Wilhelm Hoettl:
International Man of Mystery

 
Center for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN

Fall 2001

Issue No. 12

http://web.archive.org/web/20050212155823/
http://www.odci.gov/csi/bulletin/csi12.html#toc8

"I am a marked man, hunted and harassed—but I'm not saying this for effect," Wilhelm Hoettl told Ladislas Farago, a leading author on intelligence topics, in 1953. "Whether I like it or not, my life is full of melodrama. Complete strangers finger me on the streets and secret agents trail me all the time. They watch my house, search my files, rifle through my mail, and photograph my visitors—because for 10 hectic years of my life I was one of Hitler's master spies."1

No stranger to American, British, and Russian intelligence, Hoettl was indeed a marked man for the first decade after World War II. Born in Vienna in 1915, he received a doctorate in history from the University of Vienna in 1938. He joined the Nazi party in the late 1930s, was commissioned as an SS Hauptsturmführer, or captain, and subsequently became chief of the Foreign Political Section of the (SD), the Nazi security service. Throughout the war, Hoettl was involved in numerous activities against the Allies and intrigues within the Third Reich. By 1944 the British and Americans had accumulated a considerable amount of biographical information on Hoettl and even knew his private phone number in Berlin.

As the war drew to a close in 1945, American intelligence in particular became even more familiar with Wilhelm Hoettl. An intense relationship developed, one that was marked by mutual suspicion and by bulging files of information on this wily Austrian.

Nearly 56 years after the end of World War II, the CIA declassified its file on Wilhelm Hoettl. The Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington was the scene of a press conference on 27 April 2001 in which the "Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group" (known as the IWG) announced the declassification and transfer to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) of the first 20 CIA "name files" to be released. This material, which had been accumulating in CIA files for decades, details aspects of the lives and activities of notorious Nazis such as Hitler himself, Adolf Eichmann, Josef Mengele, Klaus Barbie, and Heinrich Mueller. Also included among the 20 files was a "name file" on a self-styled "master spy" named Wilhelm Hoettl.2

 

The CIA's "Name Files"

The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 spurred the US Government's search for still-classified material related to Nazi war crimes, war criminals, and stolen and looted assets. (For further details, see CIA and the Search for Nazi War Criminals, in the CSI Bulletin, Issue No. 10, Winter 2000.) The announcement in April 2001 at the Holocaust Museum was a milestone; it marked the CIA's first declassification of "name files" on individuals with Nazi pasts. The Agency, in fact, has rarely released files of any kind on individuals, largely because such files are treated legally as operational records and therefore are exempted by law from automatic declassification. (Past releases to National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) of material concerning Raoul Wallenberg and Lee Harvey Oswald were treated as legal exceptions.)

The "name files" contain a wide range of information compiled over the years from a variety of sources. In addition to documents produced by the CIA and its predecessor organizations, these files include material from other US military and civilian agencies, open sources, and elsewhere. Hoettl's name file, for example, contains extensive records from the US Army, especially the Counter Intelligence Corps.

The CIA had already declassified a large quantity of World War II-era records on Hoettl that are now part of Record Group 226, the Records of the Office of Strategic Services. For further information, see "Record Group 226 at the National Archives" in the CSI Newsletter No. 6, Summer 1996. (The Newsletter was the CSI Bulletin's predecessor.)

The CIA's name files, in conjunction with other records, including personal dossiers compiled by the US Army's Counter Intelligence Corps and maintained at the Investigative Records Repository (IRR) of the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), provide a fascinating look at the lives of many war criminals identified by the IWG. See "CIC Records: A Valuable Tool for Researchers," in CSI Bulletin No. 11, Summer 2000, for more information on CIC records.

 
 

Self-Appointed Spokesman
During the more than five decades that passed before the CIA released its holdings on Hoettl, the former Nazi spent much of his time presenting his side of the story. In 1950, using the pseudonym Walter Hagen, he published Die Geheime Front, which was re-published in English four years later as The Secret Front: The Story of Nazi Political Espionage. He followed with Unternehmen Bernhard: ein historischer Tatsachenbericht über die grosste Geldfalschungsaktion aller Zeiten (Operation Bernhard: A Historically Factual Account of the Greatest Counterfeiting Operation of All Time). Hoettl had played a role in Operation Bernhard, a German scheme to produce counterfeit Allied currency and use it to undermine the Americans and the British. Published in English under the title Hitler's Paper Weapon in 1955, this book remains a leading source of information on how the Germans disposed of their false money after the war. Just last year, American underwater experts scoured the bottom of Toplitzsee, a lake near Hoettl's former home in Austria, for sunken Nazi treasures. Like earlier such expeditions in Austria, this one recovered crates of false currency dumped by the SS in the spring of 1945.
3

By the 1980s, Hoettl had become a self-appointed spokesman for the surviving figures of the Third Reich. Sought by journalists and historians alike for information about the Nazi era, he continued to provide grist for students of the Third Reich. In 1979, shortly after the broadcast of the American television miniseries "The Holocaust" in West Germany, a 16-year-old West German named Frank Brandenburg embarked on a special mission. He was intrigued by the Third Reich and yet horrified by its crimes, and he wanted to learn more about the Nazi years from participants who still lived in West Germany and Austria. Over the course of seven years, he visited their homes and gained the confidence of some of Nazi Germany's leading personalities.

In 1990, Ib Melchior, an American author and former US Army Counter Intelligence Corps agent in World War II, recounted Brandenburg's adventures in Quest: Searching for Germany's Nazi Past: A Young Man's Story. Brandenburg, according to Melchior, provided "old-time Nazi cadres" with a voice to convey their versions of history. Brandenburg listened and took notes, but he was careful to maintain some emotional distance from his hosts and to avoid being taken in by their reminiscences. He told Melchior, "Many of the people I talked to were charming and likeable. They flattered me—and all of us are apt to respond at least a little bit to flattery. They extolled the past and minimized its shortcomings.... But in some cases I was confronted with defensive statements, evasion, self-exoneration and prejudiced portrayals of the facts."4

Brandenburg also visited the home of Wilhelm Hoettl, by then one of the last surviving members of the Reichsicherheitshauptamt VI (RSHA-VI), the foreign intelligence branch of the German Main Security Office. Hoettl, who ended the war as an SS Sturmbannführer, or major, had served in intelligence roles in southern and southeastern Europe and thus could provide an unusual perspective on wartime and post-war activities. After regaling Brandenburg with his adventures, he boasted to his visitor that "I never had to face a court...either German or Allied. I was, of course, arrested, because of my rank and position. For investigative purposes. But the examiners soon realized that I was an anständiger Mensch (respectable person), and I was released. Furthermore, the Allied authorities de-Nazified me, as they called it." Hoettl gave what Brandenburg called his "short bark of a laugh."5

Project MOUNT
Hoettl, however, was not laughing in 1945 as the Allies were racing across what was left of the Third Reich. But he made the best of a bad situation. Even before the war's end, he had drawn the attention of senior US officials including Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, the Director of Strategic Services (OSS). In the spring of 1945, Hoettl acted as an intermediary for senior Nazi officials, including Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, RSHA chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner, and an assortment of Austrians. All of these people were seeking their own terms with the Western Allies.
6

Allen Dulles, who was then the OSS Station chief in Switzerland, reported that "Hoettl's record as a SD man and collaborator [with] Kaltenbrunner is of course bad and information provided by him [is] to be viewed with caution, but I believe he desires to save his skin and therefore may be useful." OSS Headquarters, however, regarded Hoettl's dealings as a ploy by Himmler and refused to enter negotiations.7

Hoettl was captured in Austria, along with other senior Nazis, by the US 80th CIC Detachment at the end of the war.8 He then offered the Americans a "complex of agents in Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Montenegro and Albania, capable of reporting high-level political and military information."9 Hoettl claimed that his radio net, known as the "Center," still existed in Austria and could communicate with his isolated agents behind Soviet lines using a group of Hungarian cryptographers. These elements, he maintained, could be resurrected under American control if he gave them the signal.10

At that time, X-2, OSS's counterespionage branch, was playing a leading role in what the OSS called Project MOUNT, an American operation to exploit German wartime covert signals intelligence. As part of that effort, two X-2 officers—Capt. Eric Timm in Munich (where Hoettl had been taken in May 1945) and Capt. William B. Browne in Steyerling, Austria—used members of Hoettl's "Center" net to contact its agents in Budapest and Bucharest. Only routine, non-substantive messages were being sent, however, in an effort to lower the risk of exposure and hold the entire ring together until a final determination of Allied policy toward Hoettl's offer could be made. Some American officers, meanwhile, voiced concern about operating a net behind Soviet lines at a time when the USSR was still officially regarded as a military ally.

Capt. Timm in Munich raised several possible alternative explanations for Hoettl's offer:

—That the offer was genuine and that members of Hoettl's net may have believed they were still working for him.
—That the offer may have been an effort to entangle the Allies.
—That Hoettl's agents may actually have been working for the Russians by then.
—That the offer may have been intended as a distraction to divert the US from other networks or operations.11

Lt. Col. Andrew H. Berding, X-2's chief in Germany, told Gen. Donovan on 8 June about Hoettl's offer to turn over his network. In a series of lengthy memoranda, Col. Berding recounted the MOUNT project's history and implications. He forcefully urged that OSS "secure from Hoettl the last syllable of information that he is able to furnish us on the Balkan networks." Berding also observed that Hoettl was "not in the slightest degree actuated by a fatherly concern for the well-being of the American intelligence services; most of what he has to gain must lie in the empoisoning of Russian-American relationships." Berding therefore urged that the Americans tell the Soviets about Hoettl's system and recommend to them that both powers jointly exploit it "in behalf of general Allied security."12

Although Gen. Donovan had authorized X-2 on 10 June to maintain radio contact for counterespionage purposes, the MOUNT project quickly dissolved after the Soviet NKVD presented the OSS with specific questions about the German operation.13 On 21 August, Donovan informed the OSS in Germany that the "JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] has now authorized OSS to execute proposed liquidation of Hoettl network in collaboration with the Russians as simply and promptly as possible."14

Members of X-2, including Capt. Browne in Austria, were chagrined. As early as 24 June, Browne had reported to Lt. Col. Berding on the importance of the MOUNT operation for postwar US intelligence:

It is my belief that both the organization and the direction of American intelligence agencies are inadequate for the successful operation of these networks as a serious effort to penetrate Russian occupied territory. However, I do not believe it will be in American interests to destroy, by handing it over to Russia, the net. In Rumania, at least, it can function without assistance or direction from this side. My recommendation is that it be allowed to do just that. Key personnel now in our hands could be disposed of through the IC [Interrogation Center] at Freising, some allowance being made for the offer which they have made. The Center can be easily dismantled. Unless we are sure to eliminate forever all personnel involved thus far, a double-cross such as that contemplated in the plan to turn over all the information to the Russians would eventually become known, and would possibly result in the alienation of most of those well-placed political elements in Rumania and Hungary who are tied into this net, and who now seem so favorably disposed towards the United States. We would thus lose potential friends without realizing any gain commensurate with such a loss; for all that we could hope for by such a move would be gratitude and appreciation from a government which has heretofore never displayed much of either.15

An Adroit Opportunist

In September 1945, US Army officials concluded that Hoettl had been "of great assistance to Allied counterintelligence by debunking the myth of a prepared plan to continue operations after defeat." The Army noted, however, that Hoettl is "a skilled opportunist and a firm believer in his own indispensability."16 After interrogating him at the Third US Army Interrogation Center, the Army transferred him to Nuremberg as a witness for the International Military Tribunal.

Between 1945 and 1947, the Americans held Hoettl in Nuremberg and Dachau for further interrogations in support of Allied war crimes prosecutions. He provided American interrogators with a significant amount of information about German intelligence activities and personalities.17 He also shared with the Americans some insights as to how the head of the Gestapo, Heinrich Mueller, could have escaped from Berlin.18

In his most memorable testimony, Hoettl recounted a meeting at his home in Budapest in August 1944 with Adolf Eichmann, the "Architect of the Final Solution." According to Hoettl, Eichmann was depressed about the German war effort and his own situation. He acknowledged that he would rank among the chief war criminals sought by the Allies for his role in the roundup and massacre of Europe's Jews. When asked by Hoettl how many Jews had perished, Eichmann put the number at six million, including four million in German concentration camps.19

After he was freed in 1947, Hoettl returned to Austria, where he remained active in intelligence circles into the 1950s. The CIA was especially distrustful of the former SS officer. One Agency officer who had interrogated Hoettl characterized him as a "born intriguer and a dyed-in-the-wool Austrian Nazi" who had "delivered a sufficient number of Nazi war criminals to the gallows, unbeknownst to his former associates, to afford us a strong hold over him."20 Notwithstanding any such "hold," the Agency refused to have anything to do with Hoettl, although it spent considerable time and resources tracking his activities and contacts.21

For many years Hoettl continued to surface occasionally in the news. In 1961, Hungary unsuccessfully sought his extradition as an accomplice of Adolf Eichmann, who was then facing trial in Israel.22

Beyond the End of the Road
Hoettl died peacefully in 1999, two years after publishing his final book, Einsatz für das Reich (On the Reich's Mission).
23 He had become a respected citizen, serving for many years as principal of a private school. In 1995, the Austrian Government presented him with a state honor. By all appearances, Hoettl had successfully evaded any serious taint from his past.

In the foreword to his last book, Hoettl cautioned future historians against relying solely upon documents to the exclusion of personal accounts of eyewitnesses. He presumably was thinking ahead to the time when those (like himself) who could give first-hand accounts of World War II would no longer be alive and historians would be wholly dependent on documentary evidence.

Members of the Interagency Working Group, in an evaluation of the CIA's documents on Hoettl, offered this commentary:

The voluminous materials in Wilhelm Hoettl's personality file provide a fascinating insight into the intrigue and drama of the era from late in World War II to the Cold War. These documents trace the activities of a notorious intelligence peddler and fabricator, who successfully convinced one intelligence service after another of his value, and then proceeded to lose such support. If reviewed cautiously, with an eye for accuracy, this file can be a treasure trove of intelligence information from an individual who navigated his way through the Nazi, US, West German, Russian, and numerous other intelligence services. The file also illustrates the difficult situation in which US post-war intelligence agents found themselves—desperate for knowledge on Soviet activities, they saw no choice other than accepting intelligence from former Nazis with offensive pasts and questionable reliability.24

Writing in 1953, Hoettl exclaimed: "the German Secret Service is broken and scattered both to East and West. Some serve the Americans and some the Russians. Others lie low and watch which way the wind blows. Some play with fire on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and some in South America and the Middle East have taken with them the unrest that surrounded them here."25 Where did Hoettl fit in that picture? The CIA's "name file" provides leads about his wartime and postwar intelligence roles, but Hoettl's true allegiance remains a mystery even after his death.

 

 

 

Wilhelm Höttl and the Elusive 'Six Million'

by Mark Weber
 
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v20/v20n5p25_Weber.html

So ingrained has the Six Million figure become in the popular consciousness that while the average American may be quite sure that six million Jews were slaughtered by the Germans in the Second World War -- that is, in what is now called "the Holocaust" -- he has no idea of how many British, Poles, Russians, or even Americans died during that global conflict, or, for that matter, of how many of his fellow countrymen lost their lives in the American Civil War.

This is hardly surprising, considering how relentlessly the Six Million figure is hammered into the public consciousness, not only in newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, and television, but also routinely in our schools, and even by a special taxpayer-funded U.S. federal government agency, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, which runs the imposing U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC.

The familiar World Book Encyclopedia tells readers, for example: "By the end of 1945, the Nazis had slaughtered more than 6 million Jewish men, women and children -- over two-thirds of the Jews in Europe." [See note] German president Richard von Weizsäcker, in his much cited commemorative speech of May 8, 1985, spoke of "the six million Jews who were murdered in German concentration camps." Anglo-Jewish historian Martin Gilbert, a prolific writer who is also the "official" biographer of Winston Churchill, has referred to "the systematic murder of six million Jews." [See note] The Encyclopaedia Judaica states flatly: "There can be no doubt as to the estimated figure of some six million victims." [See note] An information sheet issued by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council describes the grand Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC, as a "living memorial to the six million Jews and millions of other victims of Nazi fanaticism who perished in the Holocaust."

Just what is the basis for this familiar figure?

Even before the end of the Second World War in Europe, that is, before any careful or detailed investigation was possible, the Six Million figure was already in wide circulation. For example, in essays published in late 1944 and early 1945, the prominent Soviet-Jewish writer Ilya Ehrenburg repeatedly told his many readers that "the Germans" had killed six million Jews. In an article published in March 1945, for instance, in the English-language London weekly, Soviet War News, he wrote: "The world now knows that Germany has killed six million Jews." [See note]

Some weeks later, as David Irving has related, this figure was affirmed in New York by representatives of major Jewish organizations: [See note]

In June 1945, just a few weeks after the end of the war in Europe, three Jewish lawyers who represented major Jewish organizations, met in New York with Robert Jackson, who would soon be serving as the chief U.S. prosecutor at the so-called "International Military Tribunal" in Nuremberg. Jackson asked how many Jews had lost their lives in all Nazi-occupied lands. The number, he was told, was six million.

By remarkable coincidence, some twenty-five years earlier the American Jewish community had been warning of a "holocaust" of six million Jews in Europe. In an address published in 1919 in a leading Jewish American paper, the American Hebrew of New York City, under the headline "The Crucifixion of Jews Must Stop!," the former governor of New York state, Martin Glynn, spoke repeatedly of "six million" European Jews who were "dying" and "being whirled toward the grave" in a "threatened holocaust of human life." [See note]

Given all this, it is hardly surprising that someone was found to provide "proof" for the Six Million figure at the most extravagant judicial undertaking in history, the 1945-46 trial in Nuremberg of Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess, and other high-ranking Third Reich personalities. The legendary figure was fixed in history at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, where it was cited by chief British prosecutor Sir Hartley Shawcross in his closing address, and by the Allied judges in their final judgment. [See note]

This figure was not the result of any careful investigation, research, or calculation. The only specific evidence presented for it to the Nuremberg Tribunal was the hearsay testimony of former SS officer Wilhelm Höttl (sometimes spelled Hoettl), who said that he recalled it from a remark by Adolf Eichmann, the wartime head of the Jewish affairs section of Himmler's Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). Höttl, who also served with the RSHA during the war, stated in an affidavit dated November 26, 1945, and provided to the U.S. prosecution at Nuremberg, that Eichmann confided to him in August 1944 that some four million Jews had been killed in the "various extermination camps," and another two million had been killed in other ways, mostly in shootings by Einsatzgruppen forces in the course of the military campaign in Russia. [See note]

Eichmann himself, it should be noted, later called the Höttl story "nonsense," vigorously denied ever having made the alleged remark, and speculated that Höttl may have picked up the figure from a radio or newspaper report. [See note]

If it were not for Wilhelm Höttl's role in branding into the world's consciousness the trademark Six Million figure, his place in history would likely be little more than a footnote.

Who was this man, and how reliable is his historic affidavit?

He was born in Vienna in March 1915. In 1938, at the remarkably young age of twenty-three, he received a doctorate in history from the University of Vienna. While still a student there, he joined the National Socialist party and the SS. From 1939 until the end of the war in Europe, Höttl was employed almost without interruption by Germany's central intelligence agency, the RSHA. He was first stationed in Vienna with the "foreign bureau" (Amt Ausland, later Amt VI), and then, from early 1943, in Berlin in the "Southeastern Europe" branch E of Amt VI, with the SS rank of major (Sturmbannführer).

In March 1944 Höttl was assigned to Budapest, where he served as second in command to Himmler's SS representative in Hungary, and as political advisor to Hitler's ambassador there, Edmund Veesenmayer, who reported to Berlin, for example, on the large-scale deportations in 1944 of Jews from Hungary. On May 8, 1945, as German forces were unconditionally surrendering to the Allies, American troops arrested Höttl in Austria, and for several years after that he worked as an intelligence agent for the United States. He died in 1999, not long after the publication of his self-serving memoirs.

In April 2001 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency made public thousands of pages of long-suppressed documents from its files of major German wartime figures, including the bulging Höttl file. Along with the release of these documents, two U.S. government employees wrote and issued a detailed report about Höttl based on those recently declassified CIA files, which sheds revealing light on his wartime and postwar career. This report, entitled "Analysis of the Name File of Wilhelm Hoettl," was written by two "historical researchers" of the U.S. government's "Interagency Working Group" (IWG), Miriam Kleiman and Robert Skwirot. [See note]

These documents establish that Höttl was a completely unreliable informant who routinely fabricated information to please those who were willing to pay him. In their report, the two U.S. government researchers write:

Hoettl's name file is approximately 600 pages, one of the largest of those released to the public so far. The size of the file owes to Hoettl's postwar career as a peddler of intelligence, good and bad, to anyone who would pay him. Reports link Hoettl to twelve different intelligence services, including the U.S., Yugoslav, Austrian, Israeli, Romanian, Vatican, Swiss, French, West German, Russian, Hungarian and British.

Soon after his arrest by the Americans in May 1945, Höttl began working for the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency, and then for the U.S. Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). As the two U.S. government researchers put it: "Upon his arrest, Hoettl played to the interests of his captors ..." It was during this period, while he was secretly working for American intelligence, that Höttl provided his historic and damning "six million" affidavit for submission by the American prosecution at the Allied-run tribunal at Nuremberg.

Höttl benefited from his readiness to tell those who paid him what they wanted to hear, but this eventually proved his undoing. All the same, it took several years for U.S. intelligence to firmly conclude that it was being had.

In June 1949 one U.S. intelligence official cautioned against using Höttl for any reason, calling him "a man of such low character and poor political record that his use for intelligence activities, regardless of how profitable they may be, is a short-sighted policy by the U.S." In August 1950, CIA messages referred to Höttl as a "notorious fabricator [of] intelligence." A U.S. Army CIC report in early 1952 deemed his information useless, noting that Höttl "is involved in extensive intelligence activities for almost anyone who is willing to purchase his findings." In April 1952 his reports were called "worthless and possibly inflated or fabricated."

Interestingly, numerous U.S. intelligence reports identify connections between Höttl and Simon Wiesenthal, the well-known "Nazi hunter." One U.S. Army CIC document described Wiesenthal as the "Chief Austrian Agent of the Israeli Intelligence Bureau." A U.S. Army CIC report in January 1950 noted that for the last three or four months Wiesenthal had "recruited the services of Wilhelm Höttl," and had hired him to gather information for reports by the "Nazi hunter."

In July 1952, when U.S. Army intelligence finally broke completely with Höttl, a letter on U.S. Army stationery warned:

Dr. Höttl has long been known to this headquarters and other allied military organizations in Austria as a fabricator of intelligence information. His reports normally consist of a fine cobweb of fact, heavily padded with lies, deceit, conjecture and other false types of information. This organization will have absolutely nothing to do with Dr. Höttl or any members of his present entourage. He is persona non grata to the American, French and British elements in Austria.

In their report on his postwar career, U.S. government historical researchers Kleiman and Skwirot conclude:

The voluminous materials in Wilhelm Höttl's personality file ... trace the activities of a notorious intelligence peddler and fabricator, who successfully convinced one intelligence service after another of his value, and then proceeded to lose such support.

Indeed, and as already noted, Höttl "successfully convinced" the American and British prosecutors, and the judges, of the inter-Allied tribunal in Nuremberg, and many others around the world ever since, that German authorities killed six million Jews during the Second World War. And even though U.S. intelligence services and U.S. government researchers have, finally, as it were, discredited him, Höttl's most historically important claim remains widely, and even officially accepted.

The recently released U.S. intelligence documents on Höttl, and the U.S. government report about his postwar career, confirm what some revisionist scholars have contended for years. In his pathbreaking book The Hoax of the Twentieth Century, first published in 1976, Dr. Arthur Butz cited sources that were publicly available even in the 1950s to show that, during the war, Höttl had gotten into trouble more than once with SS authorities. His involvement in a shady Polish land deal led in 1942 to an SS investigation of his activities. An internal SS report characterized him as "dishonest, scheming, fawning,... a real hoaxer," and concluded that he was not fit even for SS membership, let alone a sensitive intelligence service position. [See note] Höttl was, accordingly, demoted. But his luck improved after his friend and fellow Austrian, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, was appointed in 1943 to head the RSHA. It seems that Kaltenbrunner protected him from a second disciplinary action, this one for misappropriation of security service funds.

Regardless of the unreliability of Höttl's infamous affidavit, the more important question remains: How valid is the six million figure?

The most common technique used by Holocaust historians to calculate figures of between five and six million Jewish extermination victims is to compare prewar and postwar estimated Jewish population figures for various European countries and areas, and then assume that the differences between the figures were all killed. This was the method used, for example, by Jacob Lestchinsky to produce a figure of 5,957,000 Jewish Holocaust deaths, in his important 1946 World Jewish Congress report. [See note] It is also the technique used by the late Lucy Dawidowicz, another prominent Jewish Holocaust historian, who estimated a total of 5.9 million Jewish victims. [See note]

However, this method fails to take into account substantial numbers of Jews who emigrated or fled to Allied or neutral countries during the war years. It also ignores the fact that many Jews, particularly in Eastern Europe, did not return to their original homelands at the end of the war, but instead emigrated to Palestine, the United States, and other countries beyond Europe.

It further assumes that all Jewish deaths (or "losses") were due to German or Axis policy. Thus, all Jews in areas under German or Axis control who died during the war years are routinely and misleadingly counted as "victims of the Holocaust," regardless of the cause of death. This includes Jews who died of natural causes, perished in Allied bombings of cities and concentration camps, who died as Allied soldiers, particularly in the Soviet military, or who -- like hundreds of thousands of German civilians -- succumbed to exhaustion, disease, and exposure in the particularly catastrophic final months of the war. Raul Hilberg, probably the most prominent Holocaust historian, acknowledges that a distinction should be made between "Jewish losses" and "Holocaust victims." He notes, for example, that the average age of Jews in Germany at the outbreak of the war was abnormally high anyway. [See note]

It is unlikely that there were ever six million Jews under German control during the war.

The wartime representative of the World Jewish Congress in Switzerland, Gerhard Riegner, confidentially reported to London and Washington in August 1942 that the total number of Jews in the countries occupied or controlled by Germany was three and a half to four million. [See note] This figure presumably referred to Jews in the "Greater" German Reich (including Poland), as well as in France, Holland, Belgium, Slovakia, and the occupied Soviet territories. If one adds the approximately 1.2 million Jews estimated to be living in Hungary and Romania, the total number of Jews that came under direct or indirect German control during the war years could not have been more than 5.2 million.

The unreliable character of the legendary Six Million calculation is also shown in the manipulation of Holocaust statistics in the cases of specific countries. In this regard, it is much more fruitful to examine Jewish losses in western European countries, where much more reliable statistics and other data are available, than to attempt to estimate Jewish losses in such eastern territories as Poland, where reliable data is not available. (In the case of Poland, even the country's borders changed drastically during and just after the war.) An important feature of these manipulations is that even though figures of alleged Jewish wartime losses in individual countries may be inflated and deflated over the years, there is an obvious effort to juggle figures so that the overall total is kept as high as possible.

The Case of Denmark

Consider, for example, the case of Denmark. In 1946 the "Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry" announced in its widely quoted report that, out of a total of 5.7 million European Jews who perished during the war years, 1,500 were Danish Jews. [See note] Raul Hilberg, in his highly regarded, three-volume 1985 study, gave a similar figure of 1,000 Danish Jews "lost" during the war years. [See note]

In fact, fewer than 500 Jews were ever even deported from Denmark. (Most Danish Jews fled to Sweden in 1943.) All of these deportees from Denmark were sent to the ghetto-camp of Theresienstadt (or Terezin) where precisely 51 Danish Jews (mostly elderly) died, all of natural causes. [See note] Thus, even if these 51 are counted as "Holocaust victims," Jewish "losses" for Denmark were exaggerated approximately 30 times by the supposedly authoritative "Anglo-American Committee," and 19 times the true figure by Hilberg.

The Korherr Report

At the beginning of 1943 SS chief Heinrich Himmler ordered his "Inspector for Statistics," Richard Korherr, to prepare a report on the "Final Solution of the European Jewish Question." Relying for the most part on information and figures supplied by the Reich Security Main Office, Korherr wrote a sixteen-page statistical survey that he submitted to Himmler on March 23, 1943. A few weeks later he produced a shorter supplemental version with the same title. [See note]

Even though, as Hilberg has pointed out, much about these reports, including their origin and purpose, "remains obscure," they are nevertheless the most authoritative wartime statistical records available on the fate of Europe's Jews. [See note] These top level, secret German documents contain no mention of an extermination program or mass killings of Jews, a fact that seems hardly possible if such a program had existed. Furthermore, as Jewish historian Gerald Reitlinger noted, they suggest that nothing like six million Jews could have been killed, even assuming the most sinister interpretations of the data. [See note] Korherr, a staunch Catholic, declared after the war that he had not been aware that his reports had any sinister or murderous significance. [See note]

Jewish Restitution Claims

Another important indication that the Six Million figure is not accurate is the large number of Jewish "Holocaust survivors" who have received restitution payments (Wiedergutmachung) from the German government in Bonn and, more recently, in Berlin. Individuals who were "persecuted for political, racial, religious or ideological reasons" by the wartime German regime have been eligible for money from the Bonn and Berlin government under the terms of the Federal Compensation Law (BEG) of 1953 and 1956. This includes Jews who were interned in camps or ghettos, were obliged to wear the star badge, or who lived in hiding. [See note]

As of January 1984, there were 4.39 million successful individual BEG restitution claims. The great majority of these were from Jews. Raul Hilberg has said that "about two thirds" of the allowed claims have been from Jews. [See note] This is a realistic but possibly conservative estimate. Approximately 40 percent of those receiving payments were living in Israel, 20 percent in West Germany, and 40 percent in the United States and other countries. [See note]

The Atlanta Journal and Constitution newspaper reported in 1985 that an estimated 50 percent of Jewish "survivors throughout the world are on West German pensions." [See note] But this estimate is very probably too high. For example, Jews in Poland, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia were not eligible for restitution, at least not at that time. [See note] In the United States, only about 66 percent of the Jewish "Holocaust survivors" in the Atlanta (Georgia) area in 1985 had received German restitution money. [See note]

If one conservatively estimates that two thirds of the 4.39 million individual claims for German restitution have come from Jews, that would mean some 2.9 million Jewish claims. And if half of the Jewish "Holocaust survivors" around the world have not received any restitution (which is probably a low figure), and granted that the number of claimants may be somewhat larger than the number of claims, it would appear that some six million European Jews "survived" the Second World War. (Of course, some European Jews who lived through the war years died before the German BEG restitution law was enacted in 1953.) And given that there were no more than some eight million European Jews under German wartime control, [See note] the number of Jews who died in Europe during the Second World War must be fewer than three million. As we shall see, the actual figure of Jewish wartime dead is substantially lower.

Finally, estimates of "Holocaust survivors" provided in recent years by authoritative Jewish sources cannot be reconciled with the generally accepted "Holocaust" story or the Six Million figure.

Before going further, it is a remarkable fact that, in recent years, the number of "Holocaust survivors" has actually been increasing. This is because -- as Norman Finkelstein stresses in his important book, The Holocaust Industry -- Israel, the World Jewish Congress, and other major Jewish organizations, all of which demand and collect billions in the name of "Holocaust survivors," have an interest in inflating figures both of wartime victims and of postwar survivors.

A report issued in July 1997 -- that is, fifty-three years after the end of the war -- by a committee organized by the Israeli prime minister's office estimated the number of "Holocaust survivors" (admittedly defined rather broadly) at between 834,000 and 960,000. A similarly authoritative report issued in June 2000, that is, fifty-five years after the end of the war in Europe, estimated the number of Jewish "Holocaust" survivors at between 832,000 and 935,000. [See note]These figures, Robert Faurisson has written, suggest that there were slightly more than three million Jewish "survivors" in Europe at the end of the 1939-1945 war. [See note]

Norman Finkelstein, a professor of political science at Hunter College in New York, and author of The Holocaust Industry, has commented that, on the basis of these Israeli or Jewish figures, there would have been eight million Jewish "Holocaust survivors" in Europe at the end of the war in May 1945. Remarking on this, Finkelstein has said: [See note]

There were fewer than eight million Jews in all of Nazi-occupied Europe. In other words, if these numbers are correct, the Holocaust didn't happen. As my mother used to say, if everyone who claims to be a Holocaust survivor actually is one, who did Hitler kill?

How many Jews did die during the Second World War? A year after the end of the war, an apparently impartial Swiss analysis entitled "How high is the number of Jewish victims?" concluded that no more than 1.5 million European Jews could have perished (of all causes) under German rule during the war. It appeared in June 1946 in the respected daily Baseler Nachrichten of neutral Switzerland. [See note] The widely-cited figures of between five and six million Jewish dead, the analysis noted, were not based on official sources, but merely private and semi-official estimates that greatly exaggerated the number of Jews that ever came under German control.

Stephen F. Pinter, a U.S. War Department attorney who was stationed in Germany after the war, published a statement in 1959 in which he condemned what he called "the old propaganda myth that millions of Jews were killed by the National Socialists." He went on to write: [See note]

From what I was able to determine during six postwar years in Germany and Austria, there were a number of Jews killed, but the figure of a million was certainly never reached. I interviewed thousands of Jews, former inmates of concentration camps in Germany and Austria, and consider myself as well qualified as any man on this subject.

Some revisionist historians have reached similar conclusions. Arthur Butz and Robert Faurisson have written that as many as one million European Jews may have died of all causes during the war years (not counting those serving in military forces). [See note] Walter Sanning, a European-American scholar and university lecturer, concluded in his detailed 1983 study that total Jewish losses during the Second World War were "in the neighborhood" of 1.25 million, many of whom died as Red Army soldiers or in Soviet camps and forced evacuations. [See note]

A common rejoinder to expressions of skepticism about the Six Million is rhetorically to ask: "What difference does it make how many were killed? It would be terrible if just one million, or even one thousand, Jews were murdered." To many people, efforts to establish the true numbers seem like insensitive and perhaps irrelevant quibbling. But the skeptics are not the ones who incessantly and insistently go on about Six Million murdered Jews. It is not the revisionists who have made a totem of this legendary figure, or who invoke it as quasi-sacrosanct ritual symbol. In any case, striving for historical exactitude, even about the iconic Six Million, is precisely what historians are supposed to do.

Notes

  1. World Book Encyclopedia, 1984 edition, s.v. "Holocaust." vol. 9, pp. 263-264.
  2. Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1986), p. 811.
  3. Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971 edition, s.v. "Holocaust."
  4. The Ehrenburg essays, published in Soviet War News (London), Dec. 22, 1944, Jan. 4 and March 15, 1945, are reprinted in facsimile in the fifth edition of Joachim Hoffmann's detailed study, Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945 (Munich: Herbig, 1999), pp. 390-393 (see also p. 183), and in Hoffmann, Stalin's War of Extermination 1941-1945 (Capshaw, Alabama: TADP, 2001), pp. 189-190, 402-405.
  5. David Irving, Nuremberg: The Last Battle (London: Focal Point, 1996), pp. 61-62.
  6. The American Hebrew (New York), Oct. 31, 1919, p. 582. Facsimile in The Journal of Historical Review 15, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1995), p. 31. Also cited in Irving, Nuremberg, p. 62.
  7. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (IMT), vol. 1 (Nuremberg: 1947-1949), pp. 252-253; IMT, vol. 19, p. 434; and IMT, vol. 22, p. 496.
  8. Höttl affidavit of Nov. 26, 1945: 2738-PS (USA-296) in IMT, vol. 31, pp. 85-87, and Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (NC&A), vol. 5 (Washington, DC: 1946-1948), pp. 380-382; 2615-PS in NC&A, vol. 5, pp. 338-339. On the ad hoc and self-serving origins of the Höttl affidavit, see Otto Skorzeny's letter of Dec. 14, 1956, in Gerd Honsik, Freispruch für Hitler? (Gibraltar and Barcelona: 1994), pp. 196-197.
  9. R. Aschenauer, ed., Ich, Adolf Eichmann (Leoni [Bavaria]: Druffel, 1980), pp. 460-461, 474; Jochen von Lang, ed., Eichmann Interrogated (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), pp. 117-118. Dieter Wisliceny, another former SS officer, made a statement similar to Höttl's at Nuremberg on Jan. 3, 1946, but spoke of "only" four or five million Jews killed. IMT, vol. 4, p. 371. Eichmann later called Wisliceny's comments "theater," and said that he never had any figures of "exterminated" Jews. See von Lang, ed., Eichmann, pp. 164-165, 94-95, 110-117.
  10. The report is posted on the U.S. National Archives web site: http://www.nara.gov/iwg/declass/hoettl.html
  11. Arthur Butz, The Hoax of the Twentieth Century (Newport Beach, CA: IHR, 1997), p. 81.
  12. Jacob Lestchinsky (Leszczynski), "Balance Sheet of Extermination," 1946 and revised in 1955. Cited in Nora Levin, The Holocaust (New York: Crowell, 1968), p. 718; Leon Poliakov, Harvest of Hate (New York: Holocaust Library, 1979), p. 335 (Revue d'histoire..., Oct. 1956); Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), p. 1202.
  13. Lucy Dawidowicz, A Holocaust Reader (New York: Behrman, 1976), p. 381; Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945 (New York: Bantam [pb. ed.], 1976), p. 544.
  14. Hilberg, Destruction, p. 1206.
  15. Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret (Boston: Little Brown, 1980; New York: Henry Holt, 1998), p. 77.
  16. Levin, Holocaust, p. 715; Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution (London: Sphere Books [pb., 2nd ed.], 1971), p. 546; Wolfgang Scheffler, Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich (Berlin: Colloquium, 1960), p. 114.
  17. Hilberg, Destruction, p. 1048.
  18. Leni Yahil, The Rescue of Danish Jewry (Philadelphia: JPS, 1969), p. 318; Dawidowicz, The War, p. 505.
  19. Documents NO-5193 through NO-5198. Complete texts in German and English in: Serge Klarsfeld, ed., The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania (New York: B. Klarsfeld Foundation, 1978), pp. 165-211 (appendices). Also published in: John Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust: Selected Documents in Eighteen Volumes (New York: Garland, 1982), vol. 12, pp. 210 ff. (The two reports are sometimes together referred to as "the Korherr report.") See also Hilberg, Destruction, pp. 1204-1206; Gerald Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution, p. 136, 138; von Lang, ed., Eichmann, pp. 112-115.
  20. Raul Hilberg, "The Statistic," in: François Furet, ed., Unanswered Questions: Nazi Germany and the Genocide of the Jews (New York: Schocken, 1989), p. 158.
  21. Reitlinger, Final Solution, pp. 534-535.
  22. Gerald Reitlinger, The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945 (New York: Viking/Compass [pb.], 1968), pp. 221-223; Hilberg, Destruction, pp. 1205-1206. In a letter to Der Spiegel (Nr. 31, July 25, 1977, p. 12), Korherr specifically stated that the term "special treatment" in a report's first draft did not refer to killing.
  23. Focus on "Restitution in Germany," No. 1, May 1985, p. 3. (Information bulletin of the German Information Center, New York City, an agency of the German Federal government); see also: Hilberg, Destruction, pp. 1165, 1166; Mark Weber, "West Germany's Holocaust Payoff," JHR 8, no. 2 (summer 1988), pp. 243-250.
  24. Hilberg testimony in Zündel case, Toronto District court, Jan. 18, 1985. Transcript page 1229.
  25. Focus on "Restitution in Germany" (German Information Center), May 1985, p. 3.
  26. Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Sunday, March 31, 1985, p. 15 A.
  27. Hilberg, Destruction, p. 1170; D. Margolick, "Soviet Emigre Lawyer...," New York Times, March 10, 1983, p. B2.
  28. Atlanta Journal and Constitution, March 31, 1985, pp. 15 A, 17A.
  29. Jacob Lestchinsky, statistician for the American Jewish Congress, estimated that in 1939 there were 8.25 million Jews in the lands that came under German or Axis control. "Balance Sheet of Extermination," in Levin, Holocaust, p. 718. Lucy Dawidowicz estimated that the "pre-Final Solution population" of the lands that came under Axis control was 8.86 million. Dawidowicz, The War, p. 544.
  30. Number of Living Holocaust Survivors, July 27, 1997, report of the "Spanic Committee," organized by the Israeli Prime Minister's Office (with estimates slightly revised in May 1998), and the "Ukeles" report, June 28, 2000, commissioned by the "Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany," a semi-official Jewish agency. Both cited in: "Special Master's Proposed Plan of Allocation and Distribution of Settlement Proceeds," (Sept. 2000, also referred to as the "Gribetz Plan"), Volume I, Annex C, "Demographics," pp. C-2, C-8, C-9. Posted on line at the "Official Information Web Site for the Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation Against Swiss Banks and other Swiss Entities": http://www.Swissbankclaims.com/media
  31. Robert Faurisson, "Impact and Future of Holocaust Revisionism," JHR 19 (Jan.-Feb. 2000), pp. 9, 28 (n. 24).
  32. Interview with Norman Finkelstein, by Viktor Frölke, in Salon.com, "Shoah business," August 30, 2000. Posted on-line at: http://www.salon.com/books/int/2000/08/30/finkelstein/index.html See also: N. Finkelstein, "How the Holocaust Industry Stole the Swiss Monies," June 2001, Postscript to Foreign Translations. Posted on-line: http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/id112.htm
  33. "Wie hoch ist die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer?," Baseler Nachrichten (Abend-Blatt), June 13, 1946, p. 2. (This newspaper, founded in 1845, is no longer published.)
  34. Pinter letter in the national Catholic weekly, Our Sunday Visitor, June 14, 1959, p. 15.
  35. Butz, Hoax, p. 239; Robert Faurisson interview with Storia Illustrata (Italy), August 1979. Authorized translations in: Serge Thion (with Robert Faurisson), Vérité historique ou vérité politique? (Paris: 1980), p. 197, and JHR 2 (winter 1981), p. 348.
  36. Walter Sanning, The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry (Newport Beach, CA: IHR, 1983), pp. 198, 196.

From The Journal of Historical Review, Sept.-Dec. 2001 (Vol. 20, No. 5-6), pages 25-32. This essay is adapted from Mark Weber's address at David Irving's "Real History" conference in Cincinnati, August 31, 2001.

 

 

 

Eichmann later called the Hoettl story about the 6 million number
"nonsense,"  denied ever having made the alleged remark, and
speculated that Hoettl may have picked up the figure from a radio or
newspaper report.



  von Lang, Eichmann Interrogated, pp. 164-165, 94-95, 110-117.

Eichmann Interrogated: Transcripts from the Archives of the Israeli Police
http://www.amazon.com/Eichmann-Interrogated-Transcripts-Archives-Israeli/dp/0306809168

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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