (legal and
illegal) will continue to import primarily foreigners with two-digit IQs. These
immigrants' skills are typically insufficient to compete with our native IQ
elite, but are ample for driving down the wages of our fellow American citizens
who were not blessed in the IQ lottery.
The morality of such a
system I leave to the reader to decide.
April 14, 2002
Return
to top of page
|