Wilhelm Hoettl:
International Man of Mystery
|
Center for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
|
http://web.archive.org/web/20050212155823/
http://www.odci.gov/csi/bulletin/csi12.html#toc8
"I am
a marked man, hunted and harassed—but I'm not saying this for
effect," Wilhelm Hoettl told Ladislas Farago, a leading author
on intelligence topics, in 1953. "Whether I like it or not, my
life is full of melodrama. Complete strangers finger me on the
streets and secret agents trail me all the time. They watch my
house, search my files, rifle through my mail, and photograph my
visitors—because for 10 hectic years of my life I was one of
Hitler's master spies."1
No stranger
to American, British, and Russian intelligence, Hoettl was
indeed a marked man for the first decade after World War II.
Born in Vienna in 1915, he received a doctorate in history from
the University of Vienna in 1938. He joined the Nazi party in
the late 1930s, was commissioned as an SS Hauptsturmführer,
or captain, and subsequently became chief of the Foreign
Political Section of the (SD), the Nazi security service.
Throughout the war, Hoettl was involved in numerous activities
against the Allies and intrigues within the Third Reich. By 1944
the British and Americans had accumulated a considerable amount
of biographical information on Hoettl and even knew his private
phone number in Berlin.
As the war
drew to a close in 1945, American intelligence in particular
became even more familiar with Wilhelm Hoettl. An intense
relationship developed, one that was marked by mutual suspicion
and by bulging files of information on this wily Austrian.
Nearly 56 years after the end of World War II, the CIA
declassified its file on Wilhelm Hoettl. The Holocaust Memorial
Museum in Washington was the scene of a press conference on 27
April 2001 in which the "Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial
Government Records Interagency Working Group" (known as the IWG)
announced the declassification and transfer to the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) of the first 20 CIA
"name files" to be released. This material, which had been
accumulating in CIA files for decades, details aspects of the
lives and activities of notorious Nazis such as Hitler himself,
Adolf Eichmann, Josef Mengele, Klaus Barbie, and Heinrich
Mueller. Also included among the 20 files was a "name file" on a
self-styled "master spy" named Wilhelm Hoettl.2
The CIA's
"Name Files"
The Nazi War Crimes
Disclosure Act of 1998 spurred the US Government's
search for still-classified material related to Nazi war
crimes, war criminals, and stolen and looted assets.
(For further details, see CIA and the Search for Nazi
War Criminals, in the CSI Bulletin, Issue No.
10, Winter 2000.) The announcement in April 2001 at the
Holocaust Museum was a milestone; it marked the CIA's
first declassification of "name files" on individuals
with Nazi pasts. The Agency, in fact, has rarely
released files of any kind on individuals, largely
because such files are treated legally as operational
records and therefore are exempted by law from automatic
declassification. (Past releases to National Archives
and Records Administration (NARA) of material concerning
Raoul Wallenberg and Lee Harvey Oswald were treated as
legal exceptions.)
The "name files"
contain a wide range of information compiled over the
years from a variety of sources. In addition to
documents produced by the CIA and its predecessor
organizations, these files include material from other
US military and civilian agencies, open sources, and
elsewhere. Hoettl's name file, for example, contains
extensive records from the US Army, especially the
Counter Intelligence Corps.
The CIA had already
declassified a large quantity of World War II-era
records on Hoettl that are now part of Record Group 226,
the Records of the Office of Strategic Services. For
further information, see "Record Group 226 at the
National Archives" in the CSI Newsletter No. 6,
Summer 1996. (The Newsletter was the CSI
Bulletin's predecessor.)
The CIA's name files, in
conjunction with other records, including personal
dossiers compiled by the US Army's Counter Intelligence
Corps and maintained at the Investigative Records
Repository (IRR) of the Army's Intelligence and Security
Command (INSCOM), provide a fascinating look at the
lives of many war criminals identified by the IWG. See "CIC
Records: A Valuable Tool for Researchers,"
in CSI Bulletin No. 11, Summer 2000, for more
information on CIC records. |
Self-Appointed Spokesman
During the more than five decades that passed before the
CIA released its holdings on Hoettl, the former Nazi spent
much of his time presenting his side of the story. In 1950,
using the pseudonym Walter Hagen, he published Die
Geheime Front, which was re-published in English four
years later as The Secret Front: The Story of Nazi
Political Espionage. He followed with Unternehmen
Bernhard: ein historischer Tatsachenbericht über die grosste
Geldfalschungsaktion aller Zeiten (Operation
Bernhard: A Historically Factual Account of the Greatest
Counterfeiting Operation of All Time). Hoettl had played
a role in Operation Bernhard, a German scheme to produce
counterfeit Allied currency and use it to undermine the
Americans and the British. Published in English under the
title Hitler's Paper Weapon in 1955, this book
remains a leading source of information on how the Germans
disposed of their false money after the war. Just last year,
American underwater experts scoured the bottom of Toplitzsee,
a lake near Hoettl's former home in Austria, for sunken Nazi
treasures. Like earlier such expeditions in Austria, this
one recovered crates of false currency dumped by the SS in
the spring of 1945.3
By the
1980s, Hoettl had become a self-appointed spokesman for the
surviving figures of the Third Reich. Sought by journalists
and historians alike for information about the Nazi era, he
continued to provide grist for students of the Third Reich.
In 1979, shortly after the broadcast of the American
television miniseries "The Holocaust" in West Germany, a
16-year-old West German named Frank Brandenburg embarked on
a special mission. He was intrigued by the Third Reich and
yet horrified by its crimes, and he wanted to learn more
about the Nazi years from participants who still lived in
West Germany and Austria. Over the course of seven years, he
visited their homes and gained the confidence of some of
Nazi Germany's leading personalities.
In 1990, Ib Melchior, an American author and former US Army
Counter Intelligence Corps agent in World War II, recounted
Brandenburg's adventures in Quest: Searching for
Germany's Nazi Past: A Young Man's Story. Brandenburg,
according to Melchior, provided "old-time Nazi cadres" with
a voice to convey their versions of history. Brandenburg
listened and took notes, but he was careful to maintain some
emotional distance from his hosts and to avoid being taken
in by their reminiscences. He told Melchior, "Many of the
people I talked to were charming and likeable. They
flattered me—and all of us are apt to respond at least a
little bit to flattery. They extolled the past and minimized
its shortcomings.... But in some cases I was confronted with
defensive statements, evasion, self-exoneration and
prejudiced portrayals of the facts."4
Brandenburg also visited the home of Wilhelm Hoettl, by then
one of the last surviving members of the
Reichsicherheitshauptamt VI (RSHA-VI), the foreign
intelligence branch of the German Main Security Office.
Hoettl, who ended the war as an SS Sturmbannführer,
or major, had served in intelligence roles in southern and
southeastern Europe and thus could provide an unusual
perspective on wartime and post-war activities. After
regaling Brandenburg with his adventures, he boasted to his
visitor that "I never had to face a court...either German or
Allied. I was, of course, arrested, because of my rank and
position. For investigative purposes. But the examiners soon
realized that I was an anständiger Mensch
(respectable person), and I was released. Furthermore, the
Allied authorities de-Nazified me, as they called it."
Hoettl gave what Brandenburg called his "short bark of a
laugh."5
Project MOUNT
Hoettl, however, was not laughing in 1945 as the Allies were
racing across what was left of the Third Reich. But he made
the best of a bad situation. Even before the war's end, he
had drawn the attention of senior US officials including
Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, the Director of Strategic
Services (OSS). In the spring of 1945, Hoettl acted as an
intermediary for senior Nazi officials, including
Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, RSHA chief Ernst
Kaltenbrunner, and an assortment of Austrians. All of these
people were seeking their own terms with the Western Allies.6
Allen Dulles, who was then the OSS Station chief in
Switzerland, reported that "Hoettl's record as a SD man and
collaborator [with] Kaltenbrunner is of course bad and
information provided by him [is] to be viewed with caution,
but I believe he desires to save his skin and therefore may
be useful." OSS Headquarters, however, regarded Hoettl's
dealings as a ploy by Himmler and refused to enter
negotiations.7
Hoettl was captured in Austria, along with other senior
Nazis, by the US 80th CIC Detachment at the end of the war.8
He then offered the Americans a "complex of agents in
Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Montenegro and
Albania, capable of reporting high-level political and
military information."9
Hoettl claimed that his radio net, known as the "Center,"
still existed in Austria and could communicate with his
isolated agents behind Soviet lines using a group of
Hungarian cryptographers. These elements, he maintained,
could be resurrected under American control if he gave them
the signal.10
At that
time, X-2, OSS's counterespionage branch, was playing a
leading role in what the OSS called Project MOUNT, an
American operation to exploit German wartime covert signals
intelligence. As part of that effort, two X-2 officers—Capt.
Eric Timm in Munich (where Hoettl had been taken in May
1945) and Capt. William B. Browne in Steyerling,
Austria—used members of Hoettl's "Center" net to contact its
agents in Budapest and Bucharest. Only routine,
non-substantive messages were being sent, however, in an
effort to lower the risk of exposure and hold the entire
ring together until a final determination of Allied policy
toward Hoettl's offer could be made. Some American officers,
meanwhile, voiced concern about operating a net behind
Soviet lines at a time when the USSR was still officially
regarded as a military ally.
Capt.
Timm in Munich raised several possible alternative
explanations for Hoettl's offer:
—That the offer was
genuine and that members of Hoettl's net may have
believed they were still working for him.
—That the offer may
have been an effort to entangle the Allies.
—That Hoettl's
agents may actually have been working for the Russians
by then.
—That the
offer may have been intended as a distraction to divert
the US from other networks or operations.11
Lt. Col. Andrew H. Berding, X-2's chief in Germany, told
Gen. Donovan on 8 June about Hoettl's offer to turn over his
network. In a series of lengthy memoranda, Col. Berding
recounted the MOUNT project's history and implications. He
forcefully urged that OSS "secure from Hoettl the last
syllable of information that he is able to furnish us on the
Balkan networks." Berding also observed that Hoettl was "not
in the slightest degree actuated by a fatherly concern for
the well-being of the American intelligence services; most
of what he has to gain must lie in the empoisoning of
Russian-American relationships." Berding therefore urged
that the Americans tell the Soviets about Hoettl's system
and recommend to them that both powers jointly exploit it
"in behalf of general Allied security."12
Although Gen. Donovan had authorized X-2 on 10 June to
maintain radio contact for counterespionage purposes, the
MOUNT project quickly dissolved after the Soviet NKVD
presented the OSS with specific questions about the German
operation.13
On 21 August, Donovan informed the OSS in Germany that the
"JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] has now authorized OSS to
execute proposed liquidation of Hoettl network in
collaboration with the Russians as simply and promptly as
possible."14
Members
of X-2, including Capt. Browne in Austria, were chagrined.
As early as 24 June, Browne had reported to Lt. Col. Berding
on the importance of the MOUNT operation for postwar US
intelligence:
It is my
belief that both the organization and the direction of
American intelligence agencies are inadequate for the
successful operation of these networks as a serious
effort to penetrate Russian occupied territory. However,
I do not believe it will be in American interests to
destroy, by handing it over to Russia, the net. In
Rumania, at least, it can function without assistance or
direction from this side. My recommendation is that it
be allowed to do just that. Key personnel now in our
hands could be disposed of through the IC [Interrogation
Center] at Freising, some allowance being made for the
offer which they have made. The Center can be easily
dismantled. Unless we are sure to eliminate forever all
personnel involved thus far, a double-cross such as that
contemplated in the plan to turn over all the
information to the Russians would eventually become
known, and would possibly result in the alienation of
most of those well-placed political elements in Rumania
and Hungary who are tied into this net, and who now seem
so favorably disposed towards the United States. We
would thus lose potential friends without realizing any
gain commensurate with such a loss; for all that we
could hope for by such a move would be gratitude and
appreciation from a government which has heretofore
never displayed much of either.15
An Adroit Opportunist
In September 1945, US Army officials concluded that Hoettl
had been "of great assistance to Allied counterintelligence
by debunking the myth of a prepared plan to continue
operations after defeat." The Army noted, however, that
Hoettl is "a skilled opportunist and a firm believer in his
own indispensability."16
After interrogating him at the Third US Army Interrogation
Center, the Army transferred him to Nuremberg as a witness
for the International Military Tribunal.
Between 1945 and 1947, the Americans held Hoettl in
Nuremberg and Dachau for further interrogations in support
of Allied war crimes prosecutions. He provided American
interrogators with a significant amount of information about
German intelligence activities and personalities.17
He also shared with the Americans some insights as to how
the head of the Gestapo, Heinrich Mueller, could have
escaped from Berlin.18
In his most memorable testimony, Hoettl recounted a meeting
at his home in Budapest in August 1944 with Adolf Eichmann,
the "Architect of the Final Solution." According to Hoettl,
Eichmann was depressed about the German war effort and his
own situation. He acknowledged that he would rank among the
chief war criminals sought by the Allies for his role in the
roundup and massacre of Europe's Jews. When asked by Hoettl
how many Jews had perished, Eichmann put the number at six
million, including four million in German concentration
camps.19
After he was freed in 1947, Hoettl returned to Austria,
where he remained active in intelligence circles into the
1950s. The CIA was especially distrustful of the former SS
officer. One Agency officer who had interrogated Hoettl
characterized him as a "born intriguer and a
dyed-in-the-wool Austrian Nazi" who had "delivered a
sufficient number of Nazi war criminals to the gallows,
unbeknownst to his former associates, to afford us a strong
hold over him."20
Notwithstanding any such "hold," the Agency refused to have
anything to do with Hoettl, although it spent considerable
time and resources tracking his activities and contacts.21
For many years Hoettl continued to surface occasionally in
the news. In 1961, Hungary unsuccessfully sought his
extradition as an accomplice of Adolf Eichmann, who was then
facing trial in Israel.22
Beyond the End of the Road
Hoettl died peacefully in 1999, two years after publishing
his final book, Einsatz für das Reich (On the
Reich's Mission).23
He had become a respected citizen, serving for many years as
principal of a private school. In 1995, the Austrian
Government presented him with a state honor. By all
appearances, Hoettl had successfully evaded any serious
taint from his past.
In the
foreword to his last book, Hoettl cautioned future
historians against relying solely upon documents to the
exclusion of personal accounts of eyewitnesses. He
presumably was thinking ahead to the time when those (like
himself) who could give first-hand accounts of World War II
would no longer be alive and historians would be wholly
dependent on documentary evidence.
Members
of the Interagency Working Group, in an evaluation of the
CIA's documents on Hoettl, offered this commentary:
The
voluminous materials in Wilhelm Hoettl's personality
file provide a fascinating insight into the intrigue and
drama of the era from late in World War II to the Cold
War. These documents trace the activities of a notorious
intelligence peddler and fabricator, who successfully
convinced one intelligence service after another of his
value, and then proceeded to lose such support. If
reviewed cautiously, with an eye for accuracy, this file
can be a treasure trove of intelligence information from
an individual who navigated his way through the Nazi,
US, West German, Russian, and numerous other
intelligence services. The file also illustrates the
difficult situation in which US post-war intelligence
agents found themselves—desperate for knowledge on
Soviet activities, they saw no choice other than
accepting intelligence from former Nazis with offensive
pasts and questionable reliability.24
Writing in 1953, Hoettl exclaimed: "the German Secret
Service is broken and scattered both to East and West. Some
serve the Americans and some the Russians. Others lie low
and watch which way the wind blows. Some play with fire on
both sides of the Iron Curtain, and some in South America
and the Middle East have taken with them the unrest that
surrounded them here."25
Where did Hoettl fit in that picture? The CIA's "name file"
provides leads about his wartime and postwar intelligence
roles, but Hoettl's true allegiance remains a mystery even
after his death.
Wilhelm
Höttl and the Elusive 'Six Million'
by Mark Weber
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v20/v20n5p25_Weber.html
So ingrained has the Six
Million figure become in the popular consciousness that while the
average American may be quite sure that six million Jews were
slaughtered by the Germans in the Second World War -- that is, in
what is now called "the Holocaust" -- he has no idea of how many
British, Poles, Russians, or even Americans died during that global
conflict, or, for that matter, of how many of his fellow countrymen
lost their lives in the American Civil War.
This is hardly surprising,
considering how relentlessly the Six Million figure is hammered into
the public consciousness, not only in newspapers, magazines, motion
pictures, and television, but also routinely in our schools, and
even by a special taxpayer-funded U.S. federal government agency,
the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, which runs the imposing U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC.
The familiar World
Book Encyclopedia tells readers, for example: "By the end of 1945,
the Nazis had slaughtered more than 6 million Jewish men, women and
children -- over two-thirds of the Jews in Europe."
[See note] German president Richard
von Weizsäcker, in his much cited commemorative speech of May 8,
1985, spoke of "the six million Jews who were murdered in German
concentration camps." Anglo-Jewish historian Martin Gilbert, a
prolific writer who is also the "official" biographer of Winston
Churchill, has referred to "the systematic murder of six million
Jews." [See note]
The Encyclopaedia Judaica states flatly: "There can be no doubt as
to the estimated figure of some six million victims."
[See note] An information sheet
issued by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council describes the grand
Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC, as a "living memorial to the six
million Jews and millions of other victims of Nazi fanaticism who
perished in the Holocaust."
Just what is the basis for
this familiar figure?
Even before the end of
the Second World War in Europe, that is, before any careful or
detailed investigation was possible, the Six Million figure was
already in wide circulation. For example, in essays published in
late 1944 and early 1945, the prominent Soviet-Jewish writer Ilya
Ehrenburg repeatedly told his many readers that "the Germans" had
killed six million Jews. In an article published in March 1945, for
instance, in the English-language London weekly, Soviet War News, he
wrote: "The world now knows that Germany has killed six million
Jews." [See note]
Some weeks later, as
David Irving has related, this figure was affirmed in New York by
representatives of major Jewish organizations:
[See note]
In June 1945, just a few
weeks after the end of the war in Europe, three Jewish lawyers
who represented major Jewish organizations, met in New York with
Robert Jackson, who would soon be serving as the chief U.S.
prosecutor at the so-called "International Military Tribunal" in
Nuremberg. Jackson asked how many Jews had lost their lives in
all Nazi-occupied lands. The number, he was told, was six
million.
By remarkable
coincidence, some twenty-five years earlier the American Jewish
community had been warning of a "holocaust" of six million Jews in
Europe. In an address published in 1919 in a leading Jewish American
paper, the American Hebrew of New York City, under the headline "The
Crucifixion of Jews Must Stop!," the former governor of New York
state, Martin Glynn, spoke repeatedly of "six million" European Jews
who were "dying" and "being whirled toward the grave" in a
"threatened holocaust of human life."
[See note]
Given all this, it is
hardly surprising that someone was found to provide "proof" for the
Six Million figure at the most extravagant judicial undertaking in
history, the 1945-46 trial in Nuremberg of Hermann Göring, Rudolf
Hess, and other high-ranking Third Reich personalities. The
legendary figure was fixed in history at the International Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg, where it was cited by chief British
prosecutor Sir Hartley Shawcross in his closing address, and by the
Allied judges in their final judgment.
[See note]
This figure was not
the result of any careful investigation, research, or calculation.
The only specific evidence presented for it to the Nuremberg
Tribunal was the hearsay testimony of former SS officer Wilhelm
Höttl (sometimes spelled Hoettl), who said that he recalled it from
a remark by Adolf Eichmann, the wartime head of the Jewish affairs
section of Himmler's Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). Höttl, who
also served with the RSHA during the war, stated in an affidavit
dated November 26, 1945, and provided to the U.S. prosecution at
Nuremberg, that Eichmann confided to him in August 1944 that some
four million Jews had been killed in the "various extermination
camps," and another two million had been killed in other ways,
mostly in shootings by Einsatzgruppen forces in the course of the
military campaign in Russia.
[See note]
Eichmann himself, it
should be noted, later called the Höttl story "nonsense," vigorously
denied ever having made the alleged remark, and speculated that
Höttl may have picked up the figure from a radio or newspaper
report. [See note]
If it were not for Wilhelm
Höttl's role in branding into the world's consciousness the
trademark Six Million figure, his place in history would likely be
little more than a footnote.
Who was this man, and how
reliable is his historic affidavit?
He was born in Vienna in
March 1915. In 1938, at the remarkably young age of twenty-three, he
received a doctorate in history from the University of Vienna. While
still a student there, he joined the National Socialist party and
the SS. From 1939 until the end of the war in Europe, Höttl was
employed almost without interruption by Germany's central
intelligence agency, the RSHA. He was first stationed in Vienna with
the "foreign bureau" (Amt Ausland, later Amt VI), and then, from
early 1943, in Berlin in the "Southeastern Europe" branch E of Amt
VI, with the SS rank of major (Sturmbannführer).
In March 1944 Höttl was
assigned to Budapest, where he served as second in command to
Himmler's SS representative in Hungary, and as political advisor to
Hitler's ambassador there, Edmund Veesenmayer, who reported to
Berlin, for example, on the large-scale deportations in 1944 of Jews
from Hungary. On May 8, 1945, as German forces were unconditionally
surrendering to the Allies, American troops arrested Höttl in
Austria, and for several years after that he worked as an
intelligence agent for the United States. He died in 1999, not long
after the publication of his self-serving memoirs.
In April 2001 the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency made public thousands of pages of
long-suppressed documents from its files of major German wartime
figures, including the bulging Höttl file. Along with the release of
these documents, two U.S. government employees wrote and issued a
detailed report about Höttl based on those recently declassified CIA
files, which sheds revealing light on his wartime and postwar
career. This report, entitled "Analysis of the Name File of Wilhelm
Hoettl," was written by two "historical researchers" of the U.S.
government's "Interagency Working Group" (IWG), Miriam Kleiman and
Robert Skwirot. [See
note]
These documents establish
that Höttl was a completely unreliable informant who routinely
fabricated information to please those who were willing to pay him.
In their report, the two U.S. government researchers write:
Hoettl's name file is
approximately 600 pages, one of the largest of those released to the
public so far. The size of the file owes to Hoettl's postwar career
as a peddler of intelligence, good and bad, to anyone who would pay
him. Reports link Hoettl to twelve different intelligence services,
including the U.S., Yugoslav, Austrian, Israeli, Romanian, Vatican,
Swiss, French, West German, Russian, Hungarian and British.
Soon after his arrest by the
Americans in May 1945, Höttl began working for the U.S. Office of
Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor to the Central
Intelligence Agency, and then for the U.S. Army's Counter
Intelligence Corps (CIC). As the two U.S. government researchers put
it: "Upon his arrest, Hoettl played to the interests of his captors
..." It was during this period, while he was secretly working for
American intelligence, that Höttl provided his historic and damning
"six million" affidavit for submission by the American prosecution
at the Allied-run tribunal at Nuremberg.
Höttl benefited from his
readiness to tell those who paid him what they wanted to hear, but
this eventually proved his undoing. All the same, it took several
years for U.S. intelligence to firmly conclude that it was being
had.
In June 1949 one U.S.
intelligence official cautioned against using Höttl for any reason,
calling him "a man of such low character and poor political record
that his use for intelligence activities, regardless of how
profitable they may be, is a short-sighted policy by the U.S." In
August 1950, CIA messages referred to Höttl as a "notorious
fabricator [of] intelligence." A U.S. Army CIC report in early 1952
deemed his information useless, noting that Höttl "is involved in
extensive intelligence activities for almost anyone who is willing
to purchase his findings." In April 1952 his reports were called
"worthless and possibly inflated or fabricated."
Interestingly, numerous U.S.
intelligence reports identify connections between Höttl and Simon
Wiesenthal, the well-known "Nazi hunter." One U.S. Army CIC document
described Wiesenthal as the "Chief Austrian Agent of the Israeli
Intelligence Bureau." A U.S. Army CIC report in January 1950 noted
that for the last three or four months Wiesenthal had "recruited the
services of Wilhelm Höttl," and had hired him to gather information
for reports by the "Nazi hunter."
In July 1952, when U.S. Army
intelligence finally broke completely with Höttl, a letter on U.S.
Army stationery warned:
Dr. Höttl has long been
known to this headquarters and other allied military
organizations in Austria as a fabricator of intelligence
information. His reports normally consist of a fine cobweb of
fact, heavily padded with lies, deceit, conjecture and other
false types of information. This organization will have
absolutely nothing to do with Dr. Höttl or any members of his
present entourage. He is persona non grata to the American,
French and British elements in Austria.
In their report on his
postwar career, U.S. government historical researchers Kleiman and
Skwirot conclude:
The voluminous materials in
Wilhelm Höttl's personality file ... trace the activities of a
notorious intelligence peddler and fabricator, who successfully
convinced one intelligence service after another of his value, and
then proceeded to lose such support.
Indeed, and as already
noted, Höttl "successfully convinced" the American and British
prosecutors, and the judges, of the inter-Allied tribunal in
Nuremberg, and many others around the world ever since, that German
authorities killed six million Jews during the Second World War. And
even though U.S. intelligence services and U.S. government
researchers have, finally, as it were, discredited him, Höttl's most
historically important claim remains widely, and even officially
accepted.
The recently released
U.S. intelligence documents on Höttl, and the U.S. government report
about his postwar career, confirm what some revisionist scholars
have contended for years. In his pathbreaking book The Hoax of the
Twentieth Century, first published in 1976, Dr. Arthur Butz cited
sources that were publicly available even in the 1950s to show that,
during the war, Höttl had gotten into trouble more than once with SS
authorities. His involvement in a shady Polish land deal led in 1942
to an SS investigation of his activities. An internal SS report
characterized him as "dishonest, scheming, fawning,... a real
hoaxer," and concluded that he was not fit even for SS membership,
let alone a sensitive intelligence service position.
[See note] Höttl was, accordingly,
demoted. But his luck improved after his friend and fellow Austrian,
Ernst Kaltenbrunner, was appointed in 1943 to head the RSHA. It
seems that Kaltenbrunner protected him from a second disciplinary
action, this one for misappropriation of security service funds.
Regardless of the
unreliability of Höttl's infamous affidavit, the more important
question remains: How valid is the six million figure?
The most common
technique used by Holocaust historians to calculate figures of
between five and six million Jewish extermination victims is to
compare prewar and postwar estimated Jewish population figures for
various European countries and areas, and then assume that the
differences between the figures were all killed. This was the method
used, for example, by Jacob Lestchinsky to produce a figure of
5,957,000 Jewish Holocaust deaths, in his important 1946 World
Jewish Congress report.
[See note] It is also the technique
used by the late Lucy Dawidowicz, another prominent Jewish Holocaust
historian, who estimated a total of 5.9 million Jewish victims.
[See note]
However, this method fails
to take into account substantial numbers of Jews who emigrated or
fled to Allied or neutral countries during the war years. It also
ignores the fact that many Jews, particularly in Eastern Europe, did
not return to their original homelands at the end of the war, but
instead emigrated to Palestine, the United States, and other
countries beyond Europe.
It further assumes
that all Jewish deaths (or "losses") were due to German or Axis
policy. Thus, all Jews in areas under German or Axis control who
died during the war years are routinely and misleadingly counted as
"victims of the Holocaust," regardless of the cause of death. This
includes Jews who died of natural causes, perished in Allied
bombings of cities and concentration camps, who died as Allied
soldiers, particularly in the Soviet military, or who -- like
hundreds of thousands of German civilians -- succumbed to
exhaustion, disease, and exposure in the particularly catastrophic
final months of the war. Raul Hilberg, probably the most prominent
Holocaust historian, acknowledges that a distinction should be made
between "Jewish losses" and "Holocaust victims." He notes, for
example, that the average age of Jews in Germany at the outbreak of
the war was abnormally high anyway.
[See note]
It is unlikely that there
were ever six million Jews under German control during the war.
The wartime
representative of the World Jewish Congress in Switzerland, Gerhard
Riegner, confidentially reported to London and Washington in August
1942 that the total number of Jews in the countries occupied or
controlled by Germany was three and a half to four million.
[See note] This figure presumably
referred to Jews in the "Greater" German Reich (including Poland),
as well as in France, Holland, Belgium, Slovakia, and the occupied
Soviet territories. If one adds the approximately 1.2 million Jews
estimated to be living in Hungary and Romania, the total number of
Jews that came under direct or indirect German control during the
war years could not have been more than 5.2 million.
The unreliable character of
the legendary Six Million calculation is also shown in the
manipulation of Holocaust statistics in the cases of specific
countries. In this regard, it is much more fruitful to examine
Jewish losses in western European countries, where much more
reliable statistics and other data are available, than to attempt to
estimate Jewish losses in such eastern territories as Poland, where
reliable data is not available. (In the case of Poland, even the
country's borders changed drastically during and just after the
war.) An important feature of these manipulations is that even
though figures of alleged Jewish wartime losses in individual
countries may be inflated and deflated over the years, there is an
obvious effort to juggle figures so that the overall total is kept
as high as possible.
The Case of Denmark
Consider, for example,
the case of Denmark. In 1946 the "Anglo-American Committee of
Inquiry" announced in its widely quoted report that, out of a total
of 5.7 million European Jews who perished during the war years,
1,500 were Danish Jews.
[See note] Raul Hilberg, in his
highly regarded, three-volume 1985 study, gave a similar figure of
1,000 Danish Jews "lost" during the war years.
[See note]
In fact, fewer than
500 Jews were ever even deported from Denmark. (Most Danish Jews
fled to Sweden in 1943.) All of these deportees from Denmark were
sent to the ghetto-camp of Theresienstadt (or Terezin) where
precisely 51 Danish Jews (mostly elderly) died, all of natural
causes. [See note]
Thus, even if these 51 are counted as "Holocaust victims," Jewish
"losses" for Denmark were exaggerated approximately 30 times by the
supposedly authoritative "Anglo-American Committee," and 19 times
the true figure by Hilberg.
The Korherr Report
At the beginning of
1943 SS chief Heinrich Himmler ordered his "Inspector for
Statistics," Richard Korherr, to prepare a report on the "Final
Solution of the European Jewish Question." Relying for the most part
on information and figures supplied by the Reich Security Main
Office, Korherr wrote a sixteen-page statistical survey that he
submitted to Himmler on March 23, 1943. A few weeks later he
produced a shorter supplemental version with the same title.
[See note]
Even though, as
Hilberg has pointed out, much about these reports, including their
origin and purpose, "remains obscure," they are nevertheless the
most authoritative wartime statistical records available on the fate
of Europe's Jews. [See
note] These top level, secret
German documents contain no mention of an extermination program or
mass killings of Jews, a fact that seems hardly possible if such a
program had existed. Furthermore, as Jewish historian Gerald
Reitlinger noted, they suggest that nothing like six million Jews
could have been killed, even assuming the most sinister
interpretations of the data.
[See note] Korherr, a staunch
Catholic, declared after the war that he had not been aware that his
reports had any sinister or murderous significance.
[See note]
Jewish Restitution Claims
Another important
indication that the Six Million figure is not accurate is the large
number of Jewish "Holocaust survivors" who have received restitution
payments (Wiedergutmachung) from the German government in Bonn and,
more recently, in Berlin. Individuals who were "persecuted for
political, racial, religious or ideological reasons" by the wartime
German regime have been eligible for money from the Bonn and Berlin
government under the terms of the Federal Compensation Law (BEG) of
1953 and 1956. This includes Jews who were interned in camps or
ghettos, were obliged to wear the star badge, or who lived in
hiding. [See note]
As of January 1984,
there were 4.39 million successful individual BEG restitution
claims. The great majority of these were from Jews. Raul Hilberg has
said that "about two thirds" of the allowed claims have been from
Jews. [See note]
This is a realistic but possibly conservative estimate.
Approximately 40 percent of those receiving payments were living in
Israel, 20 percent in West Germany, and 40 percent in the United
States and other countries.
[See note]
The Atlanta Journal
and Constitution newspaper reported in 1985 that an estimated 50
percent of Jewish "survivors throughout the world are on West German
pensions." [See note]
But this estimate is very probably too high. For example, Jews in
Poland, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia were
not eligible for restitution, at least not at that time.
[See note] In the United States,
only about 66 percent of the Jewish "Holocaust survivors" in the
Atlanta (Georgia) area in 1985 had received German restitution
money. [See note]
If one conservatively
estimates that two thirds of the 4.39 million individual claims for
German restitution have come from Jews, that would mean some 2.9
million Jewish claims. And if half of the Jewish "Holocaust
survivors" around the world have not received any restitution (which
is probably a low figure), and granted that the number of claimants
may be somewhat larger than the number of claims, it would appear
that some six million European Jews "survived" the Second World War.
(Of course, some European Jews who lived through the war years died
before the German BEG restitution law was enacted in 1953.) And
given that there were no more than some eight million European Jews
under German wartime control,
[See note] the number of Jews who
died in Europe during the Second World War must be fewer than three
million. As we shall see, the actual figure of Jewish wartime dead
is substantially lower.
Finally, estimates of
"Holocaust survivors" provided in recent years by authoritative
Jewish sources cannot be reconciled with the generally accepted
"Holocaust" story or the Six Million figure.
Before going further, it is
a remarkable fact that, in recent years, the number of "Holocaust
survivors" has actually been increasing. This is because -- as
Norman Finkelstein stresses in his important book, The Holocaust
Industry -- Israel, the World Jewish Congress, and other major
Jewish organizations, all of which demand and collect billions in
the name of "Holocaust survivors," have an interest in inflating
figures both of wartime victims and of postwar survivors.
A report issued in
July 1997 -- that is, fifty-three years after the end of the war --
by a committee organized by the Israeli prime minister's office
estimated the number of "Holocaust survivors" (admittedly defined
rather broadly) at between 834,000 and 960,000. A similarly
authoritative report issued in June 2000, that is, fifty-five years
after the end of the war in Europe, estimated the number of Jewish
"Holocaust" survivors at between 832,000 and 935,000.
[See note]These figures, Robert
Faurisson has written, suggest that there were slightly more than
three million Jewish "survivors" in Europe at the end of the
1939-1945 war. [See
note]
Norman Finkelstein, a
professor of political science at Hunter College in New York, and
author of The Holocaust Industry, has commented that, on the basis
of these Israeli or Jewish figures, there would have been eight
million Jewish "Holocaust survivors" in Europe at the end of the war
in May 1945. Remarking on this, Finkelstein has said:
[See note]
There were fewer than eight
million Jews in all of Nazi-occupied Europe. In other words, if
these numbers are correct, the Holocaust didn't happen. As my mother
used to say, if everyone who claims to be a Holocaust survivor
actually is one, who did Hitler kill?
How many Jews did die
during the Second World War? A year after the end of the war, an
apparently impartial Swiss analysis entitled "How high is the number
of Jewish victims?" concluded that no more than 1.5 million European
Jews could have perished (of all causes) under German rule during
the war. It appeared in June 1946 in the respected daily Baseler
Nachrichten of neutral Switzerland.
[See note] The widely-cited figures
of between five and six million Jewish dead, the analysis noted,
were not based on official sources, but merely private and
semi-official estimates that greatly exaggerated the number of Jews
that ever came under German control.
Stephen F. Pinter, a
U.S. War Department attorney who was stationed in Germany after the
war, published a statement in 1959 in which he condemned what he
called "the old propaganda myth that millions of Jews were killed by
the National Socialists." He went on to write:
[See note]
From what I was able to
determine during six postwar years in Germany and Austria, there
were a number of Jews killed, but the figure of a million was
certainly never reached. I interviewed thousands of Jews, former
inmates of concentration camps in Germany and Austria, and
consider myself as well qualified as any man on this subject.
Some revisionist
historians have reached similar conclusions. Arthur Butz and Robert
Faurisson have written that as many as one million European Jews may
have died of all causes during the war years (not counting those
serving in military forces).
[See note] Walter Sanning, a
European-American scholar and university lecturer, concluded in his
detailed 1983 study that total Jewish losses during the Second World
War were "in the neighborhood" of 1.25 million, many of whom died as
Red Army soldiers or in Soviet camps and forced evacuations.
[See note]
A common rejoinder to
expressions of skepticism about the Six Million is rhetorically to
ask: "What difference does it make how many were killed? It would be
terrible if just one million, or even one thousand, Jews were
murdered." To many people, efforts to establish the true numbers
seem like insensitive and perhaps irrelevant quibbling. But the
skeptics are not the ones who incessantly and insistently go on
about Six Million murdered Jews. It is not the revisionists who have
made a totem of this legendary figure, or who invoke it as
quasi-sacrosanct ritual symbol. In any case, striving for historical
exactitude, even about the iconic Six Million, is precisely what
historians are supposed to do.
Notes
- World Book
Encyclopedia, 1984 edition, s.v. "Holocaust." vol. 9, pp.
263-264.
- Martin Gilbert, The
Holocaust (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1986), p. 811.
- Encyclopaedia Judaica,
1971 edition, s.v. "Holocaust."
- The Ehrenburg essays,
published in Soviet War News (London), Dec. 22, 1944, Jan. 4 and
March 15, 1945, are reprinted in facsimile in the fifth edition
of Joachim Hoffmann's detailed study, Stalins Vernichtungskrieg
1941-1945 (Munich: Herbig, 1999), pp. 390-393 (see also p. 183),
and in Hoffmann, Stalin's War of Extermination 1941-1945
(Capshaw, Alabama: TADP, 2001), pp. 189-190, 402-405.
- David Irving,
Nuremberg: The Last Battle (London: Focal Point, 1996), pp.
61-62.
- The American Hebrew
(New York), Oct. 31, 1919, p. 582. Facsimile in The Journal of
Historical Review 15, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1995), p. 31. Also cited
in Irving, Nuremberg, p. 62.
- Trial of the Major War
Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (IMT), vol.
1 (Nuremberg: 1947-1949), pp. 252-253; IMT, vol. 19, p. 434; and
IMT, vol. 22, p. 496.
- Höttl affidavit of Nov.
26, 1945: 2738-PS (USA-296) in IMT, vol. 31, pp. 85-87, and Nazi
Conspiracy and Aggression (NC&A), vol. 5 (Washington, DC:
1946-1948), pp. 380-382; 2615-PS in NC&A, vol. 5, pp. 338-339.
On the ad hoc and self-serving origins of the Höttl affidavit,
see Otto Skorzeny's letter of Dec. 14, 1956, in Gerd Honsik,
Freispruch für Hitler? (Gibraltar and Barcelona: 1994), pp.
196-197.
- R. Aschenauer, ed.,
Ich, Adolf Eichmann (Leoni [Bavaria]: Druffel, 1980), pp.
460-461, 474; Jochen von Lang, ed., Eichmann Interrogated (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), pp. 117-118. Dieter
Wisliceny, another former SS officer, made a statement similar
to Höttl's at Nuremberg on Jan. 3, 1946, but spoke of "only"
four or five million Jews killed. IMT, vol. 4, p. 371. Eichmann
later called Wisliceny's comments "theater," and said that he
never had any figures of "exterminated" Jews. See von Lang, ed.,
Eichmann, pp. 164-165, 94-95, 110-117.
- The report is posted on
the U.S. National Archives web site:
http://www.nara.gov/iwg/declass/hoettl.html
- Arthur Butz, The Hoax
of the Twentieth Century (Newport Beach, CA: IHR, 1997), p. 81.
- Jacob Lestchinsky (Leszczynski),
"Balance Sheet of Extermination," 1946 and revised in 1955.
Cited in Nora Levin, The Holocaust (New York: Crowell, 1968), p.
718; Leon Poliakov, Harvest of Hate (New York: Holocaust
Library, 1979), p. 335 (Revue d'histoire..., Oct. 1956); Raul
Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York: Holmes
& Meier, 1985), p. 1202.
- Lucy Dawidowicz, A
Holocaust Reader (New York: Behrman, 1976), p. 381; Lucy
Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945 (New York:
Bantam [pb. ed.], 1976), p. 544.
- Hilberg, Destruction,
p. 1206.
- Walter Laqueur, The
Terrible Secret (Boston: Little Brown, 1980; New York: Henry
Holt, 1998), p. 77.
- Levin, Holocaust, p.
715; Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution (London: Sphere Books
[pb., 2nd ed.], 1971), p. 546; Wolfgang Scheffler,
Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich (Berlin: Colloquium, 1960), p.
114.
- Hilberg, Destruction,
p. 1048.
- Leni Yahil, The Rescue
of Danish Jewry (Philadelphia: JPS, 1969), p. 318; Dawidowicz,
The War, p. 505.
- Documents NO-5193
through NO-5198. Complete texts in German and English in: Serge
Klarsfeld, ed., The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania (New
York: B. Klarsfeld Foundation, 1978), pp. 165-211 (appendices).
Also published in: John Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust: Selected
Documents in Eighteen Volumes (New York: Garland, 1982), vol.
12, pp. 210 ff. (The two reports are sometimes together referred
to as "the Korherr report.") See also Hilberg, Destruction, pp.
1204-1206; Gerald Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution, p.
136, 138; von Lang, ed., Eichmann, pp. 112-115.
- Raul Hilberg, "The
Statistic," in: François Furet, ed., Unanswered Questions: Nazi
Germany and the Genocide of the Jews (New York: Schocken, 1989),
p. 158.
- Reitlinger, Final
Solution, pp. 534-535.
- Gerald Reitlinger, The
SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945 (New York: Viking/Compass [pb.],
1968), pp. 221-223; Hilberg, Destruction, pp. 1205-1206. In a
letter to Der Spiegel (Nr. 31, July 25, 1977, p. 12), Korherr
specifically stated that the term "special treatment" in a
report's first draft did not refer to killing.
- Focus on "Restitution
in Germany," No. 1, May 1985, p. 3. (Information bulletin of the
German Information Center, New York City, an agency of the
German Federal government); see also: Hilberg, Destruction, pp.
1165, 1166; Mark Weber, "West Germany's Holocaust Payoff," JHR
8, no. 2 (summer 1988), pp. 243-250.
- Hilberg testimony in
Zündel case, Toronto District court, Jan. 18, 1985. Transcript
page 1229.
- Focus on "Restitution
in Germany" (German Information Center), May 1985, p. 3.
- Atlanta Journal and
Constitution, Sunday, March 31, 1985, p. 15 A.
- Hilberg, Destruction,
p. 1170; D. Margolick, "Soviet Emigre Lawyer...," New York
Times, March 10, 1983, p. B2.
- Atlanta Journal and
Constitution, March 31, 1985, pp. 15 A, 17A.
- Jacob Lestchinsky,
statistician for the American Jewish Congress, estimated that in
1939 there were 8.25 million Jews in the lands that came under
German or Axis control. "Balance Sheet of Extermination," in
Levin, Holocaust, p. 718. Lucy Dawidowicz estimated that the
"pre-Final Solution population" of the lands that came under
Axis control was 8.86 million. Dawidowicz, The War, p. 544.
- Number of Living
Holocaust Survivors, July 27, 1997, report of the "Spanic
Committee," organized by the Israeli Prime Minister's Office
(with estimates slightly revised in May 1998), and the "Ukeles"
report, June 28, 2000, commissioned by the "Conference on Jewish
Material Claims Against Germany," a semi-official Jewish agency.
Both cited in: "Special Master's Proposed Plan of Allocation and
Distribution of Settlement Proceeds," (Sept. 2000, also referred
to as the "Gribetz Plan"), Volume I, Annex C, "Demographics,"
pp. C-2, C-8, C-9. Posted on line at the "Official Information
Web Site for the Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation Against
Swiss Banks and other Swiss Entities": http://www.Swissbankclaims.com/media
- Robert Faurisson,
"Impact and Future of Holocaust Revisionism," JHR 19 (Jan.-Feb.
2000), pp. 9, 28 (n. 24).
- Interview with Norman
Finkelstein, by Viktor Frölke, in Salon.com, "Shoah business,"
August 30, 2000. Posted on-line at: http://www.salon.com/books/int/2000/08/30/finkelstein/index.html
See also: N. Finkelstein, "How the Holocaust Industry Stole the
Swiss Monies," June 2001, Postscript to Foreign Translations.
Posted on-line: http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/id112.htm
- "Wie hoch ist die Zahl
der jüdischen Opfer?," Baseler Nachrichten (Abend-Blatt), June
13, 1946, p. 2. (This newspaper, founded in 1845, is no longer
published.)
- Pinter letter in the
national Catholic weekly, Our Sunday Visitor, June 14, 1959, p.
15.
- Butz, Hoax, p. 239;
Robert Faurisson interview with Storia Illustrata (Italy),
August 1979. Authorized translations in: Serge Thion (with
Robert Faurisson), Vérité historique ou vérité politique?
(Paris: 1980), p. 197, and JHR 2 (winter 1981), p. 348.
- Walter Sanning, The
Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry (Newport Beach, CA: IHR,
1983), pp. 198, 196.
From The Journal
of Historical Review, Sept.-Dec. 2001 (Vol. 20, No. 5-6), pages
25-32. This essay is adapted from Mark Weber's address at David
Irving's "Real History" conference in Cincinnati, August 31, 2001.
|