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A
few hours after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon, the Bush administration concluded without supporting evidence,
that "Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organisation were prime suspects".
CIA Director George Tenet stated that bin Laden has the capacity to plan
``multiple attacks with little or no warning.'' Secretary of State Colin
Powell called the attacks "an act of war" and President Bush confirmed in an
evening televised address to the Nation that he would "make no distinction
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them".
Former CIA Director James Woolsey pointed his finger at "state sponsorship,"
implying the complicity of one or more foreign governments. In the words of
former National Security Adviser, Lawrence Eagleburger, "I think we will
show when we get attacked like this, we are terrible in our strength and in
our retribution."
Meanwhile, parroting official statements, the Western media mantra has
approved the launching of "punitive actions" directed against civilian
targets in the Middle East. In the words of William Saffire writing in the
New York Times: "When we reasonably determine our attackers' bases and
camps, we must pulverize them -- minimizing but accepting the risk of
collateral damage" -- and act overtly or covertly to destabilize terror's
national hosts".
The
following text outlines the history of Osama Bin Laden and the links of the
Islamic "Jihad" to the formulation of US foreign policy during the Cold War
and its aftermath.
Prime suspect in the New York and
Washington terrorists attacks, branded by the FBI as an "international
terrorist" for his role in the African US embassy bombings, Saudi born Osama
bin Laden was recruited during the Soviet-Afghan war "ironically under the
auspices of the CIA, to fight Soviet invaders". 1
In 1979 "the largest covert operation
in the history of the CIA" was launched in response to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in support of the pro-Communist government of Babrak
Kamal.2:
With the active encouragement of the
CIA and Pakistan's ISI [Inter Services Intelligence], who wanted to turn the
Afghan jihad into a global war waged by all Muslim states against the Soviet
Union, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 40 Islamic countries joined
Afghanistan's fight between 1982 and 1992. Tens of thousands more came to
study in Pakistani madrasahs. Eventually more than 100,000 foreign Muslim
radicals were directly influenced by the Afghan jihad.3
The Islamic "jihad" was supported by
the United States and Saudi Arabia with a significant part of the funding
generated from the Golden Crescent drug trade:
In March 1985, President Reagan signed
National Security Decision Directive 166,...[which] authorize[d] stepped-up
covert military aid to the mujahideen, and it made clear that the secret
Afghan war had a new goal: to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan through
covert action and encourage a Soviet withdrawal. The new covert U.S.
assistance began with a dramatic increase in arms supplies -- a steady rise
to 65,000 tons annually by 1987, ... as well as a "ceaseless stream" of CIA
and Pentagon specialists who traveled to the secret headquarters of
Pakistan's ISI on the main road near Rawalpindi, Pakistan. There the CIA
specialists met with Pakistani intelligence officers to help plan operations
for the Afghan rebels.4
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
using Pakistan's military Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a key
role in training the Mujahideen. In turn, the CIA sponsored guerrilla
training was integrated with the teachings of Islam:
"Predominant themes were that Islam
was a complete socio-political ideology, that holy Islam was being
violated by the atheistic Soviet troops, and that the Islamic people of
Afghanistan should reassert their independence by overthrowing the leftist
Afghan regime propped up by Moscow."5
Pakistan's Intelligence Apparatus
Pakistan's ISI was used as a
"go-between". The CIA covert support to the "jihad" operated indirectly
through the Pakistani ISI, --i.e. the CIA did not channel its support
directly to the Mujahideen. In other words, for these covert operations to
be "successful", Washington was careful not to reveal the ultimate objective
of the "jihad", which consisted in destroying the Soviet Union.
In the words of CIA's Milton Beardman
"We didn't train Arabs". Yet according to Abdel Monam Saidali, of the Al-aram
Center for Strategic Studies in Cairo, bin Laden and the "Afghan Arabs" had
been imparted "with very sophisticated types of training that was allowed to
them by the CIA" 6
CIA's Beardman confirmed, in this
regard, that Osama bin Laden was not aware of the role he was playing on
behalf of Washington. In the words of bin Laden (quoted by Beardman):
"neither I, nor my brothers saw evidence of American help". 7
Motivated by nationalism and religious
fervor, the Islamic warriors were unaware that they were fighting the Soviet
Army on behalf of Uncle Sam. While there were contacts at the upper levels
of the intelligence hierarchy, Islamic rebel leaders in theatre had no
contacts with Washington or the CIA.
With CIA backing and the funneling of
massive amounts of US military aid, the Pakistani ISI had developed into a
"parallel structure wielding enormous power over all aspects of government".
8 The ISI had a staff composed of military and intelligence officers,
bureaucrats, undercover agents and informers, estimated at 150,000. 9
Meanwhile, CIA operations had also
reinforced the Pakistani military regime led by General Zia Ul Haq:
'Relations between the CIA and the
ISI [Pakistan's military intelligence] had grown increasingly warm
following [General] Zia's ouster of Bhutto and the advent of the military
regime,'... During most of the Afghan war, Pakistan was more aggressively
anti-Soviet than even the United States. Soon after the Soviet military
invaded Afghanistan in 1980, Zia [ul Haq] sent his ISI chief to
destabilize the Soviet Central Asian states. The CIA only agreed to this
plan in October 1984.... `the CIA was more cautious than the Pakistanis.'
Both Pakistan and the United States took the line of deception on
Afghanistan with a public posture of negotiating a settlement while
privately agreeing that military escalation was the best course."10
The Golden Crescent Drug Triangle
The history of the drug trade in
Central Asia is intimately related to the CIA's covert operations. Prior to
the Soviet-Afghan war, opium production in Afghanistan and Pakistan was
directed to small regional markets. There was no local production of heroin.
11 In this regard, Alfred McCoy's study confirms that within two years of
the onslaught of the CIA operation in Afghanistan, "the Pakistan-Afghanistan
borderlands became the world's top heroin producer, supplying 60 percent of
U.S. demand. In Pakistan, the heroin-addict population went from near zero
in 1979... to 1.2 million by 1985 -- a much steeper rise than in any other
nation":12
CIA assets again controlled this
heroin trade. As the Mujahideen guerrillas seized territory inside
Afghanistan, they ordered peasants to plant opium as a revolutionary tax.
Across the border in Pakistan, Afghan leaders and local syndicates under
the protection of Pakistan Intelligence operated hundreds of heroin
laboratories. During this decade of wide-open drug-dealing, the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency in Islamabad failed to instigate major seizures or
arrests ... U.S. officials had refused to investigate charges of heroin
dealing by its Afghan allies `because U.S. narcotics policy in Afghanistan
has been subordinated to the war against Soviet influence there.' In 1995,
the former CIA director of the Afghan operation, Charles Cogan, admitted
the CIA had indeed sacrificed the drug war to fight the Cold War. `Our
main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets. We
didn't really have the resources or the time to devote to an investigation
of the drug trade,'... `I don't think that we need to apologize for this.
Every situation has its fallout.... There was fallout in terms of drugs,
yes. But the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left
Afghanistan.'13
In the Wake of the Cold War
In the wake of the Cold War, the
Central Asian region is not only strategic for its extensive oil reserves,
it also produces three quarters of the World's opium representing
multibillion dollar revenues to business syndicates, financial institutions,
intelligence agencies and organized crime. The annual proceeds of the Golden
Crescent drug trade (between 100 and 200 billion dollars) represents
approximately one third of the Worldwide annual turnover of narcotics,
estimated by the United Nations to be of the order of $500 billion.14
With the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, a new surge in opium production has unfolded. (According to UN
estimates, the production of opium in Afghanistan in 1998-99 -- coinciding
with the build up of armed insurgencies in the former Soviet republics--
reached a record high of 4600 metric tons.15 Powerful business syndicates in
the former Soviet Union allied with organized crime are competing for the
strategic control over the heroin routes.
The ISI's extensive intelligence
military-network was not dismantled in the wake of the Cold War. The CIA
continued to support the Islamic "jihad" out of Pakistan. New undercover
initiatives were set in motion in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the
Balkans. Pakistan's military and intelligence apparatus essentially "served
as a catalyst for the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence
of six new Muslim republics in Central Asia." 16.
Meanwhile, Islamic missionaries of the
Wahhabi sect from Saudi Arabia had established themselves in the Muslim
republics as well as within the Russian federation encroaching upon the
institutions of the secular State. Despite its anti-American ideology,
Islamic fundamentalism was largely serving Washington's strategic interests
in the former Soviet Union.
Following the withdrawal of Soviet
troops in 1989, the civil war in Afghanistan continued unabated. The Taliban
were being supported by the Pakistani Deobandis and their political party
the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). In 1993, JUI entered the government
coalition of Prime Minister Benazzir Bhutto. Ties between JUI, the Army and
ISI were established. In 1995, with the downfall of the Hezb-I-Islami
Hektmatyar government in Kabul, the Taliban not only instated a hardline
Islamic government, they also "handed control of training camps in
Afghanistan over to JUI factions..." 17
And the JUI with the support of the
Saudi Wahhabi movements played a key role in recruiting volunteers to fight
in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.
Jane Defense Weekly confirms in this
regard that "half of Taliban manpower and equipment originate[d] in Pakistan
under the ISI" 18
In fact, it would appear that following
the Soviet withdrawal both sides in the Afghan civil war continued to
receive covert support through Pakistan's ISI. 19
In other words, backed by Pakistan's
military intelligence (ISI) which in turn was controlled by the CIA, the
Taliban Islamic State was largely serving American geopolitical interests.
The Golden Crescent drug trade was also being used to finance and equip the
Bosnian Muslim Army (starting in the early 1990s) and the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA). In last few months there is evidence that Mujahideen mercenaries
are fighting in the ranks of KLA-NLA terrorists in their assaults into
Macedonia.
No doubt, this explains why Washington
has closed its eyes on the reign of terror imposed by the Taliban including
the blatant derogation of women's rights, the closing down of schools for
girls, the dismissal of women employees from government offices and the
enforcement of "the Sharia laws of punishment".20
The War in Chechnya
With regard to Chechnya, the main rebel
leaders Shamil Basayev and Al Khattab were trained and indoctrinated in CIA
sponsored camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to Yossef Bodansky,
director of the U.S. Congress's Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional
Warfare, the war in Chechnya had been planned during a secret summit of
HizbAllah International held in 1996 in Mogadishu, Somalia. 21 The summit,
was attended by Osama bin Laden and high-ranking Iranian and Pakistani
intelligence officers. In this regard, the involvement of Pakistan's ISI in
Chechnya "goes far beyond supplying the Chechens with weapons and expertise:
the ISI and its radical Islamic proxies are actually calling the shots in
this war". 22
Russia's main pipeline route transits
through Chechnya and Dagestan. Despite Washington's perfunctory condemnation
of Islamic terrorism, the indirect beneficiaries of the Chechen war are the
Anglo-American oil conglomerates which are vying for control over oil
resources and pipeline corridors out of the Caspian Sea basin.
The two main Chechen rebel armies
(respectively led by Commander Shamil Basayev and Emir Khattab) estimated at
35,000 strong were supported by Pakistan's ISI, which also played a key role
in organizing and training the Chechen rebel army:
"[In 1994] the Pakistani Inter
Services Intelligence arranged for Basayev and his trusted lieutenants to
undergo intensive Islamic indoctrination and training in guerrilla warfare
in the Khost province of Afghanistan at Amir Muawia camp, set up in the
early 1980s by the CIA and ISI and run by famous Afghani warlord Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar. In July 1994, upon graduating from Amir Muawia, Basayev was
transferred to Markaz-i-Dawar camp in Pakistan to undergo training in
advanced guerrilla tactics. In Pakistan, Basayev met the highest ranking
Pakistani military and intelligence officers: Minister of Defense General
Aftab Shahban Mirani, Minister of Interior General Naserullah Babar, and
the head of the ISI branch in charge of supporting Islamic causes, General
Javed Ashraf, (all now retired). High-level connections soon proved very
useful to Basayev."23
Following his training and
indoctrination stint, Basayev was assigned to lead the assault against
Russian federal troops in the first Chechen war in 1995. His organization
had also developed extensive links to criminal syndicates in Moscow as well
as ties to Albanian organized crime and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In
1997-98, according to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) "Chechen
warlords started buying up real estate in Kosovo... through several real
estate firms registered as a cover in Yugoslavia" 24
Basayev's organisation has also been
involved in a number of rackets including narcotics, illegal tapping and
sabotage of Russia's oil pipelines, kidnapping, prostitution, trade in
counterfeit dollars and the smuggling of nuclear materials (See Mafia linked
to Albania's collapsed pyramids, 25 Alongside the extensive laundering of
drug money, the proceeds of various illicit activities have been funneled
towards the recruitment of mercenaries and the purchase of weapons.
During his training in Afghanistan,
Shamil Basayev linked up with Saudi born veteran Mujahideen Commander "Al
Khattab" who had fought as a volunteer in Afghanistan. Barely a few months
after Basayev's return to Grozny, Khattab was invited (early 1995) to set up
an army base in Chechnya for the training of Mujahideen fighters. According
to the BBC, Khattab's posting to Chechnya had been "arranged through the
Saudi-Arabian based [International] Islamic Relief Organisation, a militant
religious organisation, funded by mosques and rich individuals which
channeled funds into Chechnya".26
Concluding Remarks
Since the Cold War era, Washington has
consciously supported Osama bin Laden, while at same time placing him on the
FBI's "most wanted list" as the World's foremost terrorist.
While the Mujahideen are busy fighting
America's war in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, the FBI
--operating as a US based Police Force- is waging a domestic war against
terrorism, operating in some respects independently of the CIA which has
--since the Soviet-Afghan war-- supported international terrorism through
its covert operations.
In a cruel irony, while the Islamic
jihad --featured by the Bush Adminstration as "a threat to America"-- is
blamed for the terrorist assaults on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon, these same Islamic organisations constitute a key instrument of US
military-intelligence operations in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in
New York and Washington, the truth must prevail to prevent the Bush
Adminstration together with its NATO partners from embarking upon a military
adventure which threatens the future of humanity.

Michel Chossudovsky
is the author of the international
best
America’s "War on Terrorism"
Second Edition, Global Research, 2005. He is Professor of Economics at the
University of Ottawa and Director of the Center for Research on
Globalization.
To order
Chossudovsky's book
America's "War on Terrorism", click
here
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Related article:
Where was Osama on September 11, 2001?
by Michel Chossudovsky, 9 September 2006
Endnotes
- Hugh Davies, International:
`Informers' point the finger at bin Laden; Washington on alert for
suicide bombers, The Daily Telegraph, London, 24 August 1998.
- See Fred Halliday, "The
Un-great game: the Country that lost the Cold War, Afghanistan, New
Republic, 25 March 1996):
- Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban:
Exporting Extremism, Foreign Affairs, November-December 1999.
- Steve Coll, Washington Post,
July 19, 1992.
- Dilip Hiro, Fallout from the
Afghan Jihad, Inter Press Services, 21 November 1995.
- Weekend Sunday (NPR); Eric
Weiner, Ted Clark; 16 August 1998.
- Ibid.
- Dipankar Banerjee; Possible
Connection of ISI With Drug Industry, India Abroad, 2 December 1994.
- Ibid
- See Diego Cordovez and Selig
Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal,
Oxford university Press, New York, 1995. See also the review of Cordovez
and Harrison in International Press Services, 22 August 1995.
- Alfred McCoy, Drug fallout: the
CIA's Forty Year Complicity in the Narcotics Trade. The Progressive; 1
August 1997.
- Ibid
- Ibid.
- Douglas Keh, Drug Money in a
changing World, Technical document no 4, 1998, Vienna UNDCP, p. 4. See
also Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1999, E/INCB/1999/1
United Nations Publication, Vienna 1999, p 49-51, And Richard Lapper, UN
Fears Growth of Heroin Trade, Financial Times, 24 February 2000.
- Report of the International
Narcotics Control Board, op cit, p 49-51, see also Richard Lapper, op.
cit.
- International Press Services,
22 August 1995.
- Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban:
Exporting Extremism, Foreign Affairs, November- December, 1999, p. 22.
- Quoted in the Christian Science
Monitor, 3 September 1998)
- Tim McGirk, Kabul learns to
live with its bearded conquerors, The Independent, London, 6
November1996.
- See K. Subrahmanyam, Pakistan
is Pursuing Asian Goals, India Abroad, 3 November 1995.
- Levon Sevunts, Who's calling
the shots?: Chechen conflict finds Islamic roots in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, The Gazette, Montreal, 26 October 1999..
- Ibid
- Ibid.
- See Vitaly Romanov and Viktor
Yadukha, Chechen Front Moves To Kosovo Segodnia, Moscow, 23 Feb 2000.
- The European, 13 February 1997,
See also Itar-Tass, 4-5 January 2000.
- BBC, 29 September 1999.
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